#12
Nezavisimaya Gazeta
November 27, 2001
WHY RUSSIA SHOULD NOT JOIN NATO
Applying for membership would only be an illusion of a foreign policy strategy
Author: Aleksei Pushkov
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]

RUSSIA'S MEMBERSHIP OF NATO COULD PARALYZE THE EXISTING SYSTEM OF DECISION-MAKING IN NATO AND TRANSFORM IT INTO AN INEFFECTIVE AND WEAK ORGANIZATION. THIS WOULD SURELY HAPPEN, DUE TO THE OBJECTIVE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE INTERESTS OF WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW IN EUROPE AND ASIA.

Time for Russia to decide what it wants from its relationship with NATO

The West offers Russia some sort of "new relationship" with NATO. So it is time for Moscow to decide on its position with regard to its future relationship with the Alliance. The choice is fairly simple - raise the issue of joining the Alliance, or aim to create a special Russia-NATO relationship by establishing new institutions for cooperation, or by a special treaty.

The Permanent Consultative Council has not lived up to the expectations, and the West suggests a new Russia-NATO Council in its place. Within its framework Russia would have a vote in discussion of the issues specified in the process of its establishment. There is a modification of the same idea - a Russia-NATO treaty that specifies new parameters of our relationship and sets out the forms of cooperation. This concerns the formula "an alliance with the Alliance", which the US Administration seems to favor.

Suggestions from NATO states do not stipulate membership of the Alliance for Russia which is only logical. Neither the United States nor the leading European countries need Russia in NATO. Russia in NATO would cut in on America's leading role and weaken its strategic links with Europe. Russia in NATO would also reduce the role of the leading European states in NATO and reconstruct the link between two superpowers, the United States and Russia, in NATO. What really counts, however, is that Russia's membership of the Alliance could paralyze the existing system of decision-making in NATO and transform it into an ineffective and weak organization. This would surely happen, due to the objective differences between the interests of Washington and Moscow in Europe and Asia.

Undoubtedly aware of all these nuances, NATO is going to seek for a form of cooperation with Russia which will bring it closer to the Alliance politically enabling the latter to use Russia's potential while simultaneously restricting Russia's involvement in decision- making to the spheres where the Alliance cannot do without Russia, or where it is interested for some reason in Russia's involvement.

Besides, the West is not sure at all that Russia's membership of the Alliance will get it anything it will never get with Russia remaining out of NATO. The West needs Russia's responsible and considerate behavior in world affairs, its support of broad international coalitions (like the current counter-terrorism coalition one), rejection of the idea to revise results of disintegration of the Soviet Union, and understanding of the strategic interests of the West (and first and foremost of the United States) in critical situations. Russia and its foreign policy demonstrate all this. For the West to wish Russia is NATO, a more serious threat to its security is needed than the present one.

The situation being what it is, shall we bring up the matter of joining NATO? What will our eagerness to join the Alliance avail us when the Alliance itself does not want us? Russia will mostly benefit on the level of foreign policy PR and its image in the West which is important. There is another potential advantage. Russia may become a mediator between the United States and Europe when the latter two argue over priorities. Possible access to the European arms markets is another potential advantage of joining NATO.

On the whole, however, applying for NATO membership will only create an illusion of foreign policy strategy. Moreover, it may turn out to be counter-productive, because of certain dangers it implies.

First danger: Membership of NATO will turn Russia into something that can be safely ignored when the decisions on further expansion or military operations are made. Application for membership automatically forces Russia to back up America's foreign policy moves even if they contradict Russia's interests.

Second danger: Russia's hands will be tied in foreign policy beyond Europe. New NATO members should demonstrate their loyalty to the Alliance and its objective even when its own interests and objectives are different (like in the sphere of Russia's special relations with China, for example).

Third danger: Russia's membership of NATO will inevitably become the subject of extremely lengthy negotiations. In the course of the negotiations the same forms of cooperation with Russia will be insisted on and practice because of Russia's real or fancied unreadiness to join the Alliance. This state of affairs will disorient our foreign policy and distort its actual interests.

Fourth danger: With the threat from the south growing, the West will be tempted to use Russia, a potential NATO member, as a kind of shield against the threat. These days Russia can make its own decisions on the level and forms of its involvement in Western coalitions. As a country en route to NATO membership, however, it will surely find its hands tied.

Fifth danger (and probably the most serious of the lot): Russia will find itself in the position of beggar and pass on the initiative to the United States and its allies, who will make the decisions without Russia. Instead of getting a new impetus, Moscow's foreign policy will find itself cornered by the necessity to wait and wait. It will inevitably cost Russia respect in the eyes of other states and regions. Getting into NATO in order to change it from within will not work. It is naive to expect that. NATO leaders are aware of the possibility and will never let Russia get away with it.

These days, Russia is in a position where it itself can form whatever relationships it needs with the United States, NATO, Europe (European Union), and China. The current rapprochement with the United States shows that there can be situations when Russia, as a military and geopolitical superpower, can work with the Americans over Europe's head. Russia can facilitate its relations with the European Union at the same time, including relations in the military-political sphere. The China factor gives Russia additional room for maneuvering.

It is the relative freedom of maneuver that makes Russia so attractive to the United States now that contours of the future world order are being defined and America's global dominance is not yet permanent. But Russia's formal appearance on the list of America's allies will surely endear Russia to America and strip it of its independence making it NATO backwaters. Bearing in mind the potential of future conflicts in Europe and Asia and Russia's geopolitical location, this partnership will benefit America much more than it will Russia.

Russia cannot brush aside the hand NATO has extended, but it should approach future cooperation with its eyes open.

The formula Tony Blair suggests reflects the level of NATO readiness to close the distance to Russia, and Russia's interest in this distance-closing. That is why we should not try to run ahead of the train. This strategy has never been useful yet.