#6
stratfor.com
Putin Pleasing the Poles To Woo the West
18 January 2002
Summary
Russian President Vladimir Putin has just made his first trip to Poland. It is in sharp contrast to Polish-Russian relations a year ago that Putin has been nothing but conciliatory and complementary toward Warsaw. Conceding to many of Poland's demands may cost Russia a bit in the long term, but Putin is looking at the big picture. A secure and friendly Warsaw is Moscow's best conduit to gain influence in Europe.
Analysis
Russian President Vladimir Putin traveled Poland Jan. 15-17 in the first visit by a Russian head of state in eight years. Despite the fact that relations between the two nations turned hostile after Poland joined NATO in 1999, Putin had nothing but warm smiles and complements for his host, newly elected Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski.
Putin recognizes that accommodating Warsaw and building closer ties will allow Russia to advance its economic and political goals not only throughout Europe but also in Poland itself. The cost of appeasing the Poles is miniscule compared to the payoff, and for Russia, time is of the essence.
Putin unexpectedly hailed Poland as a "full and equal partner," which is a far cry from the traditional Russian view of the country as an ungrateful prodigal son. In his comments, reported by the Los Angeles Times, about the failure of the Soviet empire in Central Europe, he pointed out with his trademark dry humor that "Poles are not willing to accept any form of dictate." This was about as close as a Russian leader can come to an apology for 45 years of Soviet rule.
Putin appealed directly to Polish pride by expressing admiration for Poland's favorite son, Pope John Paul II. Putin even raised the possibility of a papal visit to Moscow, suggesting that the pope could come as the Vatican's head of state rather than as a religious leader. To date, the Russian Orthodox Church has squelched any possibility of a papal visit for fear of losing influence to the Roman Catholic Church.
In a surprise move, Putin also visited the Home Army monument, a shrine commemorating Polish resistance fighters who were killed by Russian forces in the early years of Soviet rule.
The Russian president's actions during the visit reflect Poland's importance to his intensifying efforts to link Russia to Europe, with Putin himself directly appealing to Warsaw to serve as an intermediary between Moscow and both NATO and the European Union. Poland is also an important power in its own right.
Two-way trade topped $4.6 billion in 2001, and both countries want to expand their trade links. After the Soviet empire's breakup, steady growth in Poland -- which has a population about a quarter the size of Russia's -- combined with Russia's only recently halted contraction, grants the country a GDP two-thirds as large as Russia's.
Poland's overall political importance is rising concurrently. It will be the European Union's sixth-largest state when it joins the grouping in 2004, and aside from France, it will also be the most active counterweight to Germany. Russia has traditionally looked to Berlin to represent its interests in Europe, but Putin acknowledged the evolving power balance during his trip by visiting both Poland and France but not Germany.
When viewed through Russian eyes, Poland's star is even brighter than its balance sheet would otherwise indicate. A constant in Putin's foreign policy is his desire to lash Russia firmly to Europe. Various aspects of his plan include a huge natural-gas line from Russia's Yamal Peninsula and a rail network from the Koreas, which both have connecting infrastructure in Poland.
Perhaps the touchiest aspect of EU expansion in 2004 is that Kaliningrad -- a Russian Baltic enclave bordering Poland and Lithuania -- will be become a Russian island in an EU sea after both those countries join the grouping in 2004. Building ties with Poland will ensure that the region does not become completely isolated.
As a current NATO member, a prospective EU member, the most pro-U.S. country in Europe and the largest and most influential country in Central Europe, Poland has a unique ability to sabotage Russia's increasingly chummy relations with the West on many levels. Simply put, for Moscow to have meaningful relations with Europe, it must have at least tolerable relations with Poland.
And it needs to have them soon.
After Sept. 11 Putin decided to throw his lot in with the West, specifically the United States. But after an initial love fest, Washington began treating Moscow rather shabbily. The Bush administration has already unilaterally abrogated the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, making hash of an issue near and dear to Russian nationalists.
Putin probably fears he will be unable to maintain such a friendly stance vis-a-vis the United States much longer. If those relations break down, Washington could get the Polish government to snarl the Yamal project, which would transport Russian gas to Germany through Poland. If the project is completed, Russia would become Europe's largest energy provider, and Moscow's influence through the Continent would rise immeasurably.
Russia's current pro-Western tilt also gives China reason to sabotage the Korea-Europe rail link, which for Europe would make Russia its primary infrastructure link to Asia. That makes sealing good relations with Poland now absolutely crucial.
The Poles will be a hard sell. Russia's record on Poland is hardly sparkling, and there are a number of very touchy topics plaguing bilateral relations. Putin will have to concede much more than the pleasant platitudes he offered during his visit if he is to transmute Polish fear of the Bear into anything resembling cooperation.
Among the Polish demands that Putin will likely have to agree to are better deals on transit income, gas purchases and a preferable route for the Yamal line that includes Poland's major cities. Warsaw also wants Russian information on the Katyn massacre of 1940 in which Soviet forces killed 4,000 Polish officers, and on the mysterious circumstances surrounding the 1943 death of Poland's wartime leader Wladyslaw Sikorski.
All are headline issues for Warsaw, but aside from the inconvenience of having to spend a few million dollars to change the Yamal route, they are mostly issues of pride for Moscow. Unlike previous Russian leaders, however, Putin has shown he can quell his country's nationalistic tendencies.
Putin will cave to the Poles on most issues in the coming weeks because in the grand scheme of things, the president knows that minor sops to Poland are a small price to pay for binding Moscow closer to Europe. Pleasing the Poles, therefore, is something that dovetails nicely with Putin's long-term plans.
Conveniently, a completed Yamal will also translate into a permanent hold over Poland. Poland already gets more than 60 percent of its natural gas from Russia, and extending the Yamal project will lock that percentage in permanently. Placating the Poles on Yamal should also nix a Norwegian plan to displace Russian gas with their own from the North Sea.
Although Warsaw might not be altogether comfortable being close to Russia economically, much less politically, sealing a Yamal deal is a far more desirable outcome than Poland's traditional role regarding Europe and Russia: that of being the region's most well-trod invasion route.
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