#10
Analysts View Russia's Current Rapprochement With West, US; Further Prospects
Rossiyskaya Gazeta
9 January 2002
[translation for personal use only]
Interview with Sergey Kortunov, Pavel Zolotarev, and Boris Makarenko, participants in the Experts' Club discussion, by Vitaliy Dymarskiy and Vladimir Bogdanov; place and date not given:
"The Glass Is Half Full or Half Empty. What Stands Behind the Rapprochement Between Russia and the West"

"Only two sorts of people are really interesting: those who know everything about life and those who know nothing about it..." -- The Picture of Dorian Grey, by Oscar Wilde

The past year was marked by the unprecedented rapprochement in Russia's relationship with the West, particularly the United States. Many politicians from the two countries believe that the remaining differences in certain areas, including such important ones as strategic stability, are no longer viewed as an insurmountable obstacle to the general progressive development of cooperation. From the Kremlin and the White House, we can increasingly often hear statements that we have finally entered a road leading not only to partnership-like but also allied relations.

Is it really so? Are we not falling into yet another euphoric trap, engaging in wishful thinking? Sergey Kortunov, vice president of the Foreign Policy Association; retired Major General Pavel Zolotarev, president of the Interregional Public Foundation in Support of Military Reform; and Boris Makarenko, deputy general director of the Center for Political Technologies, who participated in the first session of the Experts' Club in this year, are reflecting on this matter.

[Rossiyskaya Gazeta] Let us start our session with the already classic question asked by many in recent months: What do the new relations between Russia and the West contain more: tactics or strategy? The old truth says that in big politics there are no friends but national interests. The declaration made by President Bush on 13 December 2001 on the unilateral withdrawal of the United States from the 1972 ABM Treaty confirms this truth. So, what is it: a marriage of love or convenience?

[Kortunov] It seems to me that the antiterrorist coalition is not a strategic alliance but an exclusively working body tackling a specific task. It is a long way to the strategic alliance. We should keep in mind one important circumstance: If a decision is made to make a radical turn in our foreign policy -- and this is exactly what our experts believe is happening -- this turn is impossible to do without consultations with the parliament, the main political forces in the country, and society. It is simply impossible to carry out by a decision of one person only -- the president, for example. I think we are yet to hold many discussions to find out to what extent it is tactics or strategy and how close we are going to move to the United States. So far, everything stays with the limits of the antiterrorist coalition.

[Zolotarev] It is fashionable now to deliberate on in what world we live, monopolar or multipolar. It seems to me that we are at a stage where we have a firmly established monopolar system in which the United States plays a dominant role, and that country naturally wants to strengthen it. There should be no monopolar or multipolar world. A multipolar world is an even more volatile condition. The only stable condition of a self-developing system is bipolar. In any case, the present situation is temporary.

The United States, as the single leader, needs a counterweight. It is Russia that can serve as such a counterweight. Notably, as an opponent, it can play quite a significant role first of all in an alliance with Europe. Therefore, I would rather not speak about a strategic or tactical line of the rapprochement with the United States.

[Makarenko] I think the question of whether it is a strategy or tactics can only be answered when we have analyzed the entire background of events. I would venture to give a tentative answer: It is neither a strategy nor tactics it is a pretext for moving in the direction in which we have been unable to move forward for a long time. Both objective and subjective factors prompted us to turn toward the West.

Putin assessed the 11 September events as a unique pretext for opening the "window of opportunities," as the Americans say. The president used this opportunity. However, one can see active opposition against this course in the press, in certain segments of the Russian elite, although our society as a whole views it differently. According to the latest polls, 82 percent of Russians approve of Putin's foreign policy line.

Our Center conducts its own sociological surveys, the so-called focus groups. Immediately after 11 September, the rapprochement with the United States was not welcomed because the Russians suddenly started to like that country. That was for completely opposite reasons. Earlier, Russian society had an inferiority complex for 10 years. The 11 September events showed the whole world, including our people, that the United States is not invulnerable and that other can hit it badly.

[Rossiyskaya Gazeta] What is the correlation between foreign and domestic policies? It stands to reason that the strategy and tactics in this sphere should be determined not single-handedly by the president but only through consultations with all political forces of the country. But with his high popularity rating, does Putin need it? After all, he can ignore the political elite, turning directly to public opinion.

[Kortunov] Then, the following question arises: Why do we need the parliament? What can happen inside Russia? It is a cardinal question. The big reform was started by Mikhail Gorbachev, not Vladimir Putin. We have already stepped several times on those rakes of reforms. I am talking about the euphoria over rapprochement with the United States and strategic partnership. Some time ago, Zbigniew Brzezinski published a famous article in which it called this partnership premature. As a result, we got nothing but additional irritants in our relations, such as NATO's eastward expansion and the ostentatious pullout of the United States from the AMB Treaty.

[Makarenko] I think that certain irritation is building up in different segments of military and political power because of that. This irritation may continue to build up, which may have a negative impact on the president's positive attempts to balance out foreign and domestic policies.

[Zolotarev] The structures connected with the vertical hierarchy of power and, consequently, Vladimir Putin's internal policy are being strengthened now. I see no particular problems for the president in this area. The main threats come from the economic condition of our country. It is a much more difficult and serious issue.

[Rossiyskaya Gazeta] "They have not learned anything" -- Does this phrase, said by Talleyrand about the Bourbon dynasty almost 200 years ago, apply to the Washington Administration?

[Makarenko] The withdrawal of the United States from the ABM Treaty brings to naught all the previous systems of control over nuclear arms. This naturally poses a question: What next? The arguments that we are not enemies and are not going to attack each other with nuclear arms are understandable to everyone but this is not the language that a control system speaks. Of course, our military officials, diplomats, and experts understand why the United States has pulled out of the ABM Treaty. There is one but, however! A different form, less insulting for Russia, could have been chosen. In international politics, national pride remains a very important factor.

[Kortunov] Security is a sacred thing, it is not for sale. In my opinion, we bungled the talks on the fate of the ABM Treaty. Specifically, this is evidenced by the uncoordinated declarations made by our government. Putin went to Washington with a clear position that the treaty is a cornerstone of strategic stability. But before his trip, literally one day before his arrival in Washington, Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov issued a declaration admitting that the treaty is a holdover from the Cold War. Naturally, that was a signal encouraging the other side to act more resolutely.

As for strategic stability, it has acquired a completely different dimension. After 11 September, all realized that mankind is now faced with completely new challenges and threats, which naturally influence strategic stability as well. Therefore, it would not be quite right, I believe, to say that the ABM Treaty is a cornerstone of strategic stability. If we want to move to genuine partnership, we should be talking not about the ABM Treaty but about the situation of mutual deterrence and we should change this situation in the first place, which means go beyond the limits of deterrence.

[Zolotarev] I would agree with Sergey Kortunov when he speaks about a contradiction that needs to be resolved. It is a contradiction between the absence of political reasons to rely on nuclear arguments and the fact that we are at the same time forced to maintain our nuclear arsenals in the condition of readiness for mutual destruction. We are forced to do so due to the organizational and technical measures that were undertaken back during the creation of this system.

We are the captives of the weapons that we created, which must be trained on someone due to their amount. Paradoxically, however, we do not have enough targets. According to the studies conducted recently in the United States, it is enough to have 51 charges to destroy Russia.

[Kortunov] Theoretically, France, too, can wipe out the United States with its nuclear arms. Ideally, before liquidating nuclear arms, we could try to attain the same relations between Russia and the United States as those between France and the United States. It would be an interim stage on the way to full elimination of nuclear arms.

[Makarenko] Let us recall the old formula: What is NATO for? To keep America inside, Germany at the bottom, and Russia away. It is increasingly hard to keep Germany at the bottom of NATO. America is still successfully kept inside even though this is beginning to give the Europeans a headache. That was clearly visible after the operation in Kosovo, when the Europeans realized that they would not have conducted this kind of operation without the Americans. It was exactly when the plans to create the European defense potential were stepped up. But what should be done with Russia? Even big European countries, let alone the smaller ones, are not ready to accept our country as an equal partner.

[Rossiyskaya Gazeta] Should Russia look in one direction only, at the West? What role do you see for the Chinese factor?

[Zolotarev] Russia certainly cannot be oriented at one direction only. Its policy has many vectors. As for China's role on the international arena as a whole, I do not think that country will ever claim any leading role on a global scale, it is not in keeping with Beijing's traditions.

[Kortunov] The rapprochement with the West will not ensure the creation of a firm international security system. As we are invited to the Western security system, we should still keep in mind that it is a Euro-Atlantic model. Meanwhile, Russia is a Eurasian country, which is why an ideal option for it would be to build a Eurasian, not Euro-Atlantic security system. The former, however, cannot be built without such states as China or India.

[Makarenko] I hope that our politicians have grown out of short pants, the "short pants" being a desire to play the "Europe vs. the United States" game. It stands to reason that there are contradictions and they should be tactically used. However, the Euro-Atlantic system should not be tested for endurance this way -- it only angers both Europe and the United States.

[Kortunov] Naturally, the issue of Russia's entry into NATO is arising. But, as Churchill once said, if Russia joins NATO, that would eliminate the entire rationale of this organization.

[Rossiyskaya Gazeta] Let us go back to the beginning of our conversation: the antiterrorist coalition. It is clear that the alliances of this kind, which are based on a common enemy, are temporary. The anti-Hitler coalition existed until May of 1945 and then was followed by the Cold War. Is this not what may happen in our case after the antiterrorist coalition has carried out its task? Do its members have common long-term interests?

[Kortunov] It seems to me that only the countries with similar political systems can be allies. We are currently only moving toward the model designed by the West. When we build truly mature democracy, which would not only be of representative type but also supported by civil society, then we would probably be able to talk about a strategic alliance or a union with the West and the United States.

[Zolotarev] What is going on now is a struggle with consequences but not at all with causes. If you analyze the reasons for the growing international terrorism, you will see that they are connected in particular with the legacy left by secret services. Notably, the Western legacy proved to have more staying power. Why? Because the West relied specifically on the ideology of extremist trends in Islam. Meanwhile, our ideology disappeared.

The other factor: the process of globalization, which bred transnational corporations. They, too, may encounter situations requiring reliance on military force, which they do not have. The methods of international terror may prove quite acceptable for them.

[Makarenko] Let me compare the current globalization processes to the era of the 1940-60's, when the international system of colonialism collapsed. It fell down when two value factors came into play. On the one hand, there was a rise in national self-awareness and the national liberating movement, which was largely prompted by the European civilizing mission. On the other hand, the Western liberal projects reached a point in their development where forcibly retaining other territories and other nations became perceived as something indecent and inadmissible in terms of values.

At present, the processes of globalization already force the West to think whether terrorism may be caused by a wide gap between the rich and the poor.

[Rossiyskaya Gazeta] Suppose terrorism has been radically curtailed, if not eliminated. Do Russia and the West have no other common interests?

[Kortunov] First of all, it is an economic interest. Therefore, now that we have already declared that we are integrating into the liberal project there is an issue of pace and forms of this integration. You can integrate based on equal partnership or as a supplement for raw materials.

[Zolotarev] The conflicts between states are already history. At present, mostly internal conflicts take place. Therefore, not a single European country tries at present to create Armed Forces that could independently resolve some serious tasks, even in a local war. Only as part of a coalition. They save their resources this way. Thus, I do not think any military foundation for a union here. Different times have come.

[Makarenko] Both Europe and we need peace in the Balkans. Both Europe and we need the Middle East conflict to be settled down. Both Europe and we find the totalitarian nature of the Saddam Husayn regime unpleasant. This constitutes a foundation for cooperation and competition at the same time. Sometimes, this competition can be quite harsh. Besides, Russia and the West have very different views on methods of resolving these problems.

[Rossiyskaya Gazeta] Many thanks for participating in the work of the Experts' Club. It seems that we can make one conclusion: In recent months, the "glass has become rather half full," not half empty, in relations between Russia and the West.