October 6, 2001

This Date's Issues:   5479

Johnson's Russia List
#5479
6 October 2001
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Luba Schwartzman: ORT Review.
2. AP: Weather Impedes Russian Jet Recovery.
3. AFP: Russian soldiers left cold by prospect of Chechen peace talks.
4. The Russia Journal: Otto Latsis, Still hope in Chechnya.
5. The Russia Journal: Alexander Golts, Tough challenge ahead as Putin looks West.
6. Moscow Tribune: Stanislav Menshikov, RUSSIA MOVES CLOSER TO NATO. But Strategic Thinking Should Change on Both Sides.
7. AFP: Uzbekistan hopes aiding US will eradicate Islamic militants.
8. Reuters: Russia's Kudrin attends G7 meet with head held high.
9. World Bank's Transition Online: Is There a New Russia? A report by the Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR and SITE) sums up the economic policy challenges facing the Russian government and suggests reform priorities.
10. New York Times book review: Clare Cavanagh, 'Requiem for a Lost Empire': Andreï Makine, Back in the U.S.S.R.
11. Robert Bruce Ware: Reply to Squier (JRL #5477). (re Chechnya)]

*******

#1
ORT Review
www.ortv.ru
Compiled by Luba Schwartzman (luba7@bu.edu)
Research fellow at the Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology and
Policy at Boston University

HEADLINES,
Friday, October 05, 2001
- Deputy General Prosecutor Sergei Fridinski has announced that a criminal
case (under a statute on terrorism) has been opened in connection with the
crash of the TU-154.
- Security Council Chairman Vladimir Rushailo arrived in Sochi last night
to head a committee to investigate the causes of the TU-154 catastrophe.
- Relatives the TU-154 victims are beginning to arrive to the scene.
- Russian Air Force Commander Anatoly Kornukov, who has monitored
Ukrainian Air Force exercises in the Crimean, is certain that a Ukrainian
missile did not shoot down the TU-154 airliner heading to Novosibirsk.
- Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov has arrived in Kishinev to meet
with the Moldavian government. Rumors that he also plans to meet with
Transdniester leader Igor Smirnov have been refuted by the Russian
embassy.
- U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has arrived in Uzbekistan to
meet with President Islam Karimov.
- General Vladimir Moltensky has replaced Colonel General Valerii Baranov
as commander of the joint military forces in Chechnya. The press service
of the Russian Defense Ministry announced that this was a regularly
planned change.
- President Putin held a meeting with the heads of Russia's power organs
to discuss domestic and foreign policy questions.
- According to some sources, the fighters who have entered Abkhaz
territory under the command of Ruslan Gelaev, are heading towards Russia,
towards the border with Kabardino-Balkaria. Representatives of the Abkhaz
military stated that the terrorists received food supplies from the
Georgian government.
- Deputy Prime Minister Viktor Khristenko conducted a meeting to discuss
winter preparations with select regional leaders.
- By the end of the week, deep-sea divers will connect all of the lifting
clamps to the body of the Kursk nuclear submarine.
- National teachers' day was celebrated in Russia today. President Putin
congratulated teachers and discussed education reform with representatives
of village schools, which make up 70 percent of the Russian school system.
One of these representatives was Aset Bakaeva of Chechnya. The best
teachers in Russia are taking part in a competition to be teacher of the
year: fifteen finalists will give impromptu 15-minute lessons to
demonstrate not only their knowledge, but also their ability to captivate
the class.

*******

#2
Weather Impedes Russian Jet Recovery
October 6, 2001
By SARAH KARUSH

SOCHI, Russia (AP) - Low clouds hanging over the seaside city of Sochi
hampered recovery efforts Saturday in the crash of a Russian jetliner,
while grieving relatives arrived to identify victims pulled from the choppy
Black Sea.

Emergency workers continued to search for bodies and plane fragments that
could serve as evidence, but inclement weather slowed their efforts. A
helicopter scheduled to fly low over the crash site so experts could
inspect it could not fly to the scene because of the clouds.

The Tupolev 154 - en route from Tel Aviv, Israel, to Novosibirsk, Russia -
exploded and crashed Thursday 110 miles off the Russian coast. All 78
people aboard were killed.

A prosecutor said investigators were focusing on whether an explosion or a
technical problem caused the crash.

U.S. intelligence officials have said the plane was accidentally hit by a
Ukrainian missile during exercises, and the Ukrainian prime minister said
Friday he did not rule out that possibility.

Deputy prosecutor Sergei Fridinsky said all theories were being given equal
weight, and the possibility of a technical problem was still being
considered.

``We are working on this theory just as intensely as on all the others,''
he said at a news conference.

Fridinsky said officials recovered the remains of 15 victims and brought
them to Sochi. Three bodies had been identified by relatives.

The plane was carrying Israeli residents who had recently migrated from
Russian and were flying back to visit family members.

More relatives arrived from other Siberian cities Saturday. Guarded from
journalists, they were met at the airport by a special bus.

As they filed wearily past reporters from the bus into the hotel, some
pleaded with reporters to give them space.

``We can barely walk. Please, leave us alone,'' one elderly woman said.

More were expected to arrive on Sunday.

U.S. intelligence officials believe the plane was hit by a large
surface-to-air missile built to shoot down heavy bombers flying at high
altitudes. The United States tracked the missile during a Ukrainian
military exercise with satellites that sense the heat of its launch, and
officials said the time of the launch coincided with the disaster.

Ukrainian officials initially denied the allegation. But the country's
prime minister, Anatoliy Kinakh, appeared to soften Kiev's stance on
Friday, saying the U.S. version ``has a right to exist.''

Officials on Saturday displayed some of the debris, including a wheel, the
mangled metal frames of seats, cushions, life vests and a metal fragment
that had holes in it. Some investigators have said the holes might have
been caused by bullets, supporting a Russian theory the plane had been
targeted by terrorists.

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov sent an urgent request Friday to the
Pentagon for ``documentary data'' that could prove or disprove its
contention that a missile had brought the plane down, the Interfax news
agency said.

Nine Russian ships were at the crash site to collect bodies and debris,
said Alexander Moskalets, the deputy emergency situations minister.

Officials warned it would be difficult to locate the plane's black box
because the Black Sea is 7,062 feet deep at the crash site and the bottom
was covered with 12 inches of silt.

*******

#3
Russian soldiers left cold by prospect of Chechen peace talks

ACHKOI-MARTAN, Russia, Oct 6 (AFP) -
Talk of peace negotiations in Chechnya has left many Russian soldiers asking
why they should lay down their arms after losing so many of their comrades in
the two-year conflict.

"This is already my fourth tour of duty in Chechnya," said Alexei, 38, a
soldier with the elite OMON troops, who refused to give his last name out of
security concerns.

"I have lost my friends here. I do not know how many times I will come back
here, but we don't need peace talks. What was the point of us losing so many
men then?" he demanded Friday.

"Peace talks will only give the guerrillas a chance to regroup," agreed
Maxim, 30, a soldier with the interior ministry troops.

"Their frame of mind can no longer be changed. They are used to war," he
said, staring into the plains ahead, from where the rebels open fire without
warning. "They will fight and keep giving Russia problems even if we leave."

More than 3,000 Russian troops have officially been registered killed in the
two-year war, Russia's second in Chechnya in seven years.

The Russian soldiers' mothers committee fears the true number of Russian
casualties may be closer to 10,000. No one knows how many Chechen rebels have
died -- 25 were reported killed on Friday alone.

Nor does anyone know how many civilians were killed in the ferocious barrage
of Russian shelling that was launched when federal troops were trying to
seize the rebel capital Grozny, now standing in ruins, at the start of the
war in October 1999.

Through it all -- in part sparked by last month's terrorist strikes in the
United States -- there is talk of peace settling on the ravaged North
Caucasus province.

"There will be talks," the separatist leader Aslan Maskhadov's chief
negotiator, Akhmad Zakayev, told AFP on Friday.

"It is difficult to say how these negotiations will progress. But both we and
the Russian side understand that the fighting must stop."

The chief Russian negotiator Viktor Kazantsev has said little, though he has
confirmed that some sort of negotiations are underway.

But the humiliation of the Russian troops' withdrawal after the 1994-96 war
-- which killed up to 70,000 people -- and the persistent political
turbulence that has rocked the region since then have left many stationed in
Chechnya shaking there heads in disbelief at the possibility of another
retreat.

"They must simply be destroyed," said Khavash, a worker with the pro-Russian
administration. "There can never be any talks. They are guilty before their
own people. They are shooting at their own, not only the Russian soldiers."

It seems the only people in Chechnya who want peace are the ones who never
took up arms -- either in the cause of the Russian "anti-terrorist"
operation, or for independence from Moscow.

"We are tired of this war. Civilians suffer the most. The guerrillas come
into villages, shoot at things and leave. Then the Russian soldiers move in
and start arresting people. This is senseless. There has to be a way out,"
said Akhyad, a civilian who, also citing fear of Russian soldiers, gave no
other insights into his life.

"I understand the Russians do not want to leave in humiliation. But something
must be agreed."

*******

#4
The Russia Journal
October 5-11, 2001
Still hope in Chechnya
By OTTO LATSIS

The media debate continues over how to interpret President Vladimir Putin’s
recent appeal to the Chechen rebels giving them 72 hours to begin
negotiations. If this was a proposal to find a road to peace, then why a
three-day deadline, as in an ultimatum? And if this was an ultimatum, then
why was nothing said about what sanctions would be taken against those who
refused its terms and what security guarantees would be provided to those
who did accept them?

There are other strange factors, too. First, it’s not clear what
constructive response Moscow hoped to get from its appeal to the rebels to
lay down their arms. The rebels aren’t defeated and aren’t asking for
mercy. On the contrary, they’ve been turning up the pressure on the federal
forces lately. Just a few days before Putin’s statement, they made a
successful attack on Gudermes, Chechnya’s secondlargest city. They entered
the city without difficulty, attacked federal posts and left without
hindrance.

Interior Minister Boris Gryzlov estimated the detachment at 300 rebels.
This contradicts earlier statements from military officials that the
separatists’ main forces had been smashed and are now operating in small
groups of 10-15 people. In reality, the rebels do as they please in
Chechnya, a fact that was emphasized by the recent tragic episode in Grozny
when a helicopter carrying a commission from General Headquarters was shot
down in broad daylight above the city center. Two generals and eight
colonels were killed in the attack, while the Chechen marksman was able to
get away.

Putin’s woolly terms suggest that he was deliberately trying to be unclear.
The 72-hour deadline wasn’t for laying down arms (that would have been a
simple ultimatum) or for beginning negotiations, but for appointing
representatives to begin negotiations on laying down arms.

Most observers, however, saw Putin’s statement as an ultimatum. The same
goes for most generals, who think no ultimatums are necessary and would
have preferred a massive strike against Chechnya right after the terrorist
attacks in New York and Washington. Their calculation was that the
Americans would have been too busy with other matters to protest and would
write it all off as part of the fight against "international terrorism."
Gen. Vladimir Shamanov, who fought in Chechnya, went so far as to call for
strikes against Georgia, Chechnya’s neighbor, under the pretext that
Chechens were using Georgian territory as a terrorist base.

This kind of straight-down-the-line approach is typical of military people
who don’t see the difference between conflict between regular armies and
guerrilla warfare. Guerrillas hide among the civilian population. They are
strong so long as they have the population’s support, and are powerless
once they lose it. Attempts by the regular army to ravage villages
indiscriminately on the grounds that the civilian population could be
hiding guerrillas only helps make the guerrillas invincible, because the
war against them turns into a war against the people.

This is why after federal forces crossed Chechnya and smashed the largest
rebel groups, purely military tasks should have made way for the main
political task of separating the rebels from the population. The war-weary
civilian population blamed the rebels for much of what was happening and
was psychologically ready for this new turn of events. But the continuation
of what is essentially a war against all Chechens has pushed the people
back into the rebels’ embrace time and time again.

The dogmatic approach of using military force colored many of Putin’s
statements, from his call to "kill terrorists in the outhouse" to his
often-repeated words that there is no one in Chechnya with whom to
negotiate. But this dogmatic approach is showing signs of weakness – this
is the second way of looking at Putin’s latest statements. Some of what he
said suggests that he is interested in beginning negotiations but is
expressing it in a veiled form, given the anti-Chechen sentiment that
remains strong in society and especially in the security ministries.

Particularly interesting in this respect was a TV interview with Viktor
Kazantsev, presidential representative in the Southern Federal district,
who until recently maintained that Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov had no
real power, wasn’t a legitimate president and couldn’t be a partner in
negotiations. But now he has changed his tune. As if having forgotten all
his former statements, Kazantsev announced with satisfaction that contacts
with Maskhadov had begun through an intermediary he had appointed.

Opponents to peace stand on both sides of the invisible front dividing
Chechnya. The latest attacks on several district centers in Chechnya after
Putin’s statement and Maskhadov’s unclear reaction only confirm the point.
But Putin’s appeal contains new notes of hope. Perhaps all this is just a
cover for preparations for new mass-scale strikes against the Chechens.
This can’t be ruled out, but no strikes followed the expiration of the
72-hour deadline. There is still hope.

*******

#5
The Russia Journal
October 5-11, 2001
Tough challenge ahead as Putin looks West
By ALEXANDER GOLTS

If I were younger and more impressionable, I’d have shed a tear after
listening to President Vladimir Putin’s speech in the German Bundestag,
when the tragedies in New York and Washington became his moment of truth.

While some Russian politicians and generals could barely conceal their joy
at America’s misfortune, intimating that the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks
were the price it had to pay for its arrogance and plans to defend only
itself, from Putin we heard words of remorse – a mea culpa.

Putin was right to put the responsibility on world leaders, including
himself, for giving all their attention to nonexistent security threats
such as NATO expansion and missile defense and failing to see the real
threats.

Putin’s speech in the Bundestag and his meeting this week with NATO General
Secretary Lord Robertson make it clear that the Kremlin has decided to
integrate itself with Western security organizations. What makes this
occasion different is that this time the West is willing to open its arms
to Russia.

The leaders of the industrialized countries think that Moscow should be
rewarded for its readiness to participate in the anti-terrorist coalition.
Issues that seemed hard to resolve only yesterday, such as Russia’s
accession to the World Trade Organization or obtaining the recognized
status of a country with a market economy, could now be sorted out in the
near future.

Integrating efforts

What’s more, Western countries that previously talked about Russia’s
possible entry into NATO as a purely hypothetical event, are now ready to
discuss the issue in practical terms. Judging by statements of German
Chancellor Gerhard Schroder and NATO’s Robertson, they have clearly
realized that Russia will be an essential partner in this new war.

Analysts with liberal views will no doubt find this a very touching and
heartwarming situation. But there’s reason to try to keep a cool head.
Putin faces an incredible challenge. If he is sincere about wanting to join
Western security structures, this will put him on a collision course with
the people he believes form the foundation of the Russian state – the
bureaucrats who define and implement Russia’s foreign and defense policy.

Integration with Western security structures would require Russia to
abandon what had been proclaimed as the cornerstone of Russian foreign
policy – attempts to create a multipolar world. In reality, this was just a
thinly veiled attempt to put together an international coalition to oppose
U.S. policy, which Moscow accused of being hegemonic.

In practice, building a multipolar world meant Russia was courting
anti-American regimes such as those in North Korea, Iran and Iraq.
Political strategists in Moscow thought that by supporting these regimes,
and even supplying them with arms, Russia was assuring that its foreign
policy remained independent.

Rather than remaining independent, Moscow found itself time and again held
hostage to the games played by those whose interests it was trying to
defend. Such was the case when North Korean leader Kim Jong Il tried to
make a joke out of the promise he had made to Putin to end North Korea’s
missile program. And then there were all the times when former Yugoslav
leader Slobodan Milosevic pulled the wool over Russia’s eyes.

Consequences

Cutting off support for these regimes means ending arms supplies, and this
in turn means significant financial losses for some of the members of
Putin’s entourage. If Putin is sincere, he will have to do some very
serious thinking before giving the go-ahead to contracts to supply Yemen
with fighter planes and to send arms to Iran, whose defense minister was in
Moscow this very week.

But these painful steps are nothing in comparison to the revolution Putin
will have to carry out in the military. Up until now, the armed forces’
main task has been acting as a strategic deterrent to the United States and
NATO. Moscow was opposed to U.S. plans for missile defense on the grounds
that it would undermine the principle of mutually assured destruction.
Russia had similar arguments against NATO expansion.

Now, Putin has stated to the world that these discussions were a hangover
from the past. It won’t be easy to end them, however. Almost the entire
Russian military elite was raised with the feeling that the West is the
enemy. Military training, tactics and strategy, arms and technology were
all designed to oppose a single adversary – the U.S. army.

Abandoning this old thinking in deeds rather than just in words would
require a revolution in military policy. It would mean Russia curtailing
its nuclear missile program and doing away with the need to produce a new
generation of nuclear submarines and heavy cruisers. It would also mean
having to put an end to the kinds of maneuvers that have been held over
recent years. These maneuvers have been aimed at repelling a mass-scale air
attack like the NATO operations in Yugoslavia and launching nuclear attacks
on U.S. territory.

The greatest challenge will be reforming the military organization of
Russian society. It’s no secret that it doesn’t meet any of the conditions
set for candidate NATO members. The only thing in Russia that meets these
conditions is probably Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov’s excellent English.
The same can’t be said about Ivanov’s way of thinking.

Given the emergency nature of the current situation, NATO could close its
eyes to the state of the Russian armed forces and declare Russia a member
of an organization set up specially for the purpose. But the catch is that
NATO’s conditions aren’t there just for the sake of it. They exist to
ensure real cooperation and coordination between the armed forces of member
countries.

The only way a couple of dozen countries can plan and carry out long-term
military programs is if they all have transparent and public defense
budgets. Only democratic institutions can guarantee that a country’s armed
forces won’t try to influence political decisions and draw the whole
alliance into some risky undertaking or other. In other words, the NATO
conditions are essential for maintaining confidence among the member states.

Putin will have to prepare a new military elite for Russia. For real
cooperation with the West, Russia needs generals who find it normal to obey
the orders of civilian officials. Russia also needs civilian officials who
are competent in military matters. The executive and legislative branches
of power must share responsibility for the state of the armed forces.

Firm will?

This will take an immense effort over many years, but the work must begin
right away. As yet, however, Putin hasn’t shown any firm will towards the
generals. He didn’t send Gennady Troshev and Vladimir Shamanov into
retirement when they made public political statements. He put up with it
when naval commanders lied to him about the reason for the Kursk tragedy.
The old military and political elite will surely attempt to sabotage this
new course of drawing closer to the West. And it’s not clear whether or not
Putin will be able to oppose them.

*******

#6
From: "Stanislav Menshikov" <menschivok@globalxs.nl>
Subject: RUSSIA MOVES CLOSER TO NATO
Date: Fri, 5 Oct 2001 1

"MOSCOW TRIBUNE", 5 October 2001
RUSSIA MOVES CLOSER TO NATO
But Strategic Thinking Should Change on Both Sides
By Stanislav Menshikov

After Vladimir Putin's visited Berlin and Brussels the idea of Russia
joining NATO does not look absurd any more. It was not the Russian president
's rhetoric that did the trick. The Kremlin leader has been hinting as much
for many months now, but was not taken seriously. It took the
Manhattan-Pentagon tragedy to happen for the two former rivalling
superpowers to realise that they had a common enemy with whom they were at
war as de facto allies. Once Putin and George W. Bush agreed on concrete
joint action, the alliance became one of deeds, not just words. And because
America's view is decisive in NATO, Russia, in the European perception
immediately changed from a suspected opponent into a respected partner.

It is instructive to observe how crucial definitions shift when a different
pair of eyeglasses is put on. For years Russia pleaded with the West to stop
treating it as a non-market economy and thus clear the way to membership in
the WTO. But after Putin agreed to the use of Central Asia republics'
airspace for operations against terrorists, Washington let Moscow know that
it definitely considered Russia a market economy. The European Union appears
to be ready to act in the same vein. It is clear that political decisions
have priority in resolving issues of economy and commerce.

So far, so good. But let us not indulge as yet in euphoria about a new
chapter being opened in Russia's relations with the West. It is premature,
as some experts do, to talk about "convergence of strategic interests" as
something that has already occurred or is about to happen. To start with,
despite unanimity on the need to eliminate terrorism there is significant
divergence as to who are terrorists and who are "legitimate fighters" for
national independence. As Mr. Putin explained in Brussels, Russia needs no
additional evidence to prove that Osama bin Laden and his gang are
terrorists, and is prepared to help the US eliminate that gang. But despite
shifts in the official US attitude towards Chechnya, Washington is far from
willing to support Moscow's fight against terrorism in that republic. But if
separatists there continue receiving money from abroad, terrorist acts there
will not cease.

However, much wider issues are at stake if convergence of strategic thinking
is seriously intended. Is NATO indeed willing to embrace Russia to the point
of making it, in time, a full-fledged member of the alliance? Is it prepared
to delay the inclusion of the Baltic States into NATO until Russia's
membership is decided in principle? Is the US prepared to co-operate with
Russia and Europe in changing its concept of Missile Defence in accordance
with the emerging new situation? A serious discussion of these and other
crucial issues has not even started. But without their solution any alliance
between Russia and the West will be at best temporary and will last only
until bin Laden's organisation is eliminated. And once that goal is
accomplished the world could recede once again into great power geopolitical
rivalry. Not necessarily into nuclear confrontation, more likely into
perennial struggle for spheres of interest, and control over oil and
countries that own it. It would be the same old world torn apart by enmity
and continuously breeding terrorism in new forms. Do we want that kind of
world to continue forever? Hardly.

Even maintaining a workable anti-terrorist coalition is not easy under
prevailing geopolitical stereotypes. For example, President Bush wants US
leadership, which means that orders to coalition members come from the Oval
Office. But President Putin prefers to be an equal partner and also dreams
of making a joint Europe-Russian combination another centre of global
influence. Do our leaders really need to argue who is top banana when there
is an urgent common aim to achieve? The truth is that ruling elites on both
sides have been dominated by confrontation ideologies that are difficult to
shed quickly. But done away with they must because they have ceased to
reflect the changing realities of this world.

One stark reality is that the current alliance between Russia and the US is
based on mutual need, not just mutual desire. The initial US plan was to
strike terrorists with cruise missiles. When it became clear that more
sophisticated warfare is required, Washington needed more reliable allies
close to Afghanistan than those he had so far. That meant that the republics
of Central Asia were essential to winning the war and Russia was also
indispensible because it held the key to that region. At the same time,
Russia needs the US as an ally because it cannot otherwise obliterate its
own terrorists and ensure its wider national interests. If one understands
those basic needs, all other considerations, such as the nature of allied
regimes, becomes secondary.

That requires genuine statesmanship and the will to overrule stereotypes
imbedded in elites. Only great leaders are able to do that. Whether Messrs
Bush and Putin are up to the job will be clear before long.

*******

#7
Uzbekistan hopes aiding US will eradicate Islamic militants

TASHKENT, Oct 6 (AFP) -
Uzbekistan's decision to allow an unprecedented deployment of US troops on
its soil signals the former Soviet republic's desire to eradicate Islamic
zealots who have waged a two-year terror campaign.

In an agreement with US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Uzbekistan
announced Friday that it would offer one of its airbases for use by US
transport planes for humanitarian and search and rescue operations.

Some 1,000 troops are en route to Uzbekistan in the first major deployment of
US ground forces in the showdown with Afghanistan, adding to the US warships
and bombers put within striking distance after the September 11 terrorist
attacks on New York and Washington.

Uzbek President Islam Karimov has said he was against allowing military
operations to be waged against Afghanistan from his country but many analysts
believe he has reserved the possibility for an expanded role in the future.

"Both sides are feeling their way, seeing what is possible and what kind of
consequences that could have," said International Crisis Group's Central Asia
project director, John Schoeberlein.

Uzbekistan's strategic location on Afghanistan's northern border and its
former Soviet bases make it a natural staging area in the campaign against
Osama bin Laden, the prime suspect in the September 11 attacks on New York
and Washington who is being sheltered by the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.

The strongly secular Uzbek regime offered support to the United States
following the attacks but was tight-lipped about how exactly it would
cooperate.

Uzbekistan's hesitancy came from a desire for security guarantees from the
United States that "we are not alone and will not remain alone with the
problems," as Karimov said.

The authoritarian Uzbek regime in this predominantly Muslim state is deeply
concerned by a spillover of violence from Afghanistan into the populous
country.

It is also alarmed by the possibility of an influx of refugees, with fighters
and drug smugglers among them, and by instability in neighbouring Tajikistan,
still recovering from a five-year civil war.

"There are risks but there is a lot to win. Benefit number one will be
eradicating the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) or at least destroying
its bases in Afghanistan," said Daphne Ter Sakarian of the Economist
Intelligence Unit.

The Central Asian state has been destabilised by the IMU, an obscure group
made up of Uzbek exiles and funded by Osama bin Laden which has waged a
campaign aimed at toppling Karimov for the past two years.

Radicals are also accused of masterminding 1999 bomb blasts in Tashkent,
which narrowly missed the Uzbek leader.

The United States is already widely believed to have made a concession to the
Uzbek regime in return for its help, by singling out the IMU as a target in
its anti-terrorist campaign.

But Schoeberlein warned that the United States could get bogged down in the
internal problems of Uzbekistan if it were to promise to counter the IMU,
which some view as a creation of the repressive policies of the Uzbek regime.

The Central Asian state has much to gain from increased cooperation with the
United States, which could boost Uzbekistan's standing on the international
stage.

The former Soviet republic has become increasingly isolated due to a poor
human rights record and failure to make progress with economic reforms.

The United States will also provide an effective counterbalance to Russia,
which has been trying to reassert its influence in the Central Asian region,
which it considers its backyard.

Tashkent has rebuffed Moscow's attempts to restore its clout and pulled out
of a Russian-led security pact in 1999.

Its bid to deepen ties with the United States have, however, so far been
partly thwarted by Washington, which had other priorities.

*******

#8
Russia's Kudrin attends G7 meet with head held high
By Anna Willard

WASHINGTON, Oct 5 (Reuters) - Russian Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin has come
to Washington with his head held high. Instead of arriving hat in hand to
wrangle with his counterparts about the country's debt, the economy is doing
well and he has pledged to pay.

He is also in hot demand among the Group of Seven finance ministers as a key
player in the effort to cut off sources of financing for violent groups like
those behind the Sept. 11 attacks and for his expertize in central Asia.

Kudrin is hopeful that Russia, which currently only makes a guest appearance
at a portion of the minister's meeting, will one day be a full member of the
group.

"Russia actually can participate in the real agenda," Kudrin told reporters
at a briefing here. "Step by step the conditions are emerging for broader
participation, not necessarily at the next meeting...it takes time."

On Friday, Kudrin met with U.S. Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill and Eximbank
Chairman, John Robson.

With O'Neill, Kudrin said he discussed preparations for the November visit to
the United States by Russian President Vladimir Putin.

He said that so far Russia has not found evidence that any of the
organizations on a list provided by the United States have connections with
violent activities.

"But if you go beyond this list...we do find that we have information on
terrorist accounts in certain countries," he said.

He said that there had a been "an effective agreement" between Russia and the
United States about how legal matters connected with these accounts should
proceed.

CONFIDENCE IN RUSSIAN ECONOMY

Kudrin said during his meetings there was confidence in the performance of
the Russian economy.

"Our partners do not have serious concerns about the Russian economy," he
said. In an earlier interview with Reuters, the finance minister said he
believed the economy could still grow at an expected 4 percent next year in
spite of the weaker oil price.

But he admitted that economic targets could be subject to some revision if
the global slowdown turns out to be deeper than originally forecast.

Kudrin said he had no plans to discuss an agreement with the G7 a debt
repayment peak which is widely expected to happen in 2003. He said the
country would try and pay but noted that if this is not possible because of a
worsening balance of payments outlook due to lower oil prices and the global.

It is not in Russia's interest or reputation, he said, to rely on debt
reschedules or hand-outs from lenders like the International Monetary Fund.

"The less we borrow, the more respected we are," he said. "We should try to
help ourselves or we should take money on market based approaches."

Kudrin stressed Russia's desire to play an active role in affairs in central
Asia. "There is a lot of potential for our support in the countries of the
CIS," Kudrin said. "The IMF and the Paris Club consider us to be leading
authorities in the region."

With Eximbank there was talk of a new agreement. "We are entering a new era
of relations," he said. "Today our policy is actually to try and reduce the
volume of sovereign guarantees and to try and get companies to work with
Russian banks."

There are still a few hot spots on the Russian economic front. U.S. Treasury
Undersecretary for International Affairs, John Taylor, said on Thursday
night, the country must continue to push ahead with reforms, particularly in
the banking sector. Kudrin told an attentive audience of businessmen, that
this was on his agenda along with legal and labor reforms.

At the very top of everyone's list is Russia's entry into the World Trade
Organization. This, says Kudrin is a key to the country's full re-integration
with the world economy.

*******

#9
World Bank
Transition Online
July-August-September 2001
http://www.worldbank.org/html/prddr/trans/JulAugSep01/contents.htm

Is There a New Russia?
A report by the Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR and SITE)
sums up the economic policy challenges facing the Russian government and
suggests reform priorities.

The Russian economy is growing. Thanks to the ruble devaluation and
favorable oil prices, growth is broader, involving more industries and more
regions, than ever before. More important, for the first time in a decade,
Russia’s political and economic circumstances are conducive to the broad
institutional reforms needed to put the economy on a path of sustainable
growth. Wide popular support has allowed President Putin to make
significant progress in loosening the hold of the interest groups that have
blocked reform, and he has put his weight behind an ambitious reform
program. The concentration of powers in the presidency, however, holds
major risks. Moreover, the lack of clear reform priorities threatens to
derail the government program. The CEFIR report, based on the latest
research and data analysis, helps define the challenges facing the Russian
government and establish reform priorities.

The growth challenge facing Russia is daunting. Not only are Russian firms
dramatically less productive than their counterparts in the West, but the
productivity gap has been increasing rapidly over the last decade. While
Western firms became more efficient, productivity fell in all major
industries in Russia through most of the 1990s. Recently, with increased
demand starting to reverse the decline in production and firms now
utilizing more of their capacity, productivity seems to have improved. Vast
additional improvements could be achieved simply by introducing better
business organization, but managers have not had sufficient incentives to
restructure their firms. The fragmentation of product and labor markets has
weakened competitive pressures. And poorly functioning corporate governance
and soft budget constraints have severed the link between performance and
consequences for managers.

Russia cannot achieve sustainable growth without new investment. Investment
declined for most of the 1990s, and the capital stock has aged alarmingly.
New investment is important not only in itself, but also because of the
productivity improvements that accompany it, particularly foreign direct
investment. Regional data show strong positive spillovers from such
investment, but the size of the spillovers depends critically on the
quality of human capital and the extent of economic reforms. The high
quality of Russia’s human capital, an important component of productivity,
can no longer be taken for granted. Recent figures show that while the
number of university graduates is increasing, the quality of education is
deteriorating as a result of a "brain drain" and the exclusion of more and
more young talent from the university system for financial reasons.

Business Climate Matters

On the whole, what promotes productivity improvements also generates more
investment. Investments in the education system are critical for sustaining
productivity improvements and increasing spillovers from new investment in
manufacturing and services. Poor protection of property rights, especially
weak enforcement of existing laws, undermines the incentives of investors
as well as managers. More generally, the entire political and legal
context—the business climate—matters. The concentration of power at the
federal level and within the executive branch has come at the expense of
special interests and the Russian regions. While this concentration of
power opens up an unprecedented opportunity to implement critical
structural reforms, it also creates a commitment problem. Experience from
around the world shows that when rules are unclear, or when the power of
the ruler is unchecked, economic growth suffers.

The main objective of the reform program should be to establish the checks
and balances necessary for the government to commit to stable institutional
rules conducive to sustainable economic growth. Russian—and
foreign—entrepreneurs and investors need stronger protection of property
rights. In particular, the privatization results, as deplorable as the
process was, must be accepted once and for all. And allowing businesses to
own land and streamlining the regulatory environment are important for
reducing the scope for bureaucratic arbitrariness and corruption. But to
contribute new risk capital, outside investors also need stronger
protection against expropriation by insiders, and minority investors must
have better assurances against the abuse of power by majority stakeholders.
In the balance between the interests of strategic owners and minority
investors, the growth challenge facing the economy must come first. Russian
industry desperately needs strategic investment and thorough restructuring
to increase productivity.

The Russian legal framework needs further improvement, but enforcement is
the critical task. Judicial reform should raise the pay of judges and
introduce discipline through clearer rules and more accountability through
jury trials. Administrative reform should also clarify the rules for
allocating resources within the federal structure. Elements of healthy
competition between and within levels of administration would help promote
a better business climate. Sustainable growth requires sustainable
institutions and predictable rules of the game.

Banking System Needs Upgrade

In the long term generating investment requires a functioning financial
system that transfers capital from savers to investors and monitors how the
funds are used. The Russian financial system—what remains of it after the
financial crisis of August 1998—is very underdeveloped by international
standards. The banks play little or no role in the supply of capital for
investment. Credits to the private sector have increased significantly
since 1998, but little has been done to reform the banking system. Poorly
capitalized banks working in a soft regulatory environment are unlikely to
screen investment effectively or monitor how funds are used. Unfortunately,
the Central Bank, with the backing of the current administration, still
lacks the political will to implement the necessary reforms. The prospect
of a new financial crisis over the next couple of years, as the revenues
from oil exports level off and the ruble appreciates further, should focus
attention and sharpen resolve.

The key priorities are judicial, administrative, social, and banking sector
reforms. Judicial, administrative, and social reforms are now under way,
but implementation remains a daunting challenge. The prospects for genuine
bank restructuring are less encouraging. Implementing the reform program
and bolstering the long-term credibility of the new institutional rules
would be greatly furthered by deeper integration of Russia into the world
economy. As painful as it may be, accession to the World Trade Organization
is critical for putting Russia on a path of sustainable growth.
Preparations for membership would improve enforcement of critical reforms
and put additional pressure on the Central Bank to reform the banking
system. A free trade area with the European Union—and the prospect of an
even closer association—would provide a sense of direction and an outside
anchor for Russia’s reform program. Ultimately, greater international
accountability will also help the Putin presidency commit not to use the
tremendous powers it has amassed.

SITE and CEFIR prepared this report for the Baltic Development Forum as
part of the Forum’s Third Annual Summit (see announcement on page 42). It
is based on new research and data analysis performed mainly at SITE and
CEFIR. CEFIR is an independent economic think-tank based in Moscow and
staffed by young Russian economists, many of whom received degrees from top
Western universities but decided to return to Russia. CEFIR researchers
have presented papers on the Russian economy at major international
conferences and participated in a number of policy advice projects.

*******

#10
New York Times
Book Review
October 7, 2001
'Requiem for a Lost Empire': Andreï Makine, Back in the U.S.S.R.
By CLARE CAVANAGH

REQUIEM FOR A LOST EMPIRE
By Andreï Makine.
Translated by Geoffrey Strachan.
252 pp. New York: Arcade Publishing. $24.95.

Midway through Andreï Makine's ambitious new novel, the narrator's
grandfather rescues a pregnant girl left for dead by the Bolsheviks during
Russia's civil war. ''Tell me your name,'' he begs. ''The young woman's face
twisted into a grimace, she tilted her head back slightly and forced open her
lips. Between her teeth, in the place of a tongue, Nikolai saw a broad,
oblique gash. . . . He realized that she had been mutilated so that she could
no longer tell what she had seen.''

It is a grisly reminder of the many silenced histories concealed behind the
Soviet state's official version of events. In his luminous ''Dreams of My
Russian Summers'' (1997), Makine proved himself adept at resurrecting the
human particulars lost over the course of modern Russian history. And his
admirers will recognize many elements of the earlier work in ''Requiem for a
Lost Empire.'' Again an orphaned, quasi-autobiographical ''I'' addresses an
absent, longed-for ''you,'' while laboring to recover a personal past that
has fallen prey to history in its ruthless Soviet redaction. Again the key to
this missing past lies with an adoptive French grandmother, who transmits her
native language and the boy's family history to her ward. Again lyrical
fragments recur until they coalesce in an epiphany of heartbreaking hidden
truths.

The heartbreak seems a little stale this time around. The narrator's
grandmother in ''Dreams of My Russian Summers'' had ''the advantage of
concentrating within her life span the crucial moments in the history of our
century.'' ''Requiem'' has no character as compelling as the earlier novel's
hapless, heroic Sharlota Norbetovna. And Makine's epic ambitions come
unmoored without this personal ballast. In 250 pages, he races through civil
wars, world wars, purges, famines, labor camps, concentration camps, the rise
and fall of the cold war and, finally, the Soviet empire's collapse ''in a
cacophony of shattered lives.'' Individual tragedies recounted at this
breakneck speed soon cease to resonate.

But this doesn't exhaust the book's ambitions. The quasi-autobiographical
hero familiar from earlier novels has been updated to encompass much of the
current scene. The orphaned outsider without a past is recruited into the
Soviet secret service. In his guise as a state doctor, he observes firsthand
the price of empire in Ethiopia, Angola, Afghanistan, Nicaragua and Yemen.
Later, as a disillusioned emigre, he bears jaundiced witness to the triumph
of capitalism in the West. It is as if a Russian-French John le Carre had
decided to revise ''Doctor Zhivago.''

IF anyone could pull off this unlikely project, it would be Makine. But his
commitment to lyrical particularity operates at cross-purposes with his
striving for great breadth. The third-world street fighting in the novel's
opening pages looks pretty much the same from one country to the next. The
West that surfaces elsewhere in the book doesn't fare much better. It is
peopled largely by heavy-handed caricatures of French intellectuals, along
with American arms dealers, entrepreneurs and pleasure seekers whose speech
sounds -- in the translation from the French, at any rate -- conspicuously
off kilter to American ears.

The novel's final section teeters at times on the brink of parody. The
narrator's murderous quest for a treacherous Russian emigre hiding under the
name of Val Vinner in the town of Destin, Fla., evokes Humbert Humbert's
bumbling manhunt in the work of another bilingual emigre, Vladimir Nabokov.
Yet the haunting lyricism of the novel's last pages reminds us of what Makine
can do at his best. ''Requiem,'' like the earlier ''Crime of Olga Arbyelina''
(1999), reads like a transitional work in the career of a talented writer who
is not content merely to repeat his initial successes, but has not yet found
a new form that would do justice to his remarkable gifts.

Clare Cavanagh, who teaches Slavic languages at Northwestern University, is
working on a biography of Czeslaw Milosz.

********

#11
From: "Robert Bruce Ware" <bruce@brick.net>
Subject: Reply to Squier (JRL #5477)
Date: Fri, 5 Oct 2001

While I appreciate the elements of insight and balance in John Squier's
reply (JRL 5477) it also contains fallacies that require attention.
Despite Squier's claim, I have never equated Russaphobic prejudices with
criticism of Russian policies. On the contrary, I have regularly
criticized Russian policies myself, as I did in JRL 5475.

Rather I have regularly argued that Russaphobic prejudices are responsible
for *imbalanced* and *simplistic* criticism of Russia's policies that
chronically ignores the full complexity of the situation in the Caucasus,
and thereby has served only to prolong suffering in the region. I have
regularly called for the balanced criticism of all parties in the Chechen
conflict, Russian, Chechen, and foreign. Therefore I am encouraged by
Squier's report of a balanced perspective on the part of Russian human
rights leaders such as "... the executive director of the Moscow Helsinki
Group, (who) has stated publicly that the failure of Russian human rights
organizations to forcefully condemn human rights abuses by Chechens
contributed to the deterioration of the situation in the North Caucasus,
calling it a good illustration of the dangers of double standards in human
rights monitoring."

The deterioration of the situation in the region can also be attributed to
Western organizations such as Human Rights Watch. For example, HRW
trumpets its recent interviews with 100 Chechen refugees, by which it has
"documented" Russian abuses. Clearly, if we interview 100 Republicans we
will hear some nasty things about Democrats. Some of these claims will
have a basis in fact and some will not. That is why everyone who is
interested in understanding the complex problems of, say, Northern Ireland,
realizes that it is important to listen both to Protestants and to
Catholics. However, this simple point has been lost on Western "human
rights organizations" such as HRW and AI. They have interviewed only
Chechen refugees. Neither organization has ever interviewed the many
thousands of Dagestani refugees that have been brutalized and displaced by
Chechen aggression. As Squier observes, without a balanced account of human
rights abuses on all sides of the conflict, no solution will be possible,
and the situation will continue to deteriorate. HRW, in particular, has
contributed to this deterioration through its prosecution of an ideological
agenda in the Caucasus without balance, objectivity, or methodological
rigor. HRW has contributed much to the widespread misunderstanding of the
situation that has interfered with constructive responses all around, and
has thereby prolonged the conflict. Certainly that widespread
misunderstanding of the situation, and the imbalanced criticism that he has
consequently received have, until now, rendered it all the more difficult
for Putin to change his policy in Chechnya.

Then there's the UNHCR. This is an organization with many courageous and
dedicated workers who have managed to help many of the peoples of the
Caucasus. Hence, there was hope of a balanced approach, in 2000, when
UNHCR High Commissioner, Mary Robinsion, scheduled a tour of a prison in
Chechnya and a visit to victims of Chechen aggression in Dagestan's
Novolaksky Rayon. However, after she visited the prison in Chechnya she
canceled her meeting with the Dagestanis in Novolaksky. Instead she went
straight to Dagestan's capital, Mahachkala to catch a flight back to
Moscow. Dagestani officials canceled her flight in hopes of keeping her on
the ground long enough to tell her their side of the story. However,
Robinsion refused to meet with them. Of course, no Western media reported
the incident. On many subsequent occasions she spoke strongly against
Russian abuses without ever mentioning those on the other side. These are
the sorts of imbalances that have made it impossible to work out a
reasonable solution with Russia, and the sorts of imbalances that I
therefore have criticized.

But Squier also claims to find evidence of a quid pro quo arrangement
between Putin and Bush, whereby the former trades acquiescence on
Afghanistan for the latter's acquiescence on Chechnya. Squier's evidence
(he differs from HRW in that offers some) is an article in the Washington
Post ("U.S., Russia Recast Their Relationship: Anti-Terror Agenda Appears
To Be Framework for Future" -- JRL 5476) which claims that "The Russians
told the administration that Putin would be making a major policy statement
on Chechnya. They made clear that they expected a positive, public response
from the White House. Bush administration officials said they would listen
closely to Putin's remarks and, if they were indeed forthcoming, the United
States would respond favorably." However, the same article also explains
that, when it came, Putin's major policy statement "reversed his earlier
resistance" to a political settlement in Chechnya, giving Chechen leaders
72 hours to start negotiations with Moscow. Washington has been demanding
that Putin do something like this for the past two years. Previously Putin
has always refused. Now he has "reversed his earlier resistance" to
Washington's demands regarding his conduct in Chechnya. Contrary to
Squier's claim, the article shows that Putin was not trading his
acquiescence to American policy toward Afghanistan for a positive response
from Washington. Rather Putin was trading his acquiescence to American
policy toward Chechnya for a positive response from Washington.

Most people expect a positive response when they do something that somebody
else demands of them, and if we wish to encourage them to continue meeting
our demands it is generally best to give it to them. Yet while this is
consistent with ordinary human behavior it remains inconsistent with HRW's
1 October press release that Putin attempted "to get carte blanche for the
conduct of Russian federal forces in Chechnya". On the contrary, Putin
finally acquiesced to the demands that the White House, the State
Department, the Washington Post, HRW, and many, many others have been
making of him. He offered to negotiate with Chechen militants. One might
have thought that those organizations would have found the integrity and
the good sense to praise him when he finally did so. I'm glad that the
White House had that good sense, and I regret that HRW and most Western
journals have yet to locate it. Evidently it is more fun to continue
bashing Putin, than it is constructively to encourage his further policy
changes in Chechnya.

This point is recognized even by the Washington Post editorial staff, which
writes, "In its own way this turnabout by Mr. Putin is as dramatic as the
Bush administration's shift on Chechnya, and it offers some justification
for recent U.S. actions beyond a simple
quid pro quo for Russian support in Central Asia." ("Why Chechnya is
Different", 10/4/01, JRL 5476). Nonetheless, the Post fails fully to grasp
how the shift in Moscow's position on Chechnya goes hand in hand with the
shift in Washington's position on Chechnya. I regularly have observed that
we would never persuade Russia to change its policies in Chechnya until we
began realistically to recognize the complexities of the situation there.

The Post also argues that the West must not conflate the Chechen conflict
with its anti-terrorist campaign. The editorial begins on the point of
nineteenth century Russian imperialism. While the latter is regrettable it
has little to do with current events. The Dagestanis led the Chechens in
their long nineteenth century resistance to Russian expansion. In the end
the Dagestanis were conquered as much as the Chechens. However, unlike the
Chechens, the Dagestanis settled with the results and benefited
substantially from modernization during the Soviet period. Though they
also benefited materially, the Chechens periodically chafed against Russian
hegemony and, along with other Caucasian nationalities, were brutally
deported to Central Asia in 1944. The early 1990s saw a revival of Chechen
nationalism, which culminated in the achievement of de facto independence
in 1996 and the election of a moderate leader in Aslan Maskhadov.
Regarding these points, the Post is misguided only in that it fails to
recognize their irrelevance.

Relevant is the fact that the Chechens used their independence to establish
an open slave trade, with a slave market in their capital city. They
terrorized the peoples of the region, including their Dagestani friends and
supporters who suffered invasions, kidnapings, torture, and murder on a
massive scale. Maskhadov was unable to establish control over the Chechen
warlords and criminal gangs, and members of his regime were implicated in
the hostage industry. Few Western journals reported any of this and HRW
ignored it completely. But it is of the utmost relevance because it is
what must be avoided in the future.

Why did it happen? The Post, and many others, argue that it happened
because of the brutal demographic, social, political, and infrastructural
disruptions that the Chechens suffered during their war of independence
from 1994-6. While these undoubtedly contributed to Chechnya's problems, I
have argued that the problem is primarily Chechnya's social structure and
culture, especially its teip system and its warrior mythology. The latter
account has the advantage of explaining why Chechnya has taken a road so
different from Dagestan, and from North Caucasian peoples that also
suffered Russian conquest and deportation. The former account fails to
explain Chechen exceptionalism since Chechnya had gone far down its lonely
road *prior* to its war with Russia in 1994. Moreover, unemployment in
Dagestan from 1996-9 was almost as high as that in Chechnya, but the
Dagestanis did not think that this justified them in tolerating an open
slave trade.

The Post worries about innocent people in Chechnya. Apart from the
children, I'm not certain how many there are. I'm not sure that it is
possible for an adult to live in a country with an open slave trade and
still be innocent. Many of the hostages who have been liberated from
captivity in Chechnya (including some with whom I am acquainted), and some
of the Western relief workers who helped to liberate them, have concluded
that virtually everyone in Chechnya was complicit in one way or another in
the slave trade. Everyone in a Caucasian village knows everything that
happens in that village, and some villagers have helped to recapture
hostages who tried to escape. We hold the people of Munich responsible for
Dachau. Why don't we hold the people of Chechnya responsible for the
hostage industry and the slave trade that openly underwrote the economy of
their country for years? Yesterday the Russian army liberated a man who
had been enslaved in Chechnya for eleven years and openly sold from one
"master" to another. Some people liberated from years of slavery in
Chechnya have had many of their fingers and toes systematically sawed off,
or have had their teeth ground down to the gums with a metal file, etc.,
etc., etc. Even kidnapped children have suffered such fates while captive
in Chechnya.

And that is all that is relevant: While they were independent, from 1996 to
1999, the Chechens terrorized their neighbors in horrendous ways, while
Western "human rights groups," the White House, the Washington Post, and
virtually all other Western analysts, editorialists, and journalists
largely ignored it. What is relevant is that under absolutely no
circumstances must this ever be allowed to happen again. So far the Russian
army has been the only credible guarantee that it won't. If the Russian
army leaves Chechnya, there is a strong probability that these same terrors
will be repeated, and that again they will be ignored by the West since,
again, it will offer no convenient opportunities to bash Russia.

Often unrecognized (because largely ignored by the Western media) is the
fact that from 1996-9 Chechens kidnapped and murdered each other on a
massive scale. Massive human rights abuses in Chechnya did not begin when
Russia reentered Chechnya and they will not end if the Russia departs
again. Moreover, no one seems to recognize that whereas the Dagestanis
were Chechnya's best supporters as recently as 1995, there is now a deep
and bitter animosity toward Chechnya in Dagestan. If the Russian military
withdraws, and if Chechen depredations against Dagestanis continue, it is
possible that there will be warfare between Dagestanis and Chechens. While
this war might easily exceed the current war in terms of its horror and
brutality, it would be largely ignored by the Western media and "human
rights organizations".

I have often said that Russia would never budge in its policy on Chechnya
until the West began to recognize the complexity of the situation there.
Now that Washington has begun to do so, Putin has already "reversed his
earlier resistance" to negotiations. For that he deserves credit. He does
not deserve the nearly universal suspicion and condemnation that he has
been receiving from Western media and "human rights organizations"-- not
unless they wish to make it more difficult for him to make further
concessions in Chechnya. Had it not been for mindlessly simplistic,
ludicrously lopsided, ideologically informed, and ultimately inflammatory
reaction of HRW, the Washington Post, and all of those other Western
organizations who thought that it would be useful to spend the last two
years self-complacently bludgeoning Putin, it is possible that such
progress could have been made much sooner.

*******

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