#6041
#11
Obshchaya Gazeta
No. 4
2002
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
RUSSIA AND THE WEST AFTER SEPTEMBER 11
By Grigory YAVLINSKY, leader of the Yabloko party
Our party immediately and completely supported President
Vladimir Putin's position expressed in his September 11
televised address - solidarity with the United States in the
struggle against international terrorism, rapprochement with
the West and establishment of partner relations, or better an
alliance, with it.
First, this was the only possible moral reaction to the
tragedy of New York and Washington, and it was to our country's
credit that the president showed it immediately - unlike a
large part of our political elite which, not hiding their
Schadenfreude, began to make hypocritical statements that they
"feel sorry for Americans, but not for America." Second, the
decision to support a global antiterrorist coalition was
exceptionally pragmatic from the viewpoint of Russia's national
security interests. A year before the September events the
leadership of Russia's Security Council discussed in public a
possibility of bombing terrorists' camps and Taliban positions
in Afghanistan. Given the present state of Russia's unreformed
Army, such a move would have caused developments very dangerous
to us. Yet, the threat to Russia's security persisted, and the
Defence Ministry planned to deploy a 50,000-strong force in the
south.
The military and other support provided by Russia to the
U.S.A. and its allies played a key role in routing the al-Qaeda
structure and the Taliban regime which supported it. The major
task of Russia's security was thus fulfilled, too. The
diplomatic resources created by the Russian president's
initiative helped use the U.S. military and economic potential
in our interest.
Apart from the pragmatic aspect, the choice made by the
Russian leader last September can be of a strategic nature and
of high value. It was a choice in favour of a long-term
alliance with Western, European civilisation, an organic part
of which Russia is. It is beyond all question to us that the
great Russian culture is a component part of European culture
and European civilisation, which, in turn, cannot be conceived
of without it.
We will support and uphold this long-term strategic policy
because we are convinced that Russia, which has the longest
borders with the world's most unstable regions, will be able to
solve its security problems only in alliance with the West,
just as Western countries need an alliance with the leading
Eurasian state.
But we support this choice also because this policy, if it
is consistent and long-term, will inevitably have a positive
influence on the situation in Russia. In a historical
perspective, such a policy will be incompatible with the system
of oligarchic capitalism, which dooms an overwhelming majority
of the population to poverty, with the building of controlled
democracy, and with limitations on the freedom of speech and
human rights.
At the same time, there arise serious questions which
require clear answers already today.
How sincere is the readiness of the West, above all, its
indisputable leader the U.S.A., for a strategic alliance with
Russia, an alliance that would serve mutual interests of its
participants?
Does the global struggle against terrorism pose a threat
to democratic institutions in countries waging this struggle?
Are their governments ready to limit the freedoms and rights of
their citizens for the sake of success in this struggle?
Finally, no alliances will make us shut our eyes to our
national catastrophe - the war in Chechnya, the more so to
discount it and regard it only as part of the "struggle against
international terrorism."
As regards Europe, major European leaders (Blair,
Schroeder, Chirac) and the public opinion in European countries
are interested in a strategic alliance with Russia.
The situation in Russian-U.S. relations is more difficult.
Russia's support of U.S. struggle against terrorism was highly
valued by U.S. society, and President George Bush expressed his
gratitude to his Russian counterpart during his visit to the
U.S.A.
At the same time, one cannot ignore the fact that inside
the U.S. Republican Administration there is a very influential
group of people holding very ideologised, dogmatic foreign
policy views. It would be wrong to describe this group as
anti-Russian.
Its philosophy is not of a purely anti-Russian nature, it is of
a global nature, so to say. It poses a problem even for
U.S.-European relations. The essence of this philosophy is the
United States' striving to free itself from any limitations
imposed by international agreements, including agreements with
allies, in the field of arms control and other security areas.
This is no longer criticism of the obsolete 1972 ABM Treaty,
but rejection in principle of any possible treaties in the
field of international security. It is really difficult to
build anything reliable on such a basis for a long period.
In this connection, of much significance is the destiny of
the present Russian-U.S. negotiations on reductions in
strategic armaments. To me, they seem to be a mirror image of
the ABM talks. Russia's position at those negotiations
throughout the years was inflexible, dogmatic and ill-grounded.
Missing every now and then the chance to achieve compromises
and solutions advantageous to Russia, our representatives
repeated in chorus their incantation: "The 1972 ABM Treaty is
the cornerstone of strategic stability." As inflexible,
dogmatic and ill-grounded is the position of U.S. officials who
are now repeating a new, American incantation: "We are friends,
do friends need any treaties?"
Russian diplomats now have an intellectually strong
position on this issue, and they have all grounds to convince
the U.S.
leadership and a majority of the U.S. Establishment that this
position is fair and sensible, even from the viewpoint of U.S.
national security interests.
Now about the threat to democratic institutions.
Unfortunately, our society has a weaker immunity, than the
West, to authoritarian administrative diseases.
A series of recent developments - spy trials, the ousting
of independent mass media, and profanation of justice - were
sort of orgy of conservative power structures who either want a
revenge for their defeat in the formulation of Russia's foreign
policy, or are hurrying to take their chance under the cover of
the struggle against terrorism.
We will most resolutely combat these alarming tendencies.
Russia cannot become a stable, prosperous country without the
development of a rule-of-law state and the emergence of a
developed civic society.
It cannot become such a country also without a political
solution to the Chechen problem. Indeed, the factor of
international terrorism is present in the Chechen conflict. But
it would be deliberate and irresponsible self-deception to
consider this conflict only in the context of the present
struggle against international terrorism. It has been going on
for several hundred years.
Today, after the bombings and mop-ups, we again propose
negotiations, because there is no other solution. We are
confident that, sooner or later, a special conference at summit
level, involving all interested parties, will be convened in
Moscow to find a solution to the Chechen problem.
The new foreign-policy choice by the Russian president has
a chance to succeed only if it meets with serious support by
the emerging civic society. It is not compliments and applause
that is needed but daily struggle for the establishment in our
life of values that this choice presupposes: a socially
oriented market economy, political freedoms, human rights and
respect for the personality's dignity, especially as the forces
that categorically reject these values have influence and might
in all echelons of power.
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