#4
From: "Peter Lavelle" <plavelle@metropol.ru>
Subject: Untimely Thoughts
Date: Sat, 12 Jan 2002

Peter Lavelle: Untimely Thoughts -
Smart, smarter, outsmarted? (re Putin in 2002)

The year ahead will be no picnic for Russia in general and Putin in particular. This is not because we should expect anything particularly disastrous to happen. I, unlike a number of other analysts, do not expect a repeat of the 1998 financial collapse. The challenge will stem from the two areas. Repeating the stellar macroeconomic performance of last year is hardly likely - expected international commodity prices makes this a virtual impossibility. The second is the discernable increase in expectations by most Russians, echoed by the political elite as well. This combination may put Putin and his government on the defensive during the year. In sum, this year will most likely be a task of discourse control. Or in media terms, success will be determined by who manages the "meaning of progress". Progress will have to be refined to include other benchmarks other than macroeconomic indicators.

Putin and his people will have to work particularly hard not to loose the momentum of the last 18 months. Actually, Putin's politics is only about momentum. The question "Who is Putin" is now and always has been irrelevant. "What is Putin" is far more germane. Very much like Clinton, Putin has chosen a politics of constant campaigning. This fit well with the American electorate of the 1990s where the media greatly determined the meaning of the message as well as its ultimate success. At this juncture, it is difficult to discern if this is effective for Russia. Clearly, the political function of the Russian media differs from its American counterpart. American administrations negotiate with the media, the Russian one appears to be more inclined to dictate. The communist period tells us that the definition of stupidity is the inability to learn. The media, for all its failings, on occasion teaches us a thing or two. A free (or at least a more free) media is to the President's advantage moving forward.

What made 2001 of interest is not merely a successful year in terms of the numbers, but the triumph of presentation and perception - form outdistanced content by a long shot. The discourse of "movement and change" is now hegemonic. This mode of political discourse made sense as the juggernaut of reform packages were developed by the Cabinet and passed by the Duma. While much remains to be done, there are justifiable expectations that last year's reforms should start to pay dividends. Fruition from last year's projects mostly likely will impact the perception of the present year's agenda. This will remain the case for the balance of Putin's present term as well. Essentially, in tune with the constant campaigning strategy, Putin now has a record to defend.

Putin has firmly established the necessity of reform and restructure. This is not only his agenda, but also the way he publicly presents the nature of Russian politics. He has also, as a result, firmly established what many Russians now come to perceive what the economist Thorstein Veblen called "stables of decency". Stables of decency are more than expectations. Expectations can, for the most part, be indexed in terms of macroeconomic success or failure. Stables of decency are much more psychological and relative; their social significance defines status, not necessarily real income. The Putin electorate enjoys some of the amenities that appear to define Russia's convergence with the west; i.e. mobile telephones, foreign travel, and other perceived luxuries. In an economy where social mobility remains limited, indexing these stables of decency may be the best public opinion poll available to the political elite.

The nature of political rhetoric has changed and is changing. In terms of political discourse, the rhetoric of power is in the process (at least formerly) of being replaced by the rhetoric of representation. I use the word formally due to the fact that the 'Putin Call-in Show' may have been just that - a show. Nonetheless, this is where the illusory civil society project may find an opening. Precedent demonstrates greater representation can alleviate perceived material and status depravation. This may be Putin's trump card or the makings of his demise. Meaningful reform cannot become a reality with the participation of civil society. Reaching out to the masses can be risky as well as highly profitable. The most gapping whole in Putin's reform-restructuring project is a meaningful recognition of civil society. If he needs to keep the momentum of his program of reform on track, civil society just may be the vehicle he needs most. Unfortunately, most of Russia's political elite will fight him tooth and nail if he attempts such a strategy. The interests of the ruling bureaucracy is a mirror antithesis if society's interests. Eventually Putin will have to choose for Russia.

Putin assumed the helm of state as a smart man with determination. Last year he demonstrated that he is smarter than at least the conventional political wisdom. This year, let's hope he doesn't outsmart himself. Putin needs to avoid the mistake Stolypin made a century ago: economic reform is not a substitute for, rather than accompaniment to, political reform.

Peter Lavelle
Head of Research
IFC Metropol
Moscow, Russia
plavelle@metropol.ru