October 5, 2001

This Date's Issues:   5477 • 5478

Johnson's Russia List
#5478
5 October 2001
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. AP: Russian Official Surveys Crash Site.
2. Reuters: Ukraine stands by Russian plane crash denial.
3. New York Times: Stephen Sestanovich, The Challenges of Alliance With Russia.
4. Boston Globe: John Donnelly, War on terror signals changed US relations.
5. The Economist (UK): Russia's new foreign policy. Suddenly cosier with the West. Russia's relations with the West are blossoming. Will that last?
6. The Guardian (UK): Ian Black, Russian resolution. Putin is winning western accolades for his support in the war on terror, as well as indulgence over Chechnya and even the Baltic states.
7. The New Republic: Peter Beinart, Wartime Lies. (re Chechnya)
8. Trud: Alexander Dyachenko, RUSSIA IS NO LONGER AN ISLAND OF BAD LUCK.
The global economy is on the brink of crisis - what about Russia's economy?
9. Moscow Times: Russell Workking, Committed to Telling the Toxic Truth (Interview with Grigory Pasko)
10. Novaya Gazeta: Mikhail Krugov, WHERE SHOULD WE LOOK FOR BIN LADEN'S
MONEY? It might have wound up in Russian oil industry.
11. AP: Nations Press For NATO Expansion.]

******

#1
Russian Official Surveys Crash Site
October 5, 2001
By SARAH KARUSH

SOCHI, Russia (AP) - A top Russian official on Friday surveyed the site
where a jetliner carrying at least 78 people exploded and plunged into the
Black Sea, and rescue workers brought to shore the 14 bodies that have been
found since the crash.

Vladimir Rushailo, head of the Russian Security Council, flew over the
waters where the plane went down Thursday, searching for clues as to what
caused it to blow up in flight.

U.S. intelligence officials believe a Ukrainian long-range, anti-aircraft
missile fired during a military exercise accidentally hit the Tupolev 154.
The Ukrainian government has denied the allegation, and Russia has said it
is investigating the possibility of a terrorist attack.

The Sibir Airlines plane was on its way from Tel Aviv to Novosibirsk, 1,750
miles east of Moscow.

The plane was carrying Israeli residents, many of whom had recently
migrated from Russia and were flying back to visit family members. The
victims' bodies were being returned to the Black Sea port of Sochi, where
relatives were to identify them. The plane went down 115 miles off the
Russian coast.

Officials recovered pieces of the fuselage and cockpit, as well as a door
and some personal belongings of the passengers, said Gleb Gutiyev, a
spokesman for Sochi's mayor. He held out little hope the plane's black box
would be recovered because the wreckage was at least 3,300 feet deep.

Russian President Vladimir Putin said terrorists may have caused the crash
Thursday. He added that he had no reason to doubt the Ukrainian
government's statement that missiles used in military exercises did not
have the range to reach the airliner.

Ukrainian officials said the weapons they used could only travel six miles
- not the 155 miles needed to reach the plane. However, earlier statements
from the Ukrainian military said the exercise would involve several
long-reach weapons.

Part of the exercises also involved firing on unmanned aircraft.

A senior U.S. administration official, speaking on condition of anonymity,
said there was no evidence of terrorism and that a Ukrainian military
exercise probably led to the crash.

An Armenian airline pilot flying nearby witnessed the explosion and crash.

``The plane fell into the sea, and there was another explosion in the sea.
After that I saw a big white spot on the sea, and I had the impression that
oil was burning,'' Garik Ovanisian said.

President Bush, who spoke to Putin by telephone Thursday, said his
``heartfelt sympathies, and those of the American people, are with the
people of Israel and Russia and the families of the many victims of this
tragedy.''

He did not address Putin's contention that the crash may have been the work
of terrorists.

When Pentagon officials first were told a missile felled the plane, the
weapon cited did not have the range needed to reach the aircraft. Later in
the day, the Pentagon was informed that a much larger weapon was involved.
That, along with fresh intelligence information, virtually erased U.S.
suspicions of terrorism.

Putin spokesman Alexei Gromov said Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma told
the Russian president of ``the absolute groundlessness of the
accusations,'' by the United States, the Interfax news agency reported.

Alexander Zdanovich, the spokesman for Russia's Federal Security Service,
said the Sept. 11 attacks against U.S. targets and Russia's involvement in
the anti-terrorist campaign led authorities to believe terrorism could be
involved.

The Ukrainian military exercises were conducted on Cape Onuk, in Crimea -
territory controlled by the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Ukrainian officials
said Russian forces were taking part in the exercise, but Putin denied it.

******

#2
Ukraine stands by Russian plane crash denial
By Michael Steen

KIEV, Oct 5 (Reuters) - Ukraine insisted on Friday it had not shot down an
airliner belonging to its closest ally Russia, saying fresh checks showed a
missile-firing exercise could not have caused Thursday's disaster as
suggested by U.S. officials.

Ukraine's anti-aircraft defence corps fired salvoes of live missiles during
annual military exercises on the Black Sea just as a Sibir airlines plane
flying from Tel Aviv to Siberia blew up in mid-air in the region, killing up
to 78 people.

Officials in Washington had pointed the finger of blame at Ukraine, drawing a
prompt denial. On Friday, Ukraine's Defence Ministry issued a fresh and
detailed denial that the missiles fired from launchers on the Crimean coast
were to blame.

"The missiles were fired exclusively within a restricted zone, 30 km (20
miles) out to sea from the shore, and the tragedy with the aircraft occurred
250 km from the area where the exercises were taking place," said ministry
spokesman Ihor Khalyavinsky.

He said an air traffic exclusion zone was in place around the firing range
where Russian-built S200 and S300 missiles targeted 11 unmanned aircraft
circling low over the sea.

A sombre Defence Minister Olexander Kuzmuk, speaking to reporters in Crimea,
said his forces had gone over all their launch data again overnight, and
concluded their rockets "had not gone in the direction" of the Russian Tu-154
airliner.

STRAY MISSILE

But Thursday's incident reminded many Ukrainians of Defence Ministry denials
18 months ago when an ageing Tochka-U missile went wildly off course and
ploughed into an apartment block in Brovary, a small town 20 km north of the
capital Kiev.

The impact killed four people -- most residents had been out at work or
shopping -- but it took officials four days to admit a missile caused the
blast, originally blamed on illegally stored ammunition in the residential
block.

A Western defence expert in Kiev said it was barely believable that
Thursday's exercises had gone tragically wrong.

"Most of these systems are fired at considerably less than maximum range," he
said. "It would only be (possible) if a missile had gone completely rogue."

Despite Ukraine's initial statement on Thursday that hitting the airliner was
a "practical and theoretical" impossibility, the missiles involved were
designed for long-range strikes against aircraft.

The S200, codenamed SA5 by NATO, was designed in the 1950s for such purposes.
There are three versions of the missile, with maximum ranges of between 150
and 300 km. The Defence Ministry would not say which version was deployed on
Thursday.

The strikes against unmanned drones were also not visually observed. The
military tracked their progress on radar.

"Until this is sorted out, there's obviously going to be a lot of
speculation," said the Western defence expert.

Other theories to explain Thursday's disaster include a terrorist bomb and
catastrophic mechanical failure.

******

#3
New York Times
October 5, 2001
The Challenges of Alliance With Russia
By STEPHAN SESTANOVICH
Stephen Sestanovich is senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and
professor of diplomacy at Columbia University.

WASHINGTON -- Throughout the 1990's, any use of force by the United States
sent President Boris Yeltsin of Russia into a red-faced fury. No matter the
target, he would fulminate about Washington's arrogance, invoke Russia's
nuclear might, even warn of World War III. Mr. Yeltsin's outbursts were brief
but ferocious, and they reflected a widespread conviction among Russians that
deep down, America's interests were different from theirs.

Now comes Vladimir Putin -- by instinct and training a less likely friend of
the United States than was Mr. Yeltsin -- to offer support in our struggle
against terrorism. His presence on President Bush's bandwagon is more than
just a reversal of Russian policy on America's use of force. Mr. Putin,
unlike his predecessor, seems to believe that there is a domestic consensus,
or that he can create one, in favor of a broad rapprochement between Russia
and the West.

This offers huge potential payoffs for American policy, and both sides should
work hard to make it a reality. Mr. Putin showed his readiness to do so this
week, in a statement that seemed to relax Russia's opposition to the
enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Bush
administration is reciprocating with talk of speeding up Russia's admission
to the World Trade Organization.

Yet a long-term Russian-American realignment will require more than such
statements and the better atmosphere they create. It will demand realism
about the risks and difficulties of cooperation on the very issue —
terrorism
— that seems to bring us together.

The most obvious problem is Moscow's appallingly brutal war in Chechnya. The
administration has sought to narrow its differences with Russia on this
issue, commending Mr. Putin's proposal for a political dialogue with the
Chechen rebels and echoing his demand that they expel foreign "terrorists."
(No one denies such fighters are there).

The desire to take the edge off Russian-American disagreements is
understandable. We're embarked on a large struggle and need the support even
of those we disagree with. Yet getting too close to Mr. Putin's Chechnya
policy is far more dangerous than keeping our distance from it. If the United
States is to win this new war, our coalition partners need to believe that
the effort is not anti-Islamic, that we do not apply the terrorist label
carelessly and that we will not target civilians indiscriminately.

Mr. Putin discredits us on every point. His generals, moreover, are pushing
for a new offensive that, with its inevitable atrocities, will blacken his
reputation further. We should not let them blacken ours as well.

Russia's war in Chechnya has been a magnet and a motivator for the very
terrorists who threaten Americans worldwide. It has given them new
battlefield experience, extra fund-raising appeal, fresh recruits and greater
fervor — the same fervor they deploy against us.

Mr. Putin says he has been fighting our enemies, alone, for the past two
years. But has he made them weaker or stronger? The United States needs
allies who can help us succeed, not the advice of ones who have already shown
how to fail.

If the first threat to Russian-American cooperation is Moscow's effort to
cast the Chechens in the role of Osama bin Laden, the second is the attempt
to cast neighboring Georgia in the role of the Taliban — that is, as the
protector of terrorists. We have had many differences with the Russians over
Georgia. Mr. Putin seems particularly to enjoy shocking American visitors
with his open hatred of the Georgian president, Eduard Shevardnadze. But
Moscow's attitude has rarely been more ominous than it is now.

Since Sept. 11, Russian officials have repeatedly demanded that Georgia close
down what Russia considers terrorist bases on its territory. To make the
message more menacing, Russian state television recently aired a respectful
interview with Igor Giorgadze, long wanted in Georgia for trying to
assassinate Mr. Shevardnadze.

No one disputes that of the several thousand Chechen refugees Georgia has
accepted, some are armed fighters. The Georgian government has to do more to
contain this problem. But, although weak and disorganized, it has already
cooperated with the Russian army in policing the border, has invited foreign
monitors into border areas and camps, and has launched periodic offensives to
keep order among the refugees.

Russia's charge that Georgia is a Taliban-style haven for terrorists is
preposterous. The danger it creates, however, cannot be ignored. When
President Bush meets Mr. Shevardnadze today in Washington, he should leave no
doubt about America's support for Georgia.

A third obstacle to lasting cooperation is the one on which many wartime
alliances founder: postwar arrangements. When Mr. Putin chose not to try to
keep his Central Asian neighbors from cooperating with the United States, he
removed a major obstacle to a successful war effort. Yet in doing so, he is
likely to have tried to assure skeptical advisers that his choice would not
lead to a long-term American military presence in Central Asia.

Was he right? Before Sept. 11, it would have been easy to answer yes.
American interest in the region has been increasing, but nothing suggested
the need for deeper military involvement.

The cooperation now developing between the United States and Central Asian
governments will change all this. Those that put themselves in the line of
fire with us today will face the risk of retaliation and revenge tomorrow.

They will want a shield: maybe thin, or even invisible, but real. And they
will not want to rely exclusively on the two countries — Russia and China
—
that may be quickest to offer their services. One Uzbek official said just
this week, "We want a guarantee that America will not begin a conflict and
then just leave us to deal with the consequences."

It is no longer honest to disclaim, or prudent to forswear, the possibility
of some kind of American military presence in Central Asia lasting well
beyond a round or two of antiterrorist operations. Remembering the damage
done by our indifference to Afghanistan once it had driven out the Soviet
army, the United States cannot easily walk away from this war when it is
over. Russia, having thought of the region as its natural sphere of influence
for 150 years, will not easily accept our staying. Moscow and Washington may
not be able to come to grips with this issue yet, but when and how they take
it up will say a great deal about the depth and durability of their
rapprochement.

*******

#4
Boston Globe
October 5, 2001
RUSSIA
War on terror signals changed US relations
By John Donnelly, Globe Staff

WASHINGTON - In the immediate aftermath of the Sept. 11 air attacks, Russian
President Vladimir Putin called President Bush aboard Air Force One, the
first foreign leader to reach Bush. Putin expressed his condolences and then
told Bush that Russia had taken its forces off alert and canceled several
military exercises to ensure there wouldn't be any confusion.

''I don't think there could have been a more crystallizing moment for the end
of the Cold War,'' National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice said yesterday
before the US-Russia Business Council. ''If you think back 25 or 30 years
ago, this would have been a spiral of alerts between two heavily armed,
ideologically opposed camps.''

But now what? US officials and Russia specialists say that Putin's phone
call, and his ensuing offers to help in the war against global terrorists,
including his willingness to allow US troops to be stationed in the former
Soviet republics of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, will come with a price that
will most likely include a number of Russian concerns.

Change is already afoot. The Bush administration has expressed concern that
international terror groups are involved in the Chechnya conflict. That gives
Russia some cover for its controversial military operations there. And the
administration has also signaled that it will fully support Russia's entry
into the World Trade Organization.

But many other difficult issues lie ahead for the two nations. Bush entered
office sending a message that there was little common ground with Russia,
that the United States would eventually break the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty, and that he favored NATO expansion eastward, both over Russian
objections.

A senior US official yesterday said in an interview that the administration
did not expect a quid pro quo deal with Russia for its help in the terrorism
fight, but the official added that US policy on Russia ''absolutely'' would
be reevaluated in the coming months.

''We are where we are. It is a different world after Sept. 11,'' said the
senior US official, who spoke on condition of anonymity. ''It offers
wonderful opportunities for new relationships. The Russians have been
awakened to this fact, as have we.''

Rice, a scholar on Russia and the former Soviet Union, acknowledged yesterday
that a broad agenda of difficult issues will follow the cooperation on
fighting terrorism.

''We have, of course, disagreed about the details on how to move beyond the
Cold War security relationship to a relationship that is more appropriate to
today,'' she said. ''But you know, we're working through it, and I
fundamentally believe that there is a chance for a new strategic relationship
with Russia. ... With the Russians, we are in an evolving relationship. We're
getting better at working through our differences.''

But these days, the relationship is squarely focused on terrorism. Russia has
been very forthcoming with intelligence information on Afghanistan and the
Taliban rulers, US officials said.

In the first days after the air attacks, it appeared that the United States
would not have access to geographically key bases in Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan. Without those bases, and without Russian permission to allow
flights over its airspace and over the former Soviet republics, US combat
aircraft would have to fly over Pakistan or Iran to attack Afghanistan.

Iran said no. For Pakistan, allowing overflights might cause a domestic
backlash from Taliban supporters.

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, at a summit in Armenia four days
after the attacks, flatly said air bases in the former Soviet republics were
off-limits to the United States.

But on Sept. 22, Putin gathered together his national security officials,
including Ivanov, his close friend from Leningrad. During the meeting, Bush,
who was at Camp David, called Putin, and Putin assured Bush he would allow
use of the Uzbekistan and Tajikistan air bases and would share military
intelligence.

Since that time, according to a senior European official who has talked with
Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, the Russians ''have shared everything.''

Marshall I. Goldman, a specialist in Russia at Wellesley College, said that
Putin seized an opportunity from the air attacks and ''used this free pass to
join the West, to come closer. It could work, but it's not going to be a
perfect way to do it.''

Goldman said the unfolding US-Russian relationship may ''present some costs
that we may look back on someday and say we are sorry. You're going to have
to hold your nose through a lot of this, especially Chechnya. And dealing
with many of the leaders of Central Asia is almost like we are back dealing
with Latin American thugs again.''

Putin ''wants something in return,'' said Stephen F. Cohen, a New York
University Russia specialist and author of ''Failed Crusade: America and the
Tragedy of Post Communist Russia.''

''The wish list undoubtedly will be enormous,'' he said. ''But I think we
will have to dope it out on our own. They won't be explicit.''

On the list, according to Cohen and Fiona Hill, a Russia scholar at the
Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank: putting missile defense and
NATO enlargement on the back burner; full economic engagement with Russia;
and the ability for the Russians to pursue Chechen rebels throughout the
region.

''It's going to be hard for this administration to backtrack on missile
defense, but Russia is hoping this takes a good long time,'' Hill said.

Cohen said the US-Russia relationship will be a key test of Bush's leadership
in the year ahead.

''In the beginning of the year, his administration wanted to grind their
boots on the Russians' face,'' Cohen said. ''That's changed now. You can't
have this operation without Russia, without their knowledge and their
location. Do you want them to cooperate just on this, or do you want to seize
the moment and open up talks on a range of issues? That's the question.''

*******

#5
The Economist (UK)
October 6-12, 2001
Russia's new foreign policy
Suddenly cosier with the West
Russia's relations with the West are blossoming. Will that last?

CAN this really be the same Vladimir Putin that the West used to
treat so gingerly? In the past three weeks Russia's president has
launched what on the surface looks like a transformation of his
country's foreign policy, placing it firmly with the western
coalition against global terrorism. Limp handshakes have given way to
warm embraces. But will the new mood last?

Last week Mr Putin pulled off a hugely successful coup in Germany,
where he wowed parliament with a speech delivered in fluent German
and dotted with erudite references to Kant and Schiller. Russia, he
said, was rooted in European values. This week he whizzed into
Brussels for friendly chats with top officials in the European Union
and NATO. Western leaders heaped praise on him.

In a particularly striking shift in longer-term thinking, Russia now
says it wants close ties with—perhaps even membership of—both
organisations. In the past, most top Russians have barely understood
the EU; NATO they often viewed as a hostile legacy of the cold war.
In future, top Russians will meet their European security
counterparts every month. This week Mr Putin sounded almost sanguine
about the prospect of NATO's expansion.

So what does this amount to in practice? Amnesia, for one thing. Now
that the anti-Taliban forces in Afghanistan (see article) are seen as
crucial western allies rather than lawless heroin smugglers, Russia's
recent admission of military support for them—in breach of an arms
embargo that the Kremlin approved in July 1999—passes without
criticism. And Russia's past talk of a "multi-polar world" (ie, one
not led by America) and "strategic partnership" with China is all but
forgotten.

Amnesia washes both ways. For their part, Russian officials politely
forget some Americans' dismissive talk of a "world without Russia"
and of their country as a "failed state". Russia's scalded reaction
to an American newspaper report of ties between Russian organised
crime and Osama bin Laden shows how badly Russia now wants to shed
its image of a bankrupt, untrustworthy, crime-infested mess.

Russian deeds are making the new image a little more credible. On the
immediate question of terrorism, Mr Putin offers measured but solid
support—and has, for example, deplored Saudi Arabia's reluctance to
help America. Despite squawks from the generals, Russia is not
objecting to America and its allies using airspace over bits of the
former Soviet Union. Russia is also delivering more weapons, as well
as food and clothing, to people in northern Afghanistan. And it says
it is giving America intelligence about Mr bin Laden.

Russia may also be improving relations elsewhere. Talks about talks
have started with the leaders of the breakaway republic of Chechnya,
despite the expiry last week of Russia's 72-hour ultimatum for a
peaceful capitulation. The Russians still bluster that these contacts
are nothing more than a discussion of surrender terms, but all the
signs are that Mr Putin is reining in his warmongers. In any event,
the West has already begun softening its criticism of his handling of
the Chechens.

In return, after making threats against Georgia before the events of
September 11th for allegedly harbouring Chechen rebels, Russia has
not bombed or invaded the Pankisi gorge, an ethnically Chechen bit of
northern Georgia. And Georgia is handing over 13 people detained on
its northern border who Russia claims are Chechen fighters.

The big questions now are how deep the change is, how long it will
last, and what the Kremlin wants in return. Russia is good at signing
up for grand schemes, much less so at making them happen. For
instance, a big deal with Germany on investment projects worth DM8.5
billion ($4 billion) that was meant to be signed during Mr Putin's
visit has been quietly postponed. "The willingness on the Russian
side isn't there yet," says an involved German. "As soon as they see
that a project is profitable, they start thinking that the foreign
party is not needed."

Russia is also pushing ahead with plans that in normal times the West
would find alarming. While Mr Putin was in Brussels, his hawkish
defence minister, Sergei Ivanov, was holding talks with his Iranian
counterpart, Ali Shamkhani, about a weapons deal worth $300m that
includes anti-aircraft missiles that worry Israel.

Even Russia's professions of support could yet shift back again. Mr
Putin may think that he can play Europe off against America. The main
pro-Kremlin party in his parliament thinks that talk of Russia
joining NATO is premature. For his part, Mr Ivanov's view of military
co-operation with America is extremely sceptical, in contrast to Mr
Putin's enthusiasm.

With opinion polls suggesting that three-quarters of Russians still
admire Mr Putin's leadership, he can afford to run ahead of his
public on foreign policy. But he will want a reward. Despite his mild
remarks this week about NATO'S planned expansion to embrace the
Baltic states, he recently insisted that only an "inflamed
imagination" could see Russia as a threat in the region. So far
America is saying, cagily, that the current upheavals will not affect
the alliance's expansion.

A more immediate pay-off, though, has come in trade negotiations with
the West. The American trade representative, Robert Zoellick, said
during a visit to Moscow this week that Russia might be able to join
the World Trade Organisation, the body that supervises international
business, by the end of next year. That would mark a huge advance for
Russia. Talks had been bogged down by Russia's inability to persuade
its trading partners that it could create a business regime that is
fair to foreigners.

Whatever the mix of opportunism and sincerity in Mr Putin's charm
offensive, the main test is results, in security and economic reform
alike. They are some way off. But after years of muddle and
obstructive bloody-mindedness, the friendly and sensible words now
coming from the Kremlin are at least a start.

*******

#6
The Guardian (UK)
5 October 2001
Russian resolution
Putin is winning western accolades for his support in the war on terror, as
well as indulgence over Chechnya and even the Baltic states
By Ian Black

Vladimir Putin looked only briefly irritated at a Brussels press conference
on Wednesday when asked about Chechnya. It was a rare reminder for the
poker-faced president of Russia's little local difficulty in the Caucasus
during what has looked like a triumphal progress through Europe on the back
of his support for the US in the global war against terrorism.

Putin is making hay while the sun shines. Following the September 11
attacks, he has pledged to provide assistance to the Afghan Northern
Alliance, allow use of Russian airspace for the delivery of humanitarian
aid, and help persuade the Muslim former Soviet republics of Uzbekistan and
Tajikistan to join the effort. Russian-US intelligence cooperation has been
intense. The Kremlin, at least, believes Osama bin Laden and the Taliban
are guilty.

Europeans as well as Americans are delighted. Tony Blair was in Moscow last
night as part of a final bout of alliance-stiffening diplomacy. Plaudits
have been flowing thick and fast. "Russia has impressed many by her
willingness to set history aside and to align herself solidly with the
international coalition against terrorism," gushed Chris Patten, the EU
external relations commissioner. George Robertson, Nato's
secretary-general, praised Putin's "straight talk".

Patten, outspoken in the past about Russian human rights abuses and the
obstruction of western aid agencies, added that he hoped for a "peaceful
resolution of the conflict in Chechnya". But that sounded like wishful
thinking. To the dismay of groups like Amnesty and Human Rights Watch,
Putin's payoff has been quick in coming. Gerhard Schröder, the German
chancellor, says the Chechen conflict should be "re-evaluated" in the light
of the attacks on the US. Greece predicted greater tolerance. Monthly
meetings with the EU's political and security committee are the first
prize, though perhaps not as glittering as it looks.

The superb timing of this week's EU-Russia summit was coincidental. But the
past year has seen a marked acceleration in the tempo of relations and
mutual expectations. Putin, described as the most pro-European Russian
leader since Catherine the Great, felt the Bush administration was
downgrading relations with Russia and that with 40% of its trade with the
union, closer ties made sense. After EU enlargement to the east in the
coming years, that figure will rise to between 50 and 70%. Potentially huge
energy deals are in the pipeline too. Crucially, Russia also wants
Brussels's backing for its membership of the World Trade Organisation.

For its part the EU is projecting itself as a big player on the
international stage as well as promoting stability and economic reform in
Russia. Nuclear and environmental hazards, to say nothing of the highly
unstable Kaliningrad enclave, are at stake.

Putin was flatteringly invited to the Stockholm summit in March - balance
for Bush's invitation to Gothenburg in June. Romano Prodi, president of the
European Commission, called on Russia to swap the euro for the US dollar as
a reserve currency. Criminals east of the Elbe are already poised to
convert illicit greenbacks into euros - another reason, along with illegal
immigration and drug smuggling, to seek closer police and customs
cooperation.

When Poland joins the club, in say 2005, its eastern border with Russia
will be the external border of the EU.

Not all agree with the EU's approach. Steven Everts of the Centre for
European Reform argues that a decade after the collapse of the Soviet
Union, Russia should be treated as a medium-sized power in urgent need of
economic and legal reforms, and that western Europeans should stop
pandering to its great power illusions by offering it a pivotal, privileged
relationship. "It is time to move from strategic patience to polite
clarity," he says.

Some fear that Nato is also bending too far backwards to accommodate its
old adversary. Russia reacted badly when former Warsaw Pact stalwarts
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic were admitted in 1999, just in time
to play an awkward role during the Kosovo crisis, an ill-tempered period in
recent western-Russian relations.

Now there is more at stake as the prospect looms of Nato membership for the
three Baltic states, right on Rus sia's borders and with substantial
Russian-speaking minorities, at next year's Prague summit. Moscow certainly
wants to influence the terms of what now looks a certainty and may be able
to exploit alliance disagreements over Bush's Son of Star Wars missile
defence scheme and slow-moving plans for a European rapid reaction force.

Putin did not go the whole symbolic hog and meet Robertson, as had been
predicted, at Nato headquarters. But twice in the last fortnight he has
hinted at a new relationship with the alliance in the light of the changed
security situation - if Russia can be given a greater consultation role
beyond the existing Nato-Russia permanent joint council.

Some voices, in both Moscow and western capitals, have already suggested
Nato could declare Russia a suitable candidate for future membership - in
the same way, argues the Centre for European Reform, as the EU has for
Turkey.

The problem there is that, as far as the Turks are concerned, no one
believes it. Nato remains polite but wary of Russian attempts to transform
it into a pan- European body which is more "political" than military,
something like the 54-member Organisation for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (long scorned by western countries as an ineffective talking shop).
No harm, then, in the creation of a think-tank of experts to ponder new
areas of Nato-Russian cooperation: that is not too big a commitment at a
time when, as the tectonic plates of international relations shift audibly
after September 11, almost anything seems possible.

******

#7
The New Republic
October 14, 2001
TRB FROM WASHINGTON
Wartime Lies
by Peter Beinart

The war against terrorism is still in its infancy, but it has already
claimed at least one casualty: the West's conscience about Chechnya. When
the Bush administration called on Moscow for assistance in the days after
the World Trade Center attacks, the Russians said they were already on the
case. In fact, they explained, they have been battling terrorists for years.
And they would gladly support America's new war as long as America backed
Russia's old one: in Chechnya. "The war on terrorism has been Russia's
priority for years," explained Yevgeny Kozhokin, head of the Kremlin-funded
Institute for Strategic Research. "Now that the U.S. sees what we've been
facing, perhaps they'll understand us better."

And, indeed, America and its nato allies have understood Russia's position
on Chechnya a lot "better" since September 11. German Chancellor Gerhard
Schroeder explained last week that the West would "reevaluate" its position
on the war. A top official in Schroeder's party put it more bluntly, telling
The New York Times, "Silence on Chechnya is the price for this new
solidarity." As if on cue, President Bush the next day said, "To the extent
that there are terrorists in Chechnya, Arab terrorists associated with the
Al Qaeda organization, I believe they ought to be brought to justice."

In short, we're selling out Chechnya. And tactically we probably don't have
any choice. The people who killed 6,000 Americans must be punished. To
punish them, we need Russia's military bases and Russia's military
intelligence. And unless the Bushies hold their tongues about the most
brutal war on the European continent, they won't get it. It's that simple.

But intellectually we have a very important choice. Vladimir Putin badly
wants Americans to believe, as he put it, "We have a common foe." And
suddenly many Americans are inclined to agree. They shouldn't. Morally,
America's war on terrorism and Russia's war on "terrorism" are night and
day. And if we conflate the two, our struggle against the perpetrators of
September 11 will not only fail, it will deserve to fail.

The war in Chechnya has, from the beginning, been about one thing:
nationalism. At the end of Gorbachev, the Soviet Empire was peeling away
like an onion. Eastern-bloc satellites like Poland and Hungary were breaking
free. Non-Russian territories within the ussr--such as Lithuania, Ukraine,
and Kazakhstan--were doing the same. And so several ethnically distinct
territories within Russia itself--like Chechnya--followed suit. Chechnya's
leaders were inspired by the independence movements in the Baltics. And
Chechnya's people--hundreds of thousands of whom were deported to Central
Asia by Stalin--viscerally distrusted Russia. And so in November 1990, a
thousand Chechens convened a national Congress and de-clared their homeland
independent.

The declaration wasn't entirely serious. Even after the Chechens elected a
president and a parliament in 1991, they still used Russian currency and
Soviet passports. Chechnya still competed in the Russian soccer league.
Tatarstan, which also declared independence, eventually agreed to stay
within the Russian federation in return for political and economic autonomy.
And there is evidence that the Chechen leadership might have accepted
something similar. But Chechnya's erratic and authoritarian president,
Jokhar Dudayev, repeatedly insulted Boris Yeltsin. And, as time passed
without a deal, hard-line nationalists replaced reformers within Yeltsin's
inner circle. After chauvinist demagogue Vladimir Zhirinovsky's stunning
success in Russia's 1994 parliamentary elections, Yeltsin decided that a
showdown with Chechnya would help his reelection chances in 1996. And so, in
December 1994, Moscow invaded--initiating a hideous war that ended in
stalemate two years later.

What does all this have to do with Osama bin Laden? Not a lot. The Kremlin
calls the Chechen rebellion a fundamentalist jihad. But in their excellent
book Chechnya: Calamity in the Caucasus, Carlotta Gall and Thomas de Waal
write that "Islam was not a big factor in the 1991 nationalist movement." In
fact, at the time of independence, they found in the Chechen capital of
Grozny a grand total of one shariat court--manned by an Islamic judge who
smoked Marlboros.

It's true that as the years passed, religious zealotry gained a foothold. By
1996 Russia's assault had left barely a building standing in Grozny. And
conditions deteriorated even further after 1999, when Putin--facing an
election campaign himself--whipped up nationalist support by invading
Chechnya once again. The two wars have made roughly half of Chechnya's
population refugees or homeless. And this summer, even the commander of
Russian forces in the area admitted that his troops had committed
"widespread crimes" against civilians. So it's not surprising that, as they
have all over the world, Islamic zealots exploited the chaos and hatred. In
particular, fundamentalists beyond the control of Chechnya's elected
president launched raids into neighboring Dagestan. (They may have blown up
buildings in Moscow as well, although many Russian liberals think they were
framed.)

Putin has seized on this to portray the rebellion as the work of outsiders.
Moscow has suggested that Arabs constitute as much as 70 percent of the
guerrillas fighting in Chechnya. But that's absurd. American intelligence
recently estimated that the war involves no more than several hundred Arab
militants. In July of last year, The Economist noted that of the thousands
of Chechens captured during the war, Russia had produced a grand total of
four foreigners. As Sergei Grigoryants, head of the Russian human rights
foundation Glasnost, puts it, "There may be terrorists in Chechnya, but to
say the 10-year-old Chechen rebellion is an expression of Islamic terrorism
is fundamentally wrong."

And until the World Trade Center fell, the United States understood that it
was fundamentally wrong. "We know," said a Bush official last week, "that Al
Qaeda has exploited the war in Chechnya, [and] may have even helped to
provoke it." But they seem not to have known it before September 11, because
as the Times pointed out, the administration had never before said anything
of the sort. Indeed, during the campaign, George W. Bush considered Russia's
Chechen war so indefensible that he demanded that international aid be
withheld in protest.

What was true then is true now: The idea that Russia--which is helping Iran
build a nuclear reactor--is seriously concerned about international
terrorism is laughable. Russia's leaders are concerned about their survival,
and since they have nothing genuine to offer their people, war is their best
way to guarantee it. So they have resuscitated old cultural and religious
hatreds and sent them into battle. America may have to temporarily lower its
voice about the Chechen war, but eventually, it must raise it again. Because
Russia's war in Chechnya is premised on a lie that America's war on
terrorism must at all costs avoid: that every Muslim who takes up arms for
his homeland is Osama bin Laden. It wasn't true in Bosnia. It wasn't true in
Kosovo. And it isn't true in Chechnya, no matter what Vladimir Putin and
George W. Bush say.

******

#8
Trud
October 5, 2001
RUSSIA IS NO LONGER AN ISLAND OF BAD LUCK
The global economy is on the brink of crisis - what about Russia's economy?
Author: Alexander Dyachenko
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]

RUSSIA IS A WHOLE CONTINENT, SO WE SHOULD STOP THINKING OF RUSSIA
BEING UNRELIABLE AND UNSTEADY. WE ARE CAPABLE OF RAISING UP OUR
NATIONAL ECONOMY. THE GLOBAL RECESSION WHICH SOME ARE NOW PREDICTING NEED NOT HAVE A DEVASTATING IMPACT ON RUSSIA.

Following the terrorist attacks on the US, rumors about an
upcoming crisis in the global economy have started circulating. Does
anything pose a threat to Russia? The idea that the world changed on
September 11 does not seem to be a good explanation. Let's pose a more
specific question: has the situation in the global economy changed?
The stock market is a rather sensible economic barometer - it has
confidently been displaying not just "bad weather" but a "storm".
Could this be a storm in a teacup?

U.S. stock exchanges were closed for a week - unprecedented since
World War II. Since American investors are the main players on the
market, expecting for their return for the market, the world stock
exchanges were cutting the quotes. As soon as the US returned to the
world market, the prices of shares merely collapsed.

Within days, share prices have been slightly fluctuating first
up, then down, until they stopped on rather low levels. Judging by the
stock market alone, another Great Depression is supposed to begin
already, with the only difference that unlike in the times of
Roosevelt, the world economy is global now; therefore the depression
may affect many countries. However, nothing like this is being
observed now! The point is that the contemporary stock market is
rather emotional and it is an arena for various speculations. This is
especially visible in comparison with the hard currency market, with
no peculiar events taken place on it. If a calm sets in on the
currency market, it has been exactly what could be observed during the
days of almost catastrophic collapses of the stock markets and the
most pessimistic forecasts. The U.S. financial authorities have been
taking stabilization measures: the interest rates have been decreased
by 2.5%, and the Treasury sent tens of billions of dollars to support
the investments.

The following conclusion suggests itself: nothing cardinally new,
moreover any catastrophic, has been taking place in the world economy.
A tendency toward a reduction of the growth actually exists. However,
it has been observed over a year both in the US and Europe, with Japan
having it for a few years already.

As is said, the U.S. economy would grow, based on results of
2001, not by 5%, as in 1999, but by 1% only. What a horror...

As is already witted, the newest Russia has two calamities: fools
and low oil prices, with the latter being not dependent on Russia.
Moreover, they have started to decrease, what can potentially threaten
the welfare of the Russia's 2002 budget.

Energy resources are goods for stock markets, besides they are
politically important, and if the price for these goods falls now, a
possibility that it may increase in the future increases considerably.
A scientific method, by means of which similar phenomena are
investigated, is called proximate market analysis.

Furthermore, over the past few years dependence of Russia's
economy on the oil prices has subsided. As Deputy Chairman of the Duma
committee for budget and taxes Mikhail Zadornov thinks, even with the
oil price of $12 a barrel Russia would have a budget surplus within
the next few years, being at the same time able to service its foreign
debt. The thing is that the economic growth continuing in Russia has
been resting on the internal resources and on the growth of the
internal demand both already.

Among the wise "gurus", owing to whom we have economic growth,
some experts name Victor Gerashchenko, who was not afraid to claim
responsibility and satiated the zealous economy with rubles.

According to the estimates of Deputy Prime Minister Alexei
Kudrin, Russia's GDP will increase by 5.5% at least, based on results
of 2001. Next year, according to IMF experts, the economic growth in
Russia slow down to... 4%, given that no economic growth may be
observed in some other countries. Real incomes in 2002 will increase,
according to a forecast of the Economic Development Ministry, by 6%.

Let's note the following figures. The scope of job, executed on
construction contracts in Russia in January-August 2001 has exceeded
the level of January-August 2000 by 7.6%, and exceeded the level of
January-August of 1999 by 12.1%. This August the size of contracted
work exceeded the level of last August by 12.2%. But construction
industry is the backbone of the economy.

An opinion of Yuri Maslyukov, chairman of the Duma committee for
industry, construction, and high technologies, who cannot be blamed
for incompetence or carefree attitude, is rather exponential. As he
thinks, "Russia's economy continues to improve with confidence, though
at a decreased rate." Next year this growth, according to his
assessment, will be around 3-4%.

In a word, it is high time we stopped thinking that we live on
"an island of bad luck." Russia is not an island, but a whole
continent. One can be certain of its reliability and stability,
despite the disorder around the world.
(Translated by Andrei Ryabochkin)

******

#9
Moscow Times
October 5, 2001
Committed to Telling the Toxic Truth
By Russell Working

Four years ago, navy Captain Grigory Pasko -- then a military journalist --
was jailed on charges of high treason for allegedly selling state secrets
to Japan, primarily concerning Russia's disposal of nuclear waste. Pasko,
who was a stringer for Japanese news station NHK, had filmed the dumping of
liquid radioactive waste in the Sea of Japan and documented other
environmental hazards created by the Pacific Fleet.
The charges against Pasko remained secret, but those leaked to the press by
Pasko's supporters bordered on the ludicrous. He was accused, for example,
of illegally covering a meeting at which top brass planned a military
training exercise -- despite the fact that he had been specifically invited
to cover the meeting for Boyevaya Vakhta, the Pacific Fleet newspaper.
Amnesty International adopted Pasko as a prisoner of conscience, and a
flood of letters arrived defending him as a second Alexander Nikitin,
another former navy captain who was tried repeatedly for revealing
environmental abuses by the Northern Fleet.

Last year after 20 months in jail, Pasko was acquitted of treason charges
and convicted on a minor charge of unmilitary conduct. He was sentenced to
time served and released. Both the Federal Security Service, or FSB, and
Pasko sought to overturn the decision. The FSB wanted Pasko behind bars.
Pasko wanted to clear his name.

Pasko spoke with The Moscow Times in Vladivostok about the case against
him, his fight for vindication, and the environmental problems facing
Russia's Far East.

Q:Where does your case currently stand, and what verdict do you expect?
A: I suspect the appeal is two-thirds done. On Sept. 28 the court declared
a one-month recess. On Nov. 29 the court will announce the results of its
review of all the documents. Then both sides will present arguments. And
finally, the court will announce a verdict.

Nov. 20 will mark four years since this whole thing started. Under the law,
the court has no grounds for conviction. Our opponents are grasping at all
sorts of charges. They're even trying to charge me under Article 283 --
divulging state secrets. It's nonsense. No crime has been committed. They
leak information to the press, trying to convince the public that Pasko is
a criminal. They failed to prove that I was a spy, so now they think any
charge will do. Pasko must be convicted. But we think the verdict will be
"not guilty." If not, we'll appeal to the international court in Strasbourg.

Q:Do you think that with the press distracted by the terrorist attacks on
America and the possible war against Afghanistan, the FSB might feel freer
to pressure the court for a guilty verdict?
A: In this country, anything can happen. But I'm ready. On May 25, I
received word from Strasbourg that my case had been registered, and that
the relevant documents were on file. The FSB knows about this, because all
the mail I receive in Vladivostok is opened before it gets to me.

Q: It is said that since you no longer work for the Pacific Fleet, no one
covers its environmental problems anymore. What dangers are people not
hearing about?

A: I can't answer this concretely, because I have been out of the loop for
four years. But judging from what Pacific Fleet officers tell me, and also
from what I have learned during my closed military trial -- it was declared
a "secret" proceeding only to prevent the public from learning about the
lawlessness of the FSB and military officials in contaminated areas -- the
biggest radiation threats in Primorye are the decommissioned nuclear
submarines and nuclear waste storage sites. In the Far East nuclear
submarines are located in two places: Krasheninnikova Bay in Kamchatka and
near Sysoyeva Bay in Primorye. In these two spots there is potential for a
disaster of enormous proportions.

But the environmentalists say we suffer most from the garbage dump at
Gornostai Bay, and from the huge number of cars that poison the air. And
they are right. The local government can't even cope with a relatively
small problem like a garbage dump within Vladivostok city limits on the
shore of Peter the Great Bay. How do you expect them to deal with
decommissioned submarines?

Q: Have the authorities done anything right?

A: Yes, some things have been done. In Bolshoi Kamen, they built a floating
plant to purify radioactive waste. The construction order was issued in
1992, but the plant only came online this year. Thanks to American aid,
they have the capacity to store nuclear fuel at Sysoyeva Bay and to store
ballistic missiles from the submarines before they are processed.

I suspect that the countries that might help solve these problems don't
appreciate the truly horrific situation in our dangerous radioactive zones.
And they don't know because Russia, following Soviet practice, classifies
all information on nuclear waste storage.

Last year all the decommissioned submarines and storage facilities were
handed over to the Atomic Energy Ministry. Now the Pacific Fleet bears no
responsibility for them. The ministry created a government-owned company,
Dalrao, to handle the subs and storage facilities. And they appointed a
former military man, Rear Admiral [Nikolai] Lysenko, to run it. Lysenko has
demonstrated a crude adherence to the government line. When he was asked in
court what he knew about Article 7 of the Official Secrets Act [which
stipulates that information about environmental dangers cannot be
classified], he replied: "I don't need to know anything about that. The
Defense Ministry issued a contrary decree, No. 075." Until someone charges
officials like Lysenko with criminal concealment of information affecting
public health, he and his ilk will never have any cause to shake up their
petrified military mindset.

Q: Did you ever knowingly photocopy secret documents, as rumor has it?

A: I never broke the law. First of all, military journalists are so
restricted in their work that they can't do anything without someone else's
participation. It would be impossible to get hold of secret documents
containing evidence of Soviet dumping of thousands of barrels of [the
poisonous chemicals] lewisite and yperite without anyone's knowledge. I
knew, however, that such documents existed, and that they contained the
exact amounts dumped and geographic coordinates for the dumping sites. But
I had no access to them.

Knowing that these documents existed, I exhausted every legal avenue
demanding that they be declassified. And when I published articles about
the environment I was protected by Article 7 of the Official Secrets Act.
Many officers understood this and provided me with information. Strangely,
after the articles came out, portions of this information were suddenly
classified. Under Russian law, the FSB had no right to do this. They did so
in order to build a criminal case against me.

Q: There was talk in navy circles that some of your sources were later
punished for providing you with classified information.

A: That's nonsense. Fifty-three witnesses have been interrogated. None of
my regular sources ever gave me classified documents. And none of them has
been punished.

Q: If your cause hadn't been taken up by human rights groups and the
international press, is it possible that the judge in your first trial
would have ruled to keep you in jail instead of releasing you?

A: Had I been a Japanese spy, probably yes. The court received 24,000
letters from all over the world -- from Australia, America, all over
Europe. If 48,000 letters had been delivered, but I had been guilty, they
wouldn't have helped. Faced with my clear innocence and 24,000 letters, the
court still found me guilty of a bizarre charge that doesn't apply to my case.

When I talk to journalists from other countries, I always thank the people
and organizations for their concern. For some reason, the biggest number of
letters to the court and various government agencies came from Holland. So
I thank all the countries that supported me -- we counted 98 of them -- and
to the Dutch I bear a special debt of gratitude.

Q: What are you doing now, and how will your life change when this trial is
finally over?

A:Currently, I am a correspondent for Novaya Gazeta and a co-founder of the
Environment and Human Rights Coalition. I'm also head of the environmental
committee of the Russian PEN Center. Those three jobs keep me busy enough
that I don't think too much about the trial.

******

#10
Novaya Gazeta
No. 72
October 4-7, 2001
WHERE SHOULD WE LOOK FOR BIN LADEN'S MONEY?
It might have wound up in Russian oil industry
Author: Mikhail Krugov
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]

SOME RUSSIAN OIL TYCOON MAY ACTUALLY TURN OUT TO BE A FIGUREHEAD, A PUPPET OF OSAMA BIN LADEN. RUSSIA HAD BETTER FIND OUT WHO THE REAL OWNERS AND DECISION-MAKERS IN ITS OIL INDUSTRY ARE, OR ONE DAY IT COULD FIND ITSELF ON THE LIST OF STATES SPONSORING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM.
Russia's oil sector as a potential security risk

PREPARING THEIR RETALIATORY STRIKES, THE AMERICANS ARE SEARCHING
INTENSIVELY FOR THE FINANCES OF OSAMA BIN LADEN AND HIS ORGANIZATION. LIKE EVERYTHING ELSE, TERRORISM REQUIRES CONSIDERABLE FINANCIAL RESOURCES - WHICH MAKES WHAT IS CALLED "FINANCIAL STERILIZATION" AN EFFECTIVE MEANS OF PREVENTION. IT IS WITH THIS IDEA IN MIND THAT THE AMERICANS HAVE BEEN TRACING MONEY OF THEIR PUBLIC ENEMY NO. 1 AND BLOCKING HIS BANK ACCOUNTS.

When Saudi Arabia stripped bin Laden of his citizenship, the
terrorist's family set aside his share of all its assets. This
amounted to approximately $300 million. Bin Laden invested it in all
kinds of ventures, and the interest from these investments now
sponsors his organization.

Needless to say, the terrorist could not invest his money openly.
People like that never do. It was all done via offshore companies.

It is now possible to try to find out which industry received bin
Laden's money. Specialists agree that bin Laden might have opted to
invest his millions in oil, or petrochemicals, where he himself is
knowledgeable and has contacts.

On the other hand, this particular option was not that easy. As
things stand, offshore companies are kept out of the oil trade all
over the world. They are "faceless" partners by definition, while
every country considers oil as its national wealth. Only state-
controlled or absolutely transparent structures are permitted to
participate.

Russia is the only exception. Like any other export-oriented
field, the oil sector in Russia is in the hands of offshore companies.
Because of this, anyone at all can operate in it - and, more
importantly, receive dividends anywhere in the world. Also
importantly, Russia has a sizeable Muslim community with considerable
influence, a community with pipelines into all government structures
at all levels.

There is another detail: all this took place in the mid-1990s,
when privatization in Russia was uncontrolled. It only confirms the
theory that bin Laden's money might have really ended up in Russia,
especially in its oil and petrochemical industries. In other words,
some Russian oil tycoon may actually turn out to be a figurehead, a
puppet whose strings are pulled by the leader of global terrorism.

Of course, all this is just an assumption. The primary purpose of
offshore companies is to conceal the identities of their true owners.
The problem of identifying those people should be on the agenda of the
secret services.

We are not out to cast aspersions on any Russian tycoons. By
choosing to do business via offshore companies, they tainted
themselves. The problem is that these tycoons themselves are smearing
all of Russian society, and the Muslim community in particular, under
the circumstances.

The US secret services are handling the problem now. They will
solve it sooner or later. This means it is time Russia itself checked
out its tycoons - or some day it could find itself on the list of
states sponsoring international terrorism. All Moscow has to do is
find out who the real owners of the Russian oil industry are. It
should do so without delay, right now, while the Americans are looking
for traces of bin Laden's finances on exotic islands.

*******

#11
Nations Press For NATO Expansion
October 5, 2001
By WILLIAM J. KOLE

SOFIA, Bulgaria (AP) - Expanding NATO to take in Eastern Europe and the
Baltics will help secure the world against the threat of global terrorism,
the leaders of 10 nations pressing to join the alliance said Friday.

Meeting under heavy security at Bulgarian President Petar Stoyanov's
residence, the leaders of 10 East European and Baltic countries said the
Sept. 11 attacks added urgency to their case for joining the 19-member
alliance.

``The blows at the heart of the United States have shed new light on the
need to consolidate strength against the new evil,'' Stoyanov said.

``Even if a global anti-terrorist alliance is created, it can't be
successful without a strong NATO,'' he said. ``No nation is able to cope
with the new threats single-handed.''

Russia has vehemently opposed the eastward expansion of NATO, which would
bring the alliance to its doorstep. But this week, Russian President
Vladimir Putin softened his opposition, suggesting that Russia and NATO
could find common ground in the global fight against terrorism.

Stronger relations with emerging democracies are essential to counter the
terrorist threat in Afghanistan, NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson said.

``Afghanistan is a safe haven for terrorists precisely because it does not
have a viable state structure. It is a black hole,'' Robertson said. ``That
is why NATO is engaged in southeast Europe - to prevent such black holes
from emerging on our doorstep. ... The new democracies have demonstrated
once again that they are not just fair-weather friends.''

Friday's meeting brought together the heads of state of potential newcomers
Bulgaria, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Croatia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania,
Macedonia and Albania. They issued a ``declaration of solidarity'' that
``our governments will fully support the war against terrorism.''

``The lesson we draw from the terrorist attacks in the United States is
that the security of America and Europe is more intertwined than ever
before,'' it said. ``The new democracies of Europe can help counter
terrorist and criminal threats to the community of the West.''

It was their last gathering before a November 2002 summit in Prague, where
NATO members are expected to clear the way for several new nations to join.
Former Warsaw Pact members Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary joined in
1999.

``Your determination to stand side by side with the United States and the
NATO alliance during this hour of trial sends a powerful message against
the tyranny of terror,'' President Bush said in a message to the gathering.
``The United States supports NATO membership for all of Europe's new
democracies - from the Baltics to the Black Sea - who share our values.''

On Thursday, the NATO allies granted the United States automatic and
unlimited access to their airfields and ports and agreed to deploy ships
and early-warning radar planes in Washington's campaign against terrorism.

Robertson said the process of enlarging NATO would continue and ``will not
be held hostage to any terrorist campaign.''

But he cautioned the candidate countries: ``The strong logic of enlargement
must be matched by the effort needed to make it happen. Aspirant countries
must meet NATO's political and military standards before they can be
admitted.''

On the Net:
NATO: http://www.nato.int/

******

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