#6041
#3
Nezavisimiye Voennoye Obozreniy
No. 1
2002
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
RUSSIA AND USA ARE FACING A CHOICE
They need to elaborate a new model of interstate relations
Russo-American negotiations, above all on the reduction of
strategic offensive weapons, registered a new outbreak of
activity in early 2002. Sergei ROGOV, Director of the Institute
of the USA and Canada, analyses the military policy of the Bush
administration and prospects of Russia-US relations.
Dangerous Vagueness
On December 13, 2001 Washington officially notified Moscow
of its intention to withdraw from the ABM treaty in six months,
thus showing that it would no longer maintain a semblance of
strategic parity. The Bush administration thus put a full stop
in the history of the Cold War. By launching a policy of
attaining absolute military superiority, Washington showed that
it would not recognise Moscow, Beijing or anyone else as an
equal in terms of strategic status.
The USA did this despite major improvement in Russia-US
relationship after the September 11 tragedy, when the USA and
Russia actually became allies in the war against the Taliban
and bin Laden. This created conditions for shifting bilateral
ties to the principles of partnership and allied relations.
However, our hopes for the strengthening of the budding
breakthrough in bilateral relations were smothered by a
dangerous vagueness in Russo-American relations. It is clear
that the US choice of the moment for announcing the decision to
withdraw from the ABM treaty was influenced by the euphoria of
its military victories in Afghanistan. The routing of the
Taliban regime and the expected imminent capture of bin Laden
made Russia's assistance in the struggle against international
terrorism less important in the eyes of the Bush
administration.
The USA will presumably make fresh attempts to carry on
its unilateral policy. In particular, it is feared that the
Bush administration may choose to escalate the war and spread
military operations to several other territories on the US list
of the rogue countries.
Of course, the unilateral US actions are seriously
complicating the international relations and are hindering the
build-up of trust in Russia-US relationship. The system of
control of strategic offensive and defensive weapons is being
destroyed at a time when a new mechanism of partner relations
between the two countries has not been created yet. But the USA
is not omnipotent and Washington will have to take into
consideration the political, economic and technological
limitations of its might.
Many experts believe that the USA will hardly be able to
deploy its NMD system in 2004. It is more probable that the
tests of ground-, air- and sea-based NMD elements will be
completed only in the second half of this decade. And the
deployment of a full-scale echeloned NMD system will take many
more years after that.
It should be also remembered that there are major
differences over ABM between Republicans and Democrats in the
USA. If Democrats assume control over the two houses of the US
congress in the autumn of 2002 and win the presidential
elections in 2004, the implementation of the NMD programme may
be put off and the scale of the NMD may prove to be more
limited that what the current administration may try to attain
if Bush is re-elected.
As for the strategic offensive weapons, the Pentagon has
announced its intention to reduce the number of nuclear
warheads to 3,800 by 2007 and 1,750-2,250 by 2012 (irrespective
of agreements with Russia).
Consequently, the threat to the Russian nuclear deterrence
potential can appear no sooner than in 2010-15. By that time we
should modernise our strategic nuclear forces without damaging
the national economy or the priorities of the military reform.
We should not strive for quantitative parity, which will only
draw away our limited funds from the gradual modernisation of
conventional forces.
The above prompts the conclusion that there is still a
"window of possibilities" for changing the nature of bilateral
relations and the model of Russia-US and Russia-NATO
interaction.
But to be able to use this window we should formalise the
achievements scored at the top political level in practical
agreements and treaties and new mechanisms of collaboration.
The Bush administration has been talking at length about "the
new strategic framework" but what is its essence? We will get
the answer to this question within the next few months.
For Fundamentally New Relations
We must ensure the legal and institutional formalisation
of the new Russia-US and Russia-West relations in the next six
months.
First, the sides should proclaim a common goal - the
creation of a new, positive model of relations based on
cooperation and common interests. They should replace the
framework of mutual assured destruction with a new framework of
mutual assured security.
Second, the new framework of Russia-US strategic relations
should be formalised and institutionalised, for example in a
bilateral treaty of mutual security, which should be signed
when conditions are ripe for it.
And third, there should be a transition period for a
radical transformation of Russia-US relationship, when new
mechanisms of strategic cooperation should be gradually created
and confrontation elements inherited from the old
Soviet-American rivalry liquidated.
It should be said that the main goal is not arms control
but a practical creation of the new strategic framework, a
transition to partner relations with the USA and NATO.
We should revise the problem of pooling efforts for the
creation of an ABM system. For despite its financial and
economic weakness Russia has major technological achievements
in this sphere. We have rather effective tactical ABM systems.
And lastly, Russia played the leading role in such multilateral
civilian projects as the creation of a multinational space
station and a sea-based launching pad. This invaluable
experience, or parts of it, could be used in the military
sphere.
It would be expedient to offer the USA consultations on this
issue.
We must seriously analyse the consequences of the
potential writing off of Russia's debts by the USA and possibly
by the Paris Club on the condition that Russia would spend the
money on the liquidation of mass destruction weapons.
At the same time, we should not hurry with burying the
arms control regime. We must continue to demand that agreements
on new reductions of strategic offensive weapons should be
formalised in an international-legal manner. However, the legal
status of the START-1 treaty, which ensures this regime, has
been endangered by a link with the ABM treaty. The USA should
understand that this regime can be maintained only if legally
formalised, which calls for signing a START-3 treaty (or an
interim agreement, as was done in the case of the SALT-1 treaty
in 1972).
Regrettably, this optimistic scenario will not be possible
unless the USA demonstrates readiness to honour Russia's
interests in practice.
The development of a truly mutually beneficial partnership
of Russia and the USA will be a difficult task because the
possibilities of the two states are vastly different now. The
situation may change only when Russia overcomes its systems
crisis and restores its economic, political and military might,
thus turning into a centre of power on the world scene. This
will create a potential base for more equitable partner
relations between the USA and Russia.
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