October 4, 2001

This Date's Issues:   5475 • 5476

Johnson's Russia List
#5475
4 October 2001
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Moscow Times: Kevin O'Flynn, No Happy Memories on This Anniversary.
2. AFP: 'Seismic seachange of historic proportions' in US-Russia ties: Powell.
3. RFE/RL: Kathleen Knox, Will War On Terrorism Boost Russia's Chances Of Joining NATO?
4. Interfax: Russian presidential adviser upbeat on economic growth. (Illarionov)
5. Baltimore Sun: Will Englund, Attacks on U.S. affording Kremlin a new
boldness. Russia puts pressure on Chechens, deals in arms with Iran.
6. Reuters: Rights group fears West more tolerant of repression.
7. strana.ru: Russia to draw closer to NATO and EU. Interview by Sergei Rogov, director of the Institute of U.S. and Canada Studies.
8. Financial Times (UK): Judy Dempsey, Canny Putin gets his demands from obliging EU and Nato.
9. AFP: Caspian ecology in "critical" condition: Russian envoy.
10. Robert Bruce Ware: Terrorism and Opportunism.
11. stratfor.com: George Friedman, The Geopolitical Price of War.]

*******

#1
Moscow Times
October 4, 2001
No Happy Memories on This Anniversary
By Kevin O'Flynn
Staff Writer

The black-and-white portraits went past one by one: 43 proud, blurred,
smiling, serious faces and three blank pieces of posterboard -- all with a
small black line cutting across the left-hand corner.

As the mournful procession stopped outside the Ostankino television center,
the portrait-bearers formed a circle, the photos facing inward. A Russian
Orthodox priest began reading prayers for the dead.

The poorly dressed crowd of about 300 people gathered Wednesday to
commemorate the loved ones they lost in Moscow's bloodiest clash since
World War II -- one that many believe brought the country to the brink of
civil war.

The demonstrators were a motley collection including Communist pensioners
left penniless by post-Soviet reforms and certain their government has
betrayed them, bereaved relatives and political extremists.

Some held up signs saying "Long Live the Soviet Constitution" riddled with
mock bullet holes. Others sold nationalist newspapers, music tapes or
virulent Stalinist or anti-Semitic literature.

"We come here every year to remember those people who were innocent victims
of October '93," said Leonid Bakchuk, one of the organizers of the
demonstration, which wound its way from the pond opposite the television
tower.

"These people were shot here," said Communist Duma Deputy Alexander
Kunayev, pointing to the photos. "Shot from machine guns from this
building. I was a witness.

"It's a crime of the regime -- Yeltsin's crime," he added. "Unarmed people
came here to conduct negotiations with the head of the television center,
and in response they got a bullet in the back."

Few agree that the crowd that descended on Ostankino on Oct. 3, 1993, was
unarmed. Many reports from the time say the protesters were not only armed
but that they attacked first, and the elite OMON troops opened fire in
response.

In general, there is little agreement on the details of the battle. What's
clearer is what preceded it.

Eight years ago, on Sept. 21, the patience of then-President Boris Yeltsin
snapped: Frustrated by having his reforms continually blocked by an
intransigent parliament with as many powers as the president himself,
Yeltsin disbanded the conservative legislature, called the Supreme Soviet.

His vice president, Alexander Rutskoi, sided with the opposition. They
barricaded themselves inside the White House, which now serves as the main
government building but was then parliament headquarters, declared Rutskoi
the president and a bitter two-week standoff began.

The mood in the city seemed quite the opposite of the pro-Yeltsin fervor
that had brought thousands of people to defend the White House two years
earlier when Yeltsin himself was holed up there, facing down a coup against
his predecessor Mikhail Gorbachev by Communist hard-liners.

In the fall of 1993, on the contrary, Muscovites came out to show their
displeasure with Yeltsin -- for everything from his role in the breakup of
the Soviet Union, to failure to follow through with full-fledged democratic
reforms, to the country's inflationary nightmare.

On Oct. 3 the standoff erupted into violence when Rutskoi's supporters
broke through the police lines fencing them in near the White House and
split into two groups -- one that headed for the mayor's office neighboring
the parliament and another that donned helmets and marched off to storm the
broadcasting unit at Ostankino.

That night outside the television center, police shot dead 46 people. The
following day, Yeltsin ordered tanks to shell the White House.

If the indelible image of the 1991 coup attempt was a beaming, victorious
Yeltsin standing atop a tank in front of the White House, the lasting
picture of the clashes in 1993 was the building's blackened facade and dead
bodies on the streets of central Moscow. Officially, 147 people were
killed, including the Ostankino protesters. Unofficial estimates put the
figure much higher.

Rutskoi was not at Ostankino on Wednesday. His return to big-time politics
-- he was governor of the Kursk region until earlier this year -- has seen
him branded a traitor by many of those who were on his side eight years ago.

However, in an interview with Interfax, Rutskoi himself said that the crowd
at Ostankino had been armed in 1993.

It was Rutskoi who had urged the opposition's supporters to go to
Ostankino, but he said Wednesday that he had wanted to stop them when he
saw they were armed.

Those who died ranged in age and status from a 75-year-old World War II
veteran to a 17-year-old student. Among the dead there were also two
foreigners, Irish cameraman Rory Peck and American lawyer Terry Duncan.

"It was a declaration of war," said pensioner Galina Ryabukhina, recalling
that parents weren't allowed to see injured children in hospitals after the
shooting.

"Eight years ago there was unity of sorts against Yeltsin," said Boris
Kagarlitsky, a political analyst and, in 1993, a deputy of the Moscow
legislature who lined up against Yeltsin.

Yeltsin's decision to suspend parliament was seen by the protesters as a
despotic move, by the president's supporters as the only way to deal with
the old guard.

Those against Yeltsin were "a mixture of those who wanted a return to
Soviet times, the far right and frustrated democrats," said Kagarlitsky.

"It was a coalition that could not win," he said. "It was politically
unsustainable."

*******

#2
'Seismic seachange of historic proportions' in US-Russia ties: Powell

WASHINGTON, Oct 3 (AFP) -
Last month's terrorist attacks marked a "seismic seachange of historic
proportions" in relations between the United States and Russia, US
Secretary of State Colin Powell said Wednesday.

Powell said Russia's pledge of full cooperation with a US-led anti-terror
coalition as well as the improvement in ties between Moscow and NATO would
have been "unthinkable" in the past.

"It is a seismic seachange of historic proportions," Powell told a small
group of reporters at the State Department.

Powell grinned broadly when asked about Russian President Vladimir Putin's
suggestion earlier Wednesday that Moscow might rethink its opposition to
NATO expansion eastward if it took on a more political role.

"I hope this begins to shape the discussion that we are going to have over
the next year leading up to the Prague summit as to how one might enlarge
NATO and do it in a way that nobody would find threatening," he said.

Powell praised Russia for a variety of steps it had taken in response to
the US call for a broad anti-terror coalition following the September 11
attacks in New York and Washington.

Putin and his advisers "analyzed the situation and very quickly came to the
conclusion that they had to be part of this coalition going against the
threat that they face: terrorism," Powell said.

Putin has offered unprecedented Russian assistance to the campaign,
including overflight of its airspace and possible use of its troops in
search and rescue missions, which is aimed first at Afghanistan-based Saudi
militant Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda network.

In addition, Moscow has told Washington it will not object to US
cooperation with the former Soviet Central Asian republics which Russian
officials regard as within their sphere of influence.

Earlier Wednesday, US officials presented Putin with exactly the same
classified intelligence about bin Laden and al-Qaeda that they shared with
NATO members on Tuesday, a rare if not unheard of move in relations between
the former Cold War foes.

Putin then told reporters in Brussels that Moscow might reconsider its
staunch opposition to NATO expanding into the Baltics if the alliance was
transforming itself, spurred by the anti-terrorism drive.

"If NATO takes on a different shade and is becoming a political
organization, of course we would reconsider our position with regard to
such expansion, if we are to feel involved in such processes," Putin said.

He also vowed to step up cooperation with the European Union on combatting
terrorism.

Powell applauded all of these statements and others hinting that Russia
might even be willing at some stage to join NATO.

"I think that Russia has acted in a proper way recognizing that this is a
seismic change and choosing to each out further toward the West as a
result," he said.

"Nothing is beyond consideration these days and he has on a number of
occasions now made references to NATO and possible future Russian
membership in NATO," Powell said.

*******

#3
Russia: Will War On Terrorism Boost Russia's Chances Of Joining NATO?
By Kathleen Knox

Russian President Vladimir Putin, in Brussels on the last day of a
three-day visit, today holds talks with NATO Secretary-General Lord George
Robertson. Putin recently revisited the prospect of Russia joining NATO,
leaving some observers speculating that today's meeting may pick up on that
theme. RFE/RL correspondent Kathleen Knox explores how realistic the idea
of Russia joining NATO really is. She finds that the idea may have received
a boost following the 11 September attacks on the United States.

Prague, 3 October 2001 (RFE/RL) -- When plans for Russian President
Vladimir Putin's meeting today with NATO Secretary-General Lord George
Robertson were shaping up, speculation centered on whether he would become
the first Russian or Soviet leader to set foot in the alliance's Brussels
headquarters.

To the disappointment of headline-writers everywhere, that's not going to
happen -- the two are to meet in a palace where the Belgian prime minister,
Guy Verhofstadt, regularly receives foreign guests.

But even the fact that the idea seemed even possible says something about
the growing rapprochement between the former enemies. What was once
unthinkable -- that Russia could join the alliance -- is now openly
discussed by Putin and is even receiving cautious support from some Western
leaders.

Putin said this summer that NATO should either consider admitting Russia or
disband. In Germany in late September, he was once again asked about the
possibility of Russian membership in NATO. He answered: "Everything depends
on what is on offer. There is no longer a reason for the West not to
conduct such talks."

His host during that visit, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, echoed an
earlier statement that Russian membership could not be ruled out in the
long term:

"There is a NATO-Russia Council where NATO and Russia work closely
together. If something more develops out of this cooperation, Germany would
be the last country to have something against that."

Some prominent U.S. figures have also voiced their support. Richard
Gephardt, who leads the Democrats in the U.S. House of Representatives,
suggests Russian membership would be the best way to prevent a new Cold War.

And the U.S. ambassador to Russia, Alexander Vershbow, has said there are
no fundamental obstacles to discussing Russian NATO membership and that it
could be a long-term goal.

These endorsements should not be taken to indicate that Russia is likely to
join NATO anytime soon. At the moment, Russia's say in NATO affairs is
limited to a special consultative arrangement. Analysts say Russia would
require years of social and military reforms before it could even be
considered.

There are other obvious problems, too. How would NATO's current members
feel about extending the alliance's borders to China? Could Russia ever
agree to its forces being under European or American command?

Sean Kay worked in the administration of former U.S. President Bill Clinton
on NATO policy and has advised the current administration of President
George W. Bush on its enlargement strategy.

He says the question of Russian membership in NATO is suddenly a very
legitimate one, in view of the prominent role Russia is playing in the
international response to the 11 September terrorist attacks on America:

"The prospect of Russia joining NATO has changed to the degree that this is
a topic that is a much more serious issue that must be addressed by
alliance leaders than it was previously. Beforehand, the idea of Russia and
NATO was largely rhetorical. After [11 September], the need to prioritize
operational relationships with Russia and to be sensitive towards Russia's
concerns about its security will play a very great role in alliance
decision-making. The bottom line is that, while I still see the idea of
Russia in NATO as a medium- to long-term prospect, the tone of the
discussion about the concept will take a much more serious level at this
stage."

Kay says Russia would put NATO in a tricky position if it asked to join:

"I think the allies would have to respond by taking a serious look at it,
or their credibility would be put at risk, having said it's open to all
interested parties who meet standards of democracy and civilian control of
the military. But they would also have to come back and say, 'OK, here are
the specified criteria that Russia would have to make before actually
joining,' and then the question would be -- have they set the criteria [so]
high that Russian membership becomes unlikely?"

Peter Duncan specializes in Russian foreign policy at London's School of
Slavonic and East European Studies. He argues that Putin's recent remarks
constitute nothing less than a request to join the alliance:

"At the moment, I can certainly see it's likely that Russia will be
pursuing this. But at the same time, Western attention is very much on the
military situation in the Middle East, so such an application would be put
on the back burner [set aside until a later date]."

But he says the obstacles that would need to be overcome cancel out any
recent boost for Russia's chances:

"I don't think that despite the spirit of cooperation at the moment, this
is going to be translated into anything permanent as far as Russia's
membership or role in NATO is concerned."

Lawrence Freedman is professor of war studies at King's College in London.
In an interview with RFE/RL in August, he said the enlargement process
already underway may have created a situation where Russian membership is
inevitable:

"If you're going to carry on a process of enlargement which you argue is
not necessarily driven wholeheartedly by security or strategic
considerations but by a sense that certain countries have displayed
democratic credentials and liberal economic management and so on, then it
becomes a different set of criteria as to who to include in the alliance.
Russia just might reach these criteria. More specifically, if -- as seems
likely -- there's pressure to include the Baltic states, it could be
potentially very tense with Russia. Leaving open the possibility that the
alliance could expand to include Russia could take the edge out of that,
because there's nothing else that can be offered to Russia."

Freedman says this is still a distant scenario, but adds:

"What has happened is that something that would have seemed silly and
frivolous five years ago has moved forward to where serious people can
imagine circumstances in which it can happen."

Like many other observers, Freedman says it would get harder for a larger
NATO to agree on external operations. This could leave it as a Europe-wide
security organization focused much more on internal issues, which might as
well include Russia.

"It would be almost neutralized as a major security provider, unless
something very curious was happening outside of the NATO area. So it's not
particularly something I would welcome, but having started on enlargement
and having decided to give enlargement a bigger boost, we may have just put
the alliance on a course that will end on this sort of outcome."

Observers say current talk has highlighted an important question: What is
the future for the alliance? David Abshire is a former U.S. ambassador to
NATO. In an interview in August, he said it is time to reconsider NATO's
role on the world stage:

"We have got to think ahead on the purposes of the alliance and have some
studies done on that by a wise-man's group. Those types of studies are
replete throughout the history of the alliance. Certainly the time has come
to set up a group that will study its future and its purpose, as was done
several times throughout NATO's history."

Another question the issue raises relates to the Central European states
who have recently joined the alliance or which are aiming to join, mainly
out of a desire to be protected from their larger neighbor to the East.
These countries are more skeptical about the prospect of Russia joining the
alliance.

Russia joining NATO would strip them of that security guarantee. Some
observers argue that these countries would no longer need such guarantees,
as a Russia fit to join NATO would be civilized and ruled by law. Still,
those countries would be wary at the very least.

But Svyatoslav Kaspe, a political analyst at Moscow's Public Policy Center,
says the entire discussion is so hypothetical as to render it meaningless.
He had this to say in a recent interview with RFE/RL before the 11
September attacks:

"I wouldn't even say it's become much more of a live issue recently. It's
been brought up a few times in relation to the U.S. missile defense plans,
[and] as something of a side issue that's come up connected to Russia's bid
to join the World Trade Organization. But I don't see any decisive turning
point. I think it'll be talked about and forgotten. Nothing more. No one in
the West or Russia will take it seriously for the next 10, 20, 30 years."

Whether the feeling of cooperation between Russia and the West following
the recent terrorist attacks develops into something of lasting substance
remains to be seen.

*******

#4
Russian presidential adviser upbeat on economic growth
Interfax

Moscow, 3 October: Russian economic growth in 2001 may exceed the 5.5 per
cent predicted by the government, President Vladimir Putin's economic
adviser Andrey Illarionov told the press on Wednesday [03 October].

The GDP increase "may approach a figure close to 6 per cent per annum," he
said. The probability of the rise exceeding 5.5 per cent is quite high, he
said.

Among the factors contributing to faster growth Illarionov named the easing
of government pressure on the economy. Government spending went down by
almost 1.5 per cent of GDP, he reported. Non-interest spending declined
significantly. As a result non-interest spending this year will have
smaller growth indicators than the GDP.

Illarionov named as the second factor of economic growth the dynamics of
the actual exchange rate of the rouble. In 1999-2000 the indicator grew 2
per cent every month. This year the real effective exchange rate at first
inched up 1 per cent a month and since the beginning of August 0.1 per
cent. Hence the speed of growth of the real effective exchange slowed down
significantly, Illarionov said. He accounted the change in the trend to the
fact that Russia has been paying its foreign debts in full since February.

These factors helped "to keep up the economic growth that almost stopped at
the end of last year," the aide summed up.

********

#5
Baltimore Sun
October 3, 2001
Attacks on U.S. affording Kremlin a new boldness
Russia puts pressure on Chechens, deals in arms with Iran
By Will Englund
Sun Foreign Staff

MOSCOW - Russia is already counting the benefits of its solidarity with the
United States against the Taliban.

In Chechnya, Moscow believes there is less danger of international
criticism of its actions and that it can place more pressure on the rebels.
This has raised hopes that the 2-year-old war there might finally be
resolved - perhaps even through negotiation with rebel leaders.

Russia also is putting together a significant new arms deal with Iran - one
that the United States would have vociferously objected to in the past.

And, with hardly anyone noticing, the Kremlin appears to be trying to shut
down a small television company that has served as a last holdout of
independent TV here.

President Vladimir V. Putin went to Belgium yesterday to meet with European
Union leaders, and more and more the Russian government is acting as though
it no longer needs to worry about criticism from the West. In fact, the
Bush administration has redoubled its support for Russia's entry into the
World Trade Organization.

Behind all of this is the expectation that the American military will soon
dispose of the Taliban government in Afghanistan - an outcome that the
Russians would very much like to see.

Moscow, which has been stingingly critical of American military operations
from Iraq to Kosovo, is suddenly gung-ho for action against terrorism.
Putin said yesterday that Russia requires no proof from the United States
of Osama bin Laden's involvement in the attacks on New York and Washington,
because it's already obvious.

At a press conference in Brussels, Putin criticized Saudi Arabia's
reluctance to allow U.S. forces there to attack Afghanistan, Reuters
reported. "I think this is a cardinal error. It's not a question of
soldiers preparing strikes against Muslims but rather of soldiers preparing
strikes against terrorists," he said.

The mood among some circles here was summed up by a businessman named
Vladimir Lutsenko who was in an anti-terror unit in the KGB and now runs a
private security firm that reportedly has close links to the Federal
Security Service. Asked if Russia could avoid being drawn into an American
war in Afghanistan, he replied, "Who says Russia should avoid it?"

The Russian government has long argued that the revolt in Chechnya is part
of a worldwide revolutionary Islamic movement. Two years ago, when the
second Chechen war flared up, the Russians sought to demonstrate a link
between their foes and bin Laden, and they have been renewing those
allegations the past two weeks.

Sergei Yastrzhembsky, a presidential aide, said yesterday that at least
four of the hijackers who took part in the Sept. 11 attacks had earlier
"passed through" Chechnya. The Chechen rebels' new negotiator, Akhmed
Zakayev, conceded to a Georgian news agency that one of the rebel
commanders, a Saudi named Khattab, "probably" had a connection to bin Laden
in the past.

But for two years, Moscow felt it was being pilloried by the West over
human rights violations in Chechnya; now, there's an unmistakable sense of
justification.

"President Putin has tried to use the events of Sept. 11 to get carte
blanche for the conduct of Russian federal forces in Chechnya," Elizabeth
Andersen, executive director of Human Rights Watch's Europe and Central
Asia division, said in a statement released yesterday. "The E.U. can't
allow this to happen," she said.

But after Putin went to Germany last week, Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder
said it was time to rethink Western criticism of the war, and diplomats in
Belgium reiterated that idea yesterday.

Europe, wrote Leonid Radzikhovsky in yesterday's edition of Itogi magazine,
"has no business teaching Russia to pacify bandits, but rather Russia
should teach the West to destroy bandits."

Russia is actually dealing from a position of some weakness on the ground,
but the events of the past three weeks have emboldened its efforts to find
a way to end the war. Federal forces ostensibly control most of Chechnya -
but in pretty much the same way that U.S. forces used to control the Mekong
Delta in South Vietnam. Hit-and-run attacks in August and September took a
serious toll on Russian soldiers.

But after Sept. 11, several things happened.

In Georgia, which borders Chechnya and through which the Russians believe
Chechen rebels were able to move men and materiel, a genuine fear set in
that Russia was going to take military action.

"Many people here thought that Russia would take advantage of this
anti-terrorism euphoria and seize the moment," said Alexander Rondeli, a
policy advisor in the Georgian foreign ministry and one of the architects
of Georgia's close relations with the United States.

So the Georgians entered into serious negotiations with Moscow; as a
result, Rondeli said, several men wanted by the Russians are likely to be
extradited from Georgia. The Itar-Tass news agency also reported that the
Georgians agreed to close access to the Pankisi Gorge, which leads to
Chechnya, though the Georgians have denied this.

Georgian President Eduard A. Shevardnadze is scheduled to meet Bush in
Washington on Friday, and Russians expect that he will be urged to find
ways to get along with his big neighbor.

"We are, I would say, directly protected by the Americans," Rondeli said.
"But our government has tried a bit to soften its approach."

At the same time, according to Lutsenko of the private security firm,
financial support for the Chechens has been cut off by Azerbaijan, Saudi
Arabia and even Afghanistan.

Last week, Putin delivered an ultimatum to the rebels to lay down their
arms within 72 hours, which no one heeded. But some see that move as a
first step toward negotiations - and there have been contacts between
Zakayev and Russian envoy Viktor Kazantsev since the ultimatum expired.

Yesterday, Yastrzhembsky said Russia and the United States were sharing an
unprecedented amount of information about bin Laden, Chechnya and other
concerns. "Contacts between Russian and American special services have
never been so strong," he said.

For their part, the Chechens seem to be realizing that this is the best
time to strike a deal. As for the Russians, who have characterized the
rebels in the past as animals, Yastrzhembsky now describes Zakayev as a
"quite acceptable and sane" negotiating partner.

As the Chechens and Russians gingerly approached genuine negotiations -
surely not what the Sept. 11 hijackers had in mind as one outcome of their
attack - Iran's defense minister came to Moscow to sign an agreement on
military cooperation.

The minister, Ali Shamkhani, will also be taking a look at some Russian
military hardware with an eye to buying perhaps as much as $250 million
worth over the next three years. The paper Kommersant reported yesterday
that Iran is especially interested in anti-aircraft and anti-ship missiles,
combat planes, helicopters and tanks.

Some of that hardware might well be headed through Iran to the Northern
Alliance, fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan. The United States has looked
with dismay at Russian arms sales to Iran, which it considers to be a
supporter of terrorism - but perhaps not so much dismay this time that it
could interfere with the transaction.

Last month also brought a postscript to the hard-fought battle over the NTV
television company. Earlier this year, the Kremlin-friendly Gazprom Co.
seized control of the NTV board over the objections of the staff, who
characterized it as an attack on a free press.

Most of the journalists defected to a small and not widely seen broadcaster
called TV-6. It was the last vestige of independent national television,
and the channel said its ratings were growing sharply.

But last week, with Russia and the rest of the world waiting for war, a
national oil company with a stake in the channel went to court to try to
take it over.

It looks like a replay of the controversial and highly publicized NTV
fight, except that this time, few - either here or abroad - are inclined to
pick a fight with Putin's Kremlin.

*******

#6
INTERVIEW-Rights group fears West more tolerant of repression
By Julia Ferguson

VIENNA, Oct 3 (Reuters) - A leading human rights group said on Wednesday it
feared Western countries were softening their stance towards repressive
regimes, especially in Central Asia, as they build a coalition against
international terrorism.

The International Helsinki Federation (IHF) is worried the United States and
its allies will turn a blind eye to alleged human rights abuses by Russian
forces in Chechnya and to what it called government repression in Uzbekistan.

"It's extremely disturbing that Western governments are now going to be
silent about the methods of the Russian forces in Chechnya as they
incorporate Russia into this coalition against terrorism," IHF Executive
Director Aaron Rhodes said.

In an interview with Reuters, he described Russia's campaign against
separatist rebels in Chechnya as a perfect example of how not to deal with
guerrilla warfare.

A massive military operation had not solved the problem, causing many
thousands of civilian deaths and only increasing the resolve of the
separatists, he said.

"The civilians in Chechnya are just as much a victim of terrorism as the
civilians in the World Trade Center," Rhodes added.

The IHF, which takes its name from the 1975 Helsinki Final Act -- a landmark
east-west security and human rights accord -- monitors human rights in
Europe, North America and Central Asia.

UZBEKISTAN "EXAGGERATES" TERROR THREAT

Rhodes said the United States and the European Union were already
accommodating their relationship with a number of former Soviet republics in
Central Asia in the wake of the September 11 suicide attacks in New York and
Washington.

"Uzbekistan is the most glaring example of this," he said. "It has never
received very strong criticism for its policies in respect to Islamic
believers and political dissidents."

The government of Uzbek President Islam Karimov is fighting guerrillas from
the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).

The IMU seeking to overthrow the government and set up an Islamic state in
the Fergana Valley, a bastion of Islamic support in the region where
Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan meet.

All three countries are close to Afghanistan, where Saudi-born Osama bin
Laden, the prime suspect for the U.S. attacks, is believed to be based.

The Washington Post reported on Wednesday that the U.S. Army had moved more
than 1,000 light infantry troops to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in a military
build-up near Afghanistan.

REPRESSIVE POLICIES

Rhodes said there was a genuine terrorist problem in Uzbekistan, but the
Uzbek authorities were grossly exaggerating the threat as a pretext for
repressive policies. Thousands of people were being held in gulag-like camps
on no legal basis.

"And now of course those excuses for violations of human rights are accepted
more than ever," he said.

"Uzbekistan generates and exports terrorists to the rest of the region
because of the way it treats its people simply due to what they believe."

Calling on the West not to forsake its commitment to human rights in its
drive to combat terrorism, Rhodes said: "When there's a war against
terrorism, there's also got to be a war against state terrorism.

"There's no sense just focusing on one type of terrorism, when there's state
terrorism which is devastating millions of civilian lives."

"One of the best preventative policies with respect to terrorism is human
rights," he added.

"It's rarer for terrorists to emerge from societies in which they enjoy civil
and political rights to promote their values in a peaceful and political
way."

******

#7
strana.ru
October 3, 2001
Russia to draw closer to NATO and EU
Common enemy, terrorism, will speed up creation of new world security system
By Viktor Sokolov

Interview by Sergei Rogov, director of the Institute of U.S. and Canada
Studies

QUESTION: Changes in the world are so considerable that one might as well
speak about the coming of a new era in international relations. What do you
think?

ANSWER: Some crucial changes are in progress in the world today. In scale
they are possibly comparable with such events as the collapse of the Berlin
Wall or Pearl Harbor. In fact, a new hierarchy of international relations,
a new international security system is in the making. This creates major
opportunities for Russia, which in the last few years found itself in a
sufficiently difficult situation.

QUESTION: What is the difficulty about?

ANSWER: It is connected with a number of reasons. Including the fact that
Russia is not a member of such key organizations as the European Union and
NATO, which today form the structure of the new European system. As
concepts, Europe and European Union have become synonymous. In a situation
where Russia lacked prospects for joining the EU, it in effect was in for
being excluded from Europe. The window on Europe, which Peter had cut 300
years ago, threatened to shut down.

QUESTION: What is it that has changed now?

ANSWER: Today the situation is totally reversed. Russia, the United States,
and the European Union now have an absolutely obvious common interest,
which is based on the presence of a common adversary. Why did the last
decade prove so lamentable from the point of view of creating a new
international security system and Russia's integration therein? Alas, it is
very hard to build allied relations while lacking a common adversary. Now
both we and the West are acquiring the main interest, the fight against a
common enemy in the person of international terrorism. This provides reason
to build the entire complex of relations in the economic and political
sphere and in the military sphere in a totally different manner. Of course,
it is still early to draw final conclusions, but as a result of very bold
Russian initiatives launched over the last week, there is for the first
time a serious discussion under way on how Russia should become a full
member of this new European system and new global system of international
security.

QUESTION: Does it have anything to do with consideration of Russia's
immediate accession to the EU and NATO?

ANSWER: I do not think one can talk about that today as of priorities. In
all evidence, some time will be needed for the accumulation of experience
of practical interaction between Russia and the West before those issues
move to the practical plane.

At the present stage, one can talk about some new forms of interaction
between Russia and the United States, Russia and NATO, Russia and the EU.
There was this kind of attempts in the past. Suffice it to recall the
Permanent Joint Council, which the West blocked in its time. Today there is
a renewed opportunity to invigorate this Council and pursue a practical
interaction between Russia and NATO in the fight against terrorism
precisely under its aegis. Possibly, certain similar organizations may be
created between Russia and the EU as well, which will enable Russia to
integrate into the new European defense and foreign policy. New solutions
are possible in Russian-American relations too, up to the signing of a
Russian-U.S. mutual security treaty.

QUESTION: What do the two countries have to do for that?

ANSWER: For developments to follow this course, it is necessary to remove
the irritants, which used to cause considerable tensions in relations
between Russia and the West. These are the antimissile defense problem,
NATO's expansion plus a number of complicated economic issues connected
with the terms of Russia's integration into the global market, accession to
the WTO, and payment of foreign debts. Now that there is a common main
interest, compromise solutions are obviously possible too. Some problems
may possibly be put off for some time.

On the whole, there is a major shift in progress in the entire system of
international relations, as a result of which Russia gets vast additional
openings.

********

#8
Financial Times (UK)
4 October 2001
Canny Putin gets his demands from obliging EU and Nato
By Judy Dempsey, Diplomatic Correspondent, in Brussels

Vladimir Putin, Russian president, does not pull his punches. When he spoke
at a press conference after his two-hour meeting with the European Union's
top officials, his remarks were directed at himself as much as the three
institutions he met on Wednesday morning.

"In a serious organisation," said Mr Putin, "one should be in charge of
things."

Mr Putin was flanked by representatives of three EU institutions. On one
side were Guy Verhofstadt, prime minister of Belgium, which holds the EU's
rotating presidency, and Romano Prodi, European Commission president.

On the other was Javier Solana, the EU's foreign policy chief and head of
the political and security committee (COPS), which is responsible for
overseeing the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

During the talks, Mr Putin more than held his own, officials say. His
entourage of 30 ministers and officials said little. "Putin came with a
shopping list. He got more or less what he wanted," said a Commission
official.

Mr Putin could not have chosen a better time to visit the EU or hold talks
with Lord Robertson, Nato secretary-general. Both want him on board the
US-led global coalition against terrorism. Both were more than obliging.

The first item on the shopping list was COPS. For months, Russia had been
asking the EU to include it in some way in COPS - which by the start of
2003 is due to have the ESDP's 60,000-strong Rapid Reaction Force up and
running.

Normally, only the 15 EU member states are involved in the COPS meetings,
with separate consultations for Nato members that are not in the EU. On
Wednesday, it was agreed that Russia's ambassador to the EU would be
consulted on a monthly basis about COPS.

"Russia wants to keep an eye on how COPS/ESDP is developing so that
Moscow's security interests will not threatened," said another EU official.

Ivan Ivanov, Russian foreign minister, said Moscow wanted to make sure that
everything done by ESDP conformed to international law and the United
Nations charter. Some EU officials took it as an indication that Russia
wanted a much larger role in COPS beyond monthly consultations.

The second item was trade - specifically, Russia's membership of the World
Trade Organisation. For months, the EU had complained about Russia's lack
of preparedness, while Russia complained the EU was doing little to help
it. On Wednesday, the EU agreed to accelerate preparatory work on Russia's
accession to WTO.

But it was the third item on the list that went to the heart of Russia's
relations with Europe and the US: Nato enlargement.

Mr Putin has blown hot and cold over further expansion of Nato particularly
the possible inclusion of the three Baltic states. During his visit to
Warsaw last June, President George W Bush insisted Russia would have no
veto. But the September 11 attacks may have changed all that: Nato may now
be forced to bring Russia closer to the alliance.

On Wednesday, Mr Putin set the price for that. "As for Nato expansion," he
said, "one can take another, an entirely new look at this - if Nato takes
on a different shade and is becoming a political organisation.

"Of course we would reconsider our position with regard to such expansion
if we were to feel involved in such processes." He would not elaborate.
"There was no need to," said a Nato official. "Putin clearly wants Nato to
move away from being a military organisation to a political one."

*******

#9
Caspian ecology in "critical" condition: Russian envoy

ALMATY, Oct 3 (AFP) -
Russia's envoy for the Caspian Sea Viktor Kalyuzhny called Wednesday for the
five littoral states to take "urgent measures to clean up the inland sea's
ecology which he said was in "critical" condition.

"The state of biological resources in the Caspian is critical," Kalyuzhny
said at an oil conference in Kazakh city of Almaty.

He said some oil companies exploring the sea's resources used poisonous
material for drilling, had polluted the sea with waste, and barred access to
the oil sites by ecologists.

Moreover uncontrolled poaching had created a serious depletion of the
Caspian's sturgeon stocks, Kalyuzhny said.

He suggested the five Caspian states -- Kazakhstan, Iran, Russia, Azerbaijan
and Turkmenistan -- sign agreements that would "allow them to take urgent
measures for the protection of the Caspian environment and fish."

He also called for the creation of a joint Caspian center to monitor the
sea's ecology.

In June Kazakhstan, Russia, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan agreed to suspend
sturgeon fishing until the end of the year to help restore fish stocks.

Slow progress in negotiations on the Caspian's legal status was one of the
reasons for the lack of ecological cooperation between the Caspian states,
Kalyuzhny told the oilmen.

But "the ecology cannot wait while we dawdle over negotiating the sea's
status," he warned.

The division of the Caspian Sea's resources has been a source of dispute
among the five littoral states since the collapse of the Soviet Union 10
years ago.

Kalyuzhny confirmed Russia's opposition to the laying of undersea oil and gas
pipelines, citing ecological risks.

"Before starting such projects, the littoral states need to jointly solve the
issues of the ecological safety (of the projects)," he said.

Kazakhstan is planning to build an underwater link to the pipeline from Baku,
in Azerbaijan, to the Turkish port of Ceyhan, heavily backed by the United
States.

Russia has expressed its opposition, fearing a loss of influence in the
Central Asian region.

Meanwhile, US ambassador in Kazakhstan Larry Napper discussed progress
achieved in realising the 2.8 billion-dollars Baku-Ceyhan project.

"A primary feasibility study has been completed, and the results back up the
viability of the project," Napper said.

A more detailed feasibility study, itself costing 120 million dollars, had
got under way, he told the oilmen.

*******

#10
From: "Robert Bruce Ware" <bruce@brick.net>
Subject: Terrorism and Opportunism
Date: Tue, 2 Oct 2001

Last Thursday, during a short White House press briefing on US policy
toward Russia's war in Chechnya, spokesman Ari Fleischer had to deny seven
times that the US has softened its criticism of Russian military abuses in
exchange for Russia's cooperation in America's anti-terrorist campaign.
Nevertheless most leading American journals have featured stories and
editorials charging that the White House has caved in to Russian demands.

The war in Chechnya has long been complicated by many of the same
disquieting realities that came home to Americans on September 11. But the
war has been portrayed by Western journalists in terms of familiar Cold War
prejudices. After the world shifted, on September 11, those journalists
sought desperately to prop up their fables once again.

Hence, it was inevitable that these weeks would see a flurry of Western
reports painting Russia's offer to support the US anti-terrorist campaign
as blatant opportunism. One wonders what the Russaphobes would have written
if Russia had not volunteered to support the anti-terrorist campaign.

Contrary to the language of these reports, however, there has been no
evidence that the Russians are "demanding" anything in exchange for this
support, or that their cooperation has been offered as a quid pro quo for
Western acquiescence toward their military campaign in Chechnya. It seems
that the Russians are simply reiterating their familiar claims that Chechen
fighters are supported by interests in Afghanistan and the Middle East with
links to international terrorism, including Osama Bin Laden. Our
reconsideration of these claims might be warranted since clearly we need to
learn more about terrorism in the region, since problems in the Caucasus
have been chronically misunderstood in the West, and since Western policies
toward problems in Chechnya have been at least as great a failure as have
those of Russia.

Nevertheless, these unsupported and speculative reports in leading Western
media captured the imagination of at least one self-styled human rights
organization, which was quick to seize the opportunity. On 1 October, Human
Rights Watch (HRW) issued a press release that contained the following
language:

"President Putin has tried to use the events of September 11 to get carte
blanche for the conduct of Russian federal forces in Chechnya," said
Elizabeth Andersen, executive director of Human Rights Watch's Europe and
Central Asia division. "The E.U. can't allow this to happen."
(http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/10/eu-russia-1001.htm)

On the same day, HRW also issued formal letters to the General Secretary of
NATO and the President of the EU containing the following language:

"President Putin was among the first to seek to exploit the September 11
attacks by comparing the U.S. war on terrorism to Russia's own actions in
Chechnya. (http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/10/NATO-ltr-1001.htm)

Both of HRW's claims about President Putin's actions are sweeping and
vague. Neither cites his precise words. Neither states when or where
President Putin's machinations occurred, nor makes any other specific and
verifiable reference. This is convenient for HRW since, thus far, there
appears to be absolutely no evidence anywhere that President Putin has ever
said or done anything of the kind. However, HRW's obscure, unsupported, and
hysterical claims are consistent with both the methodological rigor and the
ideological agenda that they have brought to their study of events in the
North Caucasus.

If HRW doubts that Russia is fighting terrorism then perhaps, at some point
during the past two years, they might have troubled themselves to interview
some of the 32,000 Dagestani refugees displaced by invasions from Chechnya,
or some of the 3,000 Dagestanis who were herded into a hospital by Chechen
militants in 1996, or relatives of the 100 hostages who died shortly
thereafter, or some of the relatives of the thousands of people who were
kidnapped, tortured, and murdered in Chechen cellars. Any of these people
could have told HRW that from 1998 onward the chaos spilling out of
Chechnya had led to conditions of sustained terror throughout the region.
Or perhaps HRW might simply have responded to any of the numerous attempts
that I have made to help place HRW in contact with some of these people.
They could have explained to HRW that before the Russian military returned
to the region in 1999, there was a terror that made everything that
Americans have thus far seen look pale by comparison.

While it has been difficult to confirm the extent to which Chechen
militants and Islamist extremists in the North Caucasus region have been
supported by organizations in Afghanistan and the Middle East, Moscow is
not alone in claiming the importance of this connection. Muslims in the
Northeast Caucasus have been making the same claims to me since 1998. Also
in that year the government in Russia's predominantly Muslim Republic of
Dagestan, which stretches along Chechnya's eastern border, issued a
statement accusing organizations in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia of funding
Islamist extremists in Dagestan.

Russia also has been accused of opportunism because it has asked Georgia to
stop providing refuge to Chechen fighters. However, it is not clear why
Russia is to blame for taking positions intolerant of state supported
terrorism that are similar to those which we in the West are now adopting.

Moreover, Russian mimicry of Western anti-terrorist policies presents the
West with an opportunity to take a constructive lead toward improving the
situation in Chechnya. In our campaign against terrorism in Central Asia,
let us show Russia how to avoid indiscriminate brutality by preventing harm
to innocent civilians. Let us set a high standard in Afghanistan and
challenge Russia to match it by employing similar techniques in Chechnya.
Such a policy would serve us in Central Asia at least as well as it would
serve Russia in Chechnya since it would prevent neutral or sympathetic
elements in the local population from turning against us, and since it
would spare us additional enemies in the Islamic world.

Problems in the Caucasus result in part from traditional prejudices of
Slavic Russians against the dark-complected peoples of the region. By
campaigning at home, within the United States, against anti-Islamic and
anti-Arab prejudices, let us show Russia how to campaign against its own
anti-Caucasian prejudices and challege Russia to match our efforts.

And if we expect Russia to appreciate the importance of a free media, then
let us attend to journalistic objectivity in our coverage of Russia. Let us
set aside our own Russaphobic prejudices as artifacts of times past.

Every tragedy gives rise to opportunities. In this time of tragedy, we have
an opportunity to work constructively with Russia to improve a wide range
of problems. Perhaps we will stop fearing Russian opportunism long enough
to take advantage of this important opportunity.

*******

#11
stratfor.com
October 2, 2001
The Geopolitical Price of War
By George Friedman
George Friedman is the founder and chairman of STRATFOR.

Summary

If the United States wants to fight an effective military campaign in
Afghanistan, an alliance with Russia is essential. But cooperation will
come with a price. Moscow will increase its influence in Central Asia and
may resurrect its domination of the Caucasus. No matter how the anti-terror
campaign ends, the biggest winner will not be the United States, but Russia.

Analysis

In World War II, American strategy depended on the Soviet Union breaking
the back of the Wehrmacht. The United States, through lend-lease, provided
the Soviets with weapons, supplies and technology. This was not only a good
move but also an indispensable one, since it was essential to American war
aims. Nevertheless, the inevitable consequence was that the Soviets,
greatly strengthened by U.S. assistance, became America's rival.

Late in the Cold War, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. The United
States, having had its own strength sapped in Vietnam partly because of
Soviet assistance to the North Vietnamese, saw an opportunity to return the
favor. By arming the Afghan resistance fighters, the United States not only
trapped the Soviets in an unwinnable war but also helped create the general
crisis of confidence in the Soviet Union that led to its collapse.

There was a price to be paid here as well. Although American support to the
Afghan resistance was logical and necessary, given the time and
circumstances, the assistance that was provided helped lay the groundwork
for the current crisis.

In short, the manner in which each war is fought and concluded lays the
groundwork for the next conflict. There are no wars to end all wars.
Conflict and warfare are a permanent part of the human condition. It is far
more useful to think of war as a single, inseparable thread running
throughout the fabric of human history rather than as separate,
disconnected episodes. The thread that led to Sept. 11 ultimately can be
traced to the 1980s and long before.

What defines the future is the alliances we form, the aid we demand, the
promises we will make and, most important, the actual price we have to pay
for the things we must have. All sides in every conflict must confront the
fact that there is always a price.

Such a price always strengthens someone who has the potential to become
your future enemy, or it drives away someone who had been your friend. The
war that began on Sept. 11, like every war, will change the world in
profound and not wholly unpredictable ways.

The biggest winner in this war, it appears today, will not be the United
States but Russia. The geography of Afghanistan makes Russia indispensable
to the United States. Unless America gets lucky and manages to locate and
capture or kill Osama bin Laden very quickly -- an event that would trigger
the collapse of the Taliban government -- Washington will have to fight an
extended war in Afghanistan.

There are only two bases from which to operate. One is Pakistan, highly
unstable and capable of turning on the United States should certain
factions gain control. The other base comprises the three independent
republics lining Afghanistan's northern border: Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan
and Tajikistan. It would be very difficult to mount an effective military
campaign without this Central Asian base, even with only special forces,
light infantry and airborne troops.

Although Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are independent, there is
no question that they exist within Russia's sphere of influence. Economic
and military realities created a natural dependency institutionalized by
years of Czarist and Soviet rule.

In many ways, these countries are not happy about their dependency, but it
is there, and it is very real. Without getting into the complex politics of
the region, the simple fact is that it is far away from the United States
and getting there will require the active cooperation of Russia. Add to
this the fact that the Northern Alliance, the best-organized resistance to
the Taliban, has been underwritten by Russia for years, and it is easy to
see the depth and breadth of what Washington needs from Moscow.

One of the inevitable consequences of this war will be a massive increase
in Russia's influence in Central Asia. The United States, in fact, is going
to insist on it. In all of these countries, but particularly in Tajikistan,
pro-Taliban and anti-American forces are both substantial and indigenous.
The ultimate nightmare for the United States would be creating a complex of
support bases for troops operating in Afghanistan, only to have them
attacked, blocked or even overrun by pro-Taliban elements.

The United States is going to be stretched thin under any circumstances as
it will be projecting force over extreme distances to fight a land-locked
war. If ensuring the security of the mission's forces becomes exceedingly
difficult, this could undermine the mission itself by diverting troops from
Afghanistan.

Washington therefore is going to have to rely on Russia to maintain the
stability of these countries and the security of the forces. Russia is not
going to force itself on Central Asia against American will. It will be
done at the request of and to the relief of the United States. If the
United States is to wage this war, then Russia is indispensable. The net
result will be a reassertion of the Russian sphere of influence, with
active U.S. support, in a region that earlier broke away from the former
Soviet Union.

A similar process will be underway in the Caucasus. The United States had
been highly critical of Russia's war in Chechnya, a predominantly Muslim
region of Russia that is fighting for full independence. Moscow draws the
line at allowing any part of the Russian Federation to become independent.
The Russians have claimed for a while that the Chechens are supported by
bin Laden, but the United States paid no attention.

Not only is the status of Chechnya at stake but also that of the entire
Caucasus. Russia has no hope of finally ending the insurrection in Chechnya
until it has isolated the area from its sources of supply. In other words,
Russia cannot win in Chechnya unless it dominates the Caucasus as a whole,
including Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Some of these countries like Armenia are already heavily pro-Russian.
Others, like Georgia, are bending under Russian weight. But given the
current circumstances, Russia is certainly in a position to demand from the
United States that, in return for fighting terrorism in Afghanistan, Moscow
should be permitted to fight terrorism in Chechnya.

And if Washington needs to build an international coalition to fight the
Afghans, surely it cannot object to the Russians building a regional
coalition under a doctrine similar to that announced by U.S. Secretary of
State Colin Powell: if you aren't with Russia, you are against Russia.

The return of Russian power to Central Asia will be a natural outcome of
the situation on the ground. The return of Russia to the Caucasus will not
be so natural. The United States does not need this in order to achieve its
mission. But it is a contemporaneous requirement, meaning that the United
States will be expected to deliver while the war in Afghanistan is
underway, and any betrayal will have dire consequences to the war effort.
It is not a self-fulfilling event, but it is what might be called a
self-enforcing event.

These are things that Russia will easily get out of the conflict. There are
other elements that it wants that will not be as easy to get, since they
are not essential to the U.S. mission. For example, the Russians do not
want any further NATO expansion, and they absolutely do not want to see any
part of the former Soviet Union included in NATO. But Moscow has no way of
enforcing these desires. Once the Afghan war is over, the United States can
choose to double-cross the Russians on any promises made.

Therefore, it is in Russian President Vladimir Putin's interest to create
conditions that will preclude an American double-cross. There are two
places of fundamental interest to Russia that will be affected. One is
Ukraine, the other is the Baltic States -- Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.

All were part of the former Soviet Union and are critical to Russian
strategic interests today. U.S. dependency on Russia opens a window of
opportunity for Moscow to redefine its relations with these regions.
Because Washington needs Moscow so much, it will take quite a bit to
trigger a crisis in U.S.-Russian relations.

Ukraine and the Baltic States are absolutely aware of the role reversal
that is now taking place. They have to be feeling enormously exposed at the
moment. If the war lasts for years, and it might, they will be subject to
slow but intense Russian pressure without an effective American
counterweight. They thus might find it in their interests to negotiate
their terms early, while the shift is less evident, rather than later.

For Russia, a long war is of great interest. It is important to note that
the Russians, with their networks in Afghanistan still operating, have the
opportunity to extend the war in various ways. The problem with coalition
warfare is that everyone has their own reason to be part of the coalition.

For instance, it has been noted that Russia needs financial assistance and
can expect to get more than just a few billion dollars in loans from the
International Monetary Fund. The probability that the United States will be
buying supplies in Russia or underwriting the costs of Russian aircraft
modernization, so that Moscow can support U.S. military operations more
effectively, can generate many billions of dollars in direct expenditures.

The Russians lost the Soviet Union in the mountains of Afghanistan. The
Soviet Union as an institution may never be resurrected, but it appears the
Russians will reclaim their lost territories in the mountains of
Afghanistan once again.

The United States has no choice. It must fight the war it has been handed.
It must fight it with Russian help. It must pay the Russian price.
Geopolitics, like economics, leave nations with far fewer choices than
their policymakers would like to think they have. The United States can't
decline combat. It cannot win without Russian help. The Russian bill will
be high. And, at least in part, the Afghan war will plant the seeds for the
next confrontation.

******

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