September 7, 2001

This Date's Issues:   5429 • 5430                           Under Construction

Johnson's Russia List
#5430
7 September 2001
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. AP: Putin: Chechen Peace Talks Possible.
2. AFP: Putin calls on North Caucasians to support Russian state.
3. Evening Standard (UK): James Hansam, Russian bear wakes from hibernation.
4. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: Kerstin Holm, Corruption Everywhere.
5. Nezavisimaya Gazeta: Leonid Barinov, MORE THAN JUST CRIME. Corruption has grown into a threat to Russia's national interests.
6. Constantine Dmitriev: Tourism in Russia: What Went Wrong?
7. Peter Lavelle: Untimely Thoughts - Majestic Putin (re political culture)
8. Los Angeles Times: Robin Wright, No Deadline for Accord With Russia. Defense: Putin's visit to Texas in November shouldn't be seen as "make or break" for negotiations on the ABM treaty, Powell says.
9. stratfor.com: Russian Oil May Be Under Attack.
10. allnews.ru: Gazprom Is Going Into Default.
11. allnews.ru: Russian Writer Accused Of Terrorism. (Eduard Limonov)
12. Obschaya Gazeta: Yekaterina Mikhailova, SPECIAL PLACE FOR CITIZENS.
President will monitor construction of civil society. Civil society can't be created by presidential decree.
13. Rossiiskaya Gazeta: Albert Valentinov, WHO WILL HEAD RUSSIAN ACADEMY
OF SCIENCES?
14. Reuters: EU ministers to ponder security ties with Russia.]

*******

#1
Putin: Chechen Peace Talks Possible
September 7, 2001
By VLADIMIR ISACHENKOV

MOSCOW (AP) - In a sharp about-turn, President Vladimir Putin said Friday
that Moscow may hold peace talks with the Chechen rebel leader on condition
he gives up the breakaway region's 10-year-old independence bid and disarms
all militants.

``Talks are always better than actions involving the use of force,'' Putin
said in the southern city of Kislovodsk where he was conferring with
regional officials on the situation around Chechnya.

Until now, the Kremlin has angrily dismissed criticism of the war from
Western governments and international human rights groups that called for
peace talks. Putin has continually said that the military campaign must go
on until all rebels are crushed.

Referring to a proposal by liberal lawmaker Boris Nemtsov to hold talks
with Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov, Putin said that ``we are ready for
contacts with anyone,'' adding that preconditions for such talks would be
Chechnya accepting federal rule, disarming all the rebels and surrendering
``the most notorious field commanders, whose arms are elbow-deep in the
blood of the Russian people.''

He then added with irritation that he expects Nemtsov to ensure that the
rebels meet these conditions within no more than three months, or resign as
a lawmaker.

``A month, two or three - it makes no sense to wait any longer because any
activities in this direction would then be pointless,'' Putin said in
remarks broadcast by Russian television channels.

Nemtsov, who recently traveled to Chechnya, said it was up to the Kremlin
to launch the talks.

``I think it's excellent that the president agrees that it's necessary to
hold talks,'' he told NTV television. ``Now it's necessary to move from
words to action, name a presidential representative in charge of that and
determine the conditions and time frame.''

Moscow never recognized the rebels' Sept. 6, 1991, declaration of
independence but had to withdraw its forces from the region after suffering
a humiliating defeat in the first, 1994-96 war with separatists, which left
Chechnya running its own affairs.

Moscow sent troops back into Chechnya in fall 1999 after rebels raided a
neighboring region and after apartment house explosions in Russian cities
that officials blamed on the rebels.

*******

#2
Putin calls on North Caucasians to support Russian state

MOSCOW, Sept 7 (AFP) -
Russia's President Vladimir Putin called on inhabitants of the North
Caucasus Friday to support the Russian state and bring an end to years of
conflict and confrontation with the central government in Moscow.

Putin, waging a bloody war for nearly two years in separatist Chechnya,
told a group of regional leaders from southern Russia in the neighbouring
republic of Kabardino-Balkaria that the time had come to build a peaceful
region.

"We have to get away from the conception of the North Caucasus as
permanently associated with conflict and confrontation. I am confident that
this can be done. Kabardino-Balkaria illustrates this," he said.

"The time for the protest democracy of the 1990s has gone and we must
proceed to developing the state," Putin told the meeting in Kislovodsk,
quoted by Russian news agencies.

The Russian president also said that unless more Chechens could be
persuaded to join Russian law enforcement agencies which are fighting the
separatist rebels and have been accused of widespread abuses against
civilians, unrest in the breakaway republic would not die down.

"What are we going to build in Chechnya? Will we build and then tomorrow
bomb and again destroy?," he said.

"It is clear that we won't achieve anything unless we give the Chechen
people the chance to work in law enforcement bodies and security services,"
Putin said.

He asserted that seven gubernatorial elections to be held in the region in
2002 would be a serious test for both the North Caucasus and Russia.

In Chechnya "people have emerged for whom the interests of the population
are the first priority and who are not afraid of becoming targets of
bandits," the president added.

Pro-independence guerrillas in Chechnya have assassinated dozens of
Chechens working for the pro-Moscow administration and police, branding
them as traitors.

Putin reaffirmed his hardline refusal to hold peace talks with the Chechen
rebel leader Aslan Maskhadov, who was elected as president of the
separatist republic in 1996 in a poll overseen by the OSCE, a pan-European
security body.

He said negotiations could only take place if the Chechen guerrillas
accepted Russian sovereignty and after "the surrender of weapons by all
bandit formations and the handover of particularly odious bandits ... who
have Russian blood on their hands."

A liberal Russian member of parliament, Boris Nemtsov, has suggested peace
talks with Maskhadov to end the protacted guerrilla war, which claims
Russian soldiers' lives every day.

Putin arrived in Kabardino-Balkaria on Thursday, seen as an anniversary of
independence for separatist Chechens.

On September 6, 1991, militiamen loyal to Dzokhar Dudayev, who became the
first breakaway president in Chechnya, stormed the Supreme Soviet, one of
the main organs of Soviet power.

*******

#3
Evening Standard (UK)
7 September 2001
Russian bear wakes from hibernation
by James Hansam, in Moscow

RUSSIA is defying the US-led economic gloom with some unusually impressive
statistics. In August, the Kremlin announced zero monthly inflation in an
economy only recently ridiculed by Western pundits as a basket case. Real
wages rose 5.4% and there was a trade surplus of £26bn in the first seven
months of this year. Anecdotal evidence suggests the country - which
suffered catastrophe three years ago with the collapse of the rouble - is
achieving surprising buoyancy under the stern guidance of KGB
spy-turned-President Vladimir Putin.

For example, British-based serviced offices provider Regus is planning to
double capacity in St Petersburg and increase the number of work stations
at its Moscow operation from 500 to 850.

Moscow has recently been operating at 90% capacity, well above
international averages and, significantly for Regus, some 50% of its
clients in the capital are Russian companies.

But Russia is also seeing more foreign business interest than at any time
since the financial crash, which sparked a mass exodus. In March,
engineering multinational John Brown - with links to Russia since the 1860s
- returned, its new office headed by Gerry Preskey, one of Britain's most
experienced business expats in Moscow. His recent forecast of huge oil
profits stimulating the rest of the sleeping-bear economy has excited
Russian commentators.

'People in the West - in America or England - say It'll never happen. They
don't believe that good things can happen here,' he said. 'But I've been
here for 30 years, I know what's going on. Things will get much better
within the next three to five years and the Russian people deserve it.'

However, Russia has so far conspicuously failed to attract the level of
Western investment that its supporters say it should. Many blame the litany
of obstinate Russian afflictions such as poor legal guarantees and corrupt
judges, bribe-taking officials, money-laundering, asset-stripping and the
power of mafia rings. The upturn could give a 'boost to the shadow sector'
- the still-huge black market - according to State statistics chairman
Vladimir Sokolin.

Inflation, too, is expected to rise again after a seasonal drop, with a
forecast annual rate of 19%. Yet that is still half the figure of two years
ago and much lower than in the days of spiralling prices in the aftermath
of the collapse of the USSR. In reality, too, Russia has little insulation
against a serious world downturn, should it come.

Despite this, major financial reforms have been implemented reducing tax
evasion and improving the transparency of sales of State assets. Spending
by the State, too, is coming under tighter control.

'For the second year in a row our expenses have been smaller than our
revenues,' said Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin. 'We are not building
pyramids and there should be no defaults.''

For once, Russia can look at the world with more optimism.

********

#4
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
September 6, 2001
Corruption Everywhere
By Kerstin Holm

Whenever anyone in the West considers corruption, they usually conjure up
images of murky deals in the upper echelons of public institutions. Typical
kind of things that come to mind are the disbursement of subsidies in
Brussels, the silencing of state prosecutors or the allocation of building
permits -- a classic example of corruption that almost always proves
lucrative.

The average Western citizen, however, is not really exposed to corruption
in his or her everyday life. This sense of distance is underpinned by the
existence of an independent judiciary, laws demanding procedural
transparency and an independent and aggressive media. People in the West
rest relatively secure in the knowledge that the abuse of public office
will probably be exposed and prosecuted. For most of us, corruption is
clearly definable, both legally and socially. So while we cannot stop it
from happening, it does tend to be a controllable phenomenon.

In Russia, however, corruption is a different matter. Here, the experience
of what we call corruption is universal and omnipresent. It exists
everywhere and has neither a beginning nor an end. A university lecturer in
the provincial town of Ivanovo was quoted in a sociological study as
saying: "If one accepts the Western view of corruption, then by definition
we have no economy but corruption." Sociologist Lev Timofeyev of the
liberal arts university RGGU has devoted several volumes to the study of
Russia's "shadow systems," expounding in detail on their myriad forms and
their enormous power in various sectors of Russian society.

The Russian Orthodox Church, which has made headlines with the tax breaks
it receives for wholesaling in cigarettes, alcohol, chicken legs and oil,
provides an instructive example. Sociologists examining the church focused
in particular on the lower end of the hierarchy, namely, the poor rural
parishes.

Russia's churches depend almost exclusively on donations from the faithful.
The parishes earn money from the sale of candles and from charging for
services such as christenings, marriages, consecration services and
funerals. In theory, a percentage of the money earned is passed up to the
next level of the church hierarchy -- the bishop -- and from there to the
patriarch in Moscow. In reality, though, very few parishes transfer the
money higher up or do so only partially. The upper clergy, who generally
are better off anyway, tend not to exert too much pressure on the parish
priests.

The priests, for their part, protect themselves by keeping "double
accounts," for example, understating their income from the sale of candles
and exaggerating the amount spent on restoring buildings, for example. The
priests, who are the main agents in the ecclesiastical economy, thus pocket
the money collected for christenings and memorial services.

The situation of the average priest presents an extreme example of the
psychological dilemma facing all Russian workers who are not civil
servants. They are under moral pressure to appear as selfless as orthodox
culture and public myth demand. At the same time, they must support a vast
administrative apparatus that deems itself a kind of semisacred institution.

A village priest quoted by Timofeyev outlined the dilemma this way: "A
country priest is supposed to be a role model for the members of his
parish, but their donations form the basis of his existence. Nevertheless,
I am forced to cover up my consecration services. I have to enter lower
sums in the accounts and deceive my bishop. All that pains me spiritually."

Mankind has probably always been disgusted by its own avarice. And all
cultures have probably developed techniques to control man's greed with
varying -- usually modest -- degrees of success. In this sense, Russia is
no exception.

In prerevolutionary Russia, the laws governing private ownership and
personal freedoms were rather wanting from the perspective of the rest of
Europe. As though to make up for that defect, 20th-century Russia put
itself through an unheard-of shock therapy to rid the country of the
disease of avarice. However, it turned out that the ideological nourishment
provided by communism was not enough. The first loosening of the laws that
banned personal enrichment came as early as 1921 with the introduction of
Lenin's New Economic Policy. For some eight years, small-scale trade and
entrepreneurial activity were legalized again so as to prevent economic
collapse

Even then, the demons that reared their heads in this period showed a
distorted face after the years of banishment. Fencers and fraudulent
companies flourished as the rest of the economy remained otherwise based on
requisitions. These people were of a criminal bent and out to make
short-term profits. As a result, not a few of those who were humiliated and
cheated were happy when Stalin swept these people away again.

The bloody climax of Stalinism was the carpet bombing of selfishness by
means of state sanctions. And yet self-aggrandizement sought and found
niches beyond the eagle eye of total surveillance. At high risk to
themselves, workers often stole from the factories, the farmers from the
collective farms and nursing staff from the hospitals. People learned to
privatize parts of the all-encompassing collective property. The black
market and bribery, which flourished even under Stalinism, not only saved
individuals, they also saved the state economy, which could not have
survived without them. In addition to the abundant supplies of forced
laborers, coal and oil, the Soviet empire was propped up by corruption as
well.

Following the death of Stalin, the engineers of mankind began to reduce the
doses of their medicine -- the terror -- because they recognized its
destructive side-effects. It looked as if the virus of selfishness had been
dealt a sufficiently mortal blow. All they had to do now, it seemed, was to
allow the organism of society, which had been weakened by the preceding
maltreatment, to regenerate itself, whereupon it would be able to deal with
the weakened remains of the virus on its own.

Reformers from Aleksei Kosygin to Mikhail Gorbachev injected the
convalescent with small amounts of selfishness cells to strengthen the
country. The dosage had been tested to see how much the state economy could
bear. But despite enviable physical resources, the patient did not achieve
the desired level of vitality. Believing that the competitive drive was
unbroken, the doctors gave in and applied conventional therapy.

Russia's much-touted process of making the transition to a "normal country"
is reflected in the adoption of the fundamental juridical myth of
selfishness -- the right to private property -- which has been granted
constitutional protection, as have a range of economic and political
freedoms. Most state enterprises are now private companies. That is true
for restaurants and hairdressers, but also for car factories, construction
companies and much of the media. Apart from the gas industry, all major
producers of strategic raw materials have been floated on the stock market,
as have the sacred cows of Soviet agriculture: the collective farms.

True, this privatization process is often only cosmetic in nature. Business
leaders in Russia usually have strong connections to the state. The
captains of industries specializing in processing raw materials have close
ties to national leaders, as do hotel and supermarket chains with municipal
administrations and agricultural operations with regional authorities.

In the wake of this "normalization" process, Russia's citizens have seen
income differentials soar above those in western Europe; they now lie
somewhere between those in the United States and developing countries. At
the same time, the comparatively moderate forms of "western" corruption
practiced in Soviet times, such as the transfer of large sums of money to
the bureaucratic elite and the conclusion of lucrative business deals, have
thrown up incidents of astonishing excess. It can be explained by the
absence of any commitment to transparency within the state apparatus and
large companies, by an extensive lack of independent reporting and the
nonexistence of an independent judiciary.

As Russia was normalized, its economic basis did not develop as expected.
State spoon-feeding has enabled the entire social organism to reproduce
itself at a very basic level, but it does not promote productive growth.
Ordinary citizens, robbed of their former sense of security, devote a
relatively large proportion of their time to illegal activities, above all
to ironing out conflicts with officials and robbing their own companies.

Small and medium-sized businesses in Russia are still in their infancy. Due
to a lack of investment, most of the country's infrastructure is rotting
away. The modernity deficit compared to western countries is growing
relentlessly. In comparison to Soviet times, corruption has increased
enormously. This is confirmed by successful entrepreneurs, stressed
employees and embittered pensioners. The artificial scarcity of economic
rights has inspired an enormous amount of criminal creativity.

Anyone socialized in Russia makes much shorter-term life plans and
generally lacks a sense of personal responsibility. But Russians are also
enviably imaginative when it comes to finding ways out of desperate
situations or getting around regulations. It is no coincidence that the
world admires Russian computer hackers and fears the daunting vitality of
Russian criminals.

This is where corruption actually holds a gigantic social organism
together. In fact, if one abolished corruption, the country would fall
apart. Although many observers consider Russia's sociopolitical system
disastrous and continually predict its imminent demise, it has proved very
resilient.

The disadvantages of a corrupt system are obvious. Bribery is inefficient,
investments fail to materialize, and the system subverts the psychic energy
of its citizens, who are rarely able to enjoy earning an honest ruble. A
hawker describes how it feels to make money without paying taxes, as most
people do: "Of course, I feel disgust for people who evade taxation. And
that includes myself."

But corruption also has its benefits. In a corrupt system, everything is
possible; all one must do is pay the right price. Corruption compensates a
very rigid judicial system, which, in its absence, could give rise to
brutal repression, proto-fascist conditions or civil war. As the writer
Mikhail Saltykov-Shchedrin put it: "The strictness of Russian laws is made
bearable by the fact that no one abides by them." What is more, corruption
lends a warmth to human relations that is often lost in the modern business
world. Since bribery is illegal, people have to trust each other.

A classic case is an understanding with a traffic cop, who accuses the car
driver of breaking the law -- almost always with the goal of earning some
extra cash. The conversation usually begins like this: "I have to take your
driver's license away from you, and then you have to go to the bank and
transfer the money." "Officer, I can't afford the time for that, can't we
make a deal?" Thus, the ritual dance begins. The driver carefully sounds
out the starting bid. The policeman, good at heart, wavers between duty and
his inclination to take the bribe -- then opts for the latter. They part as
friends.

A classic form of bonding, at a higher level, is the Russian custom of
taking time for the sauna. There is less here to separate the rich and
powerful, neither fashion nor protocol, and so, the parties find it easier
to make or earn concessions. A company gets a tax break in the intimate
atmosphere of the steam bath, officials are given cars or summer houses,
impoverished schools find sponsors and relatives or friends are granted
lucrative jobs.

Perhaps the key benefit of a corrupt system is that all its members are
equally compromised. That allows those in power to order people about at
will and invoke the rule of law where necessary.

Russian President Vladimir Putin also plays that card. Of the oligarchs who
came to power during the rule of former President Boris Yeltsin by means of
dubious business practices, Putin only took those to task who did not
cooperate with him enough. No one doubts that those captains of industry
and regional chieftains Putin left in place are just as guilty as the rest
and that charges are being carefully compiled for later use by state
prosecutors obedient to Putin.

Russian conditions seem to replicate that which is happening globally --
but more crassly and on the scale of a single albeit giant country. An
elite made up of people with political, academic and economic power
dominates an impoverished and ever poorer majority by means of sanctions
ostensibly aimed at dictators and concerned with restoring human rights but
often barely disguising economic interests.

The life blood of this system is raw materials. Were Russia poorer in terms
of natural resources and land, then the current system with its parasitic
and hypertrophic state apparatus would not be sustainable. Without natural
resources, the country would require a more productive economic structure,
which would need to emancipate the vast majority of citizens and push back
corruption.

The 1990s, when Russia tried to reinvent and find itself, ended in
resignation. Democratization introduced from above in the hope of
engendering more economic efficiency took the country to the brink of
destruction. Its social foundations were hardly regenerated at all. They
were already weak enough, and the elites rejected everything that might
threaten their parasitic existence.

Unless the state were to dismantle itself, the explosive growth of
corruption in Russia cannot be reversed. The means to suppress corruption
with force do not exist, and a resolute anti-corruption campaign would, in
fact, threaten the economic stability of the country as a whole.

Under Putin, who claimed he would fight corruption during his election
campaign, bribery has increased again. But it is a more predictable and
hence "more civilized" kind of bribery. Today, "experts" and companies who
obtain the necessary permits for a company, register a car or acquire
residence permits are in abundance. Without their help, such items would
cost just as much money and much more in terms of time and patience. Banned
by law, these corrupt services are effectively provided for fixed fees.

Higher up the political scale, there are also fees for a seat in
parliament, a construction permit or a piece of stolen art. This type of
formalized corruption is one step closer to legalization. It might, in
fact, be the only way to stop the criminalization of society and gradually
lead the country out of the shadows of its corruptness.

These are, indeed, the first seeds of a civil society, a self-organization
of society based on the rule of law. It is due to this "civilized"
corruption that some Russians are already successfully persuading
themselves that they can get by without corruption.

Orthodox and communist Russia endeavored to see itself as a harmonic
family, but modern Russia is gradually turning into Russia, Inc. It seems
only logical that its managers are trying to introduce more efficiency and
obedience, but they are acting in a mean spirit. Rationalization measures
plunder bankrupt companies of as many assets as possible for division among
the shareholders.

The concept of a state that regulates public affairs in the interest of the
majority of its citizens is as alien to the average Russian as the idea
that state power emanates from the people. Most people experience the state
as a threatening machine that makes demands of them, but shows no interest
in their concerns.

Conversely, the state regards the people -- the constitutional sovereign --
as human material whose will must be worn down. The concept of the state
being accountable to the people is entirely alien to Russia. It is this
social structure, reminiscent of foreign occupation, that keeps corruption
in bounds.

Every day, sadistic hazing within the ranks of the army drives young men in
the military service to commit murder or suicide. But for $3,000 a
potential recruit will be declared unfit to serve. Armored limousines fit
with blue lights ignore traffic rules and terrorize normal motorists with
impunity. But people can buy such a light for just a few hundred dollars. A
little more money will buy a certificate of immunity from the traffic police.

Putin has put Russia on a course similar to the one taken by China -- a
state-controlled capitalism coupled with police surveillance of its
citizens. Corruption has thus been guaranteed a long life.

*******

#5
Nezavisimaya Gazeta
September 7, 2001
MORE THAN JUST CRIME
Corruption has grown into a threat to Russia's national interests
Author: Leonid Barinov
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]

CORRUPTION HAS INCREASED TO A TREMENDOUS SIZE AND THE STATE HAS A LOT OF WORK TO DO TO ROOT OUT ITS MANIFESTATIONS. STATE OFFICIALS, POLITICIANS AND PUBLIC SERVANTS AT ALL LEVELS HAVE BEEN FOUND TO BE INVOLVED IN CORRUPTION. HOWEVER, A LEGAL BASIS FOR COMBATING THIS HAS TO BE CREATED FIRST.

Corruption in Russia is more than just crime: it has become so
widespread that it is even endangering Russia's national interests.
Some 2,000 bribes are disclosed in the country every year - at least
as many criminal proceedings are initiated.
Over the eleven months of 2000 alone, officials committed 53,000
crimes, 1,210 of them committed by organized groups and criminal
groupings. Let us mention the crimes, which are oftener committed by
officials. They are: misappropriation (or embezzlement) (31,444
crimes), forgeries (6,907), abuse of authority (7,175), bribing and
acceptance of bribes (4,634). Some 19,209 officials who committed
crimes were disclosed, with 13,481 of them being prosecuted now. Some
34 of them (including 14 members of parliament at all levels)
represented state authorities, and 284 more - employees of credit-
financial and banking systems.
According to appraisals of experts, criminal groupings control up
to 60% of state-run and up to 50% of private enterprises of various
property forms. In 2000 law enforcement agencies alone disclosed over
352,000 economic crimes, which is by a quarter more than in 1999. The
share of economic crimes in the entire structure of criminality was
over 13%, with every tenth crime committed by organized groupings or
in a preliminary agreement (34,000).
Along with that analysis of the court-investigation practice and
other materials show that the law enforcement agencies fail to provide
for recovery of values, expropriated from the state, to a proper
extent. Almost no signs of corpus delicti of such crimes like money
laundering and legalization of the appropriated property and remain
undisclosed, and attempts to return hard currency from abroad fail,
show auditions at large credit-financial and fuel-energy complexes.
There's a steady tendency toward an increase of a number of
crimes in the credit-financial sphere. The practice of prosecution
shows that in many cases embezzlements of state funds are committed on
conspiracy between officials of state structures and organizations and
leaders of commercial structures. Superior officials are quite often
involved in criminal deeds. Plenty of "not guilty" verdicts are
declared on cases of corruption. Cooperation between law enforcement
agencies remains low, inter-departmental barriers being a significant
reason for that.
Over the first six months of 2000 alone the Moscow prosecutor
general's office instigated 22 criminal cases on facts of criminal
conspiracy between chiefs of enterprises and banks for the purpose of
tax evasion.
A questionnaire poll, which was done by agents of the scientific-
research institute for problems of strengthening legitimacy and law
and order indicated that some 12% to 23% of citizens, questioned in
various cities not bribed only, but also accepted bribes. From over a
1,000 citizens polled in Moscow, Vladivostok, Volgograd and Voronezh,
some 10% thought that they have suffered from extortion, but only
1.51% of respondents applied to the law enforcement agencies, that is
about 15% of victims.
Organized crime penetrated various spheres of economy and the
biggest industries of national economy. Over the past 35 years almost
70 million people were sentenced in Russia, while some 10 million were
in prisons and colonies and 15 million were sentenced within a decade
of the democratic rule.
The greatest number of bribes was disclosed (in order of
decrease) in Moscow, the Krasnodar territory, the Moscow region, the
Rostov region, St. Petersburg, Bashkortostan, Tatarstan, the Stavropol
territory, the Belgorod, Vologda, Voronezh, Nizhny Novgorod,
Novosibirsk, Samara, Sverdlovsk and Chelyabinsk regions. Thousands of
officials from all branches of power, including heads of the Tula,
Vladimir regions, Kaspiisk, the Tabasaransky district of the republic
of Dagestan, Norilsk, etc. were brought to trial for economic crimes
connected with abuses of authority.
It would be impossible even to enumerate the list of names here.
Over the ten months of 2000 the number of crimes committed in the
fuel-energy complex has almost doubled. The most problematic situation
with crimes takes shape in the regions, at which oil-extracting and
oil-refining industries are concentrated - the enterprises engaged in
selling oil products - in Bashkortostan, Tatarstan, Moscow, the
Krasnoyarsk territory, the Ryazan, Tomsk and Tyumen regions. Over 40%
of the crimes committed inside these industries are classified as
embezzlements, with the domination of swindles (quite frequently with
the use of counterfeit or forged documents) and thefts.
The sphere of producing and selling alcoholic products is also
related to the most criminal industries. Evasion of excises is the
main goal of those who organize illegal production of alcoholic
beverages.
Over 52,000 crimes, including over 5,000 which were committed by
organized groups and through preliminary conspiracy, and some 15,000
of which were major crimes - were committed within the first 10 months
of 2000 in the credit and finance sector.
Dozens of heads of commercial banks were brought to trial.
Annual scale of currency flight, according to experts, is
considerably higher than the size of the credit and humanitarian
assistance, which various international organizations deliver to our
country. The information at hand shows that the illegal annual
currency capital flight from Russia is $20 to 25 billion. About 40,000
firms, including 1,500 state-run companies, 4,000 joint ventures and
over a third of the country's banks are controlled by criminal
groupings and are involved in money laundering through corrupted
officials.
There's a tendency toward an increase of the criminal proceedings
instituted against agents of law enforcement agencies and the number
of figurants involved in them. The examples of accepting bribes by
this category of state employees are disclosed in the majority of
regions. The share of similar cases in the entire number of criminal
cases on corruption has been increasing as well. The number of crimes
committed by customs officers does not reduce also.
The armed forces have also become a sphere where the criminal
business penetrated, mainly as a source for valuable raw stuff,
military property, weapons, ammunition and budgetary funds. The share
of bribe acceptance increased also. The overwhelming majority of the
crimes, which were registered, are ranked in the last category.
Under current circumstances, corruption prevention is as urgent
as never before.
Almost a half of the disclosed corrupted officials have links
with organized criminal groupings. Over 20 interregional criminal
groupings, which unite, according to the statistics of the Interior
Ministry, over 3,500 organized criminal groups and enumerate up to
5,500 members, are being controlled now.
Almost all criminal groupings have corruption links in local
administrative bodies. As is reported, some 4 criminal groupings have
made to the federal level of using the corrupted cover.
To counteract these tendencies the Interior Ministry has
initiated checking of over 1,000 various level state officials who,
according to reliable sources, are linked with organized criminal
groupings. Attempts of a few dozens of individuals, who are closely
connected with criminality, to get to the various authoritative bodies
have been suppressed. Hundreds of corrupted officials have been
disclosed in the executive bodies and many of them were either
dismissed or are now being checked or have been brought to trial.
The Russia's Prosecutor General's Office has taken urgent
additional measures to suppress activities of organized crime and
manifestations of corruption. On the whole, this measure has favorably
influenced the process of strengthening law and order and legitimacy.
However, the number of crimes connected with corruption, including
those committed by organized criminal groupings and groups, continues
to increase.
A federal law "On Combating Corruption", which is not approved
yet, must have become the basic legal act, which would promote to
enhancement of the economy and assist in counteraction to any
manifestations of criminality.
(Translated by Andrei Ryabochkin)

********

#6
Date: Fri, 07 Sep 2001
From: Constantine Dmitriev <dmitriev@sympatico.ca>
Subject: Re: 5429-Tourism

Just a brief response, rather an elaboration, to JRL 5429-Victor Sapio and
Yale Richmond's pieces on Russian tourism (below).
Sincerely,
Constantine Dmitriev
University of Western Ontario
Canada
dmitriev@sympatico.ca

Tourism in Russia: What Went Wrong?

Travelers who visit Russia on their own usually have to endure many nuisances
inflicted on them by Russian authorities. Ten years since the fall of
communism, visiting Russia remains quite a hassle. For example, if you wish to visit your
Russian friends, first you have obtain a special invitation certificate
issued by the dreadful OVIR. Another nuisance is the requirement to register one’s
visa with the OVIR within 3 days upon arrival to Russia. Yet another irritant is an
elaborate fee structure for museum tickets where non-Russian citizens have to pay
significantly higher prices for admission than their Russian counterparts.
A small price difference could be tolerable, but a 5 to 15 times difference seem a bit
excessive and unfair. Until very recently, foreign tourists were also
expected to pay higher fees for train tickets and hotels in Russia. Foreign tourists
who come to Russia with large tourist groups don’t have to face most of those problems
because travel agencies take care of visas, hotels and tickets. Individual tourists
though do, and frequently are forced to obtain fake “business” invitations through
various visa agencies, get their Russian friends to buy them “Russian” museum
tickets, etc.

The bottom line is that while group tourism to Russia works, individual
tourism does not and is not encouraged, despite the recent moves by the Moscow
authorities to allow 3-day visas issued at the airport. It may seem absurd that a country
so much in need of foreign investment, not to mention an image boost, does very
little to attract more tourist dollars by encouraging individual tourism. I would
argue that it is not merely Russian sloppiness at work, but also a mix of deliberate
policy and narrow institutional interests. Take for example Russian visas. They are
expensive and hard to obtain. Since visa regimes are often based on reciprocity, the
result is expensive western visas for Russians. On the one hand, Russian authorities
have an easier time monitoring who comes to Russia and, thanks to registration,
where they stay. On the other hand, Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry makes a lot of
money for issuing Russian visas. Losing potential tourist money and greatly
inconveniencing their own citizens just doesn’t seem to concern the Russian government. In
Russia, when it comes to looking after one’s citizens and improving services, old
Soviet structures and practices are alive and well.

*******

#7
From: "Peter Lavelle" <plavelle@metropol.ru>
Subject: Contibution
Date: Fri, 7 Sep 2001

Peter Lavelle: Untimely Thoughts - Majestic Putin
(re political culture)

Is Putin charismatic? Does he need to be? Many theorists of modern
politics contend that charisma and democratic institutions are incompatible.
Leaders using a democratic discourse have to accept being popular or
majestic. Putin desires to be democratic and majestic, while attempting to
bend the rules a bit concerning charisma. Putin's approach should not
surprise, Russian political culture may - by definition - be traditional,
and modern as well as rational all at the same time. Yelstin used his very
compelling charisma to take power in 1991. The more he pursued a democratic
agenda though, the more he lost his super-human qualities. In the end, he
became a mere mortal with a dubious democratic record. Enter Putin. Indeed
he used the language of salvation and regeneration while serving as Prime
Minister; clearly this helped him get elected President. Because of the
constitutional relationship the Russian President has with the Cabinet and
Duma, he can rule in a majestic fashion. This means he has ceremonious
power (not be to be confused with the trappings of what is defined as
ceremonial). He has the power to keep political institutions (even politics
itself) as arms length. This political arrangement protects the President's
public image as the leader of the nation and not only the defender of a
particular political agenda or the specific interests of only one social
group. The downside of course is that he is ultimately responsible for what
happens to the whole body politic. To date, Putin has used a democratic
idiom, even populist at times. He is also a traditionalist in the sense
that he does not deny or is ashamed of his past or his country's past. The
tradition of respecting authority is always present in his public statements
and ceremonious activities. Then there is charisma. Putin certainly is
aware of the power and legitimizing qualities of charisma in Russian
political culture. Tradition itself demands that Putin deal and even
confront this issue. The challenge is that he has a democratic agenda of
sorts. His solution is a compromise. He appears to appreciate the more
modern side of his Russian personality - his "dictatorship of law" seemingly
applies to himself as well. At the same time, he does not mind the
development of a mini-cult of personality around him. Is Putin charismatic?
Does he need to be? If he relents to becoming charismatic his democratic
agenda will collapse. If he cannot capture and maintain the imagination of
a good part of the Russian population he will equally fail. Let's hope
being majestic will continue to be a halfway house allowing Putin and Russia
to move forward.

*******

#8
Los Angeles Times
September 7, 2001
No Deadline for Accord With Russia
Defense: Putin's visit to Texas in November shouldn't be seen as "make or
break" for negotiations on the ABM treaty, Powell says.
By ROBIN WRIGHT, Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON -- The United States will not insist that Moscow agree to its
new missile defense strategy by November, when Russian President Vladimir
V. Putin pays a call on the Bush administration, Secretary of State Colin
L. Powell said Thursday.

"We shouldn't see November as necessarily make or break," he said in an
interview. "We have to keep all options open as to how we move forward, and
all those options are being kept open."

The administration now appears to be backing away from initial hopes that
Putin could be brought around before or during his visit. Agreement on a
strategic framework to replace the Antiballistic Missile Treaty is critical
to the United States, which wants to launch tests for its controversial
missile defense system without violating restrictions in the pact. The
accord has been the centerpiece of international arms control for three
decades.

Powell's statement follows weeks of confusion over expectations for the
summit, to be held at President Bush's Texas ranch. Several Russian
officials have warned recently that negotiations could take a year or
longer, while others still oppose abandoning the ABM treaty altogether.

Echoing other top administration officials, Powell said Thursday that
Washington would not wait indefinitely.

"We'll have to see what happens between now and November and then make our
judgment with respect to how our program is going forward and whether we
feel we can't wait any longer or whether we can continue consulting with
our allies, talking to the Chinese and also seeing what might be possible
with the Russians," he said. "We've said all along that we will not allow
this process to stop our going forward with missile defense."

Powell acknowledged that withdrawing unilaterally from the 1972 ABM treaty
would create a diplomatic furor. "There will be a controversy over this, no
question about it," he said.

But his tone was more conciliatory--and patient--than some earlier official
pronouncements. Powell stressed that the United States wants to work with
Russia on the most sensitive defense issue dividing the two former rivals.

"We want to go forward cooperatively. The Europeans want us to, the
Congress would like us to. I think it's a better way to do it," he said.

The bottom line, however, is that the absence of even a general
understanding between the two nations this year may dim Washington's hopes
of proceeding quickly on missile defense.

The administration is still determined to expedite the effort, and this
fall is to witness a flurry of diplomacy on three continents.

Over the next 10 days, Undersecretary of State John R. Bolton and
Undersecretary of Defense Douglas J. Feith will hold talks with top Russian
security officials. Powell will meet his counterpart, Russian Foreign
Minister Igor S. Ivanov, on Sept. 19, while Defense Secretary Donald H.
Rumsfeld will discuss security issues with Russian defense chief Sergei B.
Ivanov the following week. And Bush will meet Putin in Shanghai during the
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in mid-October.

The American envoys will emphasize the administration's flexibility on how
to move toward deploying missile defense, Powell said.

"We . . . will speak to them about, OK, if you don't want to mutually
withdraw [from the ABM treaty], let's look at what the alternatives are.
One alternative is, we really can't wait any longer--we have to get on with
our programs unilaterally. Or, can we find a way to modify this treaty,
change this treaty, abandon [it], pick up something new? Or, is there a way
to move forward so that we're not constrained in our recent research and
development by the treaty?"

Powell said Moscow's greatest concern now is the expansion of what the
United States says will be a limited missile defense system.

"They're looking for more predictability in what it is we're trying to do,"
he said.

But despite Russia's public concerns, it has now accepted the
"inevitability" of a U.S. missile defense system, a senior State Department
official said. While Moscow may hope to prolong negotiations by exploiting
internal U.S. divisions on the scope and costs of the system, Russia
recognizes that the idea now has firm bipartisan support, he added.

As a result, Putin has recently begun taking a "pragmatic" approach to the
issue and will eventually be prepared to accept a "limited" defense shield,
one designed to protect the United States against missiles from so-called
rogue states, the official predicted.

A decade after the Cold War's end, the two new administrations are also now
well on the road to establishing common ground on security issues, he added.

By November, the official said, "there's a reasonable chance we can make
significant progress at least in sketching out the outlines of a new
framework."

******

#9
stratfor.com
Russian Oil May Be Under Attack
6 September 2001

Summary

A bomb ripped open the Baku-Novorossiysk oil export pipeline Aug. 29 in the
Russian town of Achisu. If the explosion indicates the Chechen rebels have
begun targeting petroleum infrastructure, Russia will have huge problems
prosecuting the war. More than half of the Russian budget originates with
petroleum exports, and there are plenty of targets within arm's reach of
Chechnya.

Analysis

A blast ripped open the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline in the southern Russian
republic of Dagestan at 2:25 a.m. Aug. 29. The blast was certainly a bomb;
it left a crater 5 feet deep and 20 feet wide, according to RIA Novosti
news agency.

The use of such a large explosive indicates the bomber was not attempting
simply to tap the pipeline to steal crude but to actually destroy the line
itself. Although there are many suspects, agents of breakaway Chechnya top
the list. In fact, Russian authorities have already opened a criminal
investigation with the Chechens and their allies in mind, United Press
International reported. If the pipeline blast indicates a change in Chechen
tactics, Moscow has a major financial problem on its hands.

The implications of a new Chechen strategy could be far-reaching. The
Chechen capital of Grozny once housed the fourth-largest refinery network
in the former Soviet Union; the Chechens know exactly where to hit oil
infrastructure to maximize damage. That infrastructure is directly
responsible for the petroleum revenues that fund more than half of the
Russian budget. Budget shortfalls historically have had a disproportionate
impact on spending for badly needed social programs.

*******

#10
allnews.ru
September 6, 2001
Gazprom Is Going Into Default

The Russian Nezavisimaya gazeta newspaper is citing a report by deputy head
of Russian natural gas giant Gazprom Sergei Dubinin saying that the finance
situation in the company is very similar to that on the eve of August 17
crisis in Russia. The report is addressed to deputy chief executive Pyotr
Rodionov.
The document says that Gazprom's budget is failing to handle "the credit
pyramid" and the only way to avoid financial collapse is to contract more
debts. Dubinin urges that the situation may have dramatic consequences for
both Gazprom itself and the nation.

According to Dubinin, banks can refuse loans to Gazprom due to some
"conjuncture considerations". This scenario may be caused by gas prices
reduction in Europe that can be followed by company's export receipt
reduction. So the banks may consider the risk unacceptably high and turn
down the loan request while Gazprom has no money to pay its finance
obligations, Dubinin stresses.

At the same time the reform of the monstrous company is under way. New
Gazprom head Alexei Miller who was installed by the Kremlin in May
announced a management overhaul on Monday. The move aimed exactly at
strengthening Gazprom exports.

Pyotr Rodionov was named first deputy chief executive after Monday's
management meeting, replacing Vyacheslav Sheremet. Miller also named
Gazprom's managing committee member Yuri Komarov to replace Alexander
Pushkin as manager of the company's department in charge of exports to
former Soviet republics. Sergei Lukash was appointed deputy chairman in
charge of procurement and Mikhail Axelrod was named head of the investment
and construction department.

Gazprom is Russia's biggest company, it accounts for 8% of gross domestic
product and for a fifth of Russia's export revenues and taxes. Gazprom
controls almost 25% of the world's gas reserves. The gas giant dominates
Russia's political and corporate scene.

Gazprom has a total of 550,000 shareholders. The state owns more than 38%
of Gazprom's charter capital. Gazprom net profit in 2000 amounted to more
than $2 billion.

Gazprom has been plagued by scandal, including allegations of
mismanagement, corruption and nepotism so far. It was a key figure in a
recent scandal around Russia's independent TV station NTV.

*******

#11
allnews.ru
September 6, 2001
Russian Writer Accused Of Terrorism

National-bolshevik leader and writer Eduard Limonov has been indicted for
terrorism and organizing illegal military troops, Radio Ekho Moskvy
reported. Limonov's lawyer Sargei Beliak told journalists that the central
office of the Federal Security Service asked Russia's Prosecutor General's
Office to prolong the term of Limonov's imprisonment before trial. The
current expiring date is September 11.
Limonov was arrested on April 7 on suspicion of illegal arm dealing in
Altay. He was soon conveyed to Moscow and set to the Lefortovo prison at a
request of Russia's General Prosecutors Office.

Investigators claim that Limonov ordered four members of the
National-Bolshevik party to buy six submachine guns in Ufa and Saratov in
March.

Limonov's defence asked to set their client free on bail in August. Some
prominent Russia's figures supported the defence request such as writer
Andrei Bitov and Duma deputies Viktor Ilyukhin and Alexei Mitrofanov. But
judges said the charges against Limonov were too serious and he must remain
in jail.

*******

#12
Obschaya Gazeta
No. 36
September 6, 2001
SPECIAL PLACE FOR CITIZENS
President will monitor construction of civil society
Civil society can't be created by presidential decree
Author: Yekaterina Mikhailova
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]

THE GOVERNMENT IS STILL IN THE CLUTCHES OF THE OLD CLICHES. IT STILL
NEEDS A SPECIAL BODY FOR CONTACTS WITH THE MASSES, SO IT IS CREATING A RESTRICTED POLITICAL SPACE FOR PUBLIC PARTICIPATION. THE REGIME IS NOT PREPARED TO SHOULDER FULL RESPONSIBILITY AND INITIATE A DIRECT DIALOGUE WITH THE CITIZENRY.

Autumn is a time for harvesting. This autumn, organizers of civil
society in Russia fully intend to reap the harvest their labors.
The plan is as follows: holding a Civil Forum of independent
organizations and establishing a Civil Alliance (or Civil House) under
the president as a permanent consultative body, something like the
State Council.
The organization committee of the Civil Forum has been set up. It
includes political scientist Sergei Markov, Alexander Oslon of the
Public Opinion Foundation, Maria Slobodskaya of the Civil Society
Institute, Duma deputy Vyacheslav Igrunov, and more.
The new domestic policy of the state is to be announced at the
Civil Forum. Its contours were outlined at the meeting in the Kremlin:
"the authorities need broad public support", "society in general is
supposed to share responsibility for the socio-economic situation with
the authorities", "this can happen if and when the public participates
in decision-making."
The problem does indeed sound urgent - unless we ask some
questions. Did civil society existed in Russia before the Civil Forum?
Is it actually possible for civil society to be organized in this way?
The burdens of the government's proposed social reforms program
will to a considerable extent be borne by ordinary citizens. The
intended changes in areas such as pensions, housing and utilities, and
land legislation will heighten social tension. Preventing this from
growing into social conflict requires new levers to regulate relations
between society and the state.
Putin has an ongoing dialogue with participants in high politics:
members of parliament, oligarchs, regional leaders. For all other
forces in society, construction of new president-controlled structures
is underway:
- the State Council for the regional leaders;
- the Civil Alliance is being established for NGOs;
- "special places" are to be set up for citizens to be socially
and politically active. The range is limited. They will be either NGOs
united in the Civil Alliance or the few political parties who survive
the new law on political parties;
- the Media Union has been set up for journalists;
- two organizations are to be established for medium and small
business: Business Russia and Dialogue.
Typically enough, presidential envoys were instructed this year
to reactivate "construction of civil society", and have been doing
their honest best to accomplish the mission. It took them only a
couple of months to form the Media Union. Organizations for medium and
small business are being created now. Nationwide organizations are
established in no time at all. As far as speed is concerned, the
presidential envoys have even left Unity's founding fathers behind.
And no one seems to care that the authorities are, on the one hand,
stepping up demands and requirements for political parties (fighting
for their quality, in other words), while encouraging the appearance
of phantom organizations on the other.
All this administrative activity has nothing to do with
construction of civil society as such. The mechanical production of
new forms cannot affect the content of the process. The truth is that
one doesn't build civil society. It builds itself. Creation of
preconditions for the process is all the involvement expected from the
authorities.
The government is still in the clutches of the old cliches. It
still needs a special body for contacts with the masses. The regime is
not prepared to shoulder full responsibility and initiate a direct
dialogue with the citizenry.

*******

#13
Rossiiskaya Gazeta
September 6, 2001
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
WHO WILL HEAD RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES?
By Albert VALENTINOV

The election of the president of the Russian Academy of
Sciences will be held on November 12th. There is a lot of time
left. But scientists have been speculating for a long time on
who will head the academic Olympus. The new wave of
speculations has been triggered by the information that one of
the real candidates is a Nobel Prize winner, a member of the
Russian Communist Party Faction in the State Duma, Zhores
Alferov.
Many candidates have been named, but, in the end, sources,
pretending to be well informed, have come down to three people:
Yevgeny Velikhov, Yuri Osipov, and Zhores Alferov.
Academician Velikhov told the Rossiiskaya Gaseta newspaper
what the "well informed sources," presumably, do not even
suspect. He does not intend to run as a candidate. When asked
who, in his opinion, will head the Olympus, Mr. Velikhov said:
"Let us not name any specific people. It is clear to me
that the new president should be an individual with a capital
I. For example, Nesmeyanov was a very different individual than
Keldysh, and Keldysh was very different from Alexandrov. All
three were major individuals, who contributed a lot to science,
and to the Academy. The new president, in my view, should be
relatively young and open-minded. He should promote the youth,
and not support his own ideas only.
"The new president should revive the Academy's practice of
taking care not only of itself, but also of applied sciences,
which is basically destroyed by now.
"It is obvious that a lot will depend on Russian
authorities' decisions, and on the Russian president, whose
decision will to a certain extent be the ultimate one. I should
admit that, in this case, it is a no easy task for him." This
is the opinion of a person who tried to become the president of
the Academy twice. He had his own program for the Academy's
renewal. He was not afraid to voice an unfavorable opinion on
the activities of the Academy's presidium.
There exists a different opinion though. It belongs to
Academician Gury Marchuk, former president of the Academy.
"I am fully satisfied with the way the Academy's presidium
works," he said. "Nothing should be dramatically changed.
Otherwise, we will have not an academy, but an organization
steeped in confrontation. The Academy has survived as is for
300 years and it will survive in the future. Let everything
stay the way it has been. There, certainly, is room for change,
but changes should be cautions. Otherwise, there is a risk of
destroying everything."
The opinions are very different indeed. Which one will
prevail at the election? The vote will decide.

******

#14
EU ministers to ponder security ties with Russia

BRUSSELS, Sept 7 (Reuters) - European Union foreign ministers will consider
ways of boosting security cooperation with Russia at a meeting this weekend
in Belgium, diplomats said on Friday.

The 15 ministers will also assess the EU's relations with the former Soviet
republics of Belarus and Ukraine and with would-be member state Turkey, the
diplomats said.

"We will sound out member states on Russia's increasingly insistent request
for closer involvement in developing a common European security and defence
policy," said a Belgian diplomat, whose country holds the EU's rotating
presidency.

He said cooperation on security would be a key issue in a planned EU-Russia
summit in Brussels in early October.

But he said the EU's common security policy was still a work in progress
and it would take some time before member states were ready to involve
external partners.

Earlier this week Russia, keen to revive its flagging influence in the
Balkans, signalled support for some kind of extended international
peacekeeping or monitoring presence in Macedonia after NATO's 30-day
mission ends in late September.

But it remains unclear what shape a future mission might take and Russia
remains highly suspicious of NATO, its old Cold War foe, though it has been
much more relaxed about the EU's medium-term plans to develop a modest
military capability.

The Belgian diplomat, briefing reporters ahead of the weekend's informal
meeting in Genval near Brussels, said the foreign ministers would also
consider Russia's calls to build closer economic ties with the EU, its main
trading partner.

UKRAINE, BELARUS

The ministers will also discuss relations with Ukraine, a country which
aspires to eventual EU membership, ahead of an EU-Ukraine summit in the
Crimean resort of Yalta next Tuesday.

The EU has become increasingly concerned about whether Ukraine is committed
to political and economic reforms and has criticised what it sees as a lack
of media freedom and rampant corruption in the large impoverished country
of 50 million.

Diplomats said British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw planned to raise the
issue of Belarus, another impoverished and much less democratic ex-Soviet
republic which is scheduled to hold a presidential election on Sunday.

Belarus, under the leadership of hardline President Alexander Lukashenko,
is the only country in the region to resist closer economic and political
ties with the EU, which hopes to admit 10 ex-Soviet bloc states in the next
few years.

The EU's troubled relations with Turkey are also on the Genval agenda,
though diplomats said they expected a general assessment rather than the
announcement of any new initiatives.

The foreign ministers of the 13 candidate countries, including Turkey, will
join their EU colleagues on Sunday to discuss long-term plans for reform of
the Union's institutions.

*******

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