[Second Issue of the Day]

#11
TITLE:
PRESS CONFERENCE WITH STATE DUMA COMMITTEE FOR DEFENSE
VICE CHAIR ALEXEI ARBATOV ON US-RF RELATIONS
[RIA NOVOSTI NEWS AGENCY, 11:05, SEPTEMBER 18, 2001]
SOURCE: FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE (http://www.fednews.ru/)

Moderator: Good morning. Alexei Georgiyevich Arbatov needs no
introductions. He is a leading specialist on Russian-American
relations. And because of the good turnout we foresee a lot of
questions Alexei Georgiyevich will make a brief introduction before
we go into questions and answers. The topic is the prospects of
Russian-American relations in the light of the recent tragic
events.

Arbatov: Thank you for coming. I understand that in the light
of what has happened it is a hectic time for all the journalists.
A lot of interviews are being given. So, it is very flattering that
you have found time to come here this morning.

In the sea of words, forecasts and assessments in Russia and
abroad I would like to draw your attention to one area that has not
received its due share of attention. It seems to me that the plans
of the United States regarding what to do are more or less
predictable. The strategy is clear. Of course, the technical
details and the tactical details are still unclear. These are
secret decisions that are being made at the Pentagon and the
National Security Council. But the overall strategy is more or less
clear.

Likewise, there is more clarity in the Russian position. There
is a consensus among the Russian political classes as to what
Russia's attitude should be. At least the government rhetoric
leaves little room for doubt.

But there is one other thing that is getting very little
attention. There is no doubt that the barbaric operation in New
York and Washington was carefully planned and took a long time to
prepare. Naturally, those who prepared it knew that the United
States would respond in a robust way, using the most modern weapons
excluding perhaps, mass destruction weapons.

It stands to reason that these people have given careful
thought to the next phase of the operation. They could not have
confined themselves to planning just the first series of terrorist
acts. Most definitely they have prepared another series of acts.
And they have stand-by plans for a series of actions in response to
the American strikes. And in line with the logic of escalation
these actions should be even more horrible than those carried out
at the first phase as an unprecedented provocation with regard to
the United States aimed at provoking the United States to some
tough actions.

I am not sure whether Washington and Moscow are giving enough
thought to this. Is the United States prepared well enough, not for
air-lifting troops to Southern Asia, but to ensuring its own
security and that of its allies at least against the next stage of
the escalation which, I suspect, has been prepared by those who
have conceived of this diabolical operation which reveals the
highest degree of such diabolical skills. Because it is only now
that all the aspects of this horrible tragedy are being revealed to
us, the aspects that were planned well in advance.

And the response of the terrorists to the strike of the United
States is what worries me much more than the immediate actions that
the US may launch in the region and the immediate position of the
Russian leadership. I would like to end my introductory remarks
there and I am ready to discuss with you the questions that you
care to raise.

Q: El Pais. What are the most probable Russian actions in this
context? At least elements of these actions. And what are the
possible targets of terrorists in Russia?

Arbatov: The consensus in Russia, as I see it, is as follows.
Total moral support of the United States. That's the first point.
Political support of American determination to make the struggle
against international terrorism the top priority of American
national security policy. That's the second element. And the third
element is an appeal to the United States not to resort to massive
strikes, to non-selective actions which are unjustified from the
moral point of view -- to avenge the death of thousands of innocent
people with the death of tens of thousands of other innocent people
is wrong, it is immoral. This is what we said when NATO was bombing
Yugoslavia. We said that to take revenge for the death of innocent
people in Kosovo by killing innocent people in Belgrade and other
places was immoral. It's the same here -- the actions should be
selective and precisely targeted, they should target the people
immediately involved in the preparation and execution of this
horrible plan.

It should also be targeted at those who may not have been
involved directly, but are obviously linked to the network of
international terrorism. As for Russian participation in this,
there is some lack of unity in the top echelons. It shows that the
lack of coordination that had reached a high degree under Yeltsin
has not been overcome, but nevertheless the consensus is that
Russia will not take part in American military actions at least not
until the United States officially asks Russia to contribute and
promises Russia that in this case the United States will not take
unilateral actions, that is, the actions of the United States will
be agreed with Russia. Since Russia makes available its bases and
air fields and perhaps even some technical means the United States
will in turn have to agree its actions with Russia. And Russia will
insist that these actions should be effective and selective and not
just symbolic and token.

I would also add one other thing which I do not see in the
official Russian position. Namely, if Russia becomes directly
involved in these operations, Russia should get guarantees of its
own security from the United States because Russia is far more
vulnerable to terrorist strikes than the United States because of
geographic, political, economic and other reasons. If Russia joins
the US and becomes a target for terrorists, no matter what forms
their activities take, then Russia will have every right to seek US
obligation to ensure its security. Otherwise these relations will
not work.

If for example, in reply for Russia's agreement to participate
in US operations, a massive attack is launched against our 201st
Division in Tajikistan or our border troops, we will demand that
the US give us direct military support.

Q: Article 5.

Arbatov: Basically, we will have to develop allied relations
in one form or another, at least for the duration of the
separation, that will require both countries to assume reciprocal
obligations to ensure each other's security. Nothing like this has
so far been offered to Russia by the United States. The US expects
support from Russia but thinks that this support should have the
form of carte blanche. In other words, the US will decide what it
should do, and Russia will have to automatically give it every
support.
I am afraid that such relations will not develop between our
countries. If the US sticks to this position, Russia will provide
moral support and big political support, but nothing else that goes
beyond this framework.

Q: CNN. Last year Russia threatened to take its own military
action against the Taliban. However, it decided against it. But if
Russia has once threatened to do this, why can't it participate
now, since they have done it and are threatening now?

Arbatov: Gil, there is strong logic in your question. The
difference is that back then Russia threatened to take this action
in response to very close ties between the Taliban and the armed
opposition in Chechnya and the North Caucasus in general. So,
Russia, seeking to reduce this support, directed its threats
against the Taliban. The Taliban responded to these threats the
same way it is responding now to the US threats, that if something
happens, they will take such action against Russia that will cause
it a lot of damage.

I understand that Russia has drifted away from this position
very quickly. You may remember that in the West, including the US,
the reaction to these statements was quite negative. At that time
the US and the West did not support Russia's threats, although
Russia did not demand any help from the West. But the West gave
Russia neither moral nor political support.

If we call things by their proper names, I assume that Russia
simply fears, or to use professional language, worries about a
response from the Taliban that may cause a lot of trouble and
damage to Russian citizens, facilities and enterprises in Central
Asia and in the Caucasus, as well as in Russia itself. We are
simply not ready to open the second front. We are quite busy with
Chechnya and everything related to it. You have seen the latest
events.

According to our leadership, the war is over but fighting is
going on there. Russia was not prepared to open the second front
against the Taliban at that time, and it fears to do it now. This
explains the big conditions I have mentioned above, on which Russia
could join the US in practical measures against terrorists.

We have to understand that anti-terrorist actions, if we leave
out law enforcement agencies and special services, mean actions
against a certain country because the armed forces cannot act
against some abstract organizations or safe houses. Armed forces
always act against a certain country on the territory of which
there are certain targets that may be hit.

In this connection, it is not incidental that the US position
changed at lightning speed in a matter of days from threats to
international terrorism and bin Laden to threats to the Taliban,
because the Taliban, no matter what you think about them, and I
personally think very badly of them, irrespective of these
assessments, the Taliban is something at which military strikes may
be directed. But terrorists, that's where arrests may be made, but
not strikes delivered.

So, Russia finds itself in a very difficult situation because
Afghanistan is a very unstable neighbor. Its instability spills
into Central Asia and the Caucasus. Of course, it's not an
agreement that has been reached but may be some sort of unofficial
modus vivendi with the Taliban: as long as the Taliban do not act
directly against Russia in Central Asia, do not cross into
Tajikistan, do not attack our border guards and the 201st Division,
do not carry out terrorist acts in Russia itself and limit
themselves only to cooperation with Maskhadov's armed rebels,
Russia will not deliver strikes on the Taliban.

What happened in the past week, puts everything upside down
and makes Russia face a very difficult choice. This explains why
Russia does not rule out its practical participation in the US
operation at the military level -- unlike some of our high-ranking
officials in the Defense Ministry, I cannot rule out Russia's
participation in these operations and the provision by Russia of
not only information but some of its material resources as well.
However, if this happened, this would be conditioned on very
serious terms.

Q: Are these terms being negotiated now? Do you know if there
is any discussion of the terms on which Russia could participate in
some military action against Afghanistan? And my second question.
Much can be gained and much can be lost in the situation. The
scenario you have described leads to Russia's admission to NATO.Is
this possible?

Arbatov: As for negotiations on terms, I hope yes. The visit
by Under Secretary of State Bolton will apparently be devoted to a
preliminary discussion of these possible terms. It would be strange
if this was not discussed.

To ensure the success of the US operation against the Taliban
-- let's put it this way - in Afghanistan, its effectiveness will
largely depend on the position of Russia, both directly through its
participation and indirectly through Russia's influence on such
neighboring countries as Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and
Iran. In this sense, it would be strange if no such negotiations
were conducted.

As for NATO, it's a much broader and long-term question. If
the US reaches an agreement with its allies or decides to transform
NATO into an international organization to fight international
terrorism -- NATO has been looking for a new purpose all these
years and could not find it. So, if it finds this purpose finally,
which will presuppose a radical transformation of NATO in all
respects, then Russia's direct membership in such organization
could be considered. Actually, it will be even strange if Russia,
which is most vulnerable of all major countries to international
terrorism, stayed away from such an organization.

Q: So, you think that the US will strike back anyway, be it a
massive or pinpoint strike, even if bin Laden were extradited to
the US by the Taliban, which I think is quite unlikely.

Arbatov: Some inconclusive reports were heard to the effect
that there may be handover, that something along these lines may
happen. But I don't think that the issue can be closed, in
substance or from the political point of view, by the handover of
bin Laden. The handover of one person and the start of
investigation into the case of bin Laden is disproportionate to the
events that changed the entire international situation, namely, the
enormous tragedies.

I think strikes will be delivered in any case if only because
the extradition of bin Laden does not solve the issue. In place of
one bin Laden there will come ten bin Ladens. And without
liquidating the infrastructure of international terrorism, at least
starting from the territory of Afghanistan, this issue cannot be
solved. Imagine that bin Laden is extradited. They will then start
hijacking planes, killing people, taking hostages demanding that
bin Laden be released. It will mark a new phase of this terrible
saga.

So, strikes will be delivered in any case. How do I see the
strategy of the United States? It will not be a one-off action as
in the case of Afghanistan and Sudan in response to the explosions
of American embassies. Most probably it will be a prolonged
campaign of strikes not only on terrorist targets in Afghanistan,
but also on the Taliban forces and targets. Such a campaign can be
fairly effective because the terrain favors air raids on ammunition
dumps and bases and after several months of such a campaign the
Taliban may emerge greatly weakened and may switch to guerrilla
warfare. Then the Northern Alliance will gain a huge advantage over
them. If they manage to find a replacement for Ahmad Shah Massood,
the Northern Alliance may regain all or the largest part of the
territory of Afghanistan and take it under control.

Simultaneously, pressure in Pakistan cuts the Taliban off from
supplies across the Pakistani border and from weapons and from the
training camps where Pakistani and other instructors were training
the Taliban and deprives the Taliban of air support. It is no
secret that the Taliban fought the Northern Alliance enjoying air
support of the Pakistani air force. This is one reason why such
actions were by and large so successful. The Taliban will be
deprived of much of what they had before and will most probably
suffer a defeat. But of course it is a very risky thing to make
forecasts for that part of the world. But given a favorable
attitude on the part of Iran and stepped-up actions of the Northern
Alliance the Taliban can be defeated.

Moderator: According to our chiefs of security services, they
have repeatedly warned the Americans and their Western allies about
the terrorist acts that were being planned. But they said that the
Americans took these warnings lightly. You know the Americans well.
How do you account for such reaction? Is it due to the American
character or mistrust of the information coming from our special
services?

Arbatov: It's both. It's partly due to arrogance and
confidence of its superior force and invulnerability. But it is on
the other hand common practice because a lot of diverse information
keeps flowing in, including warnings about actions being prepared.
And, like in the fable about crying wolf, people gradually get used
to such false alarms and when it happens in reality people turn out
to be unprepared. Think about history when for decades there were
numerous warnings about an imminent attack and eventually when the
attack came it caught even large states by surprise.

Q: Regarding ABM and all this debate, Russia says that the
developments will take the edge off this discussion. And there is
some talk of this in the United States already. And the people I
have talked to say that on the contrary, that desire of the United
States will be strengthened because the Americans are thinking
about any ways of defending their country. What do you think about
this argument?

Arbatov: Well, attention is now focused on other things. But
very soon the question will back on the agenda and I think support
for NMD will grow in the United States, although it has been broad
enough anyway. Why? First, one cannot be sure that terrorists will
not acquire some missiles which can inflict terrible damage even
without the use of mass destruction weapons as the use of hijacked
planes has demonstrated. But this is not the most important
factory. More important is the fact that the strikes on terrorists
if they persist in their actions will be aimed at certain countries
which harbor terrorists and give them support. And there is more
probability that these countries have ballistic missiles, including
missiles carrying mass destruction weapons.

In that case these countries which possess such weapons will
have acquired a deterrent potential in relations with the United
States. In order to reserve the right to deliver retaliation
strikes the United States will need an anti-missile defense system
that could neutralize the threat from a small quantity of ballistic
missiles that may fall into the hands of countries which offer
their territories for the actions of terrorists.

Previously this was not an obvious scenario. The options
discussed spoke about a direct clash. For example, Iraq once again
attacks Kuwait or Saudi Arabia and the United States steps in and
it needs it anti-missile defense to counter the missiles that Iraq
may have. Now the link is a little more complicated. It is now
focussed on the struggle against international terrorism.
Nevertheless, ballistic missiles are part of the equation and
accordingly, anti-missile defense. The only difference is as
follows.

Up until now everyone assumed that citing rogue states as a
justification for anti-missile defense was a pretext and not the
real goal of the NMD program. In the foreseeable future the real
target of the NMD program is China and the Chinese strategic forces
and it is against them that the United States is trying to protect
itself. And subsequently it may also be against Russia if the
program acquires a great scale and proves to be technically
effective and Russia continues unilateral reductions of its
strategic forces.

Now it seems to me that this program will be targeted mainly
not against China or Russia, but against rogue states or any
countries that may give support to international terrorism and
simultaneously have its missile programs and mass destruction
weapons programs.

Q: Can Russia help by sharing its experience of the war in
Afghanistan, its knowledge in the terrain?

Arbatov: Definitely so. In such cases I should say that
negative experience may be more useful than positive experience.
And the experience of Russian failures and setbacks in Afghanistan
could be invaluable to the US in planning its operation, maybe even
more so than the experience of success, the knowledge of terrain,
connections with various groups in Afghanistan, or intelligence. As
a minimum, Russia's experience in Afghanistan already has big
influence on the US because the US is not planning, and I am
convinced that it will never plan, a deployment of a large
contingent of ground forces there in order to occupy and hold the
territory of Afghanistan. So, the experience of the Soviet Union is
already playing a big role for the US.

If it is planning to use some other armed forces and fighting
services besides aircraft and missiles, it will most likely be
one-time special operations, perhaps, involving paratroopers or
crack units, but anyway, these operations will pursue very specific
goals and evacuation rather than to seize and hold certain
facilities.

Q: Some Russian politicians have put Georgia on the list of
pariah states that harbor terrorists. Not so long ago Nemtsov and
Shuster said that Georgia harbors terrorists and does not extradite
them, and if it does not extradite them, Russia can act on this
territory as it sees fit, cross the border and destroy them or
something like that.

The Taliban has been asked to extradite bin Laden or somebody
else, Georgia has been asked to extradite Gelayev or I don't know
who else they mean. If the Taliban does not extradite bin Laden,
America will bomb Afghanistan, and if Georgia does not extradite
Gelayev, so Russia will bomb Georgia, or how should we understand
this, in your view?

Arbatov: We made and make complaints about the Georgian
leadership regarding what is happening in Georgia, particularly in
the Pankisi Gorge. I have recently visited these places myself,
actually last May, and there are camps and bases there where
militants who are fighting in Chechnya can rest. But I think that
such statements --

First of all, it's formal logic that can never be used in
international relations. There are no such rules. Second, these are
musings, but not an official position of Russia. I do not even
allow a thought that Russia can deliver strikes on Georgia just
because the US will be distracted by its operations in Afghanistan.

As for the pressure on Georgia, yes, it may increase. But we
should understand that Georgia's position regarding what is
happening in the region is underlain by two things. First, Georgia
can't do anything about this because it has no sufficient
resources. And this is quite explainable. If the Russian army has
so far been unable to stabilize Chechnya, what can we expect from
the Georgian army, which is much weaker, in these hard-to-access
mountainous areas? Second, Georgia is not eager to open another
front in the North as it already has Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

By the way, we know that Georgia is very displeased with
Russia's position with regard to these unresolved conflicts,
especially in Abkhazia. So, Georgia has its own reasons for being
dissatisfied. So, it would be wrong to draw such an analogy.
Secondly, it's very unlikely.

Moderator: Any more questions? If there are no more questions,
let's ...

Arbatov: Many people but few questions.

Moderator: Apparently, you have explained everything very
clearly. Thank you very much.

 
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