Johnson's Russia List
#6035
23 January 2002
davidjohnson@erols.com
A CDI Project
www.cdi.org

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Reuters: Russian closure of independent TV sparks wide concern.
2. Christian Science Monitor: Fred Weir, Did business or politics silence 
Russian TV station?
3. RFE/RL: Francesca Mereu, Vox Populi -- Muscovites Speak Out On Demise
Of TV-6.
4. Moscow Times: Yulia Latynina, An Orthodox Bank and TV Channels?
5. BBC Monitoring: Sarcastic TV6 head thanks Putin for "support" for 
journalists. (Kiselev)
6. Laura Belin: query related to TV-6.
7. Reuters: Russia's Pasko ready to accept presidential pardon.
8. Jamestown Foundation Chechnya Weekly: BORIS KAGARLITSKY EXAMINES REASONS 
FOR CURRENT IMPASSE IN CHECHNYA.
9. Ekspert: Dan Medovnikov, Russia's Tender Feelings for American Finance. 
Russia may attract more investments if it is good to U.S. venture 
capitalists.
10. Asia Times: Sergei Blagov, Putin undertakes apparent crackdown on
corruption.
11. UPI: Sam Vaknin, Analysis: Russian Roulette -- The Military.
12. eurasianet.org: Ariel Cohen, THE LACK OF RUSSIAN MILITARY REFORM HELPED 
USHER US FORCES INTO CENTRAL ASIA.
13. gazeta.ru: HIV-Infected Fugitives Recaptured.]  

*******

#1
Russian closure of independent TV sparks wide concern
By Peter Graff
  
MOSCOW, Jan 22 (Reuters) - Russia abruptly pulled the plug on its only
nationwide independent television station on Tuesday, giving the Kremlin a
monopoly of the airwaves for the first time since the Soviet era and
sparking international concern. 

Moscow has said the fate of TV6 is purely a business matter following a
court ruling upholding a shareholder's complaint that the station was
bankrupt. 

But it has raised widespread concern over President Vladimir Putin's
tolerance of dissent and the independence of the courts. 

Boris Berezovsky, TV6's owner, told Reuters the shutdown was the latest
move by the Kremlin to secure control over the media. He accused Putin of
"destroying" Russia's legal system. 

The United States also questioned the legality of the closure and said
political authorities could have stopped it if they had wanted. 

At midnight on Monday, a TV6 talk show host was interrupted mid-sentence
and replaced with test pattern stripes and the message: "We have been
pulled off the air." Power was shut off at the studio and telephones and
internet links were cut. 

"The authorities today showed that their single goal is to gag us," TV6
General Director Yevgeny Kiselyov told Ekho Moskvy radio which later
broadcast some TV6 news bulletins. 

Boris Nemtsov, head of the free-market Union of Right-wing Forces party,
told Ekho Moskvy: "This was a huge political mistake on the president's
part, and I hope that sooner or later somebody will explain that to him, or
he will realise it himself." 

In Washington, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said on Tuesday
the legal action and closure of TV6 was "extremely difficult to understand
in any business or any financial context." 

"For some time there's been a very strong appearance of political pressure
in the judicial process against Russia's independent media, including in
this case," he told a news conference. 

Asked if President Putin could have saved TV6 from closure, he replied: "I
would say that given the appearance of political pressure on the judicial
process that political authorities could have withdrawn that pressure, yes." 

Boucher said "very unusual and rapid developments" had taken place in the
case against TV6 at high judicial levels where he said things normally took
several months. 

In Berlin, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer also expressed concern.
"It would be a considerable setback for the diversity of opinion and
diversity of media in Russia if this development led to the breakup of the
network without a substitute," he said. 

Public reaction in Russia has been restrained compared to last year when
independent broadcaster NTV was taken over by the Kremlin-controlled
natural gas monopoly in a boardroom coup that led to street protests and
on-air strikes by reporters. Most TV6 staff were recruited from NTV. 

The Kremlin says it had nothing to do with action against NTV and TV6,
though Putin has never concealed his contempt for Berezovsky and former NTV
owner Vladimir Gusinsky, or his belief they had abused the power of their
media holdings. 

FINANCIER SAYS KREMLIN TIGHTENING CONTROL 

Berezovsky, a former Kremlin insider turned Putin opponent and now living
in exile in western Europe, said TV6's shutdown was part of Kremlin plans
to tighten central control in Russia. 

"I think the next logical step will be making the media further subservient
to the authorities and the forging of a single public opinion so that
everyone thinks the way the president thinks," he said by telephone. 

"I believe the president has ruined the legal system. As for TV6, the
arbitration court adopted clearly illegal positions. It was a farce, a
comedy." 

By pulling the plug, authorities silenced a team that, first at NTV and
then at TV6, dared criticise military tactics in Chechnya and expose
alleged corruption scandals in the Kremlin. 

In both companies, huge oil and gas firms with ties to the state acquired
minority stakes and went to court to wrest management control from the
businessmen. 

Media Minister Mikhail Lesin, who ordered TV6 switched off, told reporters
it was "in Berezovsky's interest to exploit the situation: he always has to
prove he is a dissident." 

A tender for the channel would be held on March 27, he said, and TV6 could
resume "if the journalists are able to organise themselves and solve
their...problems." 

In TV6's case, a pension fund for Russia's biggest oil company LUKOIL held
a 15 percent stake and won a court case to close the station, saying it was
bankrupt. 

But TV6 said popular programmes, like Russia's first Big Brother-like
reality show, had improved its finances. 

******

#2
Christian Science Monitor
January 23, 2002
Did business or politics silence Russian TV station?
Russia pulled the plug last night on TV-6, a nationwide independent news
station.
By Fred Weir
Special to The Christian Science Monitor 

MOSCOW - Russia's last independent TV network went silent yesterday after a
legal checkmate, widely seen as orchestrated by Kremlin forces, abruptly
ended its year-long struggle for survival. 

Analysts say there's little doubt that politics was the main factor in the
midnight closure of TV-6, a feisty news-driven network, which was replaced
on Moscow television screens by an all-sports channel. On the surface, the
network fell victim to a successful legal campaign launched last year to
liquidate it by a minority shareholder, the state-linked Lukoil petroleum
giant.

But experts say because TV-6 was 75 percent owned by renegade tycoon and
Kremlin opponent Boris Berezovsky, it sealed its own doom. The network's
news team, led by prominent journalist Yevgeny Kiselyov, had been unsparing
in its coverage of the war in Chechnya, official corruption, and
inner-Kremlin intrigues. "It is obvious that wherever Kiselyov goes to
work, the days of that company will be numbered," says Georgy Kuznetsov, a
professor of journalism at Moscow State University. "He incurred the wrath
of the Kremlin, and you can't get away with that."

Mr. Kiselyov and many of his TV-6 colleagues were journalistic refugees
from last year's messy takeover of the independent NTV television network
by Gazprom, the state-controlled natural gas corporation. After Kiselyov
was hired at TV-6 by Mr. Berezovsky, the network's ratings more than
doubled and, experts say, its finances improved markedly. But Lukoil, using
a Byzantine bankruptcy clause that has since been repealed by the state
Duma, or the lower house of parliament, soon launched its suit to destroy
the network.

"To liquidate a profitable company is like killing the goose that lays
golden eggs," says Alexei Simonov, chairman of the Foundation in Defense of
Glasnost, an independent media watchdog.

"There is no mistaking this situation: Lukoil was obeying political orders,
not acting in its own business interests."

Last week a court ordered TV-6 disbanded and its license put up for auction
in March. Press Minister Mikhail Lesin - notorious for his frequent
heavyhanded interference in the workings of Russia's media market -
suggested Kiselyov and his team might be permitted to remain at their jobs
until March, then bid for ownership of the company if they cut Berezovsky
out of the picture and immediately ended their struggle to remain in
control of TV-6. Kiselyov at first accepted the deal, then baulked.
Bailiffs moved in Monday night and pulled the network's plug. "It looks
like some kind of television coup," Kiselyov told the independent Ekho
Moskvy radio station. "The authorities have demonstrated that their single
goal is to gag us."

Few Russians have sympathy for Berezovsky, a former Kremlin insider who
pioneered the lawless slash-and-burn capitalism that nearly ruined Russia
in the 1990s and who routinely exploited his media assets for
self-promotion and political manipulation.

While the Kremlin says it wasn't involved in the NTV or TV-6 actions,
Berezovsky did have a falling out with President Vladimir Putin - whom he
had helped to bring to power - two years ago. "Berezovsky became rich due
to undercover intrigues and state support, and now that same system is
destroying him," says Andrei Milyokhin, director of Monitoring.ru, a Moscow
media consultancy. "Unfortunately, these methods will not lead to creation
of an open, free and competitive media market in Russia."

The closure of TV-6 leaves most Russians without an easily accessible
source of independent information. The country's two largest television
networks are controlled outright by the state, while the third, NTV, has
significantly toned down its news coverage since its takeover by Gazprom
last year. "The main victims in this situation are television audiences,
whose rights have been violated and trampled upon," the head of Russia's
Union of Journalists, Igor Yakovenko, told Ekho Moskvy. According to Eduard
Sagalayev, head of the Naitonal Association of TV Stations, 160 small
regional television outlets that purchased programming from TV-6 will
suffer serious business reverses due to the cutoff.

Even staunch supporters of TV-6 admit its closure does not spell the end of
free expression in Russia, just its marginalization.

"The takeover of NTV, and now TV-6, are milestones in the Kremlin's
campaign to place the biggest media outlets under state control," says
Sergei Ivanenko, a liberal member of the Duma's information policy
commission. "Freedom of speech continues to exist in Russia, just never in
prime time."

*******

#3
Russia: Vox Populi -- Muscovites Speak Out On Demise Of TV-6 
By Francesca Mereu

Moscow, 22 January 2002 (RFE/RL) -- The demise of TV-6 -- Russia's last 
remaining private nationwide television station -- was on the minds of many 
Muscovites today. The station was taken off the air at midnight last night 
after losing a court battle with minority shareholder LUKoil, which sued TV-6 
for unprofitability. The case is strikingly similar to that of NTV, which was 
taken over by Gazprom in April, and leaves Russians with no alternatives to 
state television.

A Moscow radio station popular with young people this morning asked listeners 
to call in and share their opinions of the TV-6 drama. One, a young man named 
Volodya, said that only in Russia can there be a situation where you turn on 
the television only to find your regular station has been replaced with 
something completely different. 

For Anatolii Chuchleb, a 40-year-old lawyer, the battle for TV-6 is an 
attempt by the government to silence oligarch Boris Berezovsky, the TV-6 
owner who has been living in self-imposed exile abroad since falling afoul of 
the Kremlin. Although he says the blackout is not about press freedom, 
Chuchleb says there is no question that TV-6 was the only unbiased channel on 
Russian television. 

"[In my opinion, TV-6] represented 'glasnost' in television. [State-owned] TV 
channels, like ORT or RTR, are biased. They cannot speak the way TV-6 
[journalists] used to speak," Chuchleb says. "For [Russians], it's a big 
loss. But I believe that [TV-6 director] Yevgenii Kiselyov and his team will 
not give up the fight."

Lyubov Brevdo, a 65-year-old pensioner, likens the TV-6 shutdown to Soviet 
times, when free media did not exist in the country. Brevdo says that while 
she didn't like TV-6 herself, she believes that people should have the right 
to hear different opinions if they so choose. 

"It's a pity [that the channel is off the air]. [TV-6] journalists are very 
talented," Brevdo says. "I can't say that I liked everything they showed on 
television, especially recently. But there are different opinions. I can 
switch the TV off if there's something I don't like. Nobody's forcing you, 
are they?"

According to a poll conducted by the Russian Center for Public Opinion, 39 
percent of Russians surveyed said they considered the TV-6 shutdown a 
political issue. Fourteen percent said they thought it was purely an economic 
issue.

*******

#4
Moscow Times
January 23, 2002
An Orthodox Bank and TV Channels?
By Yulia Latynina   

At the end of 2000, two of the five national channels were state-run. A year 
later and there are no private national stations left. TV6 has suffered the 
same fate as NTV, but with one major difference. NTV was devoured by the 
victors, who were united in the division of the property of those who had 
backed the wrong horse in the presidential elections.

Now, there is no unity within the Kremlin. The old guard from the Yeltsin era 
and the new St. Petersburgers have locked horns,, and if one team wants to 
get rid of TV6 then the other will support the channel. 
 
The president has virtually removed himself from deciding the fate of the 
channel. The word is that the leader of the hunt for TV6's frequency license 
is Mezhprombank owner and presidential confidant Sergei Pugachyov -- an 
obscure and somewhat sinister figure.

Pugachyov is not some Putin protege plucked from obscurity like Alexei Miller 
or Sergei Ivanov. He was very close to Pavel Borodin, and the money for 
Mabetex flowed through his bank. Also, it was Mezhprombank that issued 
Yeltsin's daughters with the infamous credit cards. 

Pugachyov also is the most influential bearer of Orthodox ideas in the 
president's entourage. He introduced the president to Father Tikhonov. And he 
lobbies for the creation of an "Orthodox bank," evidently tasked with 
counterbalancing "Jewish capital."

When a banker who was living on the Cote d'Azur and was implicated in the 
most dubious of the Yeltsin-era scandals not only becomes a devout believer, 
but also manages to cement the main link between the head of state and the 
church, it is hard to refrain from making the kind of accusations that are 
often leveled against the founders of modern-day sects, i.e. that their true 
faith and possibly a not entirely stable psychology paradoxically combine 
with a very earthy knack to convert their faith into boundless influence and 
large amounts of money -- often to the detriment of the spiritual health of 
the nation and its rulers. 

There is no doubt that people of Pugachyov's kind encourage the worst 
instincts in the president. They instill in the authorities the idea that 
television is a means for mass brainwashing -- no less effective than the 
church was in the Middle Ages. And this can apparently be corroborated by 
reference to the personal experience of the president: Putin would never have 
become president if it were not for television.

The problem is that television is a wonderful means for getting Putin elected 
to a second, third and 110th term, but it's no use at all in the face of 
revolutions, strikes and economic collapse. 

The main victim of total zombification by a wholly state-controlled media is 
not the public. The public knows full well whether it is getting paid and 
whether it can buy food with its wages. The main victims are the authorities 
themselves who are losing their grip on reality and what is really going on 
in the country.

The Moskovia channel, which belongs to Pugachyov, has already demonstrated 
what kind of editorial policy the Orthodox banker would like to pursue. The 
campaign launched by the station against Alexander Voloshin in no way differs 
-- apart from in scale -- from the campaign against Anatoly Chubais unleashed 
following the auction of Svyazinvest in 1997. In both cases, the television 
stations with exceptional impudence and lack of ceremony put pressure not so 
much on the public as on the authorities.

So if Pugachyov wants to advise the president on how he should act, he and 
Father Tikhonov are quite enough. There is no need for television channels as 
well.

Yulia Latynina is a journalist with ORT.
 
*******

#5
BBC Monitoring
Russia: Sarcastic TV6 head thanks Putin for "support" for journalists 
Source: Ekho Moskvy radio, Moscow, in Russian 0318 gmt 22 Jan 02

[Presenter Aleksandr Andreyev] It is 0618 [0318 gmt] in Moscow. We continue 
to discuss the situation with [opposition television channel] TV6.

[Omitted: known facts]

This is what TV6 general director Yevgeniy Kiselev told our radio station in 
the way of comment on the situation. He also told us about ongoing 
developments.

[Kiselev] TV6 broadcasting has been cut off. But it was too little for them. 
Power was cut off to the studios and the technical equipment rooms. The 
Internet does not work, I mean the internal [computer] network [providing an 
access to the Internet]. We do not receive the news agencies' output. 
Moreover, our signal is not transmitted via satellite. Therefore, more than 
100 of our regional partners, independent television companies each having 
its own broadcasting licence, are not receiving our programmes. The licence 
withdrawn on the media minister's order was issued for broadcasting in Moscow 
and 20 other cities in which branches of the MNVK [Moscow Independent 
Broadcasting Corporation] company were working. It had nothing to do with the 
regions in relation to which we were only a supplier of programmes. 
Independent television companies received them by their own choice and 
re-broadcast on the basis of their own licences. Now they have lost the 
signal as well.

According to the information I have by now, our transmitting company 
Set-Service which is absolutely independent from us and transmits our signal 
to the international satellite LMI is receiving phone calls from some people 
who probably are officers of some security agencies. They say that OMON 
[special-purpose police] will come if they do not stop transmitting our 
signal to the satellite. I do not know whether it is true but the signal is 
not sent to the satellite.

This is an actual picture. It reminds me of a television coup. I do not rule 
out that [TV6 staff] entrance permits [to the Ostankino television centre] 
will be cancelled tomorrow morning. I will not be surprised if TV6 
journalists will be simply barred from entering Ostankino tomorrow.

This is how the state supports us. I have a report in front of me, I found it 
on purpose.The official news agency RIA reported from Paris on 15 January 
that President Vladimir Putin said during his visit to France that the state 
would do everything possible to support the TV6 journalist team. Well, we see 
this support today in all its glory. I think the authority has demonstrated 
that they have only one goal: to shut us up.

Now we must understand the situation in detail. I am getting information by 
telephone and in scraps. Maybe, not all of it is true. So far I have the 
impression that they went further than the mere suspension of the licence. I 
saw the documents received from the bailiffs today. There is no mention of an 
Internet or electricity cutoff, or the disconnection of telephones in 
Ostankino, or the stoppage of the signal transmission via the LMI satellite.

*******

#6
Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2002 
From: Laura Belin <belinlaura@yahoo.com>
Subject: query related to TV-6

I heard on the BBC Russian Service today (January 22)
that although NTV Plus sports channel started
broadcasting temporarily on the frequency used by TV-6
in Moscow, the same was not true in many cities across
the Russian Federation where local stations had signed
contracts to rebroadcast TV-6 programming. 

It is not clear whether TV-6 will be able to resume
broadcasts on those stations soon. As far as I
understand, losing the license to use Channel 6 should
not affect whether TV-6 staff can produce programs for
local stations whose broadcast licenses are not in
dispute.

I would like to hear from JRL readers in Russia about
what programs (if any) they can watch on the channels
that used to carry TV-6 shows. For instance, a BBC
correspondent said that in St. Petersburg, the channel
that had previously rebroadcast TV-6 started showing
Swan Lake today after TV-6 was switched off. (As many
JRL readers will know, reruns of Swan Lake appeared on
Soviet television during the August 1991 coup.) Is
that true? Has NTV Plus offered its programming to
other stations that were rebroadcasting TV-6?

People can contact me directly at belinlaura@yahoo.com
if they would prefer not to post their comments to
JRL.

*******

#7
Russia's Pasko ready to accept presidential pardon
  
VLADIVOSTOK, Russia, Jan 22 (Reuters) - Military journalist Grigoriy Pasko,
jailed for disclosing the location of Russian navy dumping grounds to
Japanese media, said on Tuesday he was ready to agree to a presidential
pardon. 

But Pasko, sentenced to four years in jail for high treason, will not
petition for a pardon himself, his lawyer Anatoly Pyshkin said. 

"Grigoriy has not appealed for pardon and will not do so," Pyshkin said.
"But if, for example, a public organisation appealed, and the president
issued a decree to pardon him, taking the decision to free him, that would
be humane." 

Pasko's conviction on December 25 triggered protests in Russia and provoked
diplomatic rumblings last week after Moscow sharply criticised two U.S.
diplomats who attended a pro-Pasko rally in the far east port of
Vladivostok as observers. 

Pasko, a former navy captain, was arrested in 1997 by counter-intelligence
agents on his return from Japan, where he had given journalists evidence
that the Russian navy had dumped toxic waste in the Sea of Japan. 

According to Russian law, either the defendant himself or public
associations, including charities or labour organisations, can appeal for a
pardon. But no petition to free Pasko has yet been brought forward. 

Speaking in Paris during a lightning visit last week, President Vladimir
Putin said he would consider Pasko's case and possibly use his right of
pardon. 

But Pasko has so far refused to petition for a pardon, arguing it would be
tantamount to admitting guilt. 

The prosecutor general's office has appealed for a tougher sentence. The
defence wants the verdict squashed. 

*******

#8
Jamestown Foundation 
Chechnya Weekly
22 January 2002 - Volume III, Issue 3

BORIS KAGARLITSKY EXAMINES REASONS FOR CURRENT IMPASSE IN
CHECHNYA.
The no. 2 (January 14) issue of the pro-democracy weekly Novaya
Gazeta contains an incisive analysis of the reasons for the
present impasse in Chechnya by the well-known political
commentator Boris Kagarlitsky.

Kagarlitsky begins by examining trends revealed in Russian
public opinion surveys since the conflict began in the fall of
1999. By the autumn of the year 2000, he notes, "the number of
the supporters of negotiations for the first time surpassed the
number of adherents of the war. Over the course of 2001, the
popularity of a peaceful regulation [of the conflict] steadily
grew, while the popularity of the war fell. Only after the
events of September 11, 2001 did the number of supporters of the
war sharply increase. But even at that moment it was less than
the number of the war's opponents. In the ensuing months,
antiwar sentiments have once again begun to grow."

A significant portion of Russian society, Kagarlitsky
regretfully admits, is indeed hostile to the peoples of the
Caucasus. "But even among [Russian] nationalists," he
underlines, "there is a growing awareness that the war is
senseless. It is one thing to feel hostility toward 'aliens' and
another thing altogether to call for their extermination or,
even more, to justify the death of one's own soldiers."

One key problem, Kagarlitsky observes, is that present-day
Russian elites--both political and business elites--"never think
strategically." "In the fall of 1999," he recalls, "the war was
profitable because it helped resolve the problem of the transfer
of power [from Yeltsin to Putin]. By the spring of 2000,
however, the continuation of military actions no longer made any
sense. But, as if out of spite, the battles did not cease."

The Russian generals, Kagarlitsky recalls, promised to liquidate
the last centers of resistance in Chechnya by March of 2000. On
what reasoning were such promises based? "First, in Moscow, they
deemed that the defeat in the first Chechen war [of 1994-1996]
was caused by an inadequate concentration of forces and
equipment, and they therefore decided this time to introduce a
much stronger force. The question of how competently these
forces would be directed by their commanders was, naturally, not
posed. The generals sincerely believed their own myth that they
had lost the previous war due to the journalists." During the
second war, journalists were placed under firm control, and the
army's rear was thus protected.

A second reason for the over-confidence of the Russian
leadership, Kagarlitsky continues, was the collapse of the
Chechen state which occurred during the period of "almost
independence" from 1996-1999. There also emerged a sharp
conflict between "the Wahhabis and the adherents of a secular
state" which brought Chechnya to the brink of civil war. Given
this situation, Kagarlitsky remarks, Russia's second Chechen
campaign "could indeed have been crowned with success. But in
Moscow no one even conceived of how to work out a
military-political strategy for reintegrating Chechnya into
Russia."

More than two years of war, Kagarlitsky writes, have
demonstrated that the Russian army "is not in a condition to
cope with a partisan war." In addition, each mopping-up
operation and bombing raid conducted by the Russian side
objectively serves to swell the ranks of the Chechen resistance.
In the current war, however, the Chechen separatists have
themselves also proved "incapable of organizing broad-scale,
coordinated operations. The weakness of President Maskhadov is
not technical but political. He is able very well to maintain
ties with the field commanders. It is another question, however,
whether they will obey his commands."

Because of the above-cited factors, the second war, Kagarlitsky
notes, is acquiring "a drawn-out and stagnant character." "The
Russian forces cannot suppress the partisan movement, but the
Chechen rebels also do not have the possibility of delivering a
decisive blow." Such dead-end situations, Kagarlitsky points
out, are normally resolved at the negotiation table. "But the
Russian leadership fears negotiations even more than a military
defeat."

Why? Because unlike Yeltsin, who was indifferent to his ratings,
Putin is obsessed with his support in public opinion polls. The
only way that Putin could end the war would be if he were able
to scapegoat the Russian military and MVD for their conduct of
the conflict. "The generals sense this and are nervous." It is a
mistake, Kagarlitsky contends, to see all Russian generals as
"hawks" who want to fight on in Chechnya "forever." But the
generals do not want to be scapegoated for a perceived military
defeat in Chechnya. A withdrawal from Chechnya would suit them
only if it were depicted as "a political betrayal" and not as a
defeat. "It is profitable," Kagarlitsky concludes, "for Putin to
scapegoat the military and for the military to put the blame on
Putin."

What then can be accomplished during this current year of 2002?
Clearly, Kagarlitsky believes, the separatist president, Aslan
Maskhadov, must be part of any solution. "When in Moscow they
declare that Maskhadov does not control anything on the
battlefield, they are most likely correct. But, even while
controlling nothing, he remains the sole legitimate leader of
the republic.... In the event of the beginning of negotiations,
Maskhadov's legitimacy would be transformed into real political
clout, something which all the field commanders would be forced
to take into account." It is Shamil Basaev and Khattab,
Kagarlitsky points out, who are interested in "endless war,"
since they lack any real public support in Chechnya. "The
Dagestan advance [in the fall of 1999] made them unpopular. The
ideology of Wahhabism has also driven people away from them."

Even if Basaev and Khattab were to disappear from the scene,
however, Kagarlitsky believes, the war would not end, since
"their place would immediately be taken by new field
commanders." The disappearance of Basaev and Khattab, on the
other hand, would serve "radically to reduce the sharpness of
the intra-Chechen conflict." Because one cannot count on their
disappearance, however, it seems likely that a withdrawal of
Russian forces from Chechnya "would end in a [Chechen] civil
war."

Given this complex situation, Kagarlitsky argues, what is
pressingly needed is "the creation of conditions for the healthy
development of [Chechen] society." A withdrawal of Russian
forces from Chechnya could occur only after this process had
been completed. As for now, the first task is to bring about an
end to the fighting. When this has been accomplished, it is then
necessary "to conduct honest elections (with the participation
of the forced migrants)." The result of these elections would be
"a democratic representative organ whose legitimacy would be
unquestionable." In the best case, most Maskhadov and Akhmad
Kadyrov would become the leaders of important factions in this
legitimate political entity.

"Today," Kagarlitsky concludes his analysis, "it is obvious that
Russia cannot impose its will on Chechnya in one-sided fashion,
while for hundreds of thousands of Chechens living in Russian
cities the independence of Ichkeria would not constitute a
resolution of the problem. In other words, the preservation in
some form of political ties between Russia and Chechnya is in
the interest of both the Russian and the Chechen peoples."
Diplomats will be able to find formulas to resolve this problem.
What is essential is "to facilitate the economic and social
rebirth of the republic."

To sum up, Boris Kagarlitsky has provided a thoughtful and
incisive analysis of the current intractable impasse
characterizing Russo-Chechen relations. While one can disagree
with individuals points in his suggested program--he should, for
example, in our opinion, have provided for international
observers of the elections he advocates--his article does offer
useful pointers toward a peaceful resolution of the current
bloody conflict.

*******

#9
Ekspert
January 22, 2002
Russia's Tender Feelings for American Finance 
Russia may attract more investments if it is good to U.S. venture capitalists
By Dan Medovnikov
therussianissues.com

A representative of an American venture fund told our correspondent last 
summer that the Russians would be acting like idiots if they failed to use 
the current situation to their own advantage. "Your market is a mess. The new 
economy has not lived up to expectations, billions of our dollars are burning 
up and the stockholders are angry and disappointed. On the other hand, we 
catastrophically lack promising ventures for our investments," he said.

True, according to preliminary estimates, venture investments in the U.S. 
high-tech projects were worth 30 billion dollars in 2001, down three times 
the 2000 figures. Venture investors have lost faith in the U.S. model of 
scientific and technological progress. They no longer believe that it will be 
as effective as it used to be in the past. In the meantime, enormous 
financial resources have been accumulated. Furthermore, under U.S. laws, 
venture funds that fail to allocate their resources are subject to huge fines 
at year's end. It is only natural that the circumstances have forced American 
venture capitalists to search for new undeveloped areas, including Israel, 
China and India. 

However, Israel is at war. China's local laws oblige foreign businessmen to 
invest venture super-profits in the local economy. India is still 
mono-cultural in technological terms and venture capitalists are not 
interested in investing billions only in software projects. Therefore, they 
are turning their eyes to Russia, especially because it has managed to 
preserve a relatively high scientific and technological potential. 
Furthermore, Russian laws on investment profits are much more liberal than in 
China. 
s.  
Western transnational corporations, including those from the United States, 
have beaten a path to Russia's hi-tech door over the last ten years. A 
representative of Dow-Chemical tried to convince us that the Novosibirsk 
Institute of Catalysis had accumulated the world's largest stock of chemical 
know-how and that the company was willing to obtain its licenses. Another U.S 
industrial giant, General Electric, has been successfully cooperating with a 
cluster of Russian power engineering companies that are fulfilling its order 
for the production of a mono-crystal turbine shovel. The Boeing concern and 
the Tupolev design bureau worked on a project to design a supersonic 
commercial plane for many years, the Texaco company decided to finance the 
efforts of the Moscow innovation firm Soliton-NTT to develop an 
electromagnetic canon for probing underwater oil wells, and the Intel firm 
has set up a joint venture in Nizhny Novgorod to make advance software. 
Hundreds of other examples could be given to demonstrate U.S. interest in 
Russian hi-tech ventures. 

However, venture funds are a different business. Unlike corporations, they 
are guided by tough logic and include innovation projects in their production 
schemes. A branch of industry or a technological cluster to which a project 
belongs is not everything for a venture capitalist. He is much more concerned 
with the ability to resell the project quickly and at a higher price either 
at an exchange after all IPOs are placed or to a profile corporation if a 
project has been successfully launched. Things look pretty bad in Russia in 
this respect. Despite numerous attempts, Russia has failed to create its own 
NASDAQ, while local profile corporations have shown little interest in 
defining the innovative contour of their industries thus far. At the same 
time, Russia has just started to form its own venture funds and does not have 
dozens of billions of dollars, while Western transnational corporations will 
continue to finance the solution of its exclusive private technological 
tasks. That's definitely not enough for building a full-scale national 
scientific and technological strategy. So, it would be stupid to miss an 
excellent opportunity to attract U.S. venture billions to Russian innovative 
projects. There is no choice. We'll have to renew attempts to create our 
NASDAQ again, to stimulate the demand of domestic producers for our 
innovations and be tender with fearful and capricious American venture 
capitalists. 

It is absolutely essential for Russia to compete with India, China, Israel 
and other potential rivals who will sooner or later become interesting to 
American venture capital. We are not idiots, after all! 

******

#10
Asia Times
January 22, 2002
Putin undertakes apparent crackdown on corruption 
By Sergei Blagov 

MOSCOW - Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be ushering in a new 
era: a recent two-day trip to Poland ended years of frosty relations, and 
Russia's recent pledge to help the US fight terrorism has led to a 
strengthening of ties. Perhaps most important, however, has been his 
crackdown on Russia's endemic graft - one of his key electoral pledges. The 
Kremlin seems determined to carry it out. 

In early January, Putin sacked Railways Minister Nikolai Aksyonenko, who was 
accused of embezzling millions of US dollars. The former minister had been 
linked to Boris Berezovsky, the once-powerful tycoon, who found himself in 
exile after Putin began distancing the Kremlin from so-called "oligarchs". 
Before Putin's sudden accession to power in 1999, Aksyonenko - once a deputy 
prime minister under former President Boris Yeltsin - was viewed as a leading 
candidate to become Yeltsin's successor. 

Moreover, earlier this month the Russian Prosecutor-General's Office 
announced that it had launched an inspection into the prior commercial 
activities of one the country's most powerful officials, presidential chief 
of staff Alexander Voloshin. Prosecutor-General Vladimir Ustinov said that 
the initial probe may or may not result in a criminal case. In the early 
1990s, Voloshin worked with Berezovsky on the so-called "pyramid" schemes, 
say Russian media outlets. According to the reports, Voloshin ran several 
companies that were accused of embezzling millions of US dollars, but the 
case never led to criminal charges. 

Ustinov eventually backed down and said there was no criminal investigation 
relative to Voloshin. Yet the probe renewed speculation about Voloshin's 
imminent sacking, as well as several high-profile cases against officials 
associated with Yeltsin's influential inner circle. However, it has been 
argued that the high-profile probes are a reflection of the ongoing battle 
between two powerful clans influencing Putin: his old colleagues from the 
special services and the old Kremlin team joined by some right-wing 
politicians. 

There have been other signs of an ongoing crackdown on graft in Russia. In 
2001, Russian law enforcement agencies investigated a total of 40,000 
officials at Russia's various institutions. However, most investigations 
involved minor paperwork violations. As the Prosecutor-General's Office 
marked its 280th anniversary, Putin urged them to do more to combat crime, 
according to the RIA news agency. 

Putin is also moving toward jettisoning the legacy of the early wild years of 
Russia's "bandit capitalism" and taming super-rich "oligarchs". In 2001, 
Putin initiated the sacking of the head of natural gas giant and Russia's 
largest company Gazprom, Rem Vyakhirev. And earlier in January, Ustinov 
indicated that his office intends to interrogate more Gazprom executives, 
widening an investigation into the sale of the gas monopoly's assets by the 
management of rogue subsidiary Sibur. Until recently, Gazprom high-ranking 
executives were considered untouchable in Russia. 

Earlier this month, Gazprom first deputy chief executive officer, Vyacheslav 
Sheremet (who is also Sibur's board chairperson), Sibur CEO Yakov Goldovsky, 
and vice president Yevgeny Kozhit were detained for questioning. Sheremet was 
eventually released while the two other executives remain in custody. 
Prosecutors had opened a criminal case based on incriminating documents sent 
to them by Gazprom's security service. However, last week Gazprom Deputy CEO 
Alexander Ryazanov dismissed reports that Gazprom was behind the arrests. 

When Putin initiated the appointment of his old St Petersburg contact Alexei 
Miller as Gazprom chief last year, the Russian leader made it clear that he 
wanted to stop the siphoning off of valuable assets at the 38 percent 
state-owned gas monopoly. Sibur has long been seen as the final outpost for 
the cronies of Vyakhirev, and analysts regarded the petrochemical giant as a 
back door through which management could embezzle Gazprom's stakes in 
valuable enterprises. 

While the investigation centers on the sale of Sibur's assets, worth US$86 
million, a bigger story of missing assets may be disclosed. Last year, 
Russian media outlets alleged that close relatives of Gazprom's top managers 
acquired stakes in Gazprom's affiliates - worth millions of dollars - for the 
symbolic sum of 10 rubles (30 American cents). 

Few people in Russia were terribly shocked when news about corruption at 
Gazprom first surfaced. Russia's lucrative commodities sectors - oil and gas, 
aluminum, and metals - had long been marred by alleged illegal acts and 
associations with organized crime. For instance, Russia's top oil company 
LUKoil and the country's aluminum monopoly Russian Aluminum are both being 
sued for $4.8 billion in disputes with foreign business partners over alleged 
asset-grabbing. 

It has been understood that many Russian companies, including major 
corporations, emerged due to the corrupt use of political influence to steer 
business into the hands of well-connected tycoons. Now the Kremlin appears to 
be moving towards uprooting graft in Russia by cracking down on "oligarch" 
capitalism. 

Russia's closest post-Soviet ally, Belarus, is following suit. In early 
January, authorities started a criminal investigation over the alleged 
embezzlement activities of Mikhail Leonov, head of Minsk Tractor Plant (MTZ). 
If convicted, the businessman faces up to three years in jail. The Belarus 
Interior Ministry insists that Leonov embezzled funds from his 
state-controlled plant. However, Leonov's supporters argue that the former 
MTZ head became a scapegoat in ongoing attempts by the Belarus government to 
blame top managers and the plants' directors for all the problems faced by 
Belarus' unreformed economy. 

Matters don't stop there. Putin - as well as many other post-Soviet leaders - 
have repeatedly promised to tackle crime and combat bribe-taking. Putin's 
recent moves could arguably indicate that he is finally trying to tame 
Russia's "bandit capitalism". 

On the other hand, the recent wave of criminal investigations in Moscow 
seemingly raises the stakes in intrigues around the Kremlin, making the 
government's anti-graft crusade seem more politically motivated. It remains a 
matter of debate whether the recent probes could actually result in a 
meaningful crackdown on graft in Russia. 
(Inter Press Service) 

*******

#11
Analysis: Russian Roulette -- The Military 
By Sam Vaknin
UPI Business Correspondent

SKOPJE, Macedonia, Jan. 22 (UPI) -- Shabtai Kalmanovich vanished from London 
in the late 1980s. He resurfaced in Israel to face trial for espionage. He 
was convicted and spent years in an Israeli prison before being repatriated 
to Russia. His captors described him as a mastermind, in charge of an African 
KGB station.

In the early 1970s, Kalmanovich even served as advisor to Israel's iron lady, 
Golda Meir, on Russian immigration. He then moved to do flourishing business 
in Africa, in Botswana and then in Sierra Leone where his company, LIAT, 
owned the only bus operator in Freetown. He traded diamonds, globetrotted 
flamboyantly with an entourage of dozens of African chieftains and their 
mistresses, and fraternized with the corrupt elite, President Joseph Momoh 
included. In 1986-87, he even collaborated with IPE, a London-based outfit, 
which former members of the Mossad and other paragons of the Israeli defense 
establishment were rumored to have owned, including virtually all the 
Israelis implicated in the ill-fated Iran-Contras affair.

Being a KGB officer was always a lucrative and liberating proposition. Access 
to Western goods, travel to exotic destinations, making new and influential 
friends, mastering foreign languages, and doing some business on the side, 
often with one's official "enemies" and unsupervised slush funds were all 
standard perks even in the 1970s and 1980s.

Thus, when communism was replaced by criminal anarchy, former KGB personnel, 
as well as mobsters were the best suited to act as entrepreneurs in the new 
environment. They were well traveled, well connected, well capitalized, 
polyglot, possessed of management skills, disciplined, armed to the teeth, 
and ruthless. Far from being sidetracked, the security services rode the 
gravy train -- but never more so than now.

January 2002. President Vladimir Putin's dour gaze pierces from every wall in 
every office. His obese ministers often discover a sudden sycophantic 
propensity for skiing, a favorite pastime of the athletic President. The 
praise heaped on him by the servile media, the only type he allows to 
survive, comes uncomfortably close to a Central Asian personality cult.

Yet, Putin is not in control of the machinery that brought him to the 
pinnacle of power, under-qualified as he was. This penumbral apparatus 
revolves around two pivots: the increasingly fractured and warlord-controlled 
military and, ever more importantly, the KGB's successors, mainly the FSB. In 
today's piece I discuss the economics of the military's apparatus; Wednesday 
I will discuss that of the FSB.

Two weeks ago, Russia announced yet another plan to reform its bloated, 
inefficient, impoverished, demoralized and corrupt military. Close to 200,000 
troops are to go immediately and the same number in the next 3 years. The 
draft is to be abolished and the army professionalized. At its current size, 
officially 1.2 million servicemen, the armed forces are severely 
under-funded. Cases of hunger are not uncommon. Ill and late paid soldiers 
sometimes beg for cigarettes, or food.

Conscripts, in what resembles slave labor, are "rented out" by their 
commanders to economic enterprises, especially in the provinces. The incoming 
minister of defense and a close pal of Putin, Sergei Ivanov, shut down a host 
of such "trading" companies owned by bureaucrats in the Ministry of Defense 
last June. But if restructuring is to proceed apace, the successful 
absorption of former soldiers in the economy (requiring pensions, housing, 
start up capital, employment) -- if necessary with the help of foreign 
capital -- is bound to become a priority sooner or later.

But this may be too late and too little -- the much truncated and 
disorientated armed forces have been "privatized" and commandeered for 
personal gain by regional bosses in cahoots with the command structure and 
with organized crime. Ex-soldiers feature prominently in extortion, 
protection, and other anti-private sector rackets.

The war in Chechnya is another long-standing pecuniary bonanza -- and a 
vested interest of many generals. Senior Russian Interior Ministry field 
commanders trade in stolen petroleum products, food, and munitions, often in 
partnership with Chechen "rebels."

Putin is trying to reverse these pernicious trends by enlisting the rank and 
file army, one of his natural constituencies, in his battles against 
secessionist Chechens, influential oligarchs, venal governors, and 
bureaucrats beyond redemption.

As well as the army, the defense industry -- with its 2 million employees -- 
is also being brutally disabused of its centralist-nationalistic ideals.

Orders placed with Russia's defense manufacturers by the destitute Russian 
armed forces are down to a trickle. The procurement budget was increased by 
50 percent last year, to 4 percent of the U.S. budget, about $2.2 billion, 
and further increased this year to $2.7 billion. Whatever money is available, 
however, goes towards research and development, arms modernization, and 
maintaining the inflated nuclear arsenal and the personal gear of front line 
soldiers in the interminable Chechen war. The Russian daily Kommersant quoted 
Former Armed Forces weapons chief, Gen. Anatoly Sitnov, as claiming $16 
billion should be allocated for arms purchases if all the existing needs are 
to be satisfied.

Having lost their major domestic client (defense constituted 75 percent of 
Russian industrial production at one time) -- exports of Russian arms have 
soared to more than $4.4 billion annually, not including "sensitive" 
materiel. Old markets in the likes of Iran, Iraq, Syria, Algeria, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, China, India, and Libya have revived. Decision makers in Latin 
America and East Asia, including Malaysia and Vietnam, are being avidly 
courted. Bribes change hands, offshore accounts are open and shut, and export 
proceeds mysteriously evaporate. Many a Russian is wealthier due to this 
export cornucopia.

The reputation of Russia's weapons manufacturers is dismal; there are no 
spare parts, after sales service, maintenance, or quality control. But 
Russian weapons, often Cold War surplus, come cheap and the list of Russian 
firms and institutions blacklisted by the United States for selling weapons 
from handguns to missile equipped destroyers to "rogue states" grows by the 
day. Less than one quarter of 2,500 defense-related firms are subject to 
Russian Federal supervision. Gradually, Russia's most advanced weaponry is 
being made available through these outfits.

Close to 4,000 R&D programs and defense conversion projects, many financed by 
the West, have failed abysmally to transform Russia's "military-industrial 
complex." Following a much-derided "privatization" in which the state lost 
control over hundreds of defense firms to assorted autochthonous tycoons and 
foreign manufacturers -- the enterprises are still being abused and looted by 
politicians on all levels, including the regional and provincial ones. The 
Russian Federation, for instance, has controlling stakes in only seven of 
about 250 privatized air defense contractors. Manufacturing and R&D 
co-operation with Ukraine and other former Soviet republics is on the 
ascendant, often flying in the face of official policies and national 
security.

Despite the surge in exports, overproduction of unwanted goods leads to 
persistent accumulation of inventory. Even so, capacity utilization is said 
to be 25 percent in many factories. Lack of maintenance renders many plant 
facilities obsolete and non-competitive. The Russian government's new 
emphasis on R&D is wise -- Russia must replenish its catalog with hi-tech 
gadgets if it wishes to continue to export to prime clients. Still, the 
Russian Duma's prescription of a return to state ownership, central planning, 
and subsidies, if implemented, is likely to prove to be the coup de grace 
rather than a graceful coup.

******

#12
eurasianet.org
January 22, 2002
THE LACK OF RUSSIAN MILITARY REFORM HELPED USHER US FORCES INTO CENTRAL ASIA 
A EurasiaNet commentary by Ariel Cohen

The January 22 visit to Tashkent by Gen. Tommy Franks, commander of the US 
anti-terrorism campaign in Afghanistan, has Moscow strategists fretting. 
Franks' talks with Uzbek leaders comes at a time of great debate in Russia 
over the United States' intentions in Central Asia. Central Asia watchers in 
Moscow feel the latest indicators point to a permanent US presence in the 
region.

Recent actions and statements support the notion that the US is planning for 
an extended stay in Central Asia - a region that has been within Russia's 
sphere of influence for over a century. A Pentagon spokesman recently 
suggested that US military forces might remain beyond the war in Afghanistan. 
Meanwhile, the US air force began deployment at Manas International airport 
in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.

Some experts in Moscow and Beijing believe that Washington's intention in 
Central Asia is to encircle China. Others, especially in the human rights 
community, are concerned that American troops may inadvertently protect 
authoritarian regimes of the post-Soviet Central Asian states.

The US entry into Central Asia is clearly a source of vexation for Moscow. 
But if Russia's political and military leaders are dissatisfied by the recent 
geopolitical turn of events, they ought to acknowledge that they themselves 
share responsibility for the new US military presence in the region. 

As the dust settles after the fighting in Afghanistan, regardless of what 
American goals in the region are, it is clear that the Russian military, in 
its current shape, failed to give adequate answers to the global and regional 
security threats of the Taliban regime. The Ministry of Defense and the 
Russian General Staff did little to counter the drug trafficking and Islamic 
fundamentalist threats in Central Asia. The inability to respond to these 
major security challenges over the past decade was a contributing factor in 
sparking the chain of events that resulted in the US-led anti-terrorism 
campaign in Afghanistan. 

Granted, deployment of the Russian 201st Division on the Tajik-Afghan border, 
as well as Russian support for the Northern Alliance, likely helped prevent 
an expansion of radical Islamic influence into Central Asia. Nevertheless, 
the Russian defense establishment's inability to confront key reform needs 
limited Moscow's ability to deploy in the past, and is likely to hamper 
security operations in Central Asia in the future. 

Several factors underlie the Russian military reform dilemma:

First, it is the Russia's economic decline and the resulting overall poverty 
of the Russian military. After three years of growth, Russia's GDP of $308 
billion is less than the US annual military budget - around $308 billion. 
Russian military budget figures are a state secret, but estimates range 
between the official figure of $10 billion and the London-based Institute for 
International Strategic Studies (IISS) assessment of $50 billion. Even if the 
real figure falls in the higher end of the estimate range, it would seem 
insufficient to accomplish all of Russian military's strategic aims. Those 
tasks now include: projecting Moscow's influence into Central Asia, 
especially along the Tajik-Afghan border; maintaining a nuclear arsenal 
almost equal to that of the United States; and the continuation of a 
low-intensity war in Chechnya.

Secondly, the quality and motivation of the Russian troops leaves much to be 
desired. According to the Russian Ministry of Defense, a large percentage of 
recruits are chronically ill or mentally unstable; suffer from alcoholism or 
substance abuse problems; have been incarcerated for criminal offenses; or 
have a lower than average level of secondary education. Many among officers 
and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) lack permanent housing, leaving them 
demoralized. 

Conscripts are paid 1 ruble a day (about 3 cents US), while the contract 
servicemen, about $167 a month. Their level of motivation remains low, and 
they are prone to involvement in local criminal operations, including arms 
trafficking networks, some of which are controlled by corrupt military 
commanders. It is hardly a secret that many conscripts are used as cheap 
labor farmed out by their superior officers for construction projects and 
even factory and agricultural work. 

Thirdly, the Russian military remains to a great degree a product of the 
first half of the twentieth century. It is not a high tech army on a par with 
the US military. Russia's military doctrine, which is still taught in officer 
schools and military academies, was formulated in the 1940s, and updated by 
Marshal Vassily Sokolovsky in the 1960s in order to fight World War III 
against the United States. It calls for "usage of large masses of soldiers" 
and fails to address high-tech approaches developed in the Gulf War, in 
Kosovo and Afghanistan. 

Since the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991, a split in military establishment 
thinking has widened between the traditional strategic missile commanders, 
such as Marshal Igor Sergeev, whose goal was to fight a global nuclear war, 
and "generalists" such as Anatoly Kvashnin, the current Chief of Staff. 
Kvashnin promised Putin that the Russian military would be successful in the 
second war in Chechnya. Yet, the army now finds itself bogged down again, 
fighting a messy guerrilla war against highly motivated Chechen separatists.

It is no longer feasible to support a bloated military establishment. To 
respond to looming security challenges in Central Asia and elsewhere, Russia 
needs a highly mobile, high-tech military force. Such a force will have to be 
able to fight in a broad variety of terrain, including cities, mountains and 
deserts, and be able to deploy at short notice. It is also clear that a 
wholly professional army is required, with well-trained troops ready to take 
on radical Islamist guerillas and drug traffickers. This is exactly what 
President Putin has committed to do in November 2001, to the great chagrin of 
his generals.

Russia also lacks forces to provide a conventional defense against a 
hypothetical Chinese attack in the Far East-a scenario that was rejected 
outright until very recently by the Moscow military planners. However, with 
military technology transfer from Russia to China in high gear, some in 
Moscow, such as Alexander Sharavin, Director of the Institute for Political 
and Strategic Analysis, warn that the People's Liberation Army is rapidly 
becoming more battle-worthy than the cash-starved Russian Army.

Russian media sources have reported large increases in military procurement 
since the year 2000 - a 25 percent increase in 2000 compared with 1999; a 20 
percent increase in 2001 over 2000; and whopping 40 percent increase in 2002 
compared to 2001, according to Vice Premier Ilya Klebanov, who is in charge 
of the military-industrial complex. However, Russia is still lacking a clear 
vision of the threats and the structure of the armed forces. The current 
program, endorsed by Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov talks about a 10-year 
implementation framework. 

Boris Nemtsov, a reformist leader of the Union of Right Forces, a 
center-right party, who participated in consultations with Putin on the 
future of the military, says that the Russian generals deceived the 
president. "They peddled a scheme that will not be finalized until the year 
2004, and not be implemented in full until the year 2010, a year when Putin 
will no longer be in power," Nemtsov says. 

If past attempts at military reform provide any indication, the current 
efforts will bog down due to institutional resistance in the Defense 
Ministry, General Staff and among the generals. And this means that Russia 
may not be ready to effectively challenge the United States in Central Asia 
in the years to come.

Editor's Note: Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., is Research Fellow at the Heritage 
Foundation and author, Russian Imperialism: Development and Crisis 
(Praeger/Greenwood, 1998).

*******

#13
gazeta.ru
January 22, 2002
HIV-Infected Fugitives Recaptured

All fourteen prisoners who escaped from the high-security hard labour camp in 
the vicinity of Novoulyanovsk on January 18 have been recaptured. On Monday 
morning the last two of the fourteen escapees were detained in the town of 
Dimitrovgrad in the Ulyanovsk Region. 

All the escapees were serving lengthy sentences for grave crimes, including 
murder, robbery and drug trafficking. The regional prosecutors have said that 
not only will the fugitives be punished, but the staff of the Novoulyanovsk 
prison camp will also be brought to account for the escape. 

The high security labour camp in Novoulyanovsk is considered as one of the 
best prisons in Russia. The camp inmates there have the opportunity to 
participate in sports and to take up correspondence study courses, rare 
luxuries by Russian standards. 

On Friday, January 18, fourteen prisoners escaped from the high-security 
prison. After being recaptured, they said they had fled because wanted "to 
die free." All the escapees are HIV- positive and are held in a separate ward 
to prevent the spread of the HIV virus. 

It took the escapees half a year to dig an 18-meter tunnel from their ward, 
under the prison wall to waste ground next to the prison, using simple 
aluminium spoons and bowls. 

After being recaptured the escapees explained that in order to hide their 
tunnel building operation, they flushed the soil they dug out from the tunnel 
down toilets, hid heaps of soil in the pockets of their robes and threw the 
earth out when walking in the prison yard. 

Since all of the escapees are HIV-infected, other prisoners refused to work 
together with them in the prison workshop, thus they had plenty of time on 
their hands. Evidently prison wards did not bother to check on them very 
often. 

When they were not digging, the prisoners covered the hole in the floor with 
tiles and moved a bed over it. When some prisoner was busy digging inside the 
tunnel, his cellmates would put some clothes on his bed and cover them with a 
blanket, so that if prison warders cared to check, they believed the 
tunnelling man was asleep. 

Early in the morning of January 18, the 14 inmates of the AIDS ward fled. 
Only two hours later did the prison staff discover that the men had escaped, 
by which time all 14 criminals, who had no false passports, no cash, not even 
decent civilian clothes, had spread across the Ulyanovsk Region. 

On Friday, several hours after the escape, five of the men, serving sentences 
for robbery and drug dealing, were detained. 

On Saturday three more were apprehended. They were Igor Letov, Vladimir 
Mitrofanov and Sergei Sharapov. Letov and Mitrofanov were sentenced to 21 and 
12 years respectively, both for murder. Sharapov was convicted for robbery 
and sentenced to 11 years. All three were wondering around the town of 
Ulyanovsk, trying to avoid the police. 

On Sunday one more convicted murderer Alexei Stroyev and convicted robber 
Nikolai Gorbunov, were detained. Both were serving 11-year sentences. 

When detained by police, almost all the fugitives were heavily drunk. Maybe, 
that is why none of them resisted. 

On Monday the Ulyanovsk Region's law enforcers launched a large-scale search 
operation for drug dealers Alexei Balakhonov, Oleg Kalugin, Dmitry Shevchenko 
and robber Vyacheslav Bogomolov. 

They were all serving 10-year terms. Police officials said that the crimes 
those men had committed were not as serious as those perpetrated by the 
fugitives who had already been recaptured and taken back to jail. 

All four were detained very soon. They did not offer any resistance, for they 
all were too weak and too depressed to fight. 

When asked what had prompted them to make their escape attempt, they wearily 
explained that they had wanted to die free men. 

Regional prosecutors have launched an investigation into the break out. The 
law enforcers are convinced that certain prison warders helped the men to dig 
the tunnel, since they reckon that the HIV-infected inmates were too weak to 
carry out such work on their own. 

Criminal proceedings have been instigated and several prison warders are to 
face charges of negligence. 

*******