October 10, 2001

This Date's Issues:   5483 • 5484

Johnson's Russia List
#5483
10 October 2001
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Reuters: Moscow denies reports its troops in Afghanistan.
2. Itar-Tass: Public poll sees threat to Russia from US military action.
3. strana.ru: This Is Our War. Russian Press on Russia's Role in The New War.
4. Itar-Tass: Media calls on president to avert economic collapse of press.
5. Reuters: Russia opposes ally as sole Kabul master-Ivanov.
6. Baltimore Sun: Will Englund, West might have to pay for Moscow's support. Dropping oil prices or Islamic revolt could upset Russia's recovery.
7. Itar-Tass: Anti-Taleban coalition may disintegrate, says Russian parliamentarian. (Arbatov)
8. RFE/RL RUSSIAN POLITICAL WEEKLY: Julie Corwin, A NEWLY CONFIDENT PUTIN.
9. San Francisco Chronicle: Anna Badkhen, Drug trade could bloom amid conflict. War might provide smoke screen for traffic.
10. Parlamentskaya Gazeta: Fyodor Burlatsky, WAR OF CIVILISATIONS? NEVER! Is U.S. Response Punishment, Retaliation, or Crusade?
11. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace meeting: STRANGE BEDFELLOWS IN A STRANGE LAND: THE INTERNATIONAL COALITION TO COMBAT TERRORISM. Remarks of Michael McFaul.]

*******

#1
Moscow denies reports its troops in Afghanistan
October 9, 2001

MOSCOW (Reuters) - A leading Russian defense analyst said Tuesday Russian
troops were already on the ground in Afghanistan, but Defense Minister Sergei
Ivanov reiterated that no Russian troops would fight in the "war on
terrorism."

Independent defense analyst Pavel Felgenhauer said Russian technicians,
pilots and military advisers had been helping the anti-Taliban Northern
Alliance in Afghanistan for several years, but that there had been a large
influx of them recently.

Felgenhauer, speaking to Reuters, quoted informed sources as saying Russian
soldiers had helped move tanks and other heavy equipment over the Pyandzh
River from Tajikistan into Afghanistan. He estimated there were between 1,000
and 2,000 Russian troops in the country.

Ivanov, in the latest Russian denial of such reports, told RIA Novosti news
agency Tuesday: "The participation of Russian servicemen in any operation in
Afghanistan is not possible."

He was not responding directly to Felgenhauer's comments.

Russian President Vladimir Putin, setting out policy on Sept. 24, said Moscow
would increase arms supplies to the Northern Alliance to support Washington's
operations against "terrorist" bases in Afghanistan. Putin said Russian
troops would be used only in search-and-rescue operations.

The United States and Britain launched missile attacks on Afghanistan Sunday
after the Taliban refused to hand over Osama bin Laden, prime suspect in last
month's airliner attacks on the United States which left some 5,600 dead or
missing.

Felgenhauer said that 20 miles north of the capital Kabul there were around
100-200 Russian troops "who call themselves military advisers and are manning
the heavy equipment for the Northern Alliance."

He said it was a "secret operation" in violation of the Russian constitution,
but was necessary as "the Northern Alliance simply do not have people who can
man this type of equipment."

Reuters reporters in Afghanistan, specifically asked about the reports of
Russian deployments, have said they have not seen any Russian troops in the
country.

*******

#2
Public poll sees threat to Russia from US military action
Itar-Tass

Moscow, 9 October: A total of 42.4 per cent of Muscovites approve of US
military efforts in Afghanistan, while 49.4 per cent disapprove of it,
according to an opinion poll of 500 city residents conducted by the Public
Opinion Foundation-Gallup International.

Some 40.9 per cent of those polled blamed international terrorists and Usamah
Bin-Ladin personally for the military conflict. US authorities are to blame
according to 25.3 per cent of the respondents.

Furthermore, 13.7 per cent of those polled blamed the Taleban leadership, and
5.2 per cent believe that US society as a whole is to blame. Other opinions
are held by 3 per cent of the respondents.

At least 32 per cent of Muscovites fear the conflict will grow further and
spill into other countries, including Russia. The conflict might evolve into
a world war fuelled by religious differences, according to 25.9 per cent of
those polled...

An overwhelming 60 per cent of the respondents believe that US military
action poses a threat to Russia, while 36.3 per cent of those polled oppose
this opinion.

More than half, 57 per cent, said that Russia must fully cooperate with the
USA, except in committing forces to the action. At least 24.7 per cent
advocate the position of standby observer, while 11.3 per cent want Russia to
denounce the USA and demand a termination of the action.

******

#3
strana.ru
October 9, 2001
This Is Our War
Russian Press on Russia's Role in The New War
By Denis Maternowski

The Russian press is hardly optimistic about the war in Afghanistan. Most
analysts agree that this new war will create multiple problems in Pakistan
and the Central Asian states without accomplishing anything, least of all
defeating terrorism.

Nezavisimaya Gazeta ("Let's Do It Quick: Russia acquires new enemies, but no
new allies") points to the ambiguity of Russia's position. "The enemies of
the civilized world are known: they are bin Laden and the Taliban. They are
opposed by the Northern Alliance (the anti-Taliban coalition) and the Western
alliance (the world's leading countries led by the U.S. and Britain). Who is
Russia with if it is against the Taliban? In his "declaration of war,"
President George W. Bush did not mention Russia among the "loyal allies" or
"other friendly states." Russia was not mentioned once. It could be that Bush
meant Moscow when he said that "in this operation the entire world supports
us…" However, bin Laden did not forget us in his address. He said that
Russia
could have been involved in the terrorist acts in America."

At the same time, Russia openly supports the Northern Alliance. "Russia is
participating in the retaliatory attacks without being America's ally.
Moreover, our own retaliatory attacks in Chechnya are not yet over and are
still not approved of by the West. Could it be that the destruction of the
buildings in New York is more terrifying than that of the apartment buildings
in Moscow? President Putin hopes that the U.S. will do everything it can to
avoid civilian casualties even though he knows that it is impossible to do.
At the same time, Russia is still trying to explain that it is fighting
against terrorists and not the Chechen people.

In essence, Moscow is supporting internationally the very thing it has been
criticized for at home."

Nezavisimaya Gazeta is very pessimistic in its analysis of the possible turn
of events in Central Asia. "Destabilization in at least three Central Asian
states is inevitable…Americans have come to this region for at least the
next
5-10 years. This is their estimate of the campaign's length. However, they
will only guarantee the stability of their bases and aircrafts while Russia
will have to take care of global stability in the region. It is easy to guess
what will happen to the Central Asian regimes if Moscow leaves them face to
face with extremism and terrorism: they will collapse."

Izvestia ("Our War: Russia will be forced to fight for Uzbekistan and
Tajikistan") sees Russia as a key player in the war. "October 7, 2001 is as
significant to the world as September 1, 1939: it signals the beginning of a
new war. This war could be lengthy and bloody or brief and relatively
bloodless. In any case, the formation of a new world order - even in the
geographical sense - has already begun. Post-Soviet Central Asia will
inevitably fall into someone's zone of influence - Russia's, America's, a
Russo-American union's or Islam's. This will happen regardless of the
strategy chosen by the U.S. and its allies. Therefore, Russia has no way
escaping. The only question is how will it participate. Most likely, Russia
will have to fight on two fronts: internally in Chechnya and externally in
Central Asia. Unfortunately, Russia is at war now. It is Russia's war, but
its victory is less than obvious."

Vremya Novostei ("And Then Silence: No one knows who will rule post-war
Afghanistan") believes that America made a mistake by starting a "military
phase" without first deciding what to do in post-war Afghanistan.
Furthermore, attacks on the Taliban may cause a less than desirable effect:
"If the Taliban can prove that "retaliatory attacks" caused numerous civilian
casualties, all the Pathans will unite around Mullah Omar. For the very same
reason, leaders of the Northern Alliance will turn into 'traitors'."

Vremya MN ("Someone Else's War") touches upon the anti-Americanism that could
arise in Russia in response to the war. Vladimir Putin, who is openly
pro-Western and pro-American, as a democratic leader, will have to take
public opinion into consideration. "In Pakistan 60% of the population is
against the U.S. and its policies. This figure is roughly the same In
Russia…Of course, no one will call for jihad and there will be no
anti-American demonstrations…Yet millions of people will remain
anti-American
while not being pro-Taliban. They will discuss all the real and imaginary
failures and the inevitable loss of civilian lives in this new operation,
condemning the American presence in "our" Central Asia (obviously the "real"
reason behind all this)."

There is another reason for this "anti-American fever." "Do Russians want a
war? Of course not. That is why we fear that "retaliatory attacks" in close
proximity to our borders could cause an explosion of aggression. We fear that
Russia could get involved in someone else's war. Such feelings will
necessarily work against the Americans. The fear of a new war is much more
apparent than the almost non-existent fear of "international terrorism": "all
the endless discussions about the dangers of Islamic terrorism and "war of
civilizations," all the analogies with the rise of fascism or the fall of the
Roman empire remain purely academic. They do not have any connection with
real life. As for the fear of a full-scale war in Central Asia, it is very
real and tangible."

******

#4
Russia: Media calls on president to avert economic collapse of press
ITAR-TASS

Moscow, 8 October, ITAR TASS correspondent Aleksey Kravchenko: Chief editors
of leading Russian newspapers and magazines have called on Vladimir Putin to
avert the economic collapse of the national press, threatened by the
government's plans to abolish concessions on VAT, from which the press has
until now been totally exempt. In the letter addressed to the president, the
text of which has been obtained by ITAR TASS, the relevant proposals which
the cabinet has put before the Duma are described as "a threat to the very
existence of the Russian press as an effective institution of civil society".

In today's economic climate, the letter goes on to say, "only total exemption
from VAT can ensure the survival of the press. All other options will
inevitably lead not only to the mass closure of publications, but also to
those organs left on the market becoming more expensive, which will in turn
deprive a huge section of the Russian people of the very possibility to read
newspapers".

Having stated that they wholeheartedly share the "principle enunciated by the
president, that the freedom of the press required economic safeguards", the
chief editors of almost 20 of the leading federal newspapers and magazines
called on him "to prevent a blow being struck at that very freedom" by what
they term "the ill-considered actions of the government".

*******

#5
Russia opposes ally as sole Kabul master-Ivanov

MOSCOW, Oct 9 (Reuters) - Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov said on
Tuesday it would be folly to try to impose its allies in the Northern
Alliance as Afghanistan's new rulers if the Taliban are ousted by U.S.-led
military strikes.

Speaking after talks with his visiting British counterpart Geoff Hoon, Ivanov
said Moscow's bitter experience during the ill-fated 1979-89 Soviet
occupation of Afghanistan had taught it that only a broadly-based coalition
would work.

Moscow has been supplying arms to the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance for
years but has agreed to step up deliveries as part of a U.S.-led global
coalition against terrorism.

The United States and Britain launched attacks on Afghanistan on Sunday after
the Taliban refused to hand over Osama bin Laden, chief suspect in last
month's attacks in the United States in which some 5,600 people were killed
or missing.

Ivanov said the Northern Alliance was the military arm of the internationally
recognised government of Afghanistan ousted by the Taliban, but opposed the
Alliance coming to power alone.

"No, we would not like that....Because through our own painful experience, we
know that to bring someone to power from outside Afghanistan is absolutely
pointless and has no chance of success," he said.

"The question of creating Afghanistan's political future should be resolved
by the Afghans themselves, naturally taking into account the ethnic
composition of the population living there," he said.

The Northern Alliance is based mainly on ethnic Tajiks and Uzbeks and other
minorities, while the majority Pushtuns, the country's traditional rulers,
mostly back the Taliban movement that controls around 95 percent of the
country.

Hoon said it was premature to talk of a Northern Alliance government.

"The military action in Afghanistan has only just begun, and whilst it is
important that we think about the longer-term future for Afghanistan, it's
perhaps too soon to speculate what kind of government might emerge."

London wanted a broadly-based government that did not condone or support
terrorism, he said. Hoon declined to exclude Taliban from any new coalition
but said there would be "no place for any organisation that supports or
condones terrorism."

*******

#6
Baltimore Sun
October 9, 2001
West might have to pay for Moscow's support
Dropping oil prices or Islamic revolt could upset Russia's recovery
By Will Englund
Sun Foreign Staff

MOSCOW - The events of Sept. 11 knocked the United States and Russia into the
same camp, but because they also upset the market price of oil, Russia could
have to turn to the West to remain solvent.

With the opening of armed conflict in Afghanistan, the United States and its
European allies could find themselves having to prop up Russia financially to
keep its support.

The price of Russian oil - a major export - fell nearly 30 percent after the
attacks on Sept. 11, and though it has risen some since then, the drop is
going to force the Russian government to rethink its budget. Oil executives
and government officials here say they are confident that the price will
shoot upward because of the fighting in Afghanistan. But they are nonetheless
laying the groundwork for an appeal to the West.

Russia, they say, could face extraordinary demands if Islamic radicals in
neighboring Central Asia rise in revolt. The Defense Ministry, which keeps
troops in Tajikistan to guard its Afghan border, has started to rotate in
more combat-ready units. If serious conflicts break out in Uzbekistan or
Kyrgyzstan, Moscow would almost certainly intervene. And the Russians like to
point out that they are already fighting a war against Muslim extremists in
Chechnya.

What Russia will tell the West is that it needs a break on its foreign debt.

If creditors agree to a restructuring, said Dmitri Miroshnichenko, a former
Central Bank official who now works for a private forecasting group called
the Development Center, "it will be a sign that partnership is becoming more
important than confrontation."

Moscow owes about $143 billion, most of the debt inherited from the Soviet
Union. Of that, $39 billion is owed to the so-called Paris Club of creditor
nations. Payments to the Paris Club countries came to $3.8 billion this year,
more than half of Russia's overall debt service, which is the largest single
item in the federal budget.

In January, President Vladimir V. Putin's government told the Paris Club that
there wasn't money available to meet Russia's obligations, despite a two-year
boom in oil prices that has put the Russian economy back on its feet. The
government said it needed to reschedule the debt. The Paris Club said it
wasn't interested, and Russia found the money.

But that was before the worldwide coalition against terrorism was put
together and before the worldwide economic slowdown began. Now, as the
liberal politician Boris Nemtsov put it, a window has opened.

If oil income remains low, said Miroshnichenko, "the political will of the
West will be demonstrated through restructuring of the debt."

In fact, Russia has $8.5 billion in hard currency reserves, and should have
little problem meetings its obligations in 2002, but Western and Russian
analysts agree that a crunch is coming in 2003, when debt service will soar
to $19 billion. As far as many officials here are concerned, there's no time
like the present to strike a better deal, though there have been no official
requests for talks.

Russia has oil reserves second only to Saudi Arabia's, and exports 3 million
barrels of oil and petroleum products every day. Before Sept. 11, Urals crude
was selling for nearly $28 a barrel. Last week the price was hovering around
$22.

Government economists and private analysts agree that if the price remains at
$18 or higher, there should not be a serious crunch, although the 2002 budget
is pegged at a $23-a-barrel price.

If it goes to $17, expect Moscow to start talking earnestly about debt relief.

If it sinks to $9 or $10, which a deep slowdown in the world economy could
bring about, "that's a catastrophe," said Leonid Fedoun, vice president of
Lukoil, the largest Russian oil company.

Fedoun said he is counting on the mobilization of armies to kick-start the
world's economy, and he expects the conflict to be a prolonged one. "It won't
be like Desert Storm," he said. "It will take a long time."

And that should boost demand for oil.

"Thank God, there are 500 to 600 American jet planes already lined up," he
said. "And the Navy, the Navy needs a lot."

In a visit to Germany at the end of September, Putin announced that Russia
would escalate its oil exports to Europe if sources in the Middle East were
cut off by political or military action. At the moment, pipelines are flowing
at capacity, but three new routes will be going into operation in the next
two years and will make additional exports possible.

But if Middle Eastern oil continues to flow, Russia's new pipelines might
serve only to glut the market and drive the price of oil further downward.
The Russian government has said that it will not go along with cuts in
production ordered by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.
Russia is not an OPEC member.

Some analysts have pointed out that the Bush administration is not planning a
national mobilization in any way comparable to what took place during World
War II, when the United States finally wrenched itself out of the Depression.
Huge armies are not being assembled; trucks, ships and planes are not being
built by the hundreds of thousands; millions of people are not pouring into
the work force.

The United States seems to be heading into a protracted recession, along with
the rest of the industrialized world. The drop-off in commercial aviation
after Sept. 11 and resulting decline in fuel consumption, to take just one
example, will likely outweigh increased military demand. This may not be a
war that runs on oil the way Fedoun and others expect.

If a crunch comes, Russia will expect that its application to join the World
Trade Organization would be looked upon more favorably. The Bush
administration is already lobbying vigorously on Moscow's behalf. Russia
argues that membership would bring the removal of trade barriers that prevent
it from competing equally in world markets. But membership would require
profound changes in the Russian way of doing business.

In the last weeks of September, Putin made a potentially historic decision,
to align Russia with the West. Russians were as startled as most Westerners.
Many have serious misgivings. For Putin, the move is a gamble, with a
tremendous amount at stake. Part of the payoff could be a new way of tackling
problems - a new way in which the West would deal with Russia. Debt relief
tied to Russia's participation in the fight against terrorism would be just
one element.

Russia wants to know that it has allies it can count on.

What Russia, which has already lived through one disaster in Afghanistan,
doesn't want to see is this: a Western economy grinding to a halt, with
markets for Russian oil drying up. An indifference to Russia's woes. A clumsy
move by the U.S. military that brings a war between Islamic radicals and
repressive regimes to Central Asia. An America grown bored or spooked by
distant fighting, and a withdrawal from Asia that leaves chaos on Russia's
doorstep.

"If this powder keg explodes," said Mikhail Delyagin, director of the
Globalization Studies Institute, "the Americans will leave as they left
Somalia and Vietnam, and we shall be left behind and we will have to sort out
this bloody mess. And then Russia will find itself involved in a second
Afghan war, which will simply be a thousand kilometers more to the north."

*******

#7
Anti-Taleban coalition may disintegrate, says Russian parliamentarian
ITAR-TASS

Moscow, 9 October: If the United States begins dealing strikes at such
countries as Iran, Iraq, and Yemen, the anti-Taleban coalition may
disintegrate and many Islamic countries may take a stand against America,
deputy chairman of the defence committee of the State Duma lower house of
Russian parliament, Aleksey Arbatov, told a news conference on Tuesday. He
said this may also be accompanied by a speedy spread of nuclear arms and
other weapons of mass destruction.

At the same time Arbatov believes that the operation conducted by the USA in
Afghanistan is a low intensity operation.

"The American people expect more crushing, decisive and effective action.
Dissatisfaction over the lack of prompt results is mounting in society. This
may lead to the increase of the pressure on the US government by certain
groups that are for the opening simultaneously of several fronts, also
against Iraq.

However, according to Arbatov's forecasts, the United States and its allies
will hardly be able to seize Kabul by the onset of winter in Afghanistan.
"This will be possible in the spring or the summer of next year. It would be
unwise to make other moves in this situation," he said.

At the same time, Arbatov is concerned lest the Taleban cross Uzbekistan's
border and Russia would have to send troops into this adjacent country and
take immediate part in hostilities.

*******

#8
RFE/RL RUSSIAN POLITICAL WEEKLY
Vol. 1, No. 24, 8 October 2001

A NEWLY CONFIDENT PUTIN. Last summer, when President Vladimir
Putin took a number of stands that were at odds with public opinion,
such as opposing the death penalty, some commentators suggested that
Putin, as a leader, was becoming "less shy" (see "RFE/RL Russian
Political Weekly," 23 July 2001). However, those positions were
considerably less risky than President Putin's recent enthusiastic
support for the U.S.-led coalition to end international terrorism.
With his suggestion that Russia may drop its opposition to further
NATO expansion and his support for the U.S.'s stationing some of its
troops in CIS countries, Putin is taking a stand at odds not only
with public opinion but also elements within his own military and
foreign policy establishments. With his recent actions, Putin has
become not just "less shy," but possibly even quite bold.

But viewed in the context of his last 17 months in office,
Putin's departure from previous policies can simply be seen as good
tactics, because they further a goal that Putin and his
administration have consistently pursued -- greater integration into
Europe and international economic structures. And, it was a risk that
the Kremlin could well afford. Vladimir Putin has given Russian
voters exactly what they wanted: Politics in Russia has become
boring. One by one, the domestic political institutions that once
presented opposition for Putin's predecessor are gradually being
tamed or co-opted -- leaving him more leeway to take risks in the
international arena.

It is now difficult to imagine how the State Duma -- the
legislative organ that once gave Putin's predecessor, Boris Yeltsin,
so much trouble -- could be more obedient. The 2002 budget passed
through its first reading in record time, and the government is so
confident of its strength that it is now considering proposing
legislation on one of the most divisive issues in Russian politics,
the buying and selling of agricultural land (see "RFE/RL Russian
Political Weekly," 1 October 2001). The Federation Council, which was
once composed of regional leaders, who were at least occasionally
unruly, is now being taken over by full-time legislative
"professionals." They will be based in Moscow and are widely expected
to be loyal to Moscow. Already, more than a hundred senators have
signed up for the pro-Kremlin "Federation" group. The Kremlin is also
reportedly even playing a role in the selection of these
representatives.

The media, which had also once given not only President Yeltsin
but also President Putin a hard time, have been tamed. NTV is now a
softer version of its once combative self, and its old stalwarts are
finding that their smaller, lower profile refuge at TV-6 is now under
attack (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 1 October 2001). Ekho Moskvy, one of
the few voices of opposition on the radio airwaves, continues to
operate in limbo, as Gazprom delays a decision on its fate (see
"RFE/RL Newsline,"16 August 2001). Even the print media, although
less influential in terms of their impact on mass public opinion, are
quieter. The Boris Berezovskii-financed publications, such as
"Nezavisimaya gazeta," Kommersant-Daily," and "Novye Izvestiya"
continue to criticize the Kremlin, but they are probably a less
effective tool in influencing elite opinion. "Nezavisimaya gazeta" is
being dumbed down as the number of its analytical supplements has
been reduced, and the process promises to continue (see "RFE/RL
Newsline," 2 October 2001). "Kommersant-Daily" and "Novye Izvestiya,"
meanwhile, now pursue their own political agenda with the subtlety of
a jackhammer.

Precisely the opposite process is taking place with the
country's oligarchs, who appeared to have become smarter and adopted
a lower profile. Having witnessed the Prosecutor-General's relentless
pursuit of Media-MOST head Vladimir Gusinskii and of Berezovskii,
Russia's oligarchs no longer challenge the Kremlin head on. Instead,
they continue to carve up and consolidate their own spheres of
influence both on a regional and economic-sector basis, but more
quietly. Even the Central Bank, while never that rebellious, is now
likely to become even less so. Central Bank Chairman Viktor
Gerashchenko has confirmed that he is retiring, and Vladimir Kogan,
head of Promstroibank and a close Putin ally, is widely touted to
replace him (see "RFE/RL Russian Political Weekly," 16 April 2001).
With the gathering of NGOs in Moscow next month for the Kremlin-
sponsored Civic Forum, the presidential administration is aiming to
co-opt a last set of players that has insisted on retaining their
independence, as they lead the state-sponsored process of building a
civil society.

The Putin administration has captured Moscow, freeing it to
advance onwards to Brussels. And if the results of last week's EU
summit are any guide, more advances may be expected. Russian and EU
officials agreed to set up a joint panel to draw up a concept for a
common economic space, as well as a new working group to monitor
Russian-EU security issues on a monthly basis. In addition, according
to "Izvestiya" on 4 October, the two sides issued a joint communique
that is "fairly neutral on the Chechnya problem." Around the same
time, U.S. Ambassador to Russia Alexander Vershbow stated publicly
that Chechen rebels receive "enormous help from abroad," and argued
that they should be convinced "to break these international ties" to
"create more favorable conditions for the achievement of a peaceful
agreement" (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 4 October 2001). Such immediate
rewards for Russia's cooperative attitude may quiet any domestic
critics, since Putin can argue that by dropping opposition to things
that might have taken place anyway, such as stationing of U.S. troops
in Uzbekistan, Russia had everything to gain and little to lose.
(Julie A. Corwin)

*******

#9
San Francisco Chronicle
October 4, 2001
Drug trade could bloom amid conflict
War might provide smoke screen for traffic
Anna Badkhen, Chronicle Foreign Service

Kalinin, Tajikistan -- Sprawled out on a pile of pillows in the adobe home of
Safar Safoyev, a Russian border officer demanded heroin.

"Bring a little," said the colonel, who went by his first name, Sasha. "Just
a small dose to show the guests."

Safoyev smiled slyly and said he didn't have any drugs at the moment. His
son, Roma, also grinned, showing a row of gold teeth, before slapping Sasha
on the shoulder.

Just 2 miles south of Safoyev's house lies Afghanistan, the world's largest
supplier of opium and heroin. This tiny village in southeastern Tajikistan is
one of the first stops on what is informally known as the Great Drug Road.

Afghanistan, which produces 4,000 tons of opium annually, or about 75 percent
of the world's supply, uses impoverished Tajikistan, a former Soviet
republic, as a major transit country en route to Europe and the United
States.

And as U.S.-led forces prepare to strike against suspected terrorist havens
in Afghanistan, observers expect the chaos to lead to a dramatic increase in
drug trafficking.

Most opium is produced in territory controlled by the Taliban, which has
provided refuge to Osama bin Laden, the man the U.S. government suspects of
masterminding the Sept. 11 attacks.

Just last week, the Taliban lifted its 14-month ban on poppy cultivation --
an activity they had called "un-Islamic." Last year, the Taliban's reclusive
leader, Mullah Mohammed Omar, had warned that "anyone violating this statute
will be punished accordingly." Opium production then dropped by 97 percent,
according to U.N. officials.

POPPY CROP TIED TO ATTACKS

But Taliban officials told farmers to resume planting opium poppies if the
United States attacked the country. Observers speculate that the Islamic
government hopes to finance its defense against U.S. strikes with drug
profits.

The Taliban, which charges a 30 percent tax on all opium production, had used
the drug as an important source of revenue to fight opposition forces called
the Northern Alliance. The mujahedeen fighters who battled the Soviet Union
for a decade also partly funded their resistance by selling opium.

Immediately after the announcement that farmers could resume production,
wholesale prices of heroin in Afghanistan dropped by more than 80 percent,
leading to speculation that Afghan traffickers may already be selling their
stock.

Pino Arlacchi, executive director of the U.N. Office for Drug Control and
Crime Prevention, says significant stockpiles of opium are scattered across
Afghanistan, where factories refine the drug before it is smuggled into
Tajikistan or Iran.

However, he says, initial sales may not be directed by the Taliban. "Criminal
groups, who are as powerful as the Taliban and as powerful as anybody else in
Afghanistan, have full control of those stockpiles," he told the Associated
Press.

The U.S. State Department and the United Nations have said that drug
traffickers also operate freely in areas controlled by the Northern Alliance,
the Afghan opposition that has been fighting the Taliban for years and
controls about 10 percent of the country. They are believed to act as
middlemen in the transportation of opium.

ROUTINE GUNFIRE ON FRONTIER

The 10,000 border guards who patrol the 682-mile Tajik-Afghan frontier
routinely trade fire with drug couriers, although a spokesman for the guards
said it was impossible to know whether the drug-runners worked for the
Taliban, the Northern Alliance or some other drug network.

In August, smugglers and Russian soldiers clashed 16 times, said Lt. Col.
Pyotr Gordiyenko, a spokesman for Russian border guards in Tajikistan's
capital, Dushanbe. Last year, four border guards were killed during such
clashes, he said.

The couriers drive across the border in Chevrolet Blazers surrounded by
bodyguards equipped with state-of-the-art night-vision and communication
gear, Gordiyenko says. Arlacchi says each drug run is protected by 20 to 150
armed men.

"The days when one courier carried 5 kilos of heroin are gone," Gordiyenko
said.

Drug trafficking through Tajikistan has increased substantially in recent
years. In 1994, border police seized 572 pounds of raw opium and heroin. In
contrast, they seized 4.8 tons during the first eight months of 2001,
Gordiyenko said.

The confusion caused by a full-scale war just south of the Tajik border would
make drug smuggling across the frontier even easier, border guards say.

"Everyone will be running back and forth. There will be piles of dead bodies,
wounded people," said Sasha, the Russian colonel. "No one would notice the
smugglers. No one would care about drugs anymore."

Once the drugs cross the border, it is not clear who takes them from the
Afghan couriers. The United Nation's Arlacchi says drug kingpins are often
local traders, fighters, a customs official or a local mayor.

UNDER SUSPICION

Ever since 12 Russian soldiers based in the town of Dushanbe were caught
trying to ship 17 pounds of narcotics to Moscow, the Russian military has
also fallen under suspicion. And border guards, who transport weapons and
ammunition from Moscow for the alliance, privately say the Northern Alliance
sometimes pays for weapons with precious stones and, occasionally, opium and
heroin.

Some observers, however, point at Taliban-trained Islamic rebels in
Tajikistan's mountains. Others say the smugglers inside Tajikistan work for
former opposition warlords who fought post-Communist leaders during a five-
year Tajik civil war that killed more than 30,000 people.

Opposition leaders retained significant influence, observers say, which they
used in order to legitimize their share of the drug trade after a power-
sharing agreement in 1997 ended Tajikistan's conflict.

Tajikistan's southeastern Khatlonn region is rife with warlords and is a
bastion of the political opposition. In Kalinin, Safoyev's village of about
800 people, residents earn an average wage of $15 a month and must endure
frequent droughts. There are no steady jobs to be had, no medicine to be
found, no food in shops.

"Once, we lived well in the village, we had jobs, we had cars," said Safoyev,
69. "Now, we have one tractor, but no gas."

As a result, local residents appear to have found a trade that helps them to
survive.

"Come on, bring me drugs," Sasha demanded again. "Where is the heroin?"

*******

#10
Parlamentskaya Gazeta
No. 187 (October 8?)
2001
WAR OF CIVILISATIONS? NEVER!
Fedor BURLATSKY, Chairman of the Council on Political
Science of the Russian Academy of Sciences
Is U.S. Response Punishment, Retaliation, or Crusade?

The dreadful explosions in New York and Washington,
televised cold-heartedly all over the world, provoked feelings
of horror and sympathy in all hearts.

Having lived through such a tragedy in their country for
the first time in history, the Americans demand prompt riposte
that would lead to more damage than that inflicted by the
crafty attack they have experienced. Mighty forces on land,
water, and in the air are currently taking their positions and
are ready to strike. One thing is unclear: who is the enemy,
where is it hiding, and how could it be destroyed? Two concepts
are competing here: punishment and retribution. Under
punishment I mean punishment of the specific individuals,
organisations, and even countries, which carried out this
barbaric and extremely effective terrorist action. Retribution
implies retaliatory actions against those who prepared and hid
the bandits and who did not bother concealing how happy they
were that the attacks were a success. In short, eye for eye and
tooth for tooth, respectively.

If thousands of people in the United States have been
mercilessly killed, burned, and made jump out of the 400 meters
tall building, than hundreds of thousands or even millions
should die a dreadful death in revenge. The perpetrators have
not been named yet, but the target of retaliation has been
chosen. American naval ships are surrounding the countries of
the Middle and Near East.
Somewhere there terrorist number one Osama bin Laden is hiding.
Immediately after the terrorist attacks, U.S.
President George W. Bush said that he would not differentiate
between those who committed the crimes and those who gave
shelter to the criminals.

Mass media, prone to turning the most tragic of tragedies
into a sensation, reported then that the Third World War was
about to start, despite the fact that no one could say where
the enemy is, why there needs to be a war, and what a "world"
war means. The American intelligence service, which uses up to
$30 billion a year, and intelligence services of other
countries - less wealthy, but just as well informed - knew
nothing about the preparations for the crime. Now, they do not
know much either. The invisible enemy has not stopped its vile
work. It is not clear how it should be neutralised and how its
organisational and financial roots should be cut off. It is not
clear either how new thousands of volunteers should be
prevented from joining its organisations.

Technological Safety and Security

The tragedy in the U.S. made the world face new and
pressing problems. I believe that the most urgent of them is
vulnerability of modern civilisation. It turned out that
amazing technological, architectural, military, and civilian
inventions of the past decades are totally unprotected. A group
of daring people can destroy not only 110-storey buildings, but
also entire territories; poison cities and provinces; spread
diseases worse than plague; and even blow up nuclear power
plants. What if tomorrow terrorists start breaking into
computer programs, divert routes of planes and satellites, and
get their hands on a nuclear bomb?

It is obvious that the first thing we have to focus on is
the creation and introduction of a new system of technological
safety and security. I would even say security of our
civilisation, as such a system should be able to protect not
only machines, but also the people who operate them.
Naturally, no country can attain this goal on its own.
American aircraft and satellites fly all over the planet, and
they could be targeted outside the U.S. air space.

Let us imagine for a moment what would happen if the U.S.
and its allies attacked terrorist bases in Afghanistan and
other states. For the sake of the argument, let us also assume
that they succeeded in killing Osama bin Laden and his people.
Will this guarantee that the threat of terrorism is going to
disappear? Any specialist or even a reasonable person would
give a negative answer. This could result in a temporary drop
in terrorist activities only to be followed later by a more
terrible upsurge of terror generated by emotions of revenge and
hopelessness.

What are we to do? Reconcile with what has happened?
Wait? Try and seek a compromise with terrorists? Never! It is
most important to find effective ways to counter terrorism.
The U.S. and Russian presidents, German chancellor, and British
prime minister agreed on the need to combine efforts in
launching a protracted combat against terrorists. This inspires
hope.

To Understand Does Not Mean To Forgive

I would like to touch upon another side of the issue, even
though I am aware that it is quite a broad subject matter that
calls for a detailed analysis. I am talking about sources and
causes of this cancerous tumour on the body of humankind.
It becomes increasingly obvious that there exits a vacuum -
conceptual or, using the terminology of the previous times,
ideological - in understanding what causes terrorism.

A group of Norwegian scientists offered a Nobel Peace
Prize to President Bush if he manages to find the guilty of
terrorist attacks and refrain from launching a full-fledged
war. The major difficulty is to defeat terrorism, but avoid a
conflict with the Moslem world. It is important to involve the
majority of the countries in the Moslem world in various types
of cooperation. For that, we should comprehend the specificity
of the Moslem mentality, the humanitarian essence of the Koran,
and spiritual and cultural traditions of the Islamic world. We
need to understand why it takes Islamic civilisation so long to
adapt to modern technologies and way of life. Apart from
understanding that the Moslem world in many ways continues to
live in the 18th century, we should also take into account that
elites in Moslem countries have been accumulating incredible
wealth and oppressing their peoples mercilessly, which
generated a just fight for equality and freedom.

In this regard it would be worthwhile to mention an
opinion of Zbigniew Brzezinski - the unkind genius of American
strategic planning - who has come out with a concept of the new
world order. He has divided the world into groups of countries:
highly developed, developed, developing, and hopeless or rogue.
I would risk to advise my colleague, with whom I have had
discussions more than once, to reread the works by Arnold
Toynbee on world civilisations, their specificities, spiritual
strivings, and beliefs. Human nature and national spirit cannot
be changed overnight, especially by force. One can only hope to
facilitate their internal processes.

I have been to the U.S. on several occasions, but I have
not met Americans who would dream of vesting the American
presidents with power over the entire world. The recent tragedy
should have returned the U.S. to thinking in terms of its
favourite slogan: live and let others live. Live the way you
want even if there exist better ways. Live, as people in other
countries and continents would like to live.

Toynbee tried to teach his compatriots to live according
to this wisdom.

Russia's Painful Experience

Russia faced international terrorism earlier than other
countries. At first, actions in Chechnya, headed by General
Dzhokhar Dudayev, seemed to be merely an upsurge of national
self-awareness by a nation insulted and oppressed by Stalin.
However, with time, it became clear that Russia was dealing
with a conspiracy of international terrorists, whose ideas were
mixed with those of extremist fundamentalists. A real threat
that the whole Northern Caucasus and Central Asia would get
incited by these ideas and the second Taliban would emerge has
become a reality.

It is now becoming clear that in one respect American
warnings to Russia made sense. Under no circumstances should
Iran, Iraq, and other states that support extremist ideologies
be allowed to have nuclear weapons. I dread thinking of what
would happen if nuclear weapons were in the hands of
terrorists. This would mean that there is a threat of the third
and last world war, which would lead to the destruction of
everything that lives on Earth. On the other hand, Western
leaders should realise the complexity of problems that Russia
faces in Chechnya.

The new division of forces as a consequence of the
explosions in the U.S. called for a new approach to the Chechen
issue. I thought it was extremely important that the Russian
president approached the heads of illegal armed formations in
Chechnya with a new proposal. The new division of forces
involves the entire world. Rebel commanders are to form their
attitude to international terrorism, which manifested itself so
powerfully in the U.S. An important chance of a possibility of
dialogue has emerged and it should not be missed.

It is very symptomatic that heads of independent states of
the former Soviet space in Central Asia have in general adopted
a position of solidarity with states forming an anti-terrorist
coalition and that they cooperate with Russia.
This sets an example to states in the Moslem world which are
interested in moving towards modern civilisation. The Central
Asian states may play a historic role in cooperation with
Moslem countries, and serve as a bridge between the East and
West in pursuit of internationalisation in combating terrorism
and preventing a conflict between civilisations.

*******

#11
Excerpt
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
October 3, 2001
Washington DC
Meeting
"STRANGE BEDFELLOWS IN A STRANGE LAND: THE INTERNATIONAL COALITION TO COMBAT TERRORISM"
Transcript by Federal News Service

MR. KUCHINS:...our final panelist, Michael McFaul.

Mike's a Senior Associate here at the Carnegie Endowment. He's also on the
faculty of the Department of Political Science of Stanford, and he's also a
Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution. And I am sad to say that Mike will
soon be leaving the Endowment, in fact, early next week to go back to
California, but I'm happy to say that Mike will be maintaining an affiliation
with the Endowment as a Senior Associate. Mike's written very widely on
Russian politics and aspects of U.S.-Russian relations, seemingly putting out
an op-ed per day at this rate. But most recently, I should point out that
Mike's new book, Russia's Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from
Gorbachev to Putin, has just been published by Cornell University Press and I
recommend it to you.

MICHAEL MCFAUL: Thank you, Andy.

I'm going to talk about three things. And for those of you in the back, a few
chairs just freed up here in the front if you'd like to try to find them.

First I want to talk just briefly about the status of the relationship and
the chronology in terms of U.S.-Russian relations. I realize many of you in
this room follow that closely, but a good deal of you do not, so I want to
update you on that; second, talk about domestic reactions to what Putin has
proposed; and third, talk about possible steps for further cementing this
relationship in the short term and long term.

First, on the chronology, it's been said and I've been told that President
Putin was actually the first foreign leader to reach President Bush on
September 11th. It was a rather emotional phone call, a pledge of support -
we are with you - and, I am told that President Bush himself was very moved
by the openness. And the fact that it was the first call taken I think is
significant.

After that, however, there was a week of ambiguity. You'll recall Sergei
Ivanov, the minister of Defense, said, "We're not going to get involved in
this. We're not going to open our space." General Kvashnin made similar
statement of rolling back. And it seemed like we were entering a very classic
moment in Russian politics in the Putin era when there would be lots of
voices saying different things. And Putin characteristically, in those
debates, takes a long time to side with one or the other, and in fact he
prefers not to side with those groups. And to oversimplify it, it tends to be
the liberals in the governments versus the KGB and military folks that are
closer to him, both within his administration and within the institutions
that they run. That's a gross oversimplification, by this has been a pattern
we've seen in a lot of issues -- economic policy, the war in Chechnya, et
cetera - and it seemed like we were inching back towards that.

Putin then goes off to Sochi. Lots of people fly in and confer with him.
Deputy Secretary of State Armitage also goes to Moscow around this time. And
it seems to me that there was some very concrete discussions about concrete
things that the Americans were hoping for. On September 23rd, on a Sunday,
there was a 40-minute conversation between Presidents Bush and Putin. And on
the 24th, the following day, Putin made his statement, trying to put actual
meat and concrete policies on the emotional, rhetorical statement of support
he had made on September 11th.

And to remind you, these were the five points that he outlined: one,
intelligence cooperation; two, open Russian airspace for humanitarian
assistance; three, cooperation with Central Asian allies to allow their
airbases to be open for similar kinds of operations -- and then Sergei Ivanov
reversed himself 100 percent and took it a step further to say not just
humanitarian but military as well -- fourth, participation in international
search and rescue efforts; and fifth, increased direct assistance to the
Northern Alliance, and he said very explicitly technical and humanitarian but
also weapons -- military support.

Now, how far-reaching was this statement? I have to say that in our
discussions here in Washington, the press reports tended to underplay it:
what's the big deal about humanitarian over-flight after all, right? I have
to say I have a very different interpretation. I actually think this
statement was a fundamental departure from previous statements about foreign
policy made by Russians or Soviet leaders in the past. The notion that
Central Asian space - and, granted, they're independent states, caveats all
accepted - would be opened up to NATO troops, to me represents something that
was truly fundamental and different, both from what Mr. Putin has said in the
past, but President Yeltsin would never have made that statement either, let
alone Leonid Brezhnev. And I actually think we have somewhat underplayed it.
Obviously there's lots going on in our press and lots going on in the grander
coalition, but this was, for Mr. Putin, a step beyond what he normally does.

Now why? Well, one could say he was just catching up to history and that Mr.
Karimov had already pledged his support in Uzbekistan. Putin was just
acquiescing to facts on the ground. I think that's true. And by the way,
parenthetically, Karimov's support for us just didn't start with September
11th. I think that's misunderstood. This military cooperation through the
Partnership for Peace Program, Uzbekistan has been probably the most active
participant, has wanted this for a long time. And in many ways I think we
need to go back to Secretary Perry and say that the forward-leaning that he
had on this, to say that we should actively engage Uzbekistan, I have to say
mea culpa, myself, I was actively against this at the time. We're now seeing
the benefits of those kinds of programs. So, yes, he was just catching up
with history on the ground.

Second, most certainly he was just -- in terms of short term interests, the
notion of joint cooperation on terrorism is something that President Putin
has been pushing for a long time; vindicates what he has been doing in
Chechnya. They have tried to get this on the agenda for a long time. It
vindicates that.

But I actually think it is much deeper than that and I think it would be
wrong to just assume that it's just about that. I think it was something that
had to do with norms and kind of Putin's base gut reaction that when push
comes to shove, and this is a moment when push does come to shove, he wants
to be part of the West and not on the outside of the West. And for a long
time, if you look at his history and you look at his background and you look
at the issues, he's tried to balance this intuitive Western leaningness with
his Soviet background and his Soviet training and Soviet geostrategic
thinking. I think on this one he pushed and he went with his gut, not with
his interests.

And therefore they were very nervous and disappointed when that speech was
not met with the commensurate kind of acknowledgement from the West. And
between Monday and Wednesday, there was lots of scrambling going on: Why is
the West not acknowledging what we've done, this is truly a big step forward,
where is the American response? Well, it did come. It took two days, but it
came on the following Wednesday, September 26th, out of the White House. And
the Fleischer statement said a couple of things, saluted President Putin's
speech, and explicitly called on Chechen terrorists with links to bin Laden
to cease those contacts.

And let me just say a couple of things about that statement because I think
it was important for a number of respects. First of all, it came out of the
White House, it did not come out of the State Department. That was not by
accident. There was a battle about it. Second, it violated their own rules of
the game in terms of how they talk about coalition partners. For those of you
who work out with me in the gym downstairs, we're always down there, we're
always listening to Boucher go on and on and on about saying nothing, right?
And what does, as we all know, and as my friends in the journalistic
community know even more - some of them are thinking of getting new jobs
because it's so boring - he says, time and time again, "We're going to let
the other countries define their relationships with us. We are not going to
comment on anything in terms of what they've done for us." Well, they
violated that with Russia in a very pronounced way.

And I think this was a Bush initiative and Condaleeza Rice initiative. That's
why it came out of the White House. And it was very well received in Russia,
but perhaps not for the way that many of you think, and most certainly not
for the way that most journalists who've called me about it think. Everybody
assumes that this now gives Russia carte blanche to do what it wants in
Chechnya, and that's what President Putin wanted from the statement. That's
wrong. That's false. They've had carte blanche to do what they want in
Chechnya. They did not need the White House press spokesperson to give them
that. Our words, ever since the re-invasion of Chechnya, have had very little
effect on the way that they have conducted that war, tragically in my
opinion. But what they did want was the explicit linkage of terrorists in
Chechnya to bin Laden, and that's what they got from that statement, and that
was a change.

Second, domestic reactions to the Putin statement. Publicly of course, all
are standing behind the president. Sergei Ivanov, as I've already mentioned,
reversed himself 100 percent. The military is disciplined enough not to go on
the record and comment about things they disagree with with their commander
in chief. And let's remember that he still has a 65-70 percent approval
rating. People do not want to go against the president publicly. Quietly,
however, I think there's a lot of discontent, and that Putin himself is in
the minority in terms of his statement and leaning towards the West. First
and foremost, the military -- Mr. Kvashnin and his military commanders - they
do not like the notion that NATO troops are going to show up in Central Asia.
As they well know, when NATO troops show up, they rarely go home.

Second, Sergei Ivanov. I would just put a question mark next to his name and
urge you all to follow very closely what he says. Publicly he has supported
the president. Privately, I hear through various channels, that he is not
very excited about this move and is trying to quietly build an anti-Western
coalition within the government.

Third, the military industrial complex and their cronies in the Duma, or
those that are bribed by them in the Duma, they have arms contracts with
Iraq, Syria and the one you just read about with Iran. They have no interest
in reversing that right now. They don't support this.

Fourth, the communists and Zhirinovsky, obviously they don't like it.
Fortunately they don't matter that much.

Fifth, the foreign policy elite I think is split. Some, like Mr. Karaganov
and Mr. Arbatov I think are leaning westward. Others such as Mr. Migranyan
and Mr. Zatulin have already publicly stated that this is a big strategic
mistake for Russia.

Sixth, even the liberals are divided on this. Publicly they support Putin and
they see this as a big breakthrough, but quietly and privately some of them
are very nervous that this kind of grand alliance against terrorism will mean
also a grand alliance against democracy and human rights within Russia, and
they're nervous about this as well. They're split on this; there's a divide.

And finally, the Russian people. I, too, received many emails and phone
calls, an outpouring on September 11th from friends of mine. An immediate
public opinion poll showed overwhelming sympathy for the Americans. But in
terms of moving forward, one sees a real division within the way that the
public is looking at this. There has been a real suspicion - I have the
numbers here if you've interested - about American foreign policy intentions
for the last decade. And while this event has helped to move those somewhat,
it has not erased them entirely.

And the big question, of course - this is the calm before the storm. What
happens domestically when things start flying, quite literally? And as one of
my Russian liberal colleagues told me, we're a lot more like Pakistan than we
are like Germany in terms of the way we're going to react domestically and
how destabilizing this could be.

So, what can be done and what should be done? I think now the ball is in the
Western court, and in the Bush administration's court. And let me just tick
off seven or eight - Andy, I left my watch. Do I have a few minutes?

MR. KUCHINS: You have a couple of minutes.

MR. MCFAUL: Okay, let me just tick off briefly some things that I think could
be done to help push this beyond just a short-term alliance to something
deeper.

One, a statement that says we no longer believe that Russia is the successor
state to the USSR. That may sound like an obvious no-brainer to people here,
but that would have real implications for all kinds of laws that are still on
the book that were written about the Soviet Union, particularly regarding
trade, Most Favored Nation status. That would be a symbolic thing. Of course,
we could bring those things back in in terms of against Russia, but as
everybody knows, it's a lot harder to introduce new legislation than to get
rid of old.

Second, push for further integration of Russia into the West, broadly. I
think the easiest thing would be stronger statements on the WTO. Secondly, I
think we could state more boldly a new plan of cooperation between Russia and
NATO, something beyond the PJC. I think it's ludicrous to think that we're
going to stop expanding NATO or we're going to transform NATO as some - you
know, some Russians mentioned this, I think that's wrong - and most certainly
we're not going to create what some Russians are calling the new Northern
Alliance. That is not going to happen, but I think we could cement that
relationship and outline a map for closer cooperation. That has not been done
yet.

Third, allow NATO countries to buy Russian weapons. Just say that. It doesn't
mean it's going to happen, but say it, it's a new policy.

Fourth, have NATO allies buy weapons to be shipped to the Northern Alliance.
Don't forget, we used to by Czech weapons during the Cold War to send to the
Mujahadin. If we could do that then, is it so ludicrous to think that the
Italians might buy some Soviet weapons to be sent to the Northern Alliance --
Russian, excuse me. Thank you. [Laughter.]

Fifth, cooperation on fighting terrorism based in Georgia. I think this is a
real flashpoint that we should be very concerned about. And why I say
cooperation is because I want to prevent Russian unilateral raids to fight
terrorism in Chechnya. In fact, this I think could be a real flashpoint. It's
not getting serious attention. It may not come from Mr. Putin; it may come
from a commander down there. But what then happens? I think we need to be
mobilized and state very categorically that we're willing to defend the
borders of Georgia and help rid terrorists and their camps in Georgia when
Mr. Shevardnadze comes this week.

Sixth, speak more clearly about Chechnya. Not all Chechens are terrorists
just like not all people living in Afghanistan are. I think that needs to be
stated more boldly. Second, I think, regarding Chechnya, now is actually a
moment of opportunity for negotiations. There's been contact between
Maskhadov and the Russian government. We should be talking explicitly and
promoting that. And third, talk very explicitly about the negative lessons to
be learned about how the Russians fought "terrorism" in Chechnya. Russia is
not safer today because of the way they fought that war, and they've really
helped to inspire terrorists there in terms of the way they conducted that
war. We should speak out very clearly against that.

And seventh, we have to continue to push for democratization within Russia.
Russia will never be a full partner of the West until Russia is a full
democracy. And to think that that somehow is off the agenda I think is really
short-term thinking, because right now we have an alliance between what I
would call those for order and those for anarchy, those for the status quo
and those against the status quo, but that's a short-term cleavage. This is
not a war for freedom against freedom, as has sometimes been said. Russia,
unlike many countries in this alliance right now, has the opportunity to
really change its status within that divide. And I think it's going to take
leadership from both our presidents to make that happen.

*******

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