#6
Obshchaya Gazeta
No. 2
January 10, 2002
TWO YEARS AT THE HELM
Political analysts look at Putin's first two years in power
Author: not indicated
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
THE SECOND RUSSIAN PRESIDENT IS NO LONGER AN UNKNOWN QUANTITY. THERE IS ENOUGH INFORMATION TO IDENTIFY VLADIMIR PUTIN AS A CERTAIN TYPE OF LEADER. WE ASKED SOME LEADING RUSSIAN ANALYSTS FOR THEIR VIEWS: LILIA SHEVTSOVA, VLADIMIR RYZHKOV, IGOR BUNIN, AND ALEKSEI KARA-MURZA.
Question: What are Putin's priorities: power, reforms, cooperation, subordination?
Igor Bunin, General Director of the Political Consulting Center: Putin's presidency is clearly divided into two phases. In the first phase the main objective of the new leader was consolidation of the power around Kremlin, which started from establishment of federal districts and the Federal Council reform. The balance of successes and failures of this period was overall quite favorable for the present president. Pro-presidential majority formed in both parliamentary houses, which guarantees fast passing of law drafts presented by the government and the presidential administration. The executive power hierarchy works quicker and better. The remaining "resistance centers" are of no danger for the president's initiatives.
In spring 2001 the second phase of Putin's presidency started. He began a series of institutional reforms in the economy, the lawful and social spheres: tax, budget, pension, and court reforms, the new Labor Code, the housing and natural monopolies reforms. According to the majority of experts, the first results of these reforms have also been positive.
Since autumn 2001 there have been signs of the third phase on the activities of Putin's administration. The most evident of these signs is an attempt to form new relations with Western countries. Besides, the Kremlin has been actively cooperating with loyal corporative business organizations and non-commercial civil formations.
Finally, the conflict inside Putin's team that formed in 2000 made the "personnel issue" burning. The Russian elite has not unanimously accepted the new foreign political course of the president: the military are especially concerned about it. This does not mean that the army is likely to rebel, but the president will have to take new moods in consideration and to adjust his plans, including his plans for renewing the elite.
Aleksei Kara-Murza, a Moscow State University professor: The main thing the president has been busy with for the past two years has been reinforcement of his personal authority. Some call it "strengthening of the state", however, I cannot see any state institutions that have become stronger under Putin. The government is still a "technical" government, the parliament has even lost its influence, courts and prosecutor's offices fully obey the Kremlin. I can agree that the state machine is easier to operate now, but its ability to efficiently work automatically has rather fallen.
Question: What is the political role of the president: a modernizer, a conservative, or a restorer?
Lilia Shevtsova, senior analyst with the Moscow Carnegie Center: Of course, he is a modernizer, besides, he acts within the framework of the Russian tradition. The essence of this tradition is a triad: first, reforms from the "top", second, using of the Western resources, and third, preservations of autocracy. Paradoxically, but Putin's modernization is simultaneously a chance and a threat for Russia. The chance is that having overcome the lethargy of 2000 the president made two breakthroughs: he restored the economic reforms and turned the country towards the West. What is the threat of Putin's modernizations? The threat is that he is again trying to reform Russia without involving the civil society in the process. Thus, the current reforms work for bureaucracy and the tycoons and preserve stagnation and parasitical structures.
Russia is able to really integrate into the western world only on the basis of the system of common values, which demands decisive changes in the Russian interior life. Meanwhile, bargaining of the Russian elite that requires paying for every step towards the West demonstrates that the Russian ruling class is not ready to consider cooperation with the West as a cooperation meeting Russian national interests. So, the western train is likely to miss our station again.
Aleksei Kara-Murza: In short, Putin is an autocratic pro-western modernizer of the Peter the Great type. In Russia modernizations of this type were often accompanied by "squeezing" interior social processes. Europe is not only a market economy, total computer literacy, discipline, and order - it is also developed parliamentary system, multi-party system, human rights, civil control of the authorities, and so on.... Unfortunately, the Russian president does not demonstrate such a complete and entire perception of the European culture. Choosing his personnel on the basis of personal faithfulness, uniting them in a loyal corporation are not European techniques. And the defectiveness of such a system is its reversibility. It is sadly successively repeated in Russia - it may be called an algorithm of Russian modernizations.
Question: What is Putin's ruling style: he is a democrat, an autocrat, a federalist, or a unitarian?
Vladimir Ryzhkov, Duma deputy: Apparently, Putin is not a complete democrat. Over the two years of his presidency the number of freedoms has reduced - it is a fact. For instance, today the Kremlin directly or indirectly controls five of six national television networks, while the last independent television company is being purposely annihilated. The presidential administration almost fully controls both parliamentary houses. The top authority is more and more clearly demonstrates its intention to establish a corporative state, when various social groups form loyal corporations "at the initiative from the top". The MediaUnion was established for journalists; the State Council was established for regional leaders; tycoons received the Russian Union of Entrepreneurs and Industrialist; small businesses are united in the OPORA organization. The recent Civil Forum held in Moscow was an attempt to unite non-commercial public unions in a controllable corporation. The logic of forming the Russian party system is the same. Thus, we can see a number of steps that lead us in the opposite direction from the democracy.
I cannot call Putin a federalist either. Over the past two years the country has greatly turned into a unitarian state. The political reform initiated by the president - establishment of federal districts, the new order for forming the Federation Council - deprived the regions of the most part of their political influence, while the reform of budgetary relations reduced their economic independence.
I think that the basis of Putin's trend for authoritarianism and centralism is not a banal wish for absolute power but his disbelief in efficiency of democracy and developed federalism. Frightened by Yeltsin's chaos Putin has obviously overestimated the threat of real opposition and exaggerated the danger of regional separatism and "harm" if the independent media. He must be sincerely convinced that only concentration of the power in one hand will allow to extricate the country from the crisis. However, this is an illusion: recently we witnessed another "fight under the Kremlin carpet", when the new presidential team fought against the "old-timers". Apparently, an authoritarian leader is unable to prevent conflicts between commercial, political, group and personal interests even in his surrounding. An open political system when the authority is dispersed and controlled by independent civil institutions is much more efficient than closed, hierarchical-bureaucratic systems.
Question: What is Putin's character: is he a leader, a manager, a romantic, or a pragmatist?
Lilia Shevtsova: Putin is evolving. However, it is mostly noticeable by his behavior on the international arena - he is acquiring diplomatic gloss, relaxedness, becomes "reactive". On the contrary in the interior politics he is still diffident and suspicious - this leads to his willingness to lean on only familiar people. He obviously avoids open politics and open conflicts. Does he depend on someone? Undoubtedly, but his dependence of people and groups is a result of lack of experience and the aforementioned diffidence. At the same time the fact that Putin has managed to suppress the elite demonstrates that he is developing the power instinct, and the power teaches to be firm. Putin's behavior after September 11 events in the US proved that his reaction and choices can be intuitively correct and distinct.
Has Putin completely become a leader? So far his political fate has been favorable to him. He has managed to become a guarantee of the country's survival. However, time will say whether he will be able to become the Leader of the Breakthrough. His present position of an arbitrary, who is trying not to break the balance in favor of some elite grouping is rather inconvenient: sooner or later the president will become a hostage to some clan or a web of shadowy relations. The only way to avoid it is to leave the shade, using the public support if necessary. The paradox is that Russian society is more prepared than its ruling class for deep transformations.
(Translated by Arina Yevtikhova)
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