#6033
#14
Yezhenedelny Zhurnal
No. 1
January 15, 2002
SECRET AND REAL ADVISERS
Who advised President Putin to change the course of his
policies?
Author: Alexander Golts, Dmitry Pinsker
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
OVERCOMING REAL HARDSHIPS WHILE DRAWING CLOSER TO THE WEST WILL REQUIRE NOT ONLY IDEAS AND INITIATIVES, BUT ALSO HARD WORK TO IMPLEMENT THE NEW POLICIES. AND THEN PUTIN WILL HAVE TO MAKE A CHOICE BETWEEN HIS PROCLAIMED IDEAS AND HIS ASSOCIATES: BRINGING HIS REAL ADVISERS OUT OF THE SHADOWS.
By the start of Vladimir Putin's third year in office, Russian politics has fundamentally changed. After making considerable changes in the economy and legislation, President Putin announced a new foreign policy course. The idea of drawing closer to the US is prevailing in the Kremlin and the Russian leader has made some substantial sacrifices for the sake of this idea: Moscow has allowed the US to establish military bases in Central Asian republics of the former USSR, and closed its radar intelligence center in Cuba. Putin also announced that he does not consider NATO expansion to the East to be dangerous for Russia. Finally, he seemingly was not concerned at all about the Washington decision to withdraw from the 1972 ABM Treaty.
Meanwhile, the Kremlin "executors and performers" are still the same. So who worked out and advised the president to take the new course? It is very hard to find this out. it may be a rather large group of all kinds of experts and advisers who had spoken out such ideas for a long time, but only at present their ideas turned to be useful. Apparently, the president had to involve new adviser as both Yeltsin's old timers and Putin's St. Petersburg newcomers turned to be inefficient in such questions.
So those who promoted their ideas should have been promoted to key positions themselves, but they are still in the shade. Those who recently tried to prove that a contract-based army is impossible in Russia are charged with forming a contract-based army in the country. Those who until recently threatened the West with "asymmetrical answers" have been charged with strengthening the relations with the West.
The Kremlin officials explain the unwillingness of the Russian leader to radically change his team by his solidity and the intention to thoroughly and deeply consider each new candidacy, as well as his unwillingness to reject the old team "in the lump".
However, the real reason of the delay of the seemingly inevitable personnel rotation in the Kremlin may also be the consequences of Putin's appearance in the presidential chair. Two years ago he honestly said, "I would never dream in a nightmare that I could be the president." Putin has never before had to participate in a political competition. That is why when he found himself to be the president as a result of his unexpected and rapid political career he did not have a team that could be trusted and fulfilled his plans. As a result, forming of the presidential team has taken over two years already and has not been finished yet, although usually it takes no longer than six months.
Vladimir Putin has to publicly admit that he his major principle in personnel policy is "I promote those I know." He says, "I am glad to invite people from other regions, but it is necessary to know these people, it is necessary to see them working and to see the results of their work. So of course it is easier for me to hire people who I know and who I have seen working. That is why St. Petersburg natives appear in the Kremlin," explained Vladimir Putin in his interview with the Financial Times.
Two years ago the newly elected president believes that people with shoulder straps would be the best executors for his plans. That is five of seven presidential envoys appointed to the federal districts in May 2000 turned to be army, police, or KGB generals. However, very soon it turned out that those people were able to shamelessly lie to the president. It became the most obvious after the Kursk submarine disaster: the top fleet leadership was cheerfully reporting that the fleet had all the necessary means and equipment for the rescue operation and it took very long until the Supreme Commander-in-Chief made the situation out and characterized it very concisely, "We have not a bean".
Meanwhile, the recommendations of Putin's former KGB associates and St. Petersburg compatriots he invited to rule the country turned to be as unworthy as the advice Putin got from officials inherited from Boris Yeltsin. Sergei Ivanov, the closest confidant of the head of the state recommended Putin to not only support Slobodan Milosevic, but to also send an squadron to the Mediterranean in order to protect the dictator from the vicious West - Ivanov based his recommendations on the intelligence reports. Putin managed to avoid an embarrassing position at the very last moment and acknowledged Voislav Kostinsa the new president of Yugoslavia. So the best confidants of the president, such as FSB Director Nikolai Patrushev and Sergei Ivanov did not justify the hopes and have been unable to finish the "anti-terrorist operation" in Chehcnya.
Judging by the latest events the president is even unable to receive trustworthy information from his appointees. After the US September 11 tragedy it became obvious that Putin's closest supporters are absolutely unable to fulfill the objectives they get from the president. Moreover, which if much more important, they are unwilling to unconditionally support the presidential initiatives. A graphic example of this is that a few days before President Putin gave the go- ahead to locating the US military in Central Asian republics, Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov announced that he could not hypothetically admit such a possibility. The decision of the Russian president to form a contract-based army as soon as possible was obviously out of the blue for all Russian security services.
Evidently, President Putin gradually came to the conclusion that the people from his closest surrounding recommend him things that are absolutely wrong for revival of Russia. When Putin said in Berlin that they have missed real threats and dangers endlessly concentrating on ABM and national missile defense system, he addressed not only Western leaders, but also himself and his own subordinates.
The "new course" is highly likely to be initiated by the officials who managed to reveal their views to the president. According to confidential sources, they were deputy Kremlin administration head Sergei Prikhodko, who is in charge of foreign policy; presidential aid Sergei Yastrzhembsky; Minister for Economic Development German Gref; Chair of the Federation Council committee for international affairs Mikhail Margelov; and Sergei Karagonov, chairman of the Foreign and Defense Policy Council.
For instance, Sergei Yastrzhembsky, who has long exceeded the bounds of his authority as presidential aide, has spoken with the head of state several times recently, and the topic of their talks was far removed from media coverage of the continuing war in Chechnya, which he is supposed to do in accordance with his job description. At the same time, it is known that Yastrzhembsky is a decided opponent of Primakov's "multi-polar world" idea.
According to the same sources, German Gref also played a serious role in changing the foreign policy course, as well as in promotion of the military reform concept worked out by the Union of Right Forces. His approach was very simple: Russia needs an inflow of foreign capital that is likely to come from the West only and no selling weapons to the East can refund for absence of western investments - consequently, confrontation with the West means inevitable and considerable economic losses. It should be noted that as soon as Moscow started closing with the US, the process of preparation Russia for joining the World Trade Organization immediately speeded up. The necessity of a radical military reform was also motivated by economic reasons. And an almost impossible thing happened: experts of the Institute of the Transition Economics were involved in working the reform out. Moreover, to eliminate any doubt that the Defense Ministry must follow their recommendations, ideological leaders of the Union of Right forces Yegor Gaidar and Boris Nemtsov attended the governmental meeting devoted to the military reform.
Probably, some people who have been admitted to the "inner circle" only recently but have long supported the ideas that are now the official course, also influenced the president of Russia. Mikhail Margelov is considered to be a confidant of the head of the state in the questions of the new Russia - US relationship. Lately, it was Margelov instead of Defense Ministry or Federal Security Service representatives who many times was in the US at the discussions of military partnership or cooperation of the secret services during preparation of the Afghan anti-terrorist operation or the coming Russia - US negotiations on the ABM Treaty issue and US's withdrawal from the treaty. Finally , several times before the Russian president made his speech on US's withdrawal from the 1972 ABM Treaty, Margelov not only exactly predicted the reaction of the Russian president but also said the phrase that later Vladimir Putin told to British journalists, "Do not expect any hysteria".
The veteran of the Russian political science Sergei Karaganov was also called for the Kremlin court. Karaganov is the deputy director of the Institute of Europe and a founder of the Foreign and Defense Politics Council, a unique organization in Russia. The Council regularly gives the president non - trivial recommendations on the military reform, and policy in relation to the US, NATO, and the CIS states.
Currently Vladimir Putin is trying to realize the "selective involvement" principle in the foreign policy, that was invented by the members of the Foreign and Defense Policy Council. This strategy stipulates "conscious rejection of the super-power phantom and maximum possible avoidance of confrontation, especially with the countries and regions Russia's economic development depends on".
Actually, it is not vitally important who advised the president to acquire the new complex of liberal economic ideas and pro-western foreign policy orientation. The most important thing is that having decided to personally shape national politics, President Putin personally listens to the experts and learns a very considerable volume of information. At the same time he still charges his St. Petersburg favorites with implementing the foreign and defense policies he proposes. Sometimes they are unsuccessful at it. Making a speech at the NATO council of defense ministers, Sergei Ivanov completely baffled his western colleagues. For forty minutes he so energetically smashed to pieces all previous experience of Russian relations with NATO that he almost convinced NATO defense ministers of the futility of any contacts and absurdity of establishing a new body where Russia would equally participate in making the key decisions on security.
Judging by everything Vladimir Putin is inclined to find a consensus with his associates, which means he will have to make certain concessions. For instance, last week the head of the state personally announced that he transfers the functions of the Pardons Commission of the presidential administration to regional governors. Simultaneously, an accusing sentence was passed for military journalist Grigory Pasko and in Kolomna the court decided to continue investigation of scientist Igor Sutyagin but refused to let the latter out of the prison.
Undoubtedly, there is no ground to state that President Putin has any personal relation to these two sentences. However, a person who is quite close to the Russian security services briefly explained in his interview with us: "That's for Lourdes." In other words, our man Putin has to surrender to the damned imperialists one position after another thus hinted to the perplexed security services that the president still remembers who is the major enemy. According to this logic, the endless investigation of Igor Sutyagin's case is "for US's withdrawal from the ABM treaty".
If all the aforementioned is true, the new liberal policies are likely to suffer many hardships, since they are being implemented by the old "Byzantine" methods. So far, the new policies exist in the form of intentions and slogans. The Defense Ministry and the Interior Ministry are most likely to sabotage these ideas. The small and not very influential group of "shadowy" advisers is opposed by a wide front of lobbyists and officials in the form of the Foreign Ministry, top generals, directors of defense enterprises who are eager to sell weapons to outsider countries in the turbid waters of the multi-polar world.
Meanwhile, the rapid and "bloodless" victory in Afghanistan sharply increased the influence of those who believe it is unnecessary to take into account the position of coalition partners, especially Moscow. It is not ruled out that Vladimir Putin is to encounter lots of disappointments on his way to the western world.
At present Moscow bases all its hopes for avoiding a "legal vacuum" because of US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty on the work on a new treaty with the US. Russia is willing to legally register Bush's promise of a reduction of nuclear arsenals. However, US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, as well as Bush's national security adviser Condoleezza Rice, are convinced that the US should not sign any agreements at all, since they may limit their options in the future.
Apparently, Russia stands to face many problems in its relations with NATO. It is not ruled out that by spring next year Putin is to pass through another trial: the intimacy between Moscow and NATO will stop at beautiful rhetoric, while the Baltic states will be invited to join the alliance.
Overcoming these real hardships will require not only ideas and initiatives, but also hard work on implementing the new policies. And then Putin will have to make a choice between his proclaimed ideas and his associates. If he seriously believes that there is no alternative to drawing closer to the West, he will have to reject his usual personnel policy and make his secret advisers the real leaders of the country.
(Translated by Arina Yevtikhova)
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