#9
From: "Oskars Ceris" <oskars@sjcb.lv>
Subject: Re: GETTING RID OF NATO #6004
Date: Fri, 4 Jan 2002
NATO's Ongoing Role: Peace, Power and Money
I would like to use the opportunity of this list to respond to John Danzer's comment on the need to dismantle, so far the world's most potent military organisation - NATO. The main argument lies in the fact that NATO is considerably more than just an uncomfortable exclusive club of Western nations for Russia and the so-called relic of the Cold War.
1. NATO's primary function as a Cold War alliance, was by no means to fight wars and withstand a Soviet aggression, but to discourage would be aggressors, chiefly the Soviet Union, of fighting ones, since both realised the potential outcome of a war. Thus its basic function was that of the "police man" for Europe and "bogey man" for the Soviet Union, which based its own credibility on contrasting its capabilities against those of USA and its European allies.
2. It is very unlikely that even Russia envisages a Europe without NATO. What Russia may in fact experience, is a Europe without USA in purely military terms. Though, the absence of USA in the NATO framework is highly unlikely. Arguably USA's trust in its European allies is grounded in the belief of their consensual recognition of America's vast military superiority. If Europeans envisage to set up a security branch within the EU, let them try. Russia on the other hand is hardly in a position to challenge the current global setting that is being conducted by the USA, that has never experienced as much global legitimacy to its use of force. Putin apart from his predecessor, is hardly stuck to the superpower illusion of his country and most likely realises the benefits of playing along. A highly fortunate turnout of Russian foreign policy owes credit to Putin's administration that has realised the failure of useless and embarrassing rhetoric of confrontation with the West.
3. Russia's security needs are considerably more vague than objections to NATO enlargement. In realpolitik terms Russia's concern over security on its Western boarder is based on ambiguous perceptions of the Cold War termed in security studies as a "security dilemma" - basically - they have more weapons than we do. With instability in the Caucasus, vast boarders in the far East, Russia simply lacks financial and logistic capability to afford a standoff with the West. Thus Russia's rapprochement with the West and befriending with the East is a rational choice, following an analysis of geopolitics, complemented with notions of capability and prestige. Additionally, internal vulnerabilities, more than ever following September 11, need to be addressed more than external threats that are built on stereotypes and twisted public opinion.
4. European security is another complex issue. Current military potential of European nation is insignificant compared to the United States credibility. While France and United Kingdom remain nuclear powers, such status provides only symbolic power and in reality offer an option of last resort. Germany on the contrary possesses the hardware and is unquestionably the foremost potent conventional military force in Europe, yet it is overly cautions with power politics. Provided that Russia can still be regarded as a hypothetical would-be aggressor, with all due respect to the Russian military, its current military credibility is highly questionable. And while European nations are willing to break their dependence on US military support, having the US on board just in case by means of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Charter, is sufficiently satisfactory for most. Additionally, the US needs NATO as an institutional basis of its credibility in Europe. Gaining political support and consensus via an institutionalised process is considerably easier than on a bilateral basis.
5. With regard to NATO expansion, a principle of alliance formation is very simplistic - small is better. More precisely, small is more efficient. With the alliance most likely reaching the size of 23 members by the end of this year, it is only to Russia's benefit, since NATO acquisitions in Central Eastern Europe are hardly of military value, yet a stable to contribution to the organisation's ineffectiveness. Moreover, most are currently leaning westwards anyway. Perhaps Russia's greatest loss is reputation, having lost an empire, yet, with the current shape of Russia few Russians question the choice of Central Eastern European nations to seek prosperity in the West.
6. Mercantile interests are frequent determinants of high-politics. NATO's technical requirements for compatibility provide vast entrepreneurial opportunities for Pentagon's arms industry, particularly in Central Eastern Europe, which apart from transition to market economies and democracy, are in need of qualifying for NATO's requirements of modern warfare. Europeans no doubt are gross exporters of arms and military technology, yet few would argue against the superiority of US technology, particularly with regard to advanced weapon and radar systems, missile complexes, jet fighters, etc. Military marketing closely resembles Microsoft's marketing strategy of newer versions of software. New possibilities require technical upgrading, and NATO's institutional framework serves the purpose of a credible marketplace.
While the few points mentioned are far from all the reasons why NATO currently is still operational, I hope that my crude analysis of realpolitik in relation NATO's necessity has given some ideas to contribute to the debate over NATO's future and Russia's possible role.
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