Johnson's Russia List
#6007
6 January 2002
davidjohnson@erols.com
A CDI Project
www.cdi.org

[Note from David Johnson:
DJ: REQUEST: I would like to hear from JRL recipients with 
hotmail.com email addresses. Are you receiving? Every issue?
I still receive many bounced messages from hotmail addresses
and will be deleting more of them.

1. Interfax: Russian patriarch asks Russians to pray for the whole of
mankind.
2. Interfax: More than half of Russian citizens feel nostalgic about 
pre-reform years.
3. Baltimore Sun: Douglas Birch, Making spirits brrright. Moscow: A hardy 
people warmly welcome winter's snowy but dangerous beauty. 
4. New York Times: Alison Smale, Russia's Leaders Are Different. It's the 
People Who Are the Same.
5. Arch Getty: Re: 6004-Hypothermia.
6. BBC Monitoring: Russia's first lady sees it as her mission to raise her 
country's status abroad.
7. The Guardian (UK): Ian Traynor, Between uye and me, it's a dollar.
8. Robert Bruce Ware: Kinship in the Caucasus ( re. Mereu JRL 6006).
9. BBC Monitoring: Senior Russian clergyman reveals views on Orthodox 
Christmas and other matters.
10. The Observer (UK): Anthony Browne, 'Myth' of Chernobyl suffering
exposed. Relocation and hand-outs have caused more illness than radiation, a new UN 
study concludes. 
11. Wall Street Journal Europe: Vladimir Socor, Putin's 'Near-abroad'
Gambit in the Baltics.
12. Dominique Arel: Call for Papers. Nationalism, Identity and Regional 
Cooperation: Compatibilities and Incompatibilities.]  

******

#1
Russian patriarch asks Russians to pray for the whole of mankind

MOSCOW. Jan 6 (Interfax) - On Christmas eve, Patriarch Alexy II of Moscow
and All Russia asked all Russian Orthodox believers to pray more zealously
for their Fatherland, for their neighbors and for the whole of mankind. 
   "We are still experiencing many difficulties and problems - poverty,
social vulnerability, the threat of terrorism and crime, the propaganda of
immorality, the epidemic of alcoholism and drug addiction, and other
appalling vices," the Russian patriarch wrote in his Christmas message. "As
the root of all of these evils is the injury of the human soul, it is
impossible to change society for the better without faith, hope and love,"
Alexy II wrote. 
   The Russian patriarch expressed serious concern about the current
international situation. "In our turbulent world, people are again fighting
against each other, and thousands of civilians in different countries have
fallen victim to the evil will. God also sent many trials to Russia, which
was befallen by floods, storms and droughts last year," he wrote. 
   "But even in the worst of circumstances Christians must never forget the
Savior's words, 'Don't be afraid and keep believing,' addressed to each of
us," the Russian patriarch said. 

******

#2
More than half of Russian citizens feel nostalgic about pre-reform years

MOSCOW. Jan 6 (Interfax) - More than half of Russian citizens (55.1%), if
offered a choice, prefer life before the reform launched in 1991 to their
present-day life. 
   Less than one third of those polled (32.6%) prefer today's life, and
12.3% of the respondents were undecided. The poll of 2,000 respondents was
conducted by the ROMIR-Gallup International independent opinion research
group on New Year's Eve. 

******

#3
Baltimore Sun
January 6, 2002
Making spirits brrright
Moscow: A hardy people warmly welcome winter's snowy but dangerous beauty. 
By Douglas Birch
Sun Foreign Staff

MOSCOW - With scores of citizens freezing to death on its streets, icicles
the size of tree logs crashing onto the sidewalks and pedestrians tumbling
down slick sidewalks, the city of Moscow is a perilous winter wonderland. 

Which is just the way most Muscovites seem to like it. While biting cold
always seems to catch American cities by surprise, Muscovites welcome it as
a familiar - if somewhat dangerous - old friend. 

Recent winters have been messy affairs. There were alternate freezes and
thaws, with little snow to speak of before January. This season is Dr.
Zhivago-perfect. Snow has fallen almost every day since the middle of last
month, and temperatures have remained well below freezing since
mid-November. Moscow, normally brown and gray this time of year, is a
sparkling white. 

"This December was very unusual," said Gennady Yeliseev, deputy director of
the Russian State Committee on Meteorology. It was only the third December
on record when temperatures never rose above freezing. Now the forecast
calls for temperatures to slip to a bracing minus 12 tomorrow, the Russian
Orthodox Christmas. And the rest of the month is expected to be unusually
cold. 

Russians don't find this particularly alarming. Winter only slows life but
never stops it. Cross-country skiers slide through wooded parkland, and ice
fishermen flock to the Moscow River, where they swig vodka and angle for
chemical-resistant fish. Theaters, museums and circuses are crowded. 

Even swimmers are undeterred. In Moscow's Timiryazev Forest park last
weekend, passers-by watched two men chop a hole in the ice covering a pond,
strip off their clothes and jump in. On New Year's Eve, with temperatures
about 15 degrees, revelers descended on Gorky Park. A few hardy souls rode
the giant Ferris wheel, and others zipped around in a roller coaster
resembling a green dragon - throwing off sparks and generating a wind chill
factor too cold to contemplate. (The amusement park has never closed for
weather.) Ice skaters spun around the park's labyrinth of paths, and
children careered down a slide made of blocks of ice. 

Gorky Park Deputy Director Ludmila Kozlovskaya said parents don't usually
bring toddlers or younger children to the park in biting cold. But last
week, crowds of children showed up for festivals and events - including a
visit with Ded Moroz, Russia's Father Frost. A hardy 1,000 to 1,500 visit
daily - no matter the cold. 

Moscow's zoo has never closed because of cold. One zoo worker recalled Jan.
1, 1979, when the temperature dropped to a record minus 40; a family showed
up and eagerly roamed the exhibits. The family had traveled from the
Yakutia region of Siberia and wouldn't let a nip in the air keep it from
enjoying its trip to Moscow. 

They know cold in Yakutia: The town of Oymyakon, in Yakutia, recorded 90
degrees below zero Feb. 6, 1933, a record exceeded only by 129 below zero
July 21, 1983, in what was then Soviet Antarctica. 

When the temperature drops sharply, the Moscow zoo moves indoors the
animals not adapted to the cold. Thousands of Moscovites are less fortunate. 

As of Friday, the new year was barely 4 days old - and 14 people had frozen
to death on Moscow streets. Hypothermia has claimed 281 lives this winter,
a record for so early in the season. Most of the victims are homeless men,
alcoholics who die because they fall asleep in doorways or parks.
Passers-by - who will rush to the aid of a woman who slips and bumps her
knee - generally ignore vagrants. 

The cold isn't the only killer. Falling icicles are a major peril,
bludgeoning or spearing the unwary. Squads of city workers climb to the top
of buildings and chop at accumulated snow and ice while others below shout
and wave at pedestrians, forcing them to veer off the sidewalks into the
streets - often into Moscow's wild traffic. 

Side streets are more clogged with snow this winter, and sidewalks are
unusually slippery. In part, that's because the city government decided to
reduce the use of snow-melting chemicals. City officials say they are
concerned about the effects of the chemicals on city flower beds and parks.
But millions of Muscovites are opposed for less environmental reasons: The
chemicals rust their cars and ruin expensive boots. 

People cope because they know how to dress warmly. Some Russians break out
their valenki, or traditional, knee-high felt boots in the winter. Everyone
wears a hat, even if it's only a knit watch cap. Even the humblest
restaurants have coat rooms. 

Fashion sometimes takes precedence over comfort - or even safety. In
overheated Metro cars, bundled-up Muscovites never take off their hats or
unbutton their coats, apparently out of fear of appearing slovenly.
Moscow's stylish young women, all of whom seem to wear extravagant furs,
clomp down icy sidewalks in patent leather boots with spiked heels. 

In Russia, a "Christmas frost" is a legendary early January cold snap, said
Yeliseev, the meteorologist. And that's exactly where Moscow might be headed. 

He seemed delighted by the prospect. 

"At last, we will be able to experience what 'Christmas frost' really
means," he said, "about which we have heard so much but didn't have a
chance to live through." 

******

#4
New York Times
January 6, 2002
Russia's Leaders Are Different. It's the People Who Are the Same.
By ALISON SMALE
MOSCOW

FOR someone who has known Russia for 20 years, but who lived in the West in
the 1990's, perhaps the most striking thing about Vladimir V. Putin's
Moscow is how familiar it feels.

When I lived here in the 1980's, it was scarcely surprising that everybody
danced to the tune played from the Kremlin. It was the time of deepest
Communist stagnation, and falling in line was the surest way to survive.
Whatever the latest pronouncement of the latest elderly leader — Leonid I.
Brezhnev, Yuri V. Andropov or Konstantin U. Chernenko — their vocabulary
and phrases were sure to be parroted for weeks on end in the official
media. When it came time to vote, the requisite red flags and posters went
up in my neighborhood, and the residents trotted into the appointed polling
place, voted for the prescribed candidates, and hoped for some reward like
a rare shipment of mandarin oranges.

Those days are gone and they will not return. Yet after the heady wonder of
glasnost, or openness, that Mikhail S. Gorbachev brought in the late 80's,
and the chaotic, corrupt, yet exhilarating turn to capitalism and free
expression that followed under Boris N. Yeltsin, the aura that surrounds
Mr. Putin seems strangely lifeless.

The old and the new exist side by side. By night, Moscow's buildings are
bathed in light as never before, though dozens of towns are once again
without heat and power this winter. Chic young women strut the streets of
the capital, but they are not much nearer to feminist independence than
their dowdier, plumper grandmothers.

The Kremlin, however, is as impenetrable as it ever was. Russia's leader,
like the czars of old, has always set the tone for the country. Now it is
Mr. Putin, and what he radiates is the managerial air of the capable,
intelligent former K.G.B. official and Young Communist that he is. For all
that he speaks fluent German, and has turned the country westward, his
universe is unmistakably Soviet. Opposition is weak, and the war in
Chechnya has receded both in the news and in ordinary conversations.
Russians seem to have concluded that they are not really in charge of what
the government does. So if their leader promises to take care of their
lives, they will get on with living them and pay politics little heed.

That does not mean, however, that they are not warily on the watch.
Conditioned by a harsh and unpredictable history, Russians appear
disillusioned and cynical. Surveys conducted by the New Siberian University
in Siberia since 1992 found at the end of 2001 that only 6 percent of
respondents had any faith in political parties, only 10 to 12 percent
believe the media, and just 18 percent trust the Russian Orthodox Church,
which enjoyed the trust of 60 percent of respondents just 5 years ago.

Several commentators marked the end of 2001 by noting the anemic state of
political life, citing as evidence a Dec. 24 phone-in with the always
unflappable Mr. Putin, and a recent Kremlin meeting he held with invited
civic and human rights groups. Television still usually shows the president
and his official guest of the day facing each other in wooden poses and
with no sound coming from their mouths — only an announcer's voice- over.
Can this be the same Vladimir Putin who stood and bantered — albeit with
visible discomfort — at the side of a folksy George W. Bush, fielding
questions from Texas teenagers? 

No Russian has a simple answer. While Mr. Bush claims to have seen into Mr.
Putin's soul, Russians make many things of their president. His popularity
rating, if the opinion polls are to be believed (and that is always a
question here), is at around 80 percent. But that may mean little more than
that he has brought stability after 15 years of turbulence. "We need a
rest," said Larissa Anno, a friend from my years of living here who used to
teach English and now has turned her linguistic skills to advantage in
business. Mr. Putin spoke to this sentiment in his televised message to the
populace at New Year's, promising Russians that he would work to make 2002
still "more predictable."

The newspapers, meanwhile, are markedly less full of verve than in the
Gorbachev and Yeltsin days, and they are capable of fawning praise for that
kind of goal. In 2001, oozed the labor daily Trud the other day, "Russia
objectively lived the best year in its modern history." Its analyst, Vitaly
Golovachev, went on to explain that "hopelessness, apathy, pessimism used
to weaken the Russian society like corrosion eroding metal," but the
situation took a turn for the better under Mr. Putin, once he had "defined
the contours of a clear- cut policy" to strengthen the state and improve
"the well-being and dignity of Russian citizens."

In fact, Russia's economy benefited from a couple of years of high prices
for oil and gas, which Russia exports, and from the ruble crash of 1998,
which made Russian firms more competitive on the domestic market. These
developments have helped to increase the aura of well-being, at least in
Moscow, where New Year's food and presents flew off the shelves at gleaming
24-hour supermarkets. In the capital, there is a growing educated middle
class that has found its way in the new Russia, earning and spending the
fruits of honest livelihoods, and making it nearly impossible to book a
flight abroad over the three-week Christmas-New Year's-Orthodox Christmas
holiday period.

But even those around Mr. Putin hesitate to trust in a bright new future.
His economic adviser, Andrei Illarionov, recently said that hopes of
breaking corruption had so far proven illusory, and that the government
could take almost no credit for the recent economic growth. Meanwhile,
critical voices from abroad, as well as from inside Russia, point to the
shutdown of the old independent NTV, the attempt to do the same with TV6
(which won at least a temporary stay of execution from a court last week),
the sentencing last month of a journalist for treason and above all Mr.
Putin's own background in the K.G.B. as proof that he wants to control a
Soviet-style state and crush civil society. That seems unlikely in the
extreme; still, Mr. Putin's rule is full of paradoxes. How to account, say,
for that court reprieve for TV6, or for Mr. Putin's sudden embrace of the
West after Sept. 11? 

There is nothing inside him, no culture, convictions or principles," said
Valeriya Novodvorskaya, a fiercely independent woman who was once a Soviet
dissident and now is among the president's most outspoken critics. "The
Chekists," she said, using a Lenin-era term for the secret police, "are
comedians. They will play any role, don any mask. They are what any
particular time demands of them." Mr. Putin, she argued, is an intelligent
observer of world affairs, and recognized that international terrorism
might not stop at the United States; therefore, it was to his benefit to
turn to the West, particularly at a time when falling oil prices might
threaten the veneer of prosperity his presidency has so far brought.

INSTEAD of smiling upon such a guest and feeding him steak on a Texas
ranch, she said, the West should keep careful watch. Instead of agreeing
with Mr. Putin that the war in Chechnya is a war on Islamic extremism, she
said, the West "cannot keep quiet about it on a state level. Such silence
already reduces Western democracy."

What is needed, her comments seemed to suggest, is for the West and the
Russian populace to both take on the role of the old bride-to-be of Russian
folk custom, who was handed a tangled ball of thread on the eve of her
wedding. If she untangled it, she would be an excellent wife for her
complicated, problematic partner. It seemed an apt metaphor for the
problematic marriage that both the West and Russia have made with Mr.
Putin. The problem is that after a period of curiosity under Mr. Gorbachev
and Mr. Yeltsin, many Russians, and many in the West, appear to have
decided at least for now that the tangle is too vexing to unsnarl, and so
they have cast the ball of thread aside, and are devoting themselves to
simpler pleasures.

Indeed, as I walked down the snow-laden street where I lived in the 1980's,
I found it tempting to agree. The TV may be vulgar, the corruption
widespread, the people alternatively servile or cruel. But there is almost
nothing to compare with the sheer joy of sledding down a hill next to the
restored onion domes of the Novospassky Monastery, watching the men who sit
for hours fishing a hole in the ice, and listening to the gleeful shrieks
of women exulting in the rosy cheeks of their coddled and muffled children,
soon to be borne home, fed and put to that most blissful of Russian
conditions, sleep. 

*******

#5
Date: Sat, 05 Jan 2002 
Subject: Re: 6004-Hypothermia
From: Arch Getty <getty@ucla.edu>

Sarah Karush's interesting article on Russian homeless people freezing to
death (JRL 6004) leaves out one important fact.   Yes, alcoholism and
official indifference are major factors in the growth of street freezing
deaths.  But it's also one of many ancillary effects of privatization since
1990.  

In Soviet times, entryways to apartment buildings were typically left
unlocked and it was more the rule than exception in winter to find a drunk
sleeping in the warm space under the stairway.  Since 1990, many of these
buildings, or the apartments in them, have been privatized and the new
owners have installed deadbolts or code locks on the exterior doors.  In
other words, warmed urban public space accessible to street people in Moscow
and other cities has been drastically reduced.

It would be nice to know more about the political economy of urban spaces.
Who lives where, goes where, and shops where as a function of changing
ownership and rental patterns since 1990 is an interesting topic for study.

******

#6
BBC Monitoring
Russia's first lady sees it as her mission to raise her country's status
abroad 
Source: Komsomolskaya Pravda, Moscow, in Russian 28 Dec 01

Lyudmila Putina, Vladimir Putin's wife, has said it was her dream to raise
the status of the Russian language abroad. She said that, accompanying her
husband on his foreign trips, she "tells people more about our country,
about how it lives and what it is striving for", thus making more friends
for Russia. She believes every Russian should work towards "restoring the
former respect for Russia and its people and culture". In an interview with
Komsomolskaya Pravda correspondent Aleksandr Gamov, Russia's first lady
spoke, among other things, about her family, her work with underage
criminals and Putin as her husband. The following is the excerpt from
report by Russian newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda on 28 December, the
subheadings are the newspaper's own:

On the eve of the New Year your Komsomolskaya Pravda correspondent visited
the Putins' home and interviewed the country's First Lady...

Why does Vladimir Vladimirovich not sing?

[Gamov] It has been reported in the newspapers that you have changed your
image-maker.

[Putina] What do you mean? I have never had an image-maker.

[Gamov] So who works on your image?

[Putina] I rely on my own intuition.

[Gamov] Well, do you have stylists and dress designers?

[Putina] I try to follow my own understanding of beauty, fashion and style.

[Gamov] Where do you get your clothes made or where do you buy them? How do
you follow fashion?

[Putina] I get things made for me in Russia but I do buy ready-made clothes
as well.

I scarcely follow fashion. I see how the people around me are dressed,
including my friends, and I choose something for myself like that.

[Gamov] What exactly?

[Putina] I like bright, stylish, original clothes. You look at a fabric and
you think: What can I make from it? And you hold it up against yourself and
it falls of its own accord and suddenly you can see a particular line or
style of collar. That is, it is all done by sense of touch. But as for
following fashion, no.

[Gamov] Do you go to the theatre and exhibitions "unofficially?" Do you
have time to watch television?

[Putina] My main sources of information nowadays are the Internet and
television. I love the theatre but I virtually never go, there is too much
excitement in daily life anyhow. There is simply no time for "unofficial"
visits to exhibitions.

[Gamov] And what are your musical preferences?

[Putina] I like our popular singers and popular music. There is no
particular principle to it: I hear a tune and like it and enjoy listening
to it. I am very fond of ballads.

[Gamov] Do you sing yourself?

[Putina] I hum along among friends.

[Gamov] And Vladimir Vladimirovich?

[Putina] As a rule not. And I have not seen him often among friends
recently, he has no time at all. It is mainly business meetings and business.

What is an atmosphere of love?

[Gamov] You and Vladimir Vladimirovich have been married and parents for a
long time. You probably have your own secrets for bringing up children.

[Putina] There are no secrets. The atmosphere in which he lives and is
raised is important to every child. Vladimir Vladimirovich had that in mind
when he said in his book that he grew up in an atmosphere of love. I would
add to that the habit of regular work which we try to instil in our daughters.

[Gamov] What habit is that?

[Putina] Children should be fully occupied in their free time. Our
daughters have played the violin all their lives, for instance. Of course
children want to wander about and play with their dolls and more often
simply do nothing. But that should not go on all the time.

[Gamov] And they should not run wild?

[Putina] Intuition will tell you how to act in a particular situation. And
it is fairness that should probably be the criterion. With a child you
should not follow the principle: I shall do what I want with you! You must
realize that he is a person who has the right to choose, the right to some
feelings of his own. And you should let him slob around some of the time.
But it should not become a habit.

And then there is taking care of their health so that all this regular work
does not take its toll. I have never demanded high marks from my children.
I believe the main thing is knowledge. And if your teacher has given you a
three or a two, then there are plenty of reasons why that has happened. A
child cannot be alert all the time: he may have let go or been chatting to
someone, and that is why he got a low mark.

Children should not be afraid of their parents, they should respect them.
The lack of fear in a child, concern for his health, love - it is probably
all that combined which helps us bring someone up. Isn't that so?

Why she tours prisons

[Gamov] A not entirely festive question. I remember you spent a whole day
at the colony for underage criminal girls near Ryazan. Before that you
visited the Mozhaysk women's penal colony. And then the Duma announced an
amnesty for prisoners who had not committed grave crimes, primarily women
and children. They say it was not without your involvement.

[Putina] Yes, at the Mozhaysk colony, they amnestied 10 people at once. But
it is the legislative and law-enforcement bodies that are involved in that.
My main task is to draw society's attention to the problems of child crime.

After all, often children break the law under pressure of external
circumstances without even thinking about the consequences of their
actions. Only later, at the penal colony, having grown up in terms of both
years and world outlook, and I have seen this for myself, do many (if not
all) want to return to normal life and forget the nightmare which they
encountered in their "former" life...

[Gamov] Lyudmila Aleksandrovna, do you get a lot of letters?

[Putina] Yes, a great many. And some of them are painful to read. You want
to help, to make an effort, to take a part in the fate of destitute people.

[Gamov] Do you manage it?

[Putina] Not always. I simply do not have enough time or strength. But now,
as the president's wife, I have several assistants. Which, incidentally,
has never happened before. And I hope this will enable me to work more
effectively.

What will "women's programme" give Russia?

[Gamov] This year is emerging as a very busy one for the Russian president.
He has a lot of trips, particularly foreign ones. During state visits you
often work on a separate so-called "women's programme". What does that give
you personally? And, of course, the state?

[Putina] If we are speaking of personal communications with heads of state
that enables us to get to know each other better from the purely human
viewpoint. That gives rise to mutual trust. And since politics are made by
people, it is clear that this to some degree affects the decisions which
are made. Hardly to a radical extent, but in part.

And then you know that after trips abroad you take a somewhat different
view of our own problems.

During the visit to Austria in February this year, I visited St Anna
children's hospital in Vienna with the chancellor's wife [as published],
Mrs Klestil-Leffler. While we were there what pleasantly surprised and
delighted me was how lonely and elderly people voluntarily come to the
hospital to help the children and medical personnel. They care for the
children as best they can, play with them, read books to them and try to
make things as easy as possible for them.

It seems to me that several problems are resolved at the same time in this
way: The children feel they are being cared for by the adults and lonely
people are not so lonely. I though: That is how things should be in our
country!

Of course, when I go abroad I try to tell people more about our country,
about how it lives and what it is striving for. I believe that we must all
restore the former respect for Russia and its people and culture. The
broader the range of those who get to know our country better, the more
friends we will have.

And I have another dream - restoring the Russian language as a means of
international communication at the international level. I have already seen
how Russian language centres in the countries of the far abroad are little
bridges which also link our countries and help draw attention to our
multiethnic culture.

There are arguments even in the president's family

[Gamov] Do you discuss everything with the Russian president? How does he
react?

[Putina] The Russian president is for me first of all my husband. Yes,
there are many problems which perturb me and as a wife, as a woman, I do of
course discuss them with Vladimir Vladimirovich when he has a few minutes
to spare.

Although that can be difficult: The president gives virtually all his time
to work. But when we touch on some problem I say what I think about it and
sometimes even argue.

But I greatly value my husband's opinion and our views most often coincide.

About Tosya, Romeo, Rodeo and Koni

[Gamov] You have three dogs at home?

[Putina] Yes. There is mommy Tosya, a two-and-a-half-year-old toy poodle,
and her son Rodeo, who is just over a year old. Tosya had two sons: Romeo
and Rodeo. We gave away Romeo when he was six weeks old. We intended to
give Rodeo away as well but he has stayed home, it was his decision,
nothing would persuade him to go anywhere else.

And we have a female Labrador, Koni - she is supposed to be Vladimir
Vladimirovich's dog. She is just over a year old. All our dogs are very
good-natured and affectionate and are intelligent and brave of course, and
we love them and they love us.

Astrologers asked not to get upset

[Gamov] Do you believe in horoscopes and the New Year advice of Oriental
sages?

[Putina] No, I'm not interested. Although when they say that you should
wear white to see in this New Year and red to see in that New Year, I try
to follow that advice more or less.

[Gamov] How do you spend holidays, for instance the New Year holiday? Do
you have any family traditions?

[Putina] If we are at home then as a rule we spend holidays in a close
circle: Our own family and perhaps some close friends.

[Gamov] And what about presents?

[Putina] Either I do not give any at all or if I do decide to give them
then I think about them and choose them carefully. As if they were for me.
I like giving and receiving useful things. Although I am impatient: When I
buy a birthday present two months in advance I have to give it immediately,
I can't wait.

[Gamov] And Vladimir Vladimirovich?

[Putina] In that sense he has always surprised me. He is self-controlled
and patient in those cases. We were on vacation together one winter. On the
morning of my birthday I woke up and on the night table next to me was a
gold chain and cross. It turned out he had got it ready two months earlier
when we went to Jerusalem together, he had bought the cross there, had it
blessed at the Holy Sepulchre, and gave it to me.

Belief in god is very personal

[Gamov] Komsomolskaya Pravda recently printed extracts from an interview
given by archimandrite Tikhon, abbot of the Sretenskiy monastery and
Vladimir Vladimirovich's confessor, given to the Greek newspaper Khora. He
says that all the members of the president's family are Orthodox believers,
go to church, confess and take communion.

[Putina] Yes, that is so. We go to church about once a month.

[Gamov] What does faith mean for you?

[Putina] I do not like to talk about it just like that, out loud, in
public. It is very personal.... Although I can say that faith can be a
unifying factor for people.

[Gamov] Does that apply only to Orthodox Christians?

[Putina] It seems to me that in the bright, harmonious future of which many
people dream mankind must come to a single faith. Or at least to the
mutually-respectful coexistence of different faiths - without wars, without
spite, without violence. Because the Orthodox religion like, incidentally,
the majority of other religions, preaches the ideas of reciprocal love and
tolerance above all...

*******

#7
The Guardian (UK)
5 January 2002
Capital Letters: Between uye and me, it's a dollar 
BY IAN TRAYNOR IN MOSCOW

In this era of newly minted money and dustbin currencies it's a tall order
finding a euro here in Europe's second biggest city, but you can't avoid
its near relative the uye

The best restaurants list their prices in uyes. Supermarkets, too. A beer
will set you back four uyes. A cup of coffee at the airport? A couple of
uyes. The rent is paid, a car is hired and wages are doled out in wads of
uyes.

In a manner of speaking, that is. Because there are no notes or coins
bearing the word "uye". It is an abstraction, a counting device, a
euphemism for the dollar.

The word is an acronym, the initials of two words translating as "agreed
unit". The unit that has been unquestionably agreed is the dollar. And in
Moscow the dollar is king.

But the legal tender in Moscow and the rest of Russia, of course, is the
long-suffering rouble. Your bar bill or shopping basket is effectively
calculated in dollars, but you don't pay in them. That would be against the
law.

So you work out the total of "agreed units" pegged to that day's exchange
rate and hand over the sum in roubles.

Anyone will quote you that day's exchange rate of the rouble to the dollar
as slickly as a City trader rattling off share prices.

You can't walk down a city-centre street without passing a little booth
manned by bouncers taking in greenbacks and dishing out roubles. There are
hundreds of them. The better cash dispensers ask you whether you want
roubles or dollars.

The result is that tens of billions of dollars are privately stashed away
in Russia. Some estimate as much as $60bn (pounds 42bn).

Chastened by years of inflation, rotten banks and vanished savings,
Muscovites keep their money at home, preferably in dollars, and change it
daily or weekly for their routine outgoings.

I recently asked a Muscovite for his bank account details, to make a money
transfer. He responded in bewilderment, as if no halfway sensible person
would entrust his dollars to a Moscow bank.

Given its geographical proximity to the EU and the fact that 40% of
Russia's trade is with the union, Moscow's love affair with the dollar is
strange. But its staying power is obvious every time you run the customs
gauntlet at the airport on your way out. Bringing in dollars is good.
Taking them out is bad. That is what arouses suspicion and triggers
interrogation.

"How much foreign currency do you have?" "Any dollars?" the officer asks.
He or she will then poke through your bags, rifle the contents of your
wallet. The roubles are ignored. The dollars are counted. You're allowed to
take $1,500 without declaring it. Anything more invites a missed flight.

Russian zillionaires, of course, have no such problems. Year after year
they strip the country of its wealth, sending an average of $25bn a year to
Switzerland, the Channel Islands or New York.

President Vladimir Putin likes to tell the people that he wants to make
Russia a "normal" country. One mark of his success will be when Russians
trust the rouble in the way they do the dollar. That will take a while.

Presidents and prime ministers come and go. The euro is as much of an
abstraction as the uye, but a lot less familiar. But the dollar is a constant.

******

#8
From: "Robert Bruce Ware" <...@brick.net>
Subject: Kinship in the Caucasus ( re. Mereu JRL 6006)
Date: Sat, 5 Jan 2002 1

Francesca Mereu and RFE/RL deserve credit for the two part series on
religion and social structure in Chechnya ("War Destroyed Chechnya's Clan
Structure", " Islam Plays Fundamental Role In North Caucasus Life", JRL
6006). The articles are rare in that they place the conflict in Chechnya
into broader cultural and historical contexts. The failure of most reports
to do the same has led to much confusion during the last few years.
However, in the first article, on Chechen social structure, the author
seems to have missed the point. 

After describing Chechen teips and tukums, two of the seven layers of
Chechen kinship structure, Mereu observes the disruption of these
structures as a consequence of demographic shifts occurring during the
present conflict. Certainly the war has had an effect upon Chechen kinship
structure. But we will not understand the situation in Chechnya until we
also consider the effect that Chechen kinship structure has had upon the war.

The traditional fragmentation of Chechen society among kinship structures,
such as teips and tukums, has prevented the consolidation of an overarching
and authoritative political structure requisite for the rule of law and the
development of a legitimate economy. Due to its failure to organize a
modern state, Chechnya's three years of de facto independence (August 1996
to September 1999) were a catastrophe for the people of Chechnya and for
the people of the region, who were terrorized by the chaos and criminality
that characterized Chechen society and spilled across its borders on a
daily basis. 

Had Chechnya been able to avoid this failure then it is probable that today
Chechnya would be consolidating its independence in peace and growing
prosperity. But the fact of this failure made Russian intervention not only
inevitable but morally mandatory. Russia had a responsibility to protect
its citizens in the region, including its Muslim citizens, and many of
those with experience in the region spent most of 1998 and 1999 wondering
when Moscow would accept that responsibility. 

Nothing could make this point more clearly than Mereu's own account of
Chechen President Maskhadovs failure to punish Chechen warlord Salman
Raduev for his 1996 raid on the Dagestani city of Kizlyar. Raduev and his
gang held 3,000 Dagestanis hostage in a hospital, culminating (with Russian
military assistance) in the deaths of 78 people. Mereu observes that
Chechen kinship structures prevented Maskhadov from acting against Raduev,
and thereby serving justice at the same time he preserved relations with
Dagestan. It seems that both Raduev and Maskhadovs wife are members of the
Gordaloy teip. Hence, Raduev could not be brought to justice until he was
apprehended by Russian troops and sentenced, in December, by a court in
Dagestan. Russian institutions were required to do what Chechens failed to
do for themselves.

By contrast, in neighboring Dagestan, traditional political structures,
known as djamaats, have transcended kinship structures, known as tuhums,
for the last 500 years. A djamaat is a village, or an historically
connected group of villages, which typically encompasses several tuhums.
The traditional preeminence of political structures over kinship structures
is one of the reasons that Dagestan remains stable despite its 34
ethno-linguistic groups. It is also one of the reasons that Dagestan has
settled relatively comfortably into the Russia Federation.

Within Dagestani kinship structures, the tradition of "maslat" (or
"reconciliation", also know to Kumyks as "kimbeldy") has also been helpful
in preserving peace. According to this tradition, it is the responsibility
of clan members to discourage or discipline one of their kin who engages in
antisocial behavior. This is important because of the traditional system of
vendetta that remains a persuasive force in Dagestan. A clan member who
engages in serious or sustained misbehavior may endanger his own life and
the lives of other members of his clan, when relatives of the injured party
take their vengeance. Hence, it is crucial that the clan should take
preventative measures. Several Dagestanis have remarked to me that if it
had been Dagestanis who invaded a neighboring republic, as Salman Raduev
and Shamil Basayev invaded Dagestan, their families would have killed them
when they returned home. The moral responsibilities of Dagestani kinship
stand in stark contrast to Maskhadovs failures to accept responsibility
for, and to take action against, Raduev and Basayev.

Other comparisons of Chechnya with Dagestan are also helpful in
understanding causes and consequences of conflict in Chechnya. Some
observers have argued that the devastation of Chechen infrastructure during
the first war, combined with Moscow's failure to make reparations,
contributed to the disintegration of Chechen society that precipitated the
second war. Certainly, there is truth to this, and it is deeply unfortunate
that errors on both sides deprived Chechnya of a peaceful opportunity at
independence. But during the same years, Dagestan suffered unemployment and
deprivation on a scale that was comparable to that in Chechnya without
suffering the same social and political consequences. In any case, economic
collapse is not justification for the hostage industry and the slave trade
that were based in Chechnya between 1996 and 1999, and that made the second
war inevitable.

Other observers have argued that the devastation of the first war in
Chechnya contributed to the subsequent spread of political Islam, which
then contributed to the second war. There is truth to this as well, but
political Islam existed first in Dagestan, from which it later spread to
Chechnya. If war is the cause of political Islam then it should not have
existed in Dagestan, which did not fight a prior war. Rather it appears
that political Islam results from other conditions that are common to
Dagestan and Chechnya, and that were exacerbated in both republics by the
first Chechen war.

While infrastructural and economic devastation in Chechnya contributed to
the spread of political Islam, which contributed to the second war, neither
cause is sufficient to account for events that precipitated that war. For
that it is necessary to refer to Chechen social structure. Indeed, it is
possible to understand the radical nationalist appeals of President
Dudayev, which preceded the first Chechen war, as an attempt to overcome
the fragmentation of Chechen society that results from the preeminence of
its kinship structures.

The preeminence of Chechnya's ancient kinship structures has inhibited the
development of a modern society. Wars occur when societies fail to
recognize a need for internal change. Wars between Chechnya and Russia are
changing both societies, and are likely to last until the inhabitants of
both societies recognize their own responsibility for making those changes.
Russians too must take responsibility for their failure to guarantee the
rights, and ensure the autonomy, of the people of Chechnya and the other
peoples of the Caucasus. 

****** 

#9
BBC Monitoring
Senior Russian clergyman reveals views on Orthodox Christmas and other
matters 
Source: Radio Mayak, Moscow, in Russian 0805 gmt 5 Jan 02

[Presenter]... On the eve of Orthodox Christmas our studio guest today [5
January] Archbishop of Smolensk and Kaliningrad and the head of the public
relations department of the Moscow Patriarchy, Metropolitan Kiril...

Are you not concerned that the festive start-of-the-year season in Russia
goes on for a fortnight? Of course, it is great to have two weeks to relax,
and these holidays are very spiritual and noble and it's good to celebrate
them. But on the other hand, this means being idle and not working. Are you
not worried about this aspect?

[Kiril] This has nothing to do with the Church. I can give you another
example - we have exactgloy the same situation in the month of May: people
keep celebrating for half a month [May Day and Victory Day]. This has
nothing to do with the Church calendar.

[Presenter] However, perhaps, this is not Russia's best tradition - to
celebrate long holidays, especially now that we are amidst so many
problems. Now a question from our listener.

[Unidentified listener] I have a question to Metropolitan Kiril. You
represent Smolensk Region, which is my mother's native town, and
Kaliningrad Region which is an enclave. The fifth column and all these
losers in our country are constantly stirring the issue of passing the
westernmost region on to a third party. There is a similar situation in the
USA with Alaska but they do not have such questions. What do you think the
Church can do in this direction to put an end to all these political
gambling regarding Kaliningrad Region?

[Kiril] My answer will be quite harsh. As long as the Orthodox Church is
out there in Kaliningrad Region, the region will always belong to Russia.
This is not a mere statement, not just words. In order to reinforce this
truth we have decided to build a majestic Cathedral of Christ the Saviour
in the centre of the city. Construction is in full swing right now.

You know, there was a certain problem. In the past the centre of
Kaliningrad was used for rallies and parades. There was a monument to Lenin
and a rostrum, of course. When we made our decision - when I say we I mean
the public, not just the Church - to build the cathedral in the city
centre, some people began to say that this was not a suitable site. It
would be better to build a cathedral in the park, they said.

A public opinion poll was carried out. And can you imagine, most of the
people were in favour of having the cathedral built in the city centre as a
symbol of Russia, as a symbol of our link with Russia...

[Presenter] We have a question from listener Ihor from Kiev. He would like
to hear your position on the Russian Church in Ukraine and whether it will
become autocephalous. Is it possible that the Patriarch will visit Kiev?
Ihor is praying for the unity of all Russia and the Russian Church.

[Kiril] Of course, the Patriarch can visit Kiev and other places in
Ukraine. Ukraine is part of the canonical territory of the Moscow
Patriarchate, and the Ukrainian congregation is the Patriarch's flock.
Therefore, this is not a foreign visit for the Patriarch, it is just a
visit to see his own people, and therefore, such visits are likely, and I
think that the Patriarch will find an opportunity to pay such a visit in
the near future.

[Presenter] Are there any political obstacles to this visit?

[Kiril] None at all. President Kuchma has repeatedly invited the Patriarch.
Governors of various Ukrainian regions have invited the Patriarch.
Relations are very benevolent and friendly everywhere, with the exception
of Western Ukraine where, as you know, there are strong anti-Russian
sentiments and anti-Orthodox sentiments. But this is another conversation.

As far as the autocephalous church is concerned, the overwhelming majority
of the Orthodox Christians in Ukraine are now very much against the
autocephalous church. This is their choice. We cannot impose anything on
them - in the same way as no-one can impose sovereignty on a state if the
state wishes to live in a union with other states. It is equally impossible
to impose the opposite.

We proceed from the idea that the Orthodox Christians in Ukraine should
decide the future of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, together with their
clergy, with their hierarchy. If these people tell us that they want an
autocephalous church, let them have it with God's blessings.

But these people are saying today that they have no such desire because the
only strong tie uniting Russia and Ukraine at present is the united church.
As long as we have one church, we have one life and one soul...

*******

#10
The Observer (UK)
6 January 2002
'Myth' of Chernobyl suffering exposed 
Relocation and hand-outs have caused more illness than radiation, a new UN
study concludes. 
By Anthony Browne

It is seen as the worst man-made disaster in history, killing tens of
thousands, making tens of millions ill, and afflicting generations to come.
Exhibitions of photographs of the deformed victims have toured the world,
raising funds and awareness. 
Now a report from the United Nations on the consequences of the Chernobyl
nuclear disaster 15 years after the event comes to a very different
conclusion. It says the medical effects of radiation are far less than was
thought. The biggest damage to health has instead come from hypochondria
and well-meaning but misguided attempts to help people. 

The report suggests the reloca tion of hundreds of thousands of people
'destroyed communities, broke up families, and led to unemployment,
depression, and stress-related illnesses'. Generous welfare benefits,
holidays, food and medical help given to anyone declared a victim of
Chernobyl have created a dependency culture, and created a sense of
fatalism in millions of people. 

The Human Consequences of the Chernobyl Nuclear Accident, published by the
UN Development Programme and Unicef, is a challenge to those who seek to
highlight the dangers of nuclear energy. 

More than 100 emergency workers on the site of the accident on 26 April
1986 suffered radiation sickness, and 41 of them died. The biggest direct
consequences of the radiation are increases in childhood thyroid cancer,
normally a very rare disease, that increased 60-fold in Belarus, 40-fold in
Ukraine, and 20-fold in Russia, totalling 1,800 cases in all. 

The report says other evidence of increases in radiation-related diseases
is very limited. 'Intensive efforts to identify an excess of leukaemia in
the evacuated and controlled zone populations and recovery workers were
made without success. There remains no internationally accredited evidence
of an excess of leukaemia.' There is also no evidence of an increase in
other cancers, and there has been no statistical increase in deformities in
babies. The only deformities related to radiation were among babies of
pregnant women working on the site at the time of the explosion. 

The UN believes most of the deformed babies photographed by Western
charities to raise funds have nothing to do with Chernobyl, but are the
normal deformities that occur at a low level in every population. 'The
direct effect of radiation is not that substantial,' said Oksana Garnets,
head of the UN Chernobyl programme. 'There is definitely far more
psychosomatic illness than that caused by radiation.' 

The evacuation of hundreds of thousands of people, particularly from less
contaminated areas, is seen as an over-reaction, which in some cases did
more harm than good. 'The first reaction was to move people out. Only later
did we think that perhaps some of them shouldn't have been moved. It has
become clear that the direct influence of radiation on health is actually
much less that the indirect consequences on health of relocating hundreds
of thousands of people,' Garnets said. 

Among relocated populations, there has been a massive increase in
stress-related illnesses, such as heart disease and obesity, unrelated to
radiation. 

The UN is concerned about the corrosive effects of handouts to those
classified as Chernobyl victims. In Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, they get
more than 50 different privileges and benefits, including monthly payments
and free school meals, medical treatment and holidays. In Ukraine,
'victims' get up to $100 a month. 

In Ukraine, 92,000 people have been officially designated as permanently
disabled, and half of the population says their health has been affected. 

'There is an incentive to get classified as a victim. People getting
benefits think they should get more and more. They think everything should
be done for them by someone else - it creates a huge sense of fatalism and
pessimism, which means they don't get on with their life,' Garnets said. 

In the largely deserted village of Chernobyl, 18km from the reactor and
deep inside the government's total exclusion zone, the UN's report was
welcomed among the 600 people who have illegally returned to their old homes. 

Nina Melnik, 47, who edits a local newsletter, said: 'I don't just know
that relocating people killed more than the radiation did, it is
scientifically proven. It was totally the wrong thing to do. They should
open up the area and let everyone come back.' 

*******

#11
Wall Street Journal Europe
January 4, 2002    
Putin's 'Near-abroad' Gambit in the Baltics
By Vladimir Socor. 
Mr. Socor is a senior analyst for the Jamestown Foundation, publishers of
the daily Monitor.

Can you imagine the chancellor of Germany appearing on television to urge
Alsatians or German-speakers in Italy to demand more "rights," promising
support? Inconceivable in today's Europe, you'd say. Hitler patented this
sort of intrusion, and Slobodan Milosevic tried his hand at it. So why
would the Western democracies now watch passively a rerun against the
democratic Baltic states?

Yet they did. On Christmas Eve, Russian President Vladimir Putin launched a
trial balloon which had for some time been in preparation. He launched, in
fact, a personal initiative to redefine Moscow's policy toward its former
subject countries generally, and the three Baltic states in particular. It
seeks, by addressing the local Russian populations, to create a
controllable level of ethnic and linguistic tension, through which to
advance the Kremlin's foreign policy goals. In the Baltic case, that agenda
currently focuses on thwarting NATO's enlargement by playing the ethnic card.

In a live phone-in show, broadcast December 24 on all of Russia's state
television and radio channels, Mr. Putin urged Russians and
"Russian-speakers" in the Baltic states to demand official status for the
Russian language and numerical quotas of representation in government
bodies. The staging was elaborate enough to reveal advance planning. The TV
presenter, introducing a Russian viewer from Latvia's capital Riga, helped
relay this phoned-in question to Mr. Putin: "Is Russia ready, not in words
but in deeds, to defend the rights and interests of Russians in the Baltic
republics, Central Asia and other regions of the former Soviet Union?"

A ready-on-cue president replied at length, announcing "a much more
vigorous stance on protecting the interests of the Russian-speaking
population, primarily in the CIS countries of course." He spoke of waging a
"fight for official status for the Russian language ... I want to assure
you that we will intensify our efforts in this area. There is no doubt
about that." With this, the Russian president was targeting countries that
have yet to recover from Soviet ravages against their own national identities.

The overall policy thus stated, Mr. Putin announced one tailored to the
Baltic states. It rests on an analogy drawn from the Balkans and portrayed
by Mr. Putin as a political and legal precedent. He told the Riga caller:
"As is known, in Macedonia a decision has been taken -- to be blunt, under
pressure from the European Union and the OSCE (Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe) -- according to which the Albanian population
has the right, in percentage terms, to be represented in the bodies of
state power and management, including the security structures. We have
every reason to extend this principle to Russians [in other countries] as
well, including the Russians in the Baltic states. They have the right to
demand that this principle should apply to them too."

There is of course no real analogy there. Historically, politically,
legally, socially, demographically and in every other way, the situation
could not be more different in Macedonia than in Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania. These are successful modern democracies, thanks to which local
Russians are also palpably better off than those in Russia itself. This is
why they stay firmly put. But Mr. Putin is evidently more interested in
geopolitics than in accuracy. And, with this policy turn, he seems on his
way to becoming the first head of state in post-1945 Europe to publicly
urge, as a tool of foreign policy, a "compatriot" minority across the
border to raise demands based on ethnicity and language.

Stirring the pot in this manner at this time, the Kremlin evidently
calculates that a bit of local ethnic strife could dissuade NATO leaders
from admitting the Baltic states as members. NATO will be making a decision
on expansion at its Prague summit later this year. Some in the alliance
have feared that to admit the Baltic states would be to "import" ethnic
tension with the local Russians and risk more trouble with Russia. That
concern meanwhile has almost been laid to rest by the Balts' democratic
performance on ethnic and language issues. But the Russian authorities
post-1991 have proven effective at fanning precisely that type of tension
in quite a few corners of the former Soviet domain.

At present, Moscow can ill-afford to come out openly against NATO's growing
consensus to issue membership invitations to the Baltic states this year.
An overt, obdurate resistance could ruin Russia's quest for a still higher
stake -- that of a decision-making role within the alliance. Mr. Putin's
televised remarks suggest that Russian policy between now and the Prague
summit may follow two parallel tracks. On one, it will tell NATO that
Moscow could under certain conditions live with the admission of the Baltic
states into NATO. On the other, it may try, through overt and covert moves,
artificially to destabilize interethnic relations and, thus, the overall
political processes in Latvia and Estonia.

Mr. Putin's initiative also reflects angry disappointment with the OSCE,
which has just given the Baltic states a remarkably clean bill of health on
ethnic and language issues as regards local Russian populations. The OSCE
recognized that Baltic states seek, with increasingly demonstrable success,
to integrate the local Russians into the Latvian, Estonian and Lithuanian
societies. Moscow's policy, by contrast, seeks to deepen the
ethno-linguistic gulf, dividing the societies so as to weaken the Baltic
states themselves.

At its year-end meetings last month, the OSCE decided that Estonia and
Latvia were in full compliance with the organization's standards and
recommendations, and on that basis resolved to close the OSCE's monitoring
missions in the two countries. Lithuania, which has far fewer Russian
residents, had received its good marks earlier. Russia opposed the OSCE's
decision at the December conference, staging a show of indignation there
and since. It now threatens to carry its campaign to other international
organizations, in which it can only count -- as was the case in the OSCE --
on the support of its dictatorial satellite Belarus.

By now, the European Union and NATO also take the view that the Balts have
done everything that could reasonably be asked of them for societal
integration and constructive relations with Russia. In the runup to NATO's
Prague summit, however, Moscow will try hard to prove the opposite. Mr.
Putin's salvo is a warning to that effect.

*******

Date: Fri, 4 Jan 2002 
From: Dominique Arel <dominique_arel@brown.edu> 
Subject: Call for Papers 

"Nationalism, Identity and Regional Cooperation: 
Compatibilities and Incompatibilities" 

Special Convention Centro per l'Europa centro orientale e balcanica 
in association with ASN 
Bologna University 
Forlì, Italy, 4-9 June 2002 

Deadline for Proposals: 31 January 2002 

***SPECIAL SECTION ON THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION*** 

The Centro per l'Europa centro orientale e balcanica, in association with the 
Association for the Study of Nationalities (ASN), is organizing a Special 
Convention at the University of Bologna, Forli campus, in Italy, on 4-9 June 
2002. This special event will be held shortly after the Seventh Annual ASN 
World Convention, which is taking place on 11-13 April 2002 at the Harriman 
Institute, Columbia University, New York. (The deadline for the New York ASN 
convention is already past). The Forlì Special Convention is also being 
organized under the auspices of the Europe and Balkans International Network 
(EBIN), and with the participation of the Italian Association for Slavic 
Studies (AIS), the European Association for Comparative Economic Systems 
(EACES), Bologna University, and the Municipality of Forlì. 

The Centro per l'Europa centro orientale e balcanica/ASN Special Convention 
will feature several dozen panels on the Balkans, the Baltics, the Caucasus, 
central Europe, Central Asia, Russia, Ukraine, Turkey, as well as thematic 
panels on nationalism, conflict resolution, democratization, demography, 
language issues, geography, interpretations of history, ethnicity in film and 
literature, and theoretical approaches to the nation. It will be the biggest 
international scholarly convention on the European continent for experts on 
nationalism, identity and regional co-operation of Central Eastern Europe, 
the former Soviet Union and the Balkans. 

The general theme was chosen in order to stimulate extensive discussions and 
diverse approaches among international scholars, area specialists and policy 
experts. The three key words in the theme, "Nationalism, Identity and 
Regional Cooperation," can be approached both from the perspective of their 
interaction and for their specific features, by emphasizing their historical, 
political, cultural, literary, linguistic, economic, social, legal, 
anthropological, and geopolitical aspects. For instance, the needs of an 
economy as regards cooperation or autarky could be tackled either by taking 
into consideration current events, or by examining past experiences, or by 
in-depth analysis of one country in particular. The same applies to all 
disciplines. Organizers are thus inviting proposals covering a wide range of 
approaches and topics touching upon the compatibilities and incompatibilities 
arising from the interplay of nationalism, identity and regional cooperation. 

Proposals are invited for either complete panels or individual paper 
proposals, and should normally involve the presentation of prepared papers. 
Special consideration will be given to panels reporting on recent field or 
archival research, especially those that include presentations by advanced 
graduate students and/or junior faculty. The Program Committee also 
encourages the submission of panel proposals that include both women and men. 
Proposals for roundtables, i.e. of panels containing presentations not based 
on papers, should be submitted only when the topic clearly justifies this 
format. 

Please observe the following restrictions on panel/roundtable participation: 
o No participant may present more than one paper at the convention 
o No participant may appear more than twice in the convention program 

Proposals can be emailed to the Program Chairs at prgchair@spbo.unibo.it. 
Application forms, as well as full convention information, are available on 
the web at www.eurobalk.net. 

For the special convention 2002, proposals partly or entirely revolving 
around video, film, or audio-visual material (including slides and PowerPoint 
presentations) are strongly encouraged. As a rule, the convention intends to 
show video or film material produced within the past year or two. Throughout 
the convention, one or two of the convention meeting rooms will be 
exclusively devoted to the screening of video material. All suggestions and 
proposals should be sent to the Chair of the Video/Film Section, Andrea 
Brandani (brando@spbo.unibo.it). 

LOCATION 
The Special Convention will be held at Faculty of Political Sciences, Forlì 
Campus, Italy. 

PANEL STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION 
The Special Convention organized by the Centro per l'Europa centro-orientale 
e balcanica will be held at the Faculty of Political Science in Forlì during 
the first week of June 2002. The opening session will be held in the "Aula 
Magna" of the Department of Political Science, with a keynote address by an 
Italian policy maker or a prominent scholar on intercultural co-operation in 
the Adriatic basin area. The participants will be treated to a reception of 
welcome hosted by the Mayor of Forlì at the Town Hall. 

The Convention will consist of four days of panels (June 5-8) structured into 
sessions. Trips to historical towns will also be organized on the days 
immediately preceding (June 4) and following (June 9) the panels. Among the 
suggested destinations is Ravenna, at only 45 minutes by car from Forlì, 
which makes a leisurely visit and an enjoyable afternoon possible. For 
Florence and Venice, considering the greater distance, we suggest a day trip 
that could be organized either on June 4 or June 9. 

Among the innovations of the Special Convention will be the greater length of 
time devoted to the morning sessions. As a consequence, the morning panels 
will last three hours and the participants will be able to discuss the themes 
at greater depth, facilitating the exchange of opinions and experiences among 
American, Italian, and Eastern European scholars. 

Convention registration will be held on June 5, between 9-12. The first 
session is scheduled for June 5 at 2 PM. On June 6-8, the morning panels will 
begin at 9 AM, with sessions running between 9-12, 2-4, and 4.30-6.30. 

PROPOSALS 
The vast majority of proposals are expected to be sent by e-mail to the 
Program Chairs, but proposals sent by fax or regular mail are also accepted. 

The convention's coordinates are the following: 
Email: e-mail: prgchair@spbo.unibo.it 
Postal Address: Via Sigismongo Marchesi 12 - 47100 Forlì - Italy 
Phone +39/0543/21995 
Fax +39/0543/376879 

REGISTRATION 
Registration fees are 40Euro for ASN, AIS, EACES or EBIN members, $60 for 
non-members ($30 for east European non-members) and $25 for students. All 
panel participants have to pre-register by 15 May 2002. Non-panel 
participants are also urged to pre-register early. Please note that the 
Convention will be unable to refund pre-registerees after 15 May 2002. 
Pre-registration by panel participants and attendees can be done 
electronically, by fax, or by regular mail. A registration form may be 
downloaded at www.eurobalk.net or may be requested from Marcella Del Vecchio 
(delvecc@spbo.unibo.it). 

FUNDING 
Participants are responsible for seeking their own funds to cover all travel 
and accommodation costs. Some grants are available to participants coming 
from eastern-central and Balkan Europe, the former Soviet Union, and Central 
Asia. 

ACCOMMODATION 
A list of hotels is available at www.eurobalk.net. 
Participants and attendees are strongly encouraged to reserve as early as 
possible. 

ADVERTISEMENTS/EXHIBITORS 
Publishers and companies are invited to exhibits and/or advertised in the 
Special Convention Program. Due to considerations of space, advertisers and 
exhibitors are encouraged to place their order early. For information, please 
contact Beatrice Capacci (capacci@spbo.unibo.it). 

CONVENTION PAPERS 
The convention papers will be available for sale at the Convention for 2Euro 
apiece. 

WEB SITE. Our website (www.eurobalk.net) provides continuously updated 
information on the Special Convention and on activities of the Centro per 
l'Europa centro orientale e balcanica. 

We look forward to seeing you at the convention! 

Program Chairs: Stefano Bianchini, David Crowe, Francesco Privitera 
Via Sigismondo Marchesi 12 
47100 Forlì - Italy 
Phone:+39/0543/21995 
Fax: +39/0543/376879 
e-mail:prgchair@spbo.unibo.it 

Conventions directors: Dominique Arel, Beatrice Capacci, Marcella Del Vecchio 
Via Sigismondo Marchesi 12 
47100 Forlì - Italy 
Phone:+39/0543/21995 
Fax: +39/0543/376879 
e-mail: delvecc@spbo.unibo.it 

Proposals must be sent by e-mail to prgchair@spbo.unibo.it 
Contract for book exhibit space must be sent by e-mail to 
delvecc@spbo.unibo.it 
Advertising on the Convention program must be sent by e-mail to 
capacci@spbo.unibo.it 

For any other information pleased contact Beatrice Capacci or Marcella Del 
Vecchio 
Phone:+39/0543/21995 - Fax 39/0563/376879   

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