September 30, 2001

This Date's Issues:   5468

Johnson's Russia List
#5468
30 September 2001
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. AFP: Moscow and Washington's honeymoon impressive but could be short lived.
2. AP: Ron Fournier, U.S., Russia Forge New Alliance.
3. Boston Globe: David Filipov, Fatalistic Russians embody the modern necessity of flight. While US passengers worry anew about security from hijackers, Russians worry about altitude.
4. The Russia Journal: Otto Latsis, The land and the law.
5. Los Angeles Times: Robyn Dixon, In Russia, an Honest Cop Finds Out the Truth Hurts. Police: In a culture of corruption, Vladimir Port's diary about the Chechen war has earned him the label of traitor and is costing him his job.
6. The Russia Journal: Vladimir Mukhin, Soviets’ Afghan ordeal has lessons for U.S.. A personal look back at facing a fearsome enemy in Afghanistan.
7. Moscow Tribune: Stanislav Menshikov, HOW WILL OIL PRICES AFFECT RUSSIA? Geopolitics Should Not Take Precedence over War on Terror.
8. EurasiaNet.org: Richard Giragosian, THE WAR ON TERRORISM: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CAUCASUS.
9. James Hughes: Russia-US Taboos: A Comment on the 'Counter-Terrorism' Campaign.
10. UPI: Ariel Cohen, Crisis looms in Central Asia.]

*******

#1
Moscow and Washington's honeymoon impressive but could be short lived

MOSCOW, Sept 30 (AFP) -
Moscow may have signaled its readiness to cooperate closely with Washington
in fighting terrorism, but both capitals nonetheless retain numerous points
of contention that have still not been sorted out, analysts in Moscow said.

"All that is holding us (Moscow and Washington) together is a common enemy.
We have a consensus only because it regards questions where it is hard to
disagree," said Moscow-based defense analyst Pavel Felgenhauer.

The rapprochement between Russia and the United States since the September 11
suicide attacks in New York and Washington, and particularly over the past
week, has nevertheless been spectacular.

In an unexpected move, Russian President Vladimir Putin signaled on September
24 an unprecedented willingness to work hand in hand with Washington, saying
Russia could take part in "international seek and rescue missions" in
Afghanistan, a country against which the United States is considering
launching strikes.

Washington accuses Afghanistan, mostly controled by the Taliban Islamist
regime, of harboring Osama bin Laden, whom it suspects of having masterminded
the attacks.

Putin further announced he was prepared to open Russia's airspace to some US
flights headed for Afghanistan.

He added that all other countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS) -- a loose organization uniting all former Soviet republics minus the
three Baltic states -- had made a similar decision.

And the White House seemed to reciprocate Moscow's moves Wednesday as its
spokesman Ari Fleisher called on Chechen separatists to "immediately and
unconditionally cut all contacts with international terrorist groups such as
Osama bin Laden and (his) al-Qaeda organization," thus echoing a claim long
made by Russia.

This new climate between Moscow and Washington "could lead to the settlement
of pending differences," said an analyst with the Carnegie foundation in
Moscow, Alexander Pikayev.

He said that the United States might delay walking out of the 1972 Anti
Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty which bars it from building an anti-missile
shield, a step Moscow strenuously objects to.

Prior to September 11, Washington had announced it was ready to drop the ABM
in the relatively near future, even if an agreement over this could not be
reached with Russia.

However, Pikayev went on, this new cooperation mood "is not irreversible."

The "first test" will come when Iranian Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani visits
Moscow from Monday to Friday, Felgenhauer said.

The question will be whether Washington "asks Moscow once more not to sell
arms to Iran," as it has done several times before September 11, or whether
it chooses not to anger Russia, he added.

Yury Korgonyuk, an analyst with the Moscow-based INDEM foundation, thought
that the new alliance between Moscow and Washington would not necessarily
last very long.

"Russia and the United States were allied during World War II, but that does
not mean their alliance remained" after the war was over, he said.

In fact, the Izvestya daily recently wrote, "Moscow and Washington's
honeymoon based on their hatred of terrorism is over."

The United States has let it be known that it will insist on a political
solution in the breakaway republic of Chechnya and on the respect of human
rights there, whatever it does in Afghanistan, the daily wrote.

But, Felgenhauer warned, "harmonious relations between Russia and the West
will depend on the West's ability to think in terms of realpolitik, which
means tolerating Russian war crimes in Chechnya."

*******

#2
U.S., Russia Forge New Alliance
September 29, 2001
By RON FOURNIER

WASHINGTON (AP) - The terrorist attacks on America have transformed relations
with Russia, thrusting the Cold War rivals into into an alliance against
terrorism.

The new paradigm became evident on Sept. 11, when President Bush ordered the
U.S. military to high alert shortly after the attacks and Moscow did not
follow suit.

Russian President Vladimir Putin telephoned the White House, as Bush hastily
flew away from Washington aboard Air Force One. National Security Adviser
Condoleezza Rice took the call in a bunker beneath the presidential mansion.

``I want you to know that we are not putting our troops on alert,'' Putin
told her. ``Not only are we not going on alert, we are standing down.''

Rice passed word to Bush, who later remarked that Putin must have taken to
heart his oft-repeated statement that the United States and Russia are no
longer enemies.

Putin called Bush the next day to express his condolences for the thousands
of lives lost. He also pledged Russia's help in defeating terrorism.

Suddenly, nobody is talking about the dispute over Bush's missile shield
dreams. U.S. forces are preparing to strike from former Soviet territory. And
a longtime source of tension, the rebel uprising in Chechnya, has become a
pivot point in the reconfigured U.S.-Russian partnership.

In a sign of the closer alliance, a number of high-ranking Americans were in
Moscow this weekend: Undersecretary of State John Bolton for talks on the
military and diplomatic front, Trade Representative Robert Zoellick on
Russia's desire for a better trade status, and a delegation from the Joint
Chiefs of Staff to discuss military matters.

The United States has gained unprecedented access to three key former Soviet
states near Afghanistan, Russia's help to arm resistance to the
terrorist-harboring Taliban regime, and valuable intelligence about the
region. Russia fought an unsuccessful war in Afghanistan in the 1980, when
Putin was a Soviet spymaster.

In return, Putin won an unexpected opportunity to earn respect in the West
and a freer hand in Chechnya. Bush linked the rebels to terrorists for the
first time, giving tacit approval, perhaps, for Putin to crack down.

Quite a turnabout for two men who warily eyed each other in the early months
of Bush's term.

``There's a convenient meeting of interests here,'' said Antony Blinken, for
seven years a senior member of President Clinton's national security team. He
said Putin may be able to slow, if not stop, Bush's missile defense system.

``This conflict against terrorism has the potential to forge new alliances of
convenience around the globe,'' Blinken said. ``Russia may be the best
example, but it's not the only one.''

Indeed, the terrorist strike has turned the global community on its ear.

U.S. officials say they're getting intelligence from Libya and Sudan, two
terrorist-harboring states. Pakistan, rife with anti-American sentiment, is a
U.S. staging ground. And Japan may loosen its World War II-era restrictions
on military action to help the United States.

Two weeks after the attacks on New York and Washington, Putin threw his lot
firmly behind the United States in a speech to German's parliament. He said
Russia, Europe and the United States must unite in a new, common struggle.

``We speak about partnership, but in reality we've never learned to live
together,'' Putin said. ``Today we must firmly declare: The Cold War is
over.''

Hours later, Bush gleefully discussed the speech with advisers in the Oval
Office. He had good news, too, from Saudi Arabia: The kingdom had cut ties
with the Taliban government.

``We've got to say something about this,'' Bush told his team. ``Let's work
on some language.''

The remarks were hurriedly drafted and delivered several minutes later.

``I am most pleased that the Saudi Arabians yesterday cut off relations with
the Taliban and that President Putin, in a strong statement to the world,
talked about cooperation that Russia and the United States will have in
combatting global terrorism,'' Bush said.

Bush is creating a coalition of strange bedfellows. Russia, Saudi Arabia,
Japan, Libya, Sudan and many more - all providing aid to the United States,
but helping themselves, too.

EDITOR'S NOTE: Ron Fournier has covered the White House and politics for The
Associated Press since 1993.

*******

#3
Boston Globe
30 September 2001
Fatalistic Russians embody the modern necessity of flight
While US passengers worry anew about security from hijackers, Russians worry
about altitude
By David Filipov
David Filipov is the Globe's Moscow bureau chief.

SOMEWHERE OVER WESTERN RUSSIA - The first time I got on a US-bound plane
after
the attacks on New York and Washington, a mustachioed security agent wanted
to inspect my newly purchased Harry Potter paperback. ''There might be
something concealed in it,'' he explained somewhat apologetically, as he
leafed through the pages.

The next time I got on a plane, a security agent asked me if I had anything
sharp with me. I voluntarily surrendered a small pair of scissors and a
''wine companion,'' a credit card-sized utility tool that contained a bottle
opener, a small knife, and a metal toothpick. But I got to keep my tweezers
and toenail clippers.

Times have truly changed when Harry Potter and my wine companion are seen as
the potential weapons of suspected hijackers.

Then again, I have a very personal reason to appreciate this new attention to
detail. My father was a passenger on American Airlines Flight 11, whose
passengers and crew, like those on the other three flights that were
commandeered on Sept. 11, were overpowered by
hijackers wielding razors, knives, and box-cutters.

It was nice to believe
that commercial flights might be a little bit safer now. On the other hand,
in my line of work (as a Moscow-based journalist) one has to fly frequently
to and from places where it is hard to believe that flying can ever be safe,
no matter what security precautions are taken. I had a chance to think about
that last week, while I was flying out of Moscow's Sheremetyevo Airport with
my 5-year-old son. This, after all, was the airport where a correspondent
once got on a plane by walking out on the tarmac and bribing the crew to let
him board. This was also the airport where a plane was forced to abort a
landing at the last minute because, the captain said, of ''an obstacle in the
runway.''

After the plane did an impromptu loop around the airport, the jet
was able to land, because the obstacle - a grazing cow - had moved on. And
then there was the time a correspondent was flying into Sheremetyevo from
Murmansk, where the two security agents operating the metal detector were so
engrossed by their glossy magazine that they never so much as looked up as
the computer, satellite phone, electric razor, and other gear went through.

That was on Sept. 10. Now, two weeks later, President Bush is interested in
putting armed air marshals on flights. Armed men similar to air marshals
routinely travel on Russian airlines, but that has not prevented hijackings
in recent years. They also travel on flights out of Ingushetia, the Russian
republic west of war-ravaged Chechnya. Those are the flights that have to
veer sharply to the west right after takeoff, to avoid becoming targets for
rebel fighters who have shot down Russian military helicopters flying along
the border.

Americans newly reluctant to fly might consider how, in the
former Soviet Union, getting where you need to go often requires suspension
of disbelief. All the security checks in the world cannot make a
fundamentally insecure thing secure. There are at least seven document checks
for passengers on the flight from Almaty, Kazakhstan, to Tashkent,
Uzbekistan. But that did not make the passengers feel any safer when they
could overhear the crew discussing with mechanics their doubts that the
rickety old Antonov commuter plane could make it over 20,000-foot peaks of
the Tien Shan mountains. The mechanics said ''no,'' but the crew decided to
try anyway.

We made it by flying low through mountain passes. Scenes such as
these give Russian air travel the bad name it deserves. But because of the
distances and the lack of good roads, people continue to fly in Russia and
the states of the former Soviet Union because there is no other way.

''Whatever happens, I will fly,'' said one passenger on the cow-in-the-runway
flight. ''If I hit cow, I hit cow. I am powerless to change it, and I must
fly.'' Perhaps a healthy dose of similar fatalism could help would-be
American passengers regain their confidence in flight. There is talk in the
United States about increasing the police presence in airports. It may be a
good idea, but it has its limits.

On a recent flight to Murmansk, a group of
Russian journalists decided to get drunk. One of them grabbed a woman
correspondent for a US newspaper as she walked by on the way to the restroom,
frightening and offending her before she was able to break free. After the
plane landed, the obviously inebriated journalist sauntered up to the woman
and began harassing her some more. She asked him to leave. When he refused to
do so, her male colleague repeated the request, which prompted the Russian to
punch him in the face.

A cop would have come in handy here, but airport
security at Murmansk was lax. A baggage attendant did suggest that the
bloodied correspondent go wash up.

*******

#4
The Russia Journal
September 28-October 4, 2001
The land and the law
By OTTO LATSIS

The State Duma has finally approved the new Land Code, passing it on the
third reading. Right-wing and centrist factions made the decision
assuredly, with a buffer of 31 votes above what was needed. The Communist
Party, meanwhile, called the event "an act of treason against Russia’s
national interests." But such hysterics, to which we have long become
accustomed, only serve as proof that left-wing resistance is pure propaganda.

The new Code has nothing to do with agricultural land, which will require a
separate law. Indeed, the Code only extends trading rights to some 2
percent of Russia’s territory. Its most significant impact will be on
industry, as it increases investors’ confidence, allowing them to own the
land on which their businesses are located.

But the most important arguments in favor of liberalizing land rights lie
not in the text of the law, but in the details of reality. The left warns
that, as soon as land sale is allowed, criminals and foreign capitalist
sharks will swallow our dear land. But such howls are simply amusing, if
only because, even without special laws, land is already bought and sold –
and not in small quantities.

One of the biggest estates in Russia, if not the biggest, covers 280,000
hectares of black-earth fields – somewhat larger than Luxembourg – and
belongs to the Stoilo Field Corporation. The company’s land, located in the
Belgorodskaya, Voronezhskaya and Tambovskaya oblasts, is one of the
country’s most important sources of wheat. It is impossible to imagine that
local peasants, who nominally own the land, could have created such an
enterprise. Their property is registered only as shares in a former
"kolkhoz," or collective farm. From the start of market reforms, they have
officially had the right to claim their portion and create private farms.
But most of them have neither the money, qualifications or desire to do so
and, as a result, they remain in their former collectives, now officially
transformed into "shareholding societies."

Stoilo Field Corp. was founded not by peasants, but by industrial magnate
Fyodor Klyuka, who owns a controlling stake in Stoilo Ore Mining and
Processing Combine. The Stoilo pit, one of the largest in Europe, is
located in Stary Oskol, on a deposit of the Kursk magnetic anomaly. It is
the chief supplier of iron ore to the Starooskolsky Electro-Metallurgic
Combine, built 30 years ago to make steel using German direct ore-reduction
technology. The massive amounts of electricity the plant requires are
supplied by the Kursk nuclear power plant.

The natural technological connections between the three industrial giants –
the mine, the metallurgical combine and the nuclear plant – proved to be
economically durable under market conditions. The Stoilo pit is profitable,
with reliable markets in Russia and abroad, and has reserves that will last
for centuries. And its primary owner went on to establish a gigantic
agricultural enterprise, motivated not by technological concepts but by
pure economics.

The money earned from the mine needs to be invested in a profitable and
forward-looking venture, particularly one that can be bought cheap. And a
businessman from Stary Oskol, located in the heart of Russia’s black-earth
region, with some of the richest land on the planet, knows where to look.

The collapse of the Soviet kolkhoz system threw agriculture into such a
crisis, that even farms in as fertile a region as the Balgorodskaya Oblast
fell deep into debt to banks and the government. They have the resources
neither to upgrade their equipment nor pay the farm workers. Klyuka
presented the farmers with a mutually beneficial proposal – create a
corporation, supplied with investment from Klyuko and with land from the
farmers’ old kolkhoz shares.

Signposts and ownerless debts are all that remain of the 65 collective
farms whose land was fed into Stoilo Field Corp. Klyuka got land for free,
plus already operating production systems and cheap labor. The peasants
probably haven’t considered the fact that if it wasn’t for the efforts of
their left-wing protectors, they would have been able to sell their land to
Klyuka for real money. Now, they’re content to have jobs and regular
salaries. And the governors of the three oblasts rest easier now that they
don’t have to worry about unprofitable farms.

The passage of the Land Code, clearly, is of tremendous political
importance. It is a symbol of irrevocable market reforms, even in a
relatively conservative sphere, where the forces of Communist retrenchment
seemed insurmountable. As far as everyday matters are concerned, they will
be decided by money and opportunities to turn a profit from a particular
business, as they always have been. The fact that farmland – at least in
the richest agricultural districts – has made it onto investors’ wish lists
is proof that a decade of reform has not been in vain.

******

#5
Los Angeles Times
30 September 2001
In Russia, an Honest Cop Finds Out the Truth Hurts
Police: In a culture of corruption, Vladimir Port's diary about the Chechen
war has earned him the label of traitor and is costing him his job.
By ROBYN DIXON, TIMES STAFF WRITER

CHERNUSHKA, Russia -- Vladimir Port is either that rarest of diamonds--an
honest Russian policeman--or a nut case, a traitor and a liar. It depends on
whom you talk to.

His face is as round and shiny as a rosy apple. He has an eager smile but sad
eyes that tell a story of lifelong naivete--his belief that his country is a
better place than it has actually turned out to be.

When the Soviet Union collapsed, the culture of corruption and dishonesty
among public officials transferred seamlessly to the new Russia--to such an
extent that the idea of an honest Russian policeman arouses reflexive mirth.
Port, along with others from the Perm region west of the Ural Mountains,
served in Chechnya last year as an Interior Ministry police volunteer. Now he
is being pushed out of his job as a lieutenant colonel because he published
his diary about what he saw in Russia's war against the separatist republic.

He is vilified as a traitor by the police command, but he has many
supporters, people who believe that citizens like Port are Russia's hope.

"These people give us knowledge. They tell us the truth. They write history,"
said Yevgeny Yermolayev, who served with Port in Chechnya.

"His honesty is paramount. I think he's incapable of taking a bribe," said
journalist Ivan Gurin, who first published Port's diary in a small regional
newspaper. The diary was later published in a national mass-circulation
daily, Komsomolskaya Pravda.

That Port is not considered a normal cop but a saint or a freak is testament
to the pervasive dishonesty and corruption of Russian officials. The
corruption creates expense and difficulty for Russian and Western businesses
and frustrates countless individuals who have to tangle with the bureaucracy.
There is little to show for many Kremlin promises to root out graft.

Few of the tens of thousands of Russians who served in Chechnya spoke out
about what they saw.

"What you see in Chechnya and what you see on television about Chechnya is as
different as earth and sky," Port said. "Let the people know the truth. My
father taught me from childhood that a bitter truth is better than a sweet
lie."

His father was a history teacher--and history in Soviet schools was as much
about lies and distortions as it was about the truth. But Port's father, an
ardent Communist, taught with the conviction of a true believer. Port loved
history and trained to be a history teacher in his far eastern hometown of
Khabarovsk.

But he ended up working as a fireman, later moving to Chernushka to work as a
fire inspector and then as a policeman.

Port's notes on Chechnya are not the most essential part of his personal
story. The question is what made this stubborn, emotional, compassionate man
so different from those who witnessed the same thing and worse but said
nothing.

His war diary contains no sensational allegations of wide-scale atrocities.
But the battered school notebook filled with neat, tightly written sloping
hand in blue pen is a compelling condemnation of war.

Its power lies in its rambling description of the mundane grind of war. His
stories of hardships, contradictory and sometimes idiotic orders, and the
ease with which Chechen rebels evaded the Russians touched a chord with
readers and enraged Russian Defense and Interior Ministry officials.

Port exposed the desperate and chaotic state of the Russian military. His men
had to find local business sponsors in Perm to buy enough ammunition and
supply food, warm hats, adequate clothing and sleeping gear for their Chechen
mission in winter and spring last year.

Port was horrified when Gen. Gennady Troshev, chief of the North Caucasus
military district, crudely told Port's commander that he and his men should
ignore regulations. He was frustrated when his men had to dig and re-dig
trenches to satisfy the whims of several generals.

Port and his men grieved when they heard the desperate radio calls of Perm
OMON special police troops whose column was ambushed in March 2000.
Forty-three were killed, including 11 who were taken prisoner and later
executed.

Port's view that more should have been done to save the men is shared by many
in the Perm Interior Ministry unit, yet he is despised there for going public.

Yermolayev believes that Port's diaries helped Russians understand the
cheapness of life in the military services.

But Konstantin Strogy, deputy chief of the Interior Ministry in Perm, claimed
that Port's diary was fantasy. He criticized Port as unstable, nervous,
ambitious and a liar.

Port never fit into the police culture, Strogy said.

"He's an alien, to a large extent," he said. "He's a self-obsessed coward and
a panic monger, a person who failed to realize his own potential."

Port is bitter about losing his job, but he feels no shame.

"It's always been a problem for us," said Oleg Kharaskin, the young, recently
elected head of the Chernushka town administration, who supports Port. "To
act in accordance with your conscience has always meant to damage your
career. And to act according to your career always meant to damage your
conscience."

Port was always out of the loop. Although other firefighters and police
worked the system, Port was stolidly unwilling or unable to do so and found
himself marooned in low-prestige positions.

"I've always told my wife, 'If only I was just a tiny bit more grasping, it
would be much easier to live,' " said Port, who has a son in the army and a
daughter to support.

But Tatyana Port fell in love with her husband because of his sense of
fairness and the fact that he was never afraid to tell the truth. In Soviet
times, it was often difficult to avoid lies. She recalled a student meeting
at which her husband and others were criticized for failing to attend a
compulsory rally to wave flags and cheer then-Soviet leader Leonid I.
Brezhnev.

In the Soviet Union, people coveted a khlebnoye position, derived from the
word for bread: a job that let you line your pockets with bribes or fees.

After the Soviet Union collapsed, the free market and privatization opened
new opportunities for corruption. For public officials whose salaries were
not paid on time, bribes were a means of survival.

In Soviet times, as now, there were two types of firefighters: those like
Port who risked their lives putting out fires, and inspectors who were
supposed to make sure that buildings met regulations--a khlebnoye position
because of bribes.

People never did, and still don't, think about the dishonesty involved in
accepting bribes, Port said. Fire inspectors could get their hands on
anything, and people approached them for favors.

"Of course people went to them. But I felt uncomfortable, and I still do. I
think you can do without sausage, rather than go to them," Port said.

The best guide to Port's honesty is his modest three-room apartment in a
shabby block. Among the basic Soviet-era furniture there's a humble 1980s
record player, a chunky digital alarm clock and an old Soviet iron.
Prominently displayed on a shelf are the plastic Soviet military models of
ships and planes he made with his son.

The surroundings declare that this is not a man on the take.

Port describes himself as a credible man, easy to deceive. "I really try to
trust people," he said.

After he transferred from Khabarovsk to Chernushka in 1988, he got a job as a
fire inspector responsible for collective farms.

"There were cases when they offered me meat. I took the meat, but I paid for
it. I knew I didn't need to pay. But you do it once, and then you know you'll
never stop. I didn't want to go down that path. No way," he said.

Gurin, the journalist, said Port donated the money he received from the
newspaper to families of the dead Perm OMON police.

"He's emotional. But that's a good thing. An indifferent person makes a bad
policeman," Gurin said. "He's the only man of that caliber I've ever met."

Port is disappointed and angry at being rejected as a policeman. Asked about
these feelings, he juts out his chin, swallows, refuses to gripe.

"OK, justice did not win out in my case, and it won't in the next and the
next after that. But in the fourth case it might win. I think there are more
good people in the world than bad," he said.

Dixon was recently on assignment in Chernushka.

******

#6
The Russia Journal
September 28-October 4, 2001
Soviets’ Afghan ordeal has lessons for U.S.
A personal look back at facing a fearsome enemy in Afghanistan
By VLADIMIR MUKHIN

As the U.S. military looks increasingly likely to mount an operation in
Afghanistan, the Soviet experience in the country can offer valuable
lessons for Washington’s generals and strategists.

My acquaintance with Afghanistan began in the late 1970s when I was
studying at the Tashkent General Military Command Academy. This was the
southernmost military academy in the Soviet Union, and it trained officers
spec-ifically to fight in mountainous and desert territory.

The Afghan war hadn’t yet begun, and our only knowledge of Afghanistan came
from our history and military geography textbooks and from the media. Our
first contact with the Afghans themselves came shortly after the April 1978
revolution in that country, when a group of Afghan officers arrived at our
academy.

First contact

We played soccer against them and we won, but I was struck by the energy
and passion they put into their game. I had the feeling then that a people
like this would be a serious opponent for their enemies. And I was soon
proved right. Later, I went to Afghanistan on several occasions as a
military journalist, and I realized just how futile it was to wage war
against the Afghans.

My brother Alexei, with whom I studied at the Tashkent military academy,
was killed in Afghanistan in 1981. We graduated in 1979 and were surprised
that almost all of us were sent to join units in the Turkestan military
district bordering Afghanistan. But six months later, when our troops
entered Afghanistan, we stopped being surprised.

At first, the Afghans saw us as liberators and met us with bread and
flowers. But that didn’t last long. During battles with the Mujahadin, our
tanks and artillery wiped out homes and villages, and the Afghan people
soon lost respect for us.

"The only way to beat the Mujahadin is cunning," Alexei said when we met
shortly before his death. "But even that doesn’t work for long because the
entire Afghan people are the Mujahadin. You can buy them, they’ll thank you
for the fuel you’ve siphoned off for them from your tank, and then, when
you’re on your way out of the village, they’ll calmly shoot you from behind
with a grenade launcher."

Alexei had received the Order of the Red Banner and served in intelligence,
but he didn’t boast about it. He was killed by a bullet from a World-War
II-era Soviet gun – shot in the back as he left a village that he knew well
and where he had friends. He had a week to go before his tour of duty in
Afghanistan ended.

"After 10 years of war, the Afghans are different: they know now how to
start up and steal an armored personnel carrier, how to shoot accurately
from large-caliber machine guns," said Roman Sudzhayev, who served in the
Afghan town of Hyraton in 1989, where I had been sent as a military
correspondent to cover the withdrawal of our forces.

The town was located just over the bridge from the Uzbek town of Termez. We
sat in a teahouse in the center of town, as the proprietor, Batyr, who
spoke Russian, poured the Soviet officers tea and also vodka served in
teapots. Shooting broke out in the streets, and the officers grabbed their
guns and scattered. Only Batyr paid no attention and kept filling the bowls
with tea. When I asked him why he wasn’t afraid, he said: "Everything is up
to Allah."

I next saw him several years later looking hunched and thin and selling
Chinese products at one of Moscow’s markets. He said he’d had to flee when
the Taliban forces occupied northern Afghanistan in 1995. The Taliban
hanged people they caught selling vodka. "Our life became even poorer,"
Batyr said. "I had to buy a passport in Termez and escape to Russia."

A hanging

Almost 150,000 other Afghans who supported Afghan Commu-nist leader
Najibullah also fled to the C.I.S. Najibullah was one of the first to be
hanged when the Taliban entered Kabul. There are 6 million Afghan emigrants
round the world, and all these people could potentially stand under the
flag of an anti-Taliban coalition, but the question is: how long would they
tolerate the presence of "outsiders" in their land?

"It’s hard to understand the Afghan mentality," said Vadim Solovyov, editor
of Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye (Independent Military Review) and an
Afghan war veteran. "They’ve been fighting for power for 10 years now. They
fought against Russia and they hold strong Muslim convictions. It’s hard to
say what divides them now, but I wouldn’t be surprised if they joined
forces if the Americans, God forbid, do begin a ground operation and get
bogged down in Afghanistan."

Solovyov said the Afghans are well-prepared for combat and are good at
guerrilla warfare tactics, including carrying out surprise attacks. He
noted that both the Taliban detachments and the Northern Alliance forces
are highly mobile, know their way around the mountainous territory, are
experts with mines and explosives and have good communications, including
satellite technology. They are also undemanding, disciplined and have an
excellent fighting spirit.

Impressive marchers

Afghan troops can march 70 km in just 24 hours, and a handful of Mujahadin
in good positions can hold out against a whole company. One of the Afghans’
most common tactics is to wear out their opponents. Regular army forces
trying to eliminate numerous and scattered guerrilla groups have to channel
tremendous means into the task.

"I don’t envy the Americans – the Mujahadin will show them something worse
than Vietnam," said Yevgeny Shve-tsov, a former special forces officer
seriously wounded in Afghanistan when Mujahadin fighters threw a grenade
into the cave where he was hiding.

Like Solovyov, Shvetsov believes that U.S. plans for military action in
Afghanistan won’t be effective. "It’s intelligence agencies that should be
fighting terrorists, not troops," Shvetsov said.

******

#7
From: "stanislav menshikov" <menschivok@globalxs.nl>
Subject: HOW WILL OIL PRICES AFFECT RUSSIA?
Date: Sat, 29 Sep 2001

"MOSCOW TRIBUNE", 28 September 2001
HOW WILL OIL PRICES AFFECT RUSSIA?
Geopolitics Should Not Take Precedence over War on Terror
By Stanislav Menshikov

The recession in the US has made world oil prices fall below the OPEC range
of $22-28 per barrel. How long this situation lasts depends upon a few
factors. The main immediate factor is reduced fuel demand by airlines,
which is thought to continue throughout the autumn. This should be
counter-balanced by some output reduction in OPEC countries. Even if their
formal decision is difficult to take for political reasons, the OPEC
mechanism should automatically adjust production schedules once prices dive
below a certain point. Also the fall in prices is due to unstable markets.
They first overreacted to assumptions of a coming big war in the Middle
East, then crashed when the war scare receded. But a military operation is
sure to follow leading to more expensive oil. The overall expectation is
that prices will largely stay within the OPEC range.

It is not surprising that these developments made some Russian economic
experts jittery. Andrei Illarionov, the president's advisor, for one,
expressed his concern that the government had not hedged against all
possible risks, including world recession, oil prices and currency
instability. But Mikhail Kasyanov, the Prime Minister, was more optimistic.
This year, he announced, the economy would rise at the sturdy rate of 5.5
percent, a full 2 percentage points higher than the government had
projected at the start of 2001. Next year growth could still be 4 percent
or better despite the danger signals coming from abroad. But he warned
against complacency in 2002, particularly as to the effect of oil prices on
the federal budget. And Alexei Kudrin, the Finance Minister, made it clear
that the situation would not affect Russia's payments on her external debt.

There are good reasons to side in this matter with the government. Indeed,
the effect of oil prices on the Russian economy has been largely overblown.
While oil and gas account for 40 to 50 percent of total exports, their
share in GDP is much smaller. When oil prices fall, they affect value, not
output and do not cause a slowdown in real economic growth. But because
export duties on fuel account for about 12 percent of federal revenues
lower oil and gas prices do affect the budget.

Why then is the government so calm despite the world recession? The reason
is that in the budget revenues are calculated on the assumption that oil
prices will average $22 per barrel, but spending is calculated assuming
prices are as low as $17. Whenever oil is above that minimum, the budget
yields a surplus. As of today, the surplus is projected at 178 billion
roubles ($6 billion). Most of external debts are provided for in the
regular appropriatrions. The surplus is used as a reserve for additional
needs.

Oil is also now in the news in a different, geopolitical context. When
presidents Bush and Putin reached their telephone agreement on the nature
and extent of Russia's participation in the anti-terrorist coalition, it
was assumed that the Afghani "Northern Alliance" would be actively
supported with a view of becoming part of the new government in Kabul.
Because Taleban sheltered Osama bin Laden and even made him
inspector-general of their army, it was a foregone conclusion that they
would have to go. Later in the week doubts on this point started emanating
out of Washington. Concerns were raised that removing Taleban would leave a
political vacuum favouring "some neighbouring countries", presumably
Russia, while the US would have to leave the fruits of its new victory to
others.

While the political future of Afghanistan is a tricky issue yet to be
decided, it is clear that geopolitics should not take precedence over the
war against terrorism. If regimes that harbour terrorism have to pay the
price, so let it be. Great powers may have different geopolitical interests
in the region but these should be reconciled as allies in a coalition
usually do. The issue of Afghanistan statehood is crucial. When a territory
is left to irresponsible forces whose interests are in conflict with those
of their nation the inevitable result is barbarism, disintegration and a
reign of terror.

There is also an oil aspect to this issue. When the Soviet Union left
Afghanistan and later fell apart plans were set for oil and gas pipelines
to be built across the country from former Soviet Central Asia all the way
to Pakistan's ports on the Arabian Sea. To make these projects feasible
political stability in the area was necessary, and it was assumed that
Taleban under the aegis of Pakistan would provide safety for the pipelines.
But Taleban was not able to perform that role. As the civil war continued,
nobody dared to touch the project. Today it could make all the difference
in providing economic stability to an impoverished country.

Fighting terrorism is not only making war. It is also making sure that the
basis is set for such a development that does not permit the roots of
terrorism to take hold. Economic development is part of the picture.

******

#8
EURASIA INSIGHT
September 29, 2001
EurasiaNet.org
THE WAR ON TERRORISM: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CAUCASUS
Richard Giragosian: 9/29/01

The still unfolding US campaign against global terrorism poses several
significant changes to the traditional geopolitical landscape, ranging from
a convergence of interests among the United States, Russia, Iran, and even
China, to a focus on Central Asia as a region of newly-enhanced strategic
importance. The implications are both profound and comprehensive, but their
potential for altering the situation in the Caucasus are striking.

The fragile states of the Caucasus now face a set of new challenges and
opportunities stemming from US efforts to create an anti-terrorism
coalition. Each of the region's three small states -- Armenia, Azerbaijan
and Georgia -- now face greater insecurity and increased vulnerability. Each
is particularly prone to the effects of a recasting of relations in the
region as a whole, and of changes in US-Russian relations in particular.
This is most evident in the apparent revision of the Western stance towards
Russian actions in Chechnya, granting Moscow much more of a free hand in its
military campaign there. Many in the region worry that US interest in the
Caucasus will wane, while Russian interest increases.

Until recently, the chief focus on the Caucasus concerned the development of
Caspian Basin energy resources. The United States was a big player,
advocating the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. Geopolitical tension over oil and gas,
as well as export routes, was on the rise this summer, underscored by Iran's
aggressive behavior in a dispute with Azerbaijan over Caspian boundaries.
This focus has now been overtaken by a greater pursuit of security and
stability, manifested in the global fight against terrorism. For the
Caucasus, this means a shift in the traditional geopolitical balance of the
regional powers -- Russia, Iran and Turkey. It also creates an immediate
challenge for each of the three small Caucasus states to chart a new course
in their foreign policy.

The shift of the geopolitical landscape, although global, is starkly evident
in the Caucasus. The United States, in seeking to forge a broad
anti-terrorism coalition, has explored new avenues of cooperation with both
Iran and Russia. These new avenues offer additional incentives for
coordination of regional energy development and transport. Such cooperation,
however, means the United States may have to make compromises on some energy
development positions.

For small landlocked Armenia, the regional shift offers an opportunity to
capitalize on its long-standing foreign policy of "complementarity," whereby
Armenia has sought to balance its expanding relations with Washington with
its dependence on Moscow and its necessity for relations with Tehran. As the
direction of the US campaign currently suggests a more dynamic partnership
with Russia, Armenia may also garner a stronger strategic importance.

These geopolitical realignments threaten to damage Azerbaijan, however.
Already, Baku has been hampered by the recent economic difficulties of its
closest regional ally, Turkey. Now, Azerbaijan's international importance,
derived mostly from its status as a potential Caspian oil and gas power,
could diminish, given the US preoccupation with security issues. Having
formulated foreign policy solely on the basis of global interest in its
Caspian resources, political leaders now may need to refine Azerbaijan's
image to retain international interest in the country's development.

Georgia faces the most serious challenge, and has the most to lose from new
geopolitical conditions. Tbilisi is in danger of entering a final, and
possibly fatal, stage as a "failed state." The realignment of Russian and US
interests in combating terrorism implies a more accepting view of Russian
actions in Chechnya, and suggests a renewed Russian determination to
maintain its military bases in Georgia. It also seems likely that Russian
cooperation in the US anti-terror campaign will result in increased Russian
pressure on the Shevardnadze government to adopt stronger measures to combat
the presence of Chechen rebel bases and supply lines within Georgian
territory.

The Chechen threat from Georgia, both real and exaggerated, will continue to
be used to justify a halt to the withdrawal of Russian forces from their
remaining bases in Georgia and will be used as political leverage over the
weakened Georgian government. The implications of this new war on terrorism,
therefore, herald pronounced change for the region, with their full outcome
yet to be determined.

Editor's Note: Richard Giragosian is a frequent commentator on
Caucasus-related issues. He served for nine years as a professional staff
member of the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress. He is also the
author of a monthly newsletter, "TransCaucasus: A Chronology," now in its
tenth year of consecutive monthly publications.

*******

#9
From: "James Hughes" <James.Hughes@IUE.it>
Subject: Russia-US Taboos
Date: Sun, 30 Sep 2001

Russia-US Taboos: A Comment on the 'Counter-Terrorism' Campaign
James Hughes
Senior Lecturer
London School of Economics
j.hughes@lse.ac.uk

[1] One of the fundamentals of the Bush agenda prior to 11 September was to
rid US foreign policy from international constraints and eschew
international cooperation where it did not conform to US national interests.
The current US preparations for military action against Islamic extremists
demonstrates the limits and dangers of isolationism. The US may enjoy a
global military superiority but it has a weak capacity to counter a
dispersed, highly motivated and fanatically committed enemy, that is small
in number but operates with immense popular support in the Islamic world,
which is well-funded, well supplied and well-trained in terrorist
operations, and of whom the US has poor and outdated intelligence. The US is
discovering the limits to its bid for global hegemony and learning the
lesson that to be effective in the international arena it must mobilise
international cooperation. The awkwardness of the Bush administration in
building an international coalition is illustrative of its instinctive
preference for unilateralism. The taboos of contemporary nationalism,
especially in Russia and the US, need to be confronted if we are to reach a
balanced judgement of current trends. Politicians and diplomats are
unwilling to do it, business is uninterested in doing it, and journalists
(with a few notable exceptions) are incapable of doing so. One of the
tragedies for the US is that over the last quarter century it has steadily
debilitated its academic reservoir of specialists in area political studies,
i.e. precisely those who could provide coherent insights into the politics
of a region such as Central Asia. Most US university-trained specialists in
politics are more concerned with 'elegant and parsimonious' rational choice
models than with understanding the social and cultural complexities of the
world.

[2] Any US military operation in Afghanistan would benefit immensely from
Russian cooperation, particularly, through the use of airspace, bases in
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, and the sharing of the much more accurate and
up-to-date Russian intelligence on Islamic extremist groups, and the
logistics of conducting military operations in Afghan terrain. Tactically,
Russia has little to offer since its military has performed so badly against
well-motivated guerrilla armies. The Russian government must balance the
potential gains against the very heavy costs that close co-operation with
the United States could entail.

[2] Many Russian politicians and commentators have drawn parallels between
the attacks on the World Trade Centre and the bombings in Moscow and other
Russian cities in September 1999, supposedly the handiwork of Chechen
'terrorists' (though there is some evidence that they may have been a
provocation by the FSB). Moscow has long accused Osama bin Laden of helping
Chechen guerrillas and called its wars there 'a struggle against
international terrorism'. Now Russia is demanding an end to 'double
standards in the fight against international terrorism'. In fact, the
images of the destruction of part of downtown New York pale beside those of
Grozny, the once modern capital of Chechnya, which has been devastated by
wanton Russian bombing and shelling. Russia's two wars against secessionist
Chechnya (1994-6, 1999-present) have killed and maimed tens of thousands,
obliterated much of the country's modern infrastructure, and driven about
half of its population (some 250,000-300,000 persons) into refugee camps. In
echoes of US conduct in Vietnam, the wars have been characterised by
wholesale human rights abuses by poorly disciplined Russian troops against
Chechen civilians, reckless use of military power, and the rejection of laws
of war. Russia's conduct in Chechnya borders on the genocidal, and indeed
has brought serious and sustained criticism from PACE, the OSCE and the EU.
Whereas, the Clinton administration likened Yeltsin to Lincoln, battling
against secession, and saw the wars as an 'internal' matter for Russia,
there was a significant policy change when Bush came to power. In the first
six months of his presidency Bush put a critique of Russia's conduct in the
Chechnya conflict at the centre of his Russia policy. The critique, however,
was downplayed somewhat after the summit in Slovenia earlier this summer,
as the US sought movement from Russia on a more crucial foreign policy goal
- consent for the US to abrogate the ABM treaty.

[3] Putin, demonstrating his diplomatic skills, has played on Western fears
and incoherence of policy on terrorism, and seizing on the opportunity
presented by the attacks in the US, has successfully impressed Western
leaders into a policy change on Chechnya. US Secretary of State Colin Powell
has reverted to the old Clintonesque formula that Chechnya is an 'internal'
affair for Russia. President Bush has now accepted the linkage between bin
Laden and Chechen resistance. Most significantly, Putinmania has infected
the European political class, much as Gorbymania in the late 1980s. German
Chancellor Gerhardt Schroeder, wooed by Putin's 'German' speech to the
Bundestag, has called for a 'more differentiated evaluation in world
opinion' of the Chechnya question, that is to say, a more understanding
approach to Russia's near genocidal actions. Even Putin has been stunned by
the suddenness of the policy shift on Chechnya, and by the new importance
attached to active partnership with Russia expressed by Western leaders. It
is no surprise, therefore, that Russia is seizing the moment to accelerate
its preparations for a major military offensive in Chechnya. Apart from the
open airspace for humanitarian missions and the shared intelligence Putin
has actually delivered very little in return for the new softer line on
Chechnya. The most important contribution that Russia has made to the US
preparations for an attack on Afghanistan is to consent to the Central Asian
states to open their air bases to the US. These bases will be crucial for US
military operations, assuming that the use of bases in Pakistan is
considered to be too much of a political and security risk.

Nevertheless, despite Putin's rhetoric, there are very strong reasons why
Russia would not serve its own national interest by becoming closely
involved with US-led military action in Afghanistan.

[4] Firstly, Russia is concerned about the surge of US unilateralism under
the Bush presidency. A US-led 'counter-terrorism' campaign may well further
consolidate US global hegemony. Together with France, Russia wants any
military action against 'terrorists' to be organised and applied under a UN
Security Council mandate. Internationalization of this kind does not serve
US interests for several reasons. It would constrain US action by
international law and norms, and most importantly, subject military and
other actions to the approval of the Security Council, which the US does not
control. It would demonstrate the political complexity of
'counterterrorism'. For example, Russia demands international support for
its war against the 'terrorists' in Chechnya. Significantly, the US dropped
references to the Chechen resistance from its global 'terrorism' list in
2000, a clear indication of a more positive US policy towards the Chechens.
Perhaps most significantly, however, internationalisation would mean that
the US would lose control not only of the campaign of coercion but also of
the very definition of the phenomenon and the targets.

[5] Secondly, Russia's geography makes it acutely sensitive to relations
with the Islamic world. Russia and the CIS share borders with fundamentalist
countries and could therefore become an easy target for radical Islamic
terrorists. Moreover, Russia's 20 million strong Moslem population, most of
which is territorially concentrated in the Volga and Caucasus regions, would
be alienated by support for indiscriminate attacks on Islamic countries
suspected of harbouring terrorists. Russia, already too weak to deal with a
few thousand highly motivated guerrillas in Chechnya, could not cope with
more widespread domestic unrest. Russia also has valuable trade relations
with countries such as Iraq and Libya, which may well become the targets of
US anti-terrorist attacks. Most importantly, Russia has no interest in a
US-led defeat of the Taliban that would result in the creation of a pro-West
puppet regime in Kabul. Since its military defeat in Afghanistan and forced
withdrawal in 1988, Russia has been actively supporting the northern ethnic
Tajiks and Uzbeks in Afghanistan's civil war (currently under the Northern
Alliance). Should the Taliban be defeated or thrown into disarray by a
US-led military campaign, it would inevitably intensify Russian-backed
military intervention in the north, which could potentially divide
Afghanistan into US and Russian zones of influence. In fact, the recent
offensive by the Northern Alliance suggests that some coordination of this
kind is already occurring. Concurrently, the Pashtuns of southern
Afghanistan and northern Pakistan are highly radicalised and militarised and
we can expect a destabilisation of the Taliban regime to create a surge of
anti-Western Islamic sentiment within Pakistan.

[6] Thirdly, Putin is evidently running ahead of his own inner cabinet and
senior military chiefs in his enthusiasm for cooperation with the West in
the expectation of concessions on issues such as the ABM Treaty, NATO
expansion, and WTO. Many in Russia's political and military establishment
will echo the views of Foreign Minister Sergei Ivanov and Chief of the
General Staff, General Anatoly Kvashnin, both of whom have forcefully
opposed any direct military cooperation with the US. After all, in Russia
bin Laden is viewed as a creature of the US. His terrorist network was
created, funded, trained, and supplied by the US republican administration
of Ronald Reagan (in which Bush snr played a leading role) as part of its
strategic goal of spoiling Soviet hegemony over Afghanistan after the
invasion of 1980. The bin Laden network has plagued Russia's security both
by stirring up Islamic extremism in Tajikistan and other Central Asian
states, and by radicalizing the war in Chechnya from 1999. In any event,
they will argue, presumably the US is well-versed in the command and control
infrastructure and equipment of bin Laden and Taliban forces since it was so
closely implicated in their provision, through its proxy in the region,
Pakistan.

[7] Fourthly, Russia is more concerned by the prospect of wider instability
in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, than in taking bin Laden 'Dead or Alive'. The
intricate arrangements of the 1997 peace agreement to end the civil war in
Tajikistan could well collapse. Two years of droughts have devastated the
country leaving it dependent on the drug trade from Afghanistan, which
supplies 80 percent of the heroin in Russia and Europe. Afghanistan is the
poorest country in the world, with at least three million persons dependent
on UN food aid. Conflict and sanctions against Afghanistan may disrupt the
drug trade, and even unseat the Taliban, but it will lead to a massive
refugee problem as the population flees en masse for safety and food across
borders. The southern frontiers of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are a timber
box of ethno-territorial rivalries infused with demographic pressures and
social changes that are waiting to explode into all-out ethnic war. A sudden
influx of radicalized ethnic Tajiks and Uzbeks from Afghanistan into the
southern frontiers of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan could well be the trigger
for a conflagration. Similarly, an outflow of defeated and disgruntled
Pashtuns from southern Afghanistan into Pakistan could well ignite a civil
war. The prospect of such developments will form the key elements of the
Russian decision calculus, which at root recognizes that Russia will have to
deal with the aftermath of a US-led attack long after the US has turned its
attention span elsewhere.

******

#10
Analysis: Crisis looms in Central Asia
By ARIEL COHEN

MOSCOW, Sept. 29 (UPI) -- The anti-terrorist coalition is learning just
how difficult the battle against the Taliban rulers in Afghanistan may be.

The command of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance announced Friday that
one of its commanders, Gen. Abdul Rashid Dostum, is stopping the offensive
against Mazari Sharif, a strategic town located northeast of the capital
Kabul, and that the offensive against the Afghan capital has been postponed.

This is only 24 hours after promises to take Kabul and, more importantly,
the air strip in Bagram, a key air base just north of the Afghan capital,
partially controlled by the anti-Taliban forces.

Still, the former head of operations of the Uzbek general staff, Col.
Shamil Gareyev said Thursday that Central Asian countries are "ideally
suited" for launching a military offensive against the Taliban.

He was echoed by Alexander Ramazanov, an Afghan vet officer who served
until recently with the 201st Russian division deployed in Tajikistan, who
believes Americans will have no problems operating from still-sturdy Soviet
era infrastructure in these remote and dusty lands.

"Americans may have a culture shock when the Russian technicians will
offer them warm vodka to drink, or the locals supply cannabis and heroin
dirt cheap," a Russian national security analyst here quipped. But this is
no laughing matter for U.S. planners who should realize that the troops may
face lack of regular facilities, clean potable water, and the home would be
12 time zones away.

Central Asian countries regularly battle outbursts of dysentery and
cholera, and even Russia wasn't spared this year.

Nevertheless, there is no geopolitical alternative for a Central Asian
deployment, Russian believe.

Vladimir Mukhin, a retired Soviet officer and a military commentator for
Nezavisimaya Gazeta here suggests that in addition to the large air base in
the Tajik capital Dushanbe, air fields in Parkhar, Kagaita near Termez in
Uzbekistan, and Mara, only 40 miles north of the Afghan border, may all be
used in the pending military offensive.

They are large enough to base jet attack aircraft, such as the Russian war
horse Sukhoi SU-25/SU-27, or receive heavy transport planes. The air bases
are also necessary to handle helicopters to ferry supplies to the Northern
Alliance units.

However, the military weakness of the Northern Alliance is looming large
and needs to be addressed. So is the pending humanitarian disaster, when
hundreds of thousands of refugees may flee the battle zones. This would
demonstrate to planners in Washington, Brussels and Moscow just how
difficult this battle would be.

Not since Vietnam, and possibly, World War II, have U.S. forces have faced
the terrain this harsh, and an environment so difficult to understand.

The U.S. military better learn, and learn fast, Russian experts warn. As
of now, the U.S. Armed Forces lack language skills and terrain familiarity,
and may need to rely on the Russians, the Uzbeks and the Tajiks, who have
had plenty of bitter experience in the region.

The Russians already have learned their lesson in the long and bloody war
in Afghanistan, which ended with the Soviet army withdrawal in 1989, and
they are in no mood to bog down again -- at least not with their own troops,
government officials and military experts here have told United Press
International.

According to the Russian NTV evening news, the leaders of the Northern
Alliance, which is militarily inferior to the Taliban forces in personnel
numbers, mobilization reserves, and fire power, are still saying they can
defeat the radical mullahs. However, they are now demanding that Russia and
the West furnish large amounts of arms, ammunition, money, medical supplies
and food.

Military experts in Moscow are also appraising the morale of the ethnic
Pashtun, fundamentalist Taliban as being higher than that of the
Northerners, who are primarily Tajik, Uzbek and Khazara.

Speaking at a celebration in Kabul, Mullah Mohammad Omar, the Taliban's
supreme leader, declared that his regime will not distinguish between
Afghanis who will are supported by American or Russian bayonets, and that
their fate will be the same -- death.

There are reports that Taliban's armed gangs are forcing tens of thousands
of youths, and young men, particularly Tajiks, into their military.

Omar called on Afghanis who left or are leaving their impoverished country
to go back to their homes. Central Asian republics and Iran are expecting
more than 150,000 refugees if the fighting spreads, and possibly many more
if the fighting is sustained over months.

These countries are poor and have no infrastructure to accommodate the
refugees. Health officials are already warning of epidemics due to lack of
potable water and malnutrition.

Tajikistan is stricken by the most severe drought in its history, and
according to the United Nations, up to one-third of its population is in at
least some danger of starvation.

The relief agencies may need thousands of tons of food flown in -- fast --
and the rest shipped by train from the ports on the Baltic and Black Sea, or
trucked across inhospitable and unsafe Kazakhstani steppes, probably in
protected convoys.

The first Eurasian battle of the 21st century is imminent - and may stay
with us for months, possibly years, to come.

(Editor's note: This is part one of two parts.)

Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., is research fellow in Russian and Eurasian studies at
the Heritage Foundation and the author of "Russian Imperialism: Development
and Crisis."

*******

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