September 4, 2001

This Date's Issues:   5424 • 5425

Johnson's Russia List
#5424
4 September 2001
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Stephen Shenfield: INTRODUCING THE JRL RESEARCH AND ANALYTICAL
SUPPLEMENT. [DJ: I am very pleased that Stephen Shenfield will be
editing this addition to the JRL content. Stephen has a substantial
background in Russian studies and the Supplement will enhance
the value of JRL to many recipients. The first installment will be
sent to you as the next issue of JRL. If you have comments or
suggestions please share them with Stephen and me.]
2. Novoe Vremya: FANTASIES ABOUT DEMOCRACY. (poll)
3. Financial Times (UK): Robert Cottrell, Primakov seen as Putin's choice for foreign adviser.
4. BBC Monitoring: Russian paper reports foreign currency ban coming.
5. BBC Monitoring: Russian politician remains "moral leader" of his faction after resignation. (Primakov)
6. gazeta.ru: Kremlin Aide Wants New Law For Russian Media. (re Chechnya)
7. Moscow Times: Boris Kagarlitsky, Terrorism Benefits the State.
8. Gerry Schwartz: status of Stalin era buildings.
9. RFE/RL: Francesca Mereu, State Council's Education Reforms Meet With Skepticism.
10. Robert Freedman: RUSSIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST ON THE EVE OF THE
SHARON VISIT.
11. Transitions Online: Alexei Pankin, The Gilded Age. Over the last 10 years, the Russian media has never been shy about asking for support from the state--or from the oligarchs.
12. Financial Times (UK): Andrew Jack, Labour shortages start to tell in Russia. The booming economy is forcing companies to look abroad to fill vacancies.
13. BBC Monitoring: Russian patriarch urges introduction of Orthodox culture subject in schools.]

*******

#1
Date: Mon, 3 Sep 2001
Subject: Introducing the JRL Research and Analytical Supplement
From: Stephen Shenfield <shenfield@neaccess.net>


INTRODUCING THE JRL RESEARCH AND ANALYTICAL SUPPLEMENT

A MESSAGE TO READERS OF JRL FROM STEPHEN D. SHENFIELD
<shenfield@neaccess.net>, EDITOR OF THE JRL RESEARCH
AND ANALYTICAL SUPPLEMENT

This message is to explain the purposes of the JRL
Research and Analytical Supplement to Johnson's Russia
List -- henceforth RAS -- and to suggest ways in which
you might like to contribute to it. I append some
information about my own background.

PURPOSES OF THE RAS

The main purpose of the RAS is to make available to
readers of JRL in a convenient form the most significant
findings of academic research on Russia, whether
conducted in Russia itself or in other countries. I hope
that in addition the RAS will provide a useful resource
for students and educators, and facilitate communication
and cooperation among Russian and Western researchers.

It is difficult to define the division of labor between
JRL and the RAS in a way that will eliminate all overlap.
But in general JRL presents commentary on current
developments as they occur, while the RAS will focus on
in-depth analysis of longer-term trends and problems.
Besides politics, economics, and sociology, the RAS will
cover other spheres that are no less important in a
long-term perspective, such as culture, technology,
ecology, demography, and epidemiology.

The RAS will therefore be somewhat more academic in
character than most of what appears in JRL. But I am
determined that it should not be so academic as to be
inaccessible or irrelevant to the non-academic or
non-specialist reader.

THE FIRST ISSUE

The first issue of the RAS, which you will be receiving
in a day or two, may be regarded as a trial run. It
consists mainly of synopses I have written on the
findings of selected academic literature recently
published in English or Russian. Future issues will
also contain short analytical pieces specially written
for the RAS by scholars in Russia and the West.

I realize that the synopses I have written are not
adequate even as summaries of research results. All I am
trying to do is to draw attention to research and to
highlight certain points of interest. I realize also
that in selecting for coverage a few of the research
reports that I find of particular interest I am leaving
out many others no less worthy of inclusion. I will try
to fill some of the gaps in future issues. I am sure
that there is a great deal of important research going
on of which I am not aware. It will take me some time to
build up the base of knowledge I need to do the best job
I can as editor of the RAS. I would greatly appreciate
any help you can give me.

I welcome all reactions, suggestions, and friendly
criticism. Substantive responses to research findings
featured in the RAS will be included in a special
"Debate" section of future issues.

INVITATION TO POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTORS

I invite researchers in all countries to consider
contributing to the RAS. By contributing material, you
can help make this venture a success, and also bring
your work to the attention of thousands of people in all
walks of life with a strong interest in Russia.

I would like to ask all contributors to remember that
they are writing for a varied readership including many
who are not specialists in their own field and many who
are not academics at all. In addition, the nature of
e-mail as a medium imposes certain constraints. For
these reasons you cannot write for the RAS in the same
way that you would write for a scholarly journal or
conference. So:

Please be brief and stick to the most essential points.

Please avoid waffle, convoluted or unnecessarily
abstract language.

Please do not make inessential or unexplained references
to scholarly theories and debates.

Please avoid technical terms where possible and explain
any technical terms that cannot be avoided.

Please omit references and notes.

If you wish, you may like to add a note offering to
provide readers with a conference paper or other full
scholarly account of your work on request. In fact,
I very much encourage you to do so.

There are two kinds of material that you might
contribute: (a) reports of completed or ongoing research,
and (b) analytical articles on issues of topical
interest.

HOW TO GET RESEARCH REPORTED IN THE RAS

I am interested in including reports both of recently
completed research and of research that is still in
progress and may not yet have generated scholarly
publications but that has already yielded interesting
provisional findings.

If you would like your research, or the research of your
colleagues, to be reported in the RAS, please send me
relevant information (published or unpublished) in
Russian, English or French at the following address:

S. D. Shenfield
145 Colonial Road
Providence
RI 02906, USA

I much prefer to receive material by ordinary mail (post)
rather than as e-mail attachments, especially if it is at
all bulky or in Russian (making technical problems more
likely) or from people I don't know (because of the risk
of computer viruses). It is more convenient to work with
material in physical form, and it gives me the chance to
get away from the computer now and then!

I don't mind receiving fairly brief information by e-mail
IF it is in the body of the message itself rather than in
attached files. Please use Latin characters -- that is,
write in English or French, or write in Russian with
transliteration.

The report to be included in the RAS can be written
EITHER by you, the researcher, OR by me, the editor, on
the basis of information that you send me. If you write
the report yourself, please make it brief, clear, and
interesting and accessible to the non-specialist reader.
If you find it difficult to do this, it may be best to
leave the job of writing the report to me.
It would be convenient to receive the short draft report
in the body of an e-mail message, and any supporting
material by ordinary mail. In that case, I can send you
back the edited report for you to check for accuracy
before it is included. However, I will also accept
reports sent by ordinary mail.

I can't make an absolute promise to review all papers
received -- some, for instance, I might be unable to
understand -- but I'll do my best.

ANALYTICAL ARTICLES

Besides research reports, I invite researchers in all
countries to write short analytical articles for the RAS
on issues of topical interest.

But if you do have an idea for an article that you
could write, please start by sending an e-mail message
to <shenfield@neaccess.net> introducing yourself and
your work and briefly outlining your idea for an article.
But please do not attach any files to your first message:
to guard against computer viruses I don't open attached
files from people I don't know. Then we can come to an
understanding on the length and theme of the article
that you are going to write. (I'd like most articles to
be in the range 500--1,000 words, but exceptions are
possible.) Then you will know that your article will be
used and that you are not wasting your time. It will
also make it easier for me to plan future issues.

Please send articles in one of these forms:

-- by mail in Russian, English or French to
145 Colonial Road, Providence, RI 02906, USA

-- in the body of an e-mail message in English or
French, or in Russian using transliteration to
Latin characters (keeping lines short -- like this)

-- in an attached WORD file in English or French,
or in Russian using the KOI8 code or Latin
transliteration (but ONLY after an exchange of
messages with me)

If your native language is Russian, please write in
Russian unless your written English is very good. If
you write in good English it saves me a little trouble,
but I find it much easier to translate a text in good
Russian than to edit a text in poor English.

Please indicate on your article how you wish to be
described ("The author is ... ") and whether or not you
want your e-mail address or other contact details
published together with the article.

A LITTLE ABOUT MYSELF

I grew up in London, England. I have some family
connection with Russia (Russian Empire / USSR). My
father was born in Kharkov, and my grandmother in
Smorgon', now a district center in Belarus. It was from
her that I learned my first Russian as a child: she
used to recite Pushkin to me. When she died, we
discovered her correspondence with relatives in Russia
of whose existence we had been unaware.

My first career was as a government statistician. In
1979, I started out on Soviet Studies at the Centre for
Russian and East European Studies, University of
Birmingham. My Ph.D. was on the Soviet Family Budget
Survey.

In 1983 I acted as guide to social scientist Fyodor
Burlatsky when he visited Birmingham. He stimulated my
interest in the intricacies of Soviet ideological
innovation, leading to my first book, one of the
earliest analyses of Gorbachev's "new thinking" --
"The Nuclear Predicament: Explorations in Soviet
Ideology" (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1987).

In the 1990s I was based at the Watson Institute for
International Studies at Brown University in the USA,
where I took part in various research projects dealing
with Russia and the post-Soviet region. Currently I am
an independent researcher and translator. My book
"Russian Fascism: Traditions, Tendencies, Movements" was
published by M. E. Sharpe of New York in January 2001
(synopsis in first issue of the RAS).

I am interested in (almost) everything. For that reason
I look forward to learning about your work and editing
the JRL Research and Analytical Supplement.

*******

#2
Novoe Vremya
No. 34
August 2001
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
FANTASIES ABOUT DEMOCRACY

Since it is thought that in August 1991 democracy gained the
upper hand over an attempt to restore an authoritarian system, it is
interesting to know how Russian people envision democracy. Asked what
does living in a democratic state mean for us, 38% of respondents
replied it is "confidence in tomorrow", 24% answered that this
primarily means "observance of human rights, and respect for the
individual". And 23% think it means "living in peace and concord", and
21% more assume that a democratic state is a state run by the people,
where the "people live well". Respondents were given the option of
choosing two answers.

Taking into consideration these criteria, 54% of respondents say
that Russia is overall not a democratic state, 14% think it is a
democratic state and 32% could not decide. Perhaps a slight disregard
for free elections as a significant aspect of democracy is due to the
fact that many people do not believe that their participation in the
election can change anything (23% of respondents say it can, but 60%
more say it cannot, with the remaining 17% having no particular
opinion).

Most of all, people want peace and order, whether it is called
democracy or something else. People's attitudes toward party-building
as a part of democratic process is rather skeptical.

******

#3
Financial Times (UK)
4 September 2001
Primakov seen as Putin's choice for foreign adviser
By Robert Cottrell in Moscow
Russia's one-time spy chief and ex-prime minister, Yevgenny Primakov,
resigned on Monday as parliamentary boss of a pro-Kremlin political block,
Fatherland-All Russia, prompting speculation that he might soon be offered
a new job by President Vladimir Putin.

Mr Primakov hinted on Monday that something was in the air, but gave no
details. "My decision doesn't mean that I am leaving big-time politics," he
said.

Politicans and commentators suggested that Mr Putin might want Mr Primakov,
71, as a foreign affairs adviser, or as his special representative to the
Middle East.

Mr Primakov is seen as a conservative in foreign policy and other areas.
When he succeeded the pro-western Andrei Kozyrev as foreign minister in
1996 he encouraged closer ties with China and India, and a more sceptical
view of the US. When prime minister, he turned his aircraft round in
mid-air, aborting a visit to Washington DC, in protest at Nato's bombing of
Serbia.

He said on Monday he was quitting his job as parliamentary leader of the
Fatherland-All Russia faction, which has 45 seats in the 450-member Duma,
or lower house of parliament, to give a new parliamentary leader plenty of
time to prepare for general elections due in 2003.

Mr Primakov has made clear in the past his reservations about a plans to
merge Fatherland with the Duma's other big pro-Kremlin block, Unity. These
plans have been pushed forward mainly by Fatherland's national leader, Yuri
Luzhkov, mayor of Moscow. A new law allows only big, national organisations
to register as political parties.

Fatherland made Mr Primakov its parliamentary leader in 1999 without
requiring him to take party membership. Mr Primakov said on Monday that he
had no wish to join any political party. "It is enough for me that I was in
my time a member of the Politburo [of the Communist party of the Soviet
Union]," he said.

******

#4
BBC Monitoring
Russian paper reports foreign currency ban coming
Source: Ekho Moskvy radio, Moscow, in Russian 1800 gmt 3 Sep 01

[Presenter] There could be a ban on the circulation of foreign currency in
Russia in the very near future. The draft of the relevant presidential
decree has already been drawn up, reports tomorrow's edition of `Novyye
Izvestiya'.

The paper says that the authors of the document are planning to force the
people to hand over all the currency they have stashed away. It is
noteworthy that instead of foreign money people will be given so called
universal freely convertible debit cheques...

Let me just add that the official authorities refrained from commenting on
this subject today. There will be more about it at 1930 gmt.

******

#5
BBC Monitoring
Russian politician remains "moral leader" of his faction after resignation
Source: NTV International, Moscow, in Russian 1200 gmt 3 Sep 01 1

The new leader of the Fatherland-All Russia faction has said that his
predecessor remained the moral leader after his resignation. Interviewed by
Russian NTV International, Vyacheslav Volodin said that his predecessor,
Yevgeniy Primakov, would continue in politics and there would be no change
in policy. Primakov himself said President Putin had tried to dissuade him
from resigning. He denied that he had been offered a job in government. The
following is the text of the TV report broadcast on 3 September.
Subheadings have been inserted editorially.

[Presenter] Yevgeniy Primakov, the leader of the Fatherland-All Russia
faction, has resigned. He announced this officially after a meeting of the
faction and proposed that Vyacheslav Volodin be elected as his successor.
Volodin was unanimously elected by the faction members. Our observer
Vladimir Kondratyev watched the whole thing unfolding. Hello, Vladimir.
Over to you.

[Kondratyev, shown with Volodin in front of Duma building] Hello, Natasha.
I hope you can see that I have the new head of the Fatherland-All Russia
faction in the State Duma, Primakov's successor, Vyacheslav Viktorovich
Volodin, standing next to me.

Before asking him to speak I would like to say something about how it all
happened and show you pictures of it.

The faction meeting today started off with quite a surprise for many
people, even for some of Primakov's colleagues. The leader of the Unity
faction, [Vladimir] Pekhtin, for instance, said he had no idea Primakov
intended to resign today. I find that hard to believe but that is how it
happened.

Primakov addressed the Fatherland-All Russia faction. It is not a minor
faction. It is the third biggest in the State Duma. Primakov explained the
reasons for his resignation, which are mainly to do with the conversion of
the movement into a party, and then nominated his former deputy, now the
main leader of the faction, Vyacheslav Volodin.

After this all happened, we heard a lot of applause - the meeting room was
off limits to journalists. Primakov was presented with bouquets, after
which he and Volodin went to meet the press and there was a short news
conference.

Primakov denies offer of government job

Primakov started answering questions. The journalists, naturally, asked
first whether he had had offers of another job. No-one could believe that
Primakov [a former prime minister] could just get up and leave an important
job like that. Let's hear what Primakov said.

[Recorded video clip] [Female journalist's voice] Yevgeniy Maksimovich,
could you let us into the secret? Have you perhaps been offered some job in
the executive?

[Primakov, shown surrounded by microphones] No. Even so, this decision of
mine does not mean I am getting out of high politics.

[Male journalist's voice] Could you tell us whether you discussed today's
decision of yours with the president yesterday? If so, how did the
president react?

[Primakov] I did. The president started by asking me not to do it. But I
had already decided. [End of video clip of Primakov news conference]

[Correspondent] That is what Primakov said about it, Natasha, but, of
course, few believe that Primakov will stay in politics as just an ordinary
member of parliament. [Turns to Volodin] Vyacheslav Viktorovich, what is
your view of this? Do you think Primakov is likely to be in demand?

[Volodin] Well, Primakov will still be Primakov, even as an ordinary member
of parliament. Yevgeniy Maksimovich will definitely be in demand in
society. We are working today within the State Duma and we consider that
this is quite an important area of work.

If the president were to see fit to appoint Yevgeniy Maksimovich to work in
the executive or in any other office, there is nothing stopping him. I
cannot say whether there will be talks to this effect or whether they have
already happened but I do know that Primakov is staying in high politics.

Primakov remains moral leader of faction

Another thing I do know is that Yevgeniy Maksimovich remains our moral
leader, and we think that the fact that Yevgeniy Maksimovich has stayed in
the faction and in its council will make it possible for the faction to
continue conducting a statesmanlike policy, a policy whereby we lay out our
own viewpoint. Our faction is not one with a definite bias. The best thing
is that we will maintain complete continuity.

Of course, it will not be easy for us, especially in the time now to come,
with Yevgeniy Maksimovich absent. He used to take all the flak onto
himself. We are quite clear about this. We realize this. This can only be
replaced by greater unity, with more consultation and coordination between
ourselves. We asked Yevgeniy Maksimovich not to be offended if we continue
asking him questions and ask for his help on one issue or another.

The choice was his and he made it. Since he made this decision we think
that it was one he had to make, even though we tried hard to dissuade him.
Everyone of us is basically aware that he is irreplaceable and that any
replacement, whatever the faction should decide, would not be an equal one.

[Correspondent] Thank you, Vyacheslav Viktorovich. Congratulations too from
us on your new job. Natasha?

Faction wants changes to budget

[Presenter] Vladimir, I should like to ask Mr Volodin a question.
Vyacheslav Viktorovich, what, in your view, are the faction's main jobs in
the autumn session that approaches?

[Volodin] They remain the same. The fact is that, as well as the leadership
issue, we have also been discussing the budget for 2002 and have drafted a
statement on behalf of the faction. We think that it is time for the
government to start consultations with the parliamentary groups. There are
questions to be asked about the budget. As a faction we have questions to
ask about the supplementary revenues, for instance. We think the revenue
side of the budget has been set too low. We think that we should not
impinge on the interests of the regions, because about 67 per cent of the
funds today are concentrated on the federal level and only 33 per cent on
the regional. So we have some hard work to do, particularly on the budget,
which we are going to examine in the months to come.

The faction is working. the faction is studying all these issues today. So
I think nothing has changed. Continuity will be assured. Furthermore, as I
already said, Yevgeniy Maksimovich is still with us. So the Primakov spirit
remains in the faction and there will be no changes in one direction or
another.

[Correspondent] That is all from us, Natasha.

[Presenter] Thank you. Thank you, Vyacheslav Viktorovich. Thank you,
Vladimir. That was our observer Vladimir Kondratyev from the building of
the State Duma, where the leadership of the Fatherland-All Russia faction
changed today. Faction leader Yevgeniy Primakov resigned and Vyacheslav
Volodin became the new leader in his place.

******

#6
gazeta.ru
3 September 2001
Kremlin Aide Wants New Law For Russian Media

By Russian laws, national media outlets are allowed to publish only one
interview with terrorists, separatists, rebels and murderers per year.
Putin’s aide Sergei Yastrzhembsky wants this clause repealed. An interview
with the president of the self-proclaimed Chechen state of Ichkeria Aslan
Maskhadov, published in Kommersant Daily newspaper on Friday, fully
exhausted Yastrzhembsky’s patience.

The interview with Aslan Maskhadov, published by Kommersant on Friday, was
dedicated to the fifth anniversary of the so-called Khasavyurt peace
agreements between Russia and Chechnya, signed in Daghestan on August 31,
1996.

The interview preceded two other articles on the Chechen issue. On page 2,
the head of pro-Moscow Chechen Administration Akhmad Kadyrov shared his
views on Khasavyurt peace treaty and on the present-day situation in the
Republic. Another article contained the editorial comment on the historical
importance of the 1996-1997 events in Chechnya.

In his interview with Kommersant, Aslan Maskhadov said that the military
campaign that goes on in the Republic today would inevitably lead to the
signing of a peace agreement, and only thus the war in Chechnya would end.
Maskhadov pointed out that the Russian army in Chechnya was exhausted,
demoralized and incompetent, and "has come to constitute the real criminal
gang".

Outraged by the paper’s impertinent move, Sergei Yastrzhembsky circulated a
statement about the interview immediately after it was published.

Firstly, he resolutely denied any peace agreement may be reached between
Russia and Chechen rebels. Such an agreement is impossible and would be
harmful, he told Interfax news agency. The agreement signed in Khasavyurt,
Dagestan, by then Security Council Secretary Alexander Lebed and Aslan
Maskhadov is "one of the most negative pages in modern Russian history," he
stressed.

After doing away with “whatever Chechen leader and his men abroad say”, the
Kremlin propaganda chief switched to Kommersant role. In Yastrzhembsky’s
opinion, it is absolutely inadmissible to allow Chechen rebel leaders
express their opinions in Russian press. “For the moment, it is a kind of
an internal choice made by an editor or a journalist. However, not all duly
cope with that internal choice,” he said.

In order to relieve journalists from a complicated ethical dilemma ­
whether to interview the rebels or not - the presidential aide suggested
that effective laws should amended accordingly. Yastrzhembsky did not
specify, however, what particular changes he would like to have introduced
to Russian media laws.

Most likely, Yastrzhembsky’s idea is to expressly prohibit Russia media,
both printed and electronic, from interviewing ‘rebels’ and publishing
their statements. Currently effective laws on media and on combating
terrorism do not expressly prohibit journalists from interviewing the
rebels. So, until the Kremlin submits the corresponding bill to the Duma,
the only thing the Kremlin aide is in power to do is to dress the paper down.

However, it is not Sergei Yastrzhembsky’s responsibility to exercise
control over the contents of publications that emerge in Russian media, but
that of the Press Ministry. The ministry officials told Gazeta.Ru they were
aware of the Kommersant’s interview with Maskhadov.

The Press Ministry’s spokesman Yuri Akinshin informed Gazeta.Ru that the
ministry has set up a special commission, that will scrutinize the
interview in order to establish whether it violates Russian laws on media
outlets and on combating terrorism. Akinshin said the commission would need
several days to decide. In case the commission rules that Maskhadov’s
interview violates Russian law, the ministry might officially reprimand the
newspaper.

Kommersant’s legal counsel Maxim Chernigovsky is convinced that the paper
violated no laws by publishing the interview with Maskhadov last Friday.
“The interview with Maskhadov was thoroughly censored,” he told Gazeta.Ru.
“There is nothing unlawful therein.”

*******

#7
Moscow Times
September 4, 2001
Terrorism Benefits the State
By Boris Kagarlitsky

In Russia, terrorism does not conform to the norms that exist around the
world. Here, acts of terrorism occur when it suits the interests of the
powers-that-be. The blowing-up of apartment blocks in 1999 marked the start
of Vladimir Putin's election campaign. The bus hijacking in Mineralniye
Vody by a Chechen occurred on exactly the same day that refugees in
Ingushetia were organising a peace march. The explosion in a market-place
in Astrakhan happened just as anti-war sentiments were strengthening in
society, moreover in a city where such sentiments are pretty strong.

Until now, Chechens have been blamed for all the explosions. In Astrakhan,
the police didn't do that: the entire city knew that local gangs were in a
fierce battle for control over the market. This did not, however, deter the
FSB from immediately sniffing out the "Chechen trail." In the rest of the
world, terrorist organizations openly acknowledge responsibility for their
actions. In Russia, not a single well-known Chechen organization has taken
responsibility for the terrorist acts -- on the contrary, Chechen leaders
have condemned them. Of course, the rebels' words should be given no
greater weight than those of Kremlin propagandists. However, the question
still remains: Why do terrorists in Northern Ireland, Spain, or Palestine
openly acknowledge their involvement, while in Russia they do not.

Kremlin propaganda represents the rebels as unprincipled people. But the
point is, for terrorists the only way of accounting before their sponsors
is to take responsibility for an explosion or killing. How else can it be
done? By writing detailed reports? By notifying the relevant people
beforehand where the explosion will take place? Such information will be
intercepted sooner or later, to the considerable detriment of the sponsors
as well as the terrorists. Maybe, we are not dealing here with terrorism,
but with a Special Services operation. The Special Services never publicly
acknowledge their responsibility -- they have their own ways of accounting
for their actions.

By organising explosions, terrorists not only raise their "rating" amongst
political investors -- more importantly, support for the organization rises
amongst the part of the population from which terrorist groups recruit most
of their activists. It is for exactly this reason that in Palestine, the
Hamas and Islamic Jihad argue over the "glory" accorded to the organizers
of explosions in Jerusalem. In Northern Ireland, many approve of terror as
an entirely legitimate means of fighting. Such sentiments are not without
foundation. Hatred and the desire for revenge are provoked by long years of
humiliation and exploitation. To give the Chechens their due: Even after
everything that has happened in the last few years, terrorist slogans have
not taken root amongst the masses. If the explosions do not evoke mass
support from the rebels' social base and don't make them any more popular,
these actions are worse than useless -- in fact, they're counterproductive.
So, who gains from it all?

The simple answer is: The explosions benefit those -- on both sides, of
course -- who wish to prolong the war. However, there are more such people
in Moscow than in Chechnya, as the end of the war will spell political
catastrophe for those that initiated it. At least, for the so-called
hard-liners. This means that the war must continue at all costs. The
Astrakhan explosion coincided strikingly with the military failures at
Vedeno. The TV silence only served to confirm that things were not going
well. And then there appeared the broadcasts about the Astrakhan explosion
-- as if by way of response.

However, it is no longer 1999. The trial in Pyatigorsk took place
immediately after the Astrakhan explosion, and for the first time it was
decided to put a terrorism case to trial by jury. The result was that the
case just fell apart and the jury pronounced the accused not guilty. In
putting the case to a jury trial, the authorities were convinced that the
people supported the war, that they were against "blacks," and that
therefore any -- even the most groundless -- accusations would find
support, especially after the latest terrorist act.

Trial by jury provides a kind of snapshot of public opinion. It turned out
society was not minded as its leaders had assumed. The conclusion regarding
these provocations is self-evident. Provocations come in different forms.
It is possible to organize a training exercise by placing bags of "sugar"
under an apartment block in Ryazan and get caught red-handed. On the other
hand, any fight between criminal gangs can be declared the actions of
Chechen terrorists. While investigations continue to be conducted along the
"Chechen trail," any criminal group of non-Caucasian origins can sleep
peacefully at night.

Boris Kagarlitsky is a Moscow-based sociologist.

******

#8
Date: Mon, 3 Sep 2001 13:50:54 -0700 (PDT)
From: <cariboolean@yahoo.com> Gerry Schwartz
Subject: status of Stalin era buildings

The last article on today's List stated:
"The other "wedding cake" towers, among them
Moscow University, the Foreign
Ministry, a hotel and prestigious blocks of
flats, look magnificent from
the outside but their interiors suffer from
shoddy Soviet workmanship, bad
plumbing and lack of maintenance."

I disagree. I recently stayed in an apartment
in Taganka Vesotka, which is one of structures
described. Not only was the apartment extremely
comfortable and esthetically pleasing, it had
excellent plumbing in all respects. The elevators
worked fine, the building was clean.
Your correspondent should be careful when
making such broad generalizations - they are
certain to be untrue.

*******

#9
Russia: State Council's Education Reforms Meet With Skepticism
By Francesca Mereu

A high-level Russian advisory council has given tentative approval to a
long-term plan to reform the educational system. The plan aims to give
teachers better wages, make higher education more accessible, and fight
corrupt practices. But ordinary Russians, who have seen standards slip
badly in the 10 years since the fall of the Soviet Union, are now
questioning whether the new reform will fit the country's needs.

Moscow, 3 September 2001 (RFE/RL) -- The Soviet Union guaranteed free
education for everyone. The quality of the education system had long been a
point of pride for Russians; they believed it was one of the best in the
world.

But after the 1991 Soviet collapse, education declined as scarce resources
were diverted to other sectors of the economy. Schools were deprived of
resources and common teaching standards eroded.

These were the problems the high-level State Council was attempting to
address last week by giving tentative approval to a long-term education
reform plan. The council meeting brought together President Vladimir Putin
as well as cabinet members and state governors.

The core of the plan is to raise the amount of money channeled into
education and to raise teachers' salaries.

Deputy Prime Minister Valentine Matvyenko said the government would
allocate about 56 billion rubles ($1.9 billion) from federal and regional
budgets to reform the system in the next five years.

Education Minister Vladimir Filipov said monthly salaries for teachers
would be doubled to 1,200 rubles to 2,450 rubles (around $50 to $75) a
month. Teachers are among the poorest paid workers in the country.

Angelina Burdena, a schoolteacher from Tyumen in Siberia, tells RFE/RL it's
impossible to survive on such low wages. She says she keeps cows at her
home to help feed her family. Burdena says after so much work she has
little time left to prepare her lessons.

In Moscow the situation is not much better. Svetlana Ryazanova teaches in
city school Number 325. She says that in order to earn a more or less
decent wage, she has to teach from 26 to 30 hours a week.

"The teachers' wages are so low. A teacher has to work many hours to have
more or less a normal wage. A wage can range from 1,500 rubles to 3,000
rubles. It depends on the amount of hours a teacher works. A teacher has to
work 26 to 30 hours to have a wage of 3,000 rubles [about $100]."

Ryazanova says she welcomes the proposed 50 percent pay raise, but says
it's still not enough.

Olga Leontova, a schoolteacher from Moscow, says because of the low wages,
she considers teaching a hobby, not a job. She says she could never afford
what she calls a "pleasure" if her husband didn't earn enough money to feed
their two children.

Filipov says the low wages have encouraged many students to avoid the
profession. He says only about 50 percent of college students who study
teaching actually take up the profession.

The reform plan also calls for extending the length of primary and
secondary education from 11 years to 12 years and for introducing a system
of standardized tests for entering university.

But both proposals face strong opposition and are not likely to be
implemented soon.

Our correspondent reports few parents appear enthusiastic about their child
spending an additional year in school.

Galina Nazarova is choosing a school uniform for her son Dima in the
Dyetski Mir -- the biggest shop for kids in Moscow. She says that, in her
opinion, to extend the length of education is useless.

"[This new] system is too long. More subjects will be [introduced]. [Much]
more than children need at their age."

Dima, as a male, faces the additional prospect of being conscripted
immediately out of school.

Russian children typically enter school at age seven, and the 12-year
system would mean that they would finish at 18. Young men at that age are
subject to the draft unless they have certain exemptions, for example
admission to university.

Concerning the unified entrance exam for universities, the plan's authors
believe it would reduce the incidence of bribe-paying in exchange for
admitting a student since it would create universal standards.

Under the current system, Russian universities administer their own
entrance exams.

That system has encouraged development of a "cottage" industry of so-called
tutors who provide lessons to help students gain admission. In reality
these lessons are often bribes paid to members of the selection board.

Nastya is a second-year student at the Faculty of Economy. She says her
parents paid about $50 an hour to a faculty professor. The professor, a
member of the board of examiners, in turn, helped her to pass the entrance
exam.

She says at her school it is impossible to pass the exam without paying
money. She says her admission cost her parents about $2,500 in "lessons."

Dmitri Sergeev, a father of two, is pessimistic the exams will change
anything. He says that with the new unified state exams, corruption will
simply move from the universities to the schools where the exams are
administered.

"There will be [corruption], I'm sure. If it will disappear from the
universities, it will [reappear] at the schools."

Nikita Alekseev of the Russian Academy of Education agrees and says that in
Russia it will be possible to falsify the high school graduation exams, and
university professors will have to deal with bad students.

"In our country, it is possible to falsify anything. So there will be a lot
of good students, with very good marks [but all this will be false]. How
can university teachers work with them? This is a problem. [This reform] is
not part of our tradition, since [in Russia] universities are used to
selecting the students."

On the contrary, Aleksandr Gavrilov, the spokesman with the Moscow
Committee of Education, says he likes the unified test. He says that it
might reduce corruption among professors involved in admitting students,
but he thinks it still needs to be worked out.

"We [the Moscow Committee of Education] are for the unified government
exam. We think it might help to eliminate [students] paying bribes to be
admitted to an institute or a university. Moscow is not taking part in the
experiment, since we believe [that it still needs to be worked out.]"

******

#10
From: "Robert Freedman" <rofreedman@home.com>
Subject: RUSSIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST ON THE EVE OF THE SHARON VISIT
Date: Mon, 3 Sep 2001

RUSSIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST ON THE EVE OF THE SHARON VISIT
BY DR. ROBERT O. FREEDMAN
Dr. Robert O. Freedman is Peggy Meyerhoff Pearlstone Professor of
Political Science at Baltimore Hebrew University and Visiting Professor of
Political Science at Johns Hopkins University. Among his publications are
MOSCOW AND THE MIDDLE EAST(Cambridge University Press 1991), ISRAEL UNDER RABIN (Westview Press, 1995) and ISRAEL'S FIRST FIFTY YEARS (University
Press of Florida,2001)

As Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon journeys to Moscow for
discussions with Russian President Vladimir Putin, a review of Russian
policy toward the Middle East under Putin will set the stage for the
visit.

Ten years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Putin leads a country
which is far weaker economically and much less influential than was
the USSR under Brezhnev(1965-1982) or even under Gorbachev(1985-1991). The
are three primary factors which motivate Putin's policy in the Middle
East. First is the need to strengthen the Russian economy through advantageous
business arrangements with the countries of the region. Second is the need
to restore Moscow's prestige in the world by demonstrating that Russia is
still a major player in Middle Eastern affairs despite its economic and
military weakness. Third is the need to neutralize threats from the Middle
East, above all what Russian leaders call the Islamic Fundamentalism which
they are fighting in Chechnya, to the Russian Federation and to
TransCaucasia and Central Asia which Moscow considers the "soft
underbelly" of the Russian Federation.Understanding these three motivations--which are
sometimes in conflict with each other--is the key to understanding Russian
policy toward the four Middle Eastern countries with which it is most
closely involved--Iran,Iraq, Turkey and Israel.

IRAN

Iran is Moscow's closest ally in the Middle East. The two countries
have cooperated in dealing with a series of conflicts including jointly
negotiating an end to the civil war in Tajikistan,resisting a Taliban
take-over in Afghanistan(Moscow sees the Taliban as supporting the Chechen
rebels), and supporting Armenia against Azerbaizhan in the conflict over
Nagorno-Karabach. Moscow also sees Tehran as an ally in resisting what the
Russian and Iranian regimes see is an attempt by the United States to
create a unipolar world which it would dominate.

Reinforcing the diplomatic alignment have been the sale of Russian
military equipment, including fighter jets and submarines, and nuclear
technology in the form of reactors for Iran's Bushehr project.Putin
considers the sale of the military equipment so important that he broke an
agreement with the United States to cease selling arms after the year
2000. Moscow also supplies missile technology to Iran(although the Russian
government claims this is not "official policy"), which has helped Iran
develop the Shihab III intermediate range missile which is a direct threat
to Israel.

In return for Russian diplomatic support and military assistance, Iran
although claiming to be the champion of Moslems throughout the world, has
kept a low profile while Russia has twice invaded Chechnya, despite the
fact that the Russian Army was killing large numbers of Moslems , and despite
the fact that the Chechens claim that they are fighting for Islam.

While generally agreeing on most foreign policy issues, Russia and Iran
have taken different positions on developing the oil resources of the
Caspian Sea. Moscow, which has found oil in its sector, now supports the
division of the Caspian into national sectors for oil and natural gas
development. Iran, which has the smallest portion of the Caspian
shoreline, continues to hold out for an equal division of the Caspian's energy
riches. A second conflict may arise should an American-Iranian rapprochement take
place--an unlikely prospect at present. Russia and Iran would then become
competitors in providing export routes for Caspian oil and natural gas,
because the first fruits of an American-Iranian rapprochement would be the
lifting of US sanctions on the construction of oil and natural gas
facilities, including pipelines, in Iran. And Iran, as oil company
executives frequently point out, is the shortest and most secure export
route for Caspian oil.

IRAQ

As far as Iraq is concerned, Moscow has two major goals: the repayment
of more than $7 billion in debt owed by Iraq, and business for Russian
companies, including oil companies such as Lukoil, and the Russian arms
industry. Neither goal can be achieved unless the UN sanctions, imposed on
Iraq because of its invasion of Kuwait in 1990, are lifted. So far, at
least, Moscow has been unwilling to unilaterally break the sanctions
regime for fear of undermining the United Nations which Putin, as Yeltsin before
him, sees as a check on American unilateralism.Nonetheless, Moscow has
been nibbling around the edge of the sanctions regime, with "humanitarian"
flights to Baghdad, and has also strongly opposed US efforts to tighten
the sanctions. Putin may hope that with rising Arab opposition to sanctions,
the sanctions regime will collapse on its own.

TURKEY

Turkey has presented both a problem and an opportunity for Moscow. As a
NATO ally of the United States, as a competitor for influence in Central
Asia and TransCaucasia, and as the sponsor of a rival Caspian Sea
pipeline route(Baku-Ceyhan) that challenges the preferred Russian
Route(Baku-Novorossisk), Turkey has aroused the ire of right-wing elements
in the Russian political elite such as former Foreign Minister and former
Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov who have advocated a policy of
confrontation with Turkey. On the other hand Russian businessmen see Turkey as a lucrative
market, especially for Russian natural gas, and, as Russia's
leading trading partner in the Middle East, a country to be cultivated.
Putin, recognizing Russia's economic weakness, has backed the
businessmen's position on Turkey, and he has actively promoted the "Blue Stream" natural
gas pipeline across the Black Sea from Russia to Turkey. When completed,
the pipeline will provide Turkey with a major share of its natural gas
imports.

ISRAEL

Of all the countries in the Middle East, Moscow has its most complex
relations with Israel. On the one hand there are major economic,cultural and
even military ties between the two countries. After Turkey Israel is
Russia's leading Middle Eastern trade partner, although trade dropped
following the Russian economic collapse of August 1998. In addition,
Russia and Israel are cooperating in the production of military equipment to be
sold to third countries such as India and China, including refurbished
MIG-21 aircraft and AWACS command and control aircraft.Israel, at least
until the Al-Aksa Intifadah, was also a favorite place for Russian
tourists given the presence of Russian TV stations, newspapers, books and Russian
Orthodox holy places. Some Russian analysts even saw Israel as a fellow
victim of Islamic Fundamentalism, stating that Israel was facing the same
problems from Hamas and Islamic Jihad as Russia was in Chechnya.

On the other hand, Russia's population is 20% Moslem, and although
Russian Moslems are not yet politically influential, they have a limiting
effect on Russian diplomacy. More importantly, Russian "Arabists", many of
whom are holdovers from the Soviet Union, are currently working in
Russia's Foreign Ministry and Secret Police, and they advocate a pro-Arab position
for Moscow in the Arab-Israeli conflict and a return to the "zero-sum-game"
competition for influence with the United States in the Arab world. So
far, Putin has taken a middle position between the pro- and anti Israeli
groupings in Moscow and has adopted what could be called an even-handed
position toward the escalating Intifadah. He has also backed the
US-inspired Mitchell Report as the best means of returning to negotiations, and since
Russia is a cosponsor of the Middle East peace talks seeks to demonstrate
that Russia is playing a role to solve the conflict.

When Sharon goes to Moscow, in addition to discussing the Intifadah, he
will probably raise the issue of the Russian supply of arms and missile
technology to Iran--probably the most serious problem in Russian-Israeli
relations today. On a more positive note he may also discuss the
possibility of extending Russia's "Blue Stream" natural gas pipeline from Turkey to
Israel. Sharon had promoted this project in the late 1990's, but it had
been vetoed by then prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu. Given the apparent
collapse of the large natural gas deal between Egypt and Israel, the
Russian alternative may become more viable. From his point of view, Putin,
following the visit of Jordanian King Abdullah at the end of August, can
point to the Sharon visit as evidence of Russia's continuing importance in
world affairs. While major breakthroughs should not be expected from the
Sharon-Putin meeting, it should be helpful to both leaders and should
reinforce Russian-Israeli relations.

*******

#11
Transitions Online
August 29, 2001
Media Notes:
The Gilded Age
Over the last 10 years, the Russian media has never been shy about asking
for support from the state--or from the oligarchs.
by Alexei Pankin

In my previous column--inspired by the discussions in the Russian and
foreign media of the 10th anniversary of the 19-21 August 1991 coup in
Moscow--I strayed away from my traditional topic of media analysis and
published instead a synopsis of a book I was supposed to write in 1994. It
was called "From Perestroika to Perestrelka" ("From Restructuring to Shoot
Out"). With chapters like “A desire to be liked by foreigners as the main
reason for, and tragedy of, perestroika,” “The Soviet Union was too small
for them, so they invented Russia,” “Zhirinovsky as a savior of Russian
democracy” the book was supposed to convey the paradoxical, often
tragicomic nature of the events that led to collapse of the Communist
system and the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

One chapter was missing from the proposed book--the role of the media
before and after the August coup. The ensuing two weeks were full of
conversations with old friends and colleagues, fellow journalists and
editors on what had happened to us from April 1985, when perestroika and
glasnost started, to today.

So, what follows is an outline of what ought to have been said on the role
of media in the book subtitled “An irreverent inside story of reforms in
the Soviet Union.”

I asked Yegor Yakovlev, the legendary editor of the perestroika-era
Moskovskie Novosti weekly and current editor of Obshchaya Gazeta--the
newspaper created in August 1991 by journalists from banned newspapers, why
it was that the press that had fought so hard for a market economy had
proven to be unprepared for the market when it came in 1992? Here is his
answer: "Speaking about the market, we didn't have any idea what the market
actually was. Some of us fared better, some worse, in resisting the state
censorship. But we all lived on the money that the state gave us. Since
then we have come a long way. I remember times when bankers were happy to
be let in our reception areas. They were ready to pay any money for the
opportunity to participate in the media. But recently one major oligarch
told me: 'Yegor, today the press is not a commodity. It doesn't cost
anything.' And I can't even say that this is a bad thing for the media.
After all, in order for a monkey to become a human being it had to fall out
of tree and break its tail."

This candid confession of one of the most prominent figures on the Soviet
and Russian media scene leads to several important conclusions.

Under Gorbachev, media’s involvement in supporting the reform process was
largely idealistic. In a sense that they were promoting values--freedom of
the press, democracy, market economy--whose practical implications for
their own self-interest, let alone for such a country as complex as the
USSR, were unclear even for themselves. Moreover, this idealism was
encouraged by the nature of the state they were denouncing and fighting
with. Until the beginning of 1992, the absolute majority of media outlets
were one way or another funded from the state budget, and journalism was
among the best-paid occupations. Paradoxically, the final years of
communism were the Golden Age for journalists: They had almost all the
freedom of expression they could wish, they felt important and even heroic,
and yet they had no need whatsoever to think about such earthly things as
making money by actually selling their product to the audiences.

The ensuing years of Yeltsin’s rule, which with hindsight today, looks like
a time when freedom of speech flourished, were in fact characterized by the
media’s desperate attempts to restore the status quo. Faced with the
hardships of the transition to a market economy, the media were the first
to ask for state support: As early as January 1992, editors of the four
largest circulation newspapers--Izvestia, Komsomolskaya Pravda, Argumenty i
Fakty, and Trud had a meeting with Yeltsin and asked for direct subsidies.
Soon hundreds of periodicals found ways to explain to the federal and local
governments why they were exceptionally important for the new Russian
statehood and nascent democracy. In other words, it was at the request of
the media themselves that the state has remained, and remains to this day,
heavily involved in the affairs of the media, including the print press.

The wider implications were even worse. It was the example of the media
that helped convince other and more powerful interest groups like the
agrarians and the military-industrial complex that former Prime Minister
Yegor Gaidar’s liberal reforms were just rhetoric and that the government
and the president were susceptible to pressure. Thus while in word the
media split along the lines of pro-and con-Gaidar reforms, in deed, as an
industry, they precipitated their crash and laid the first cornerstone in
the edifice of an “economy of exceptions."

In addition to fostering an unnaturally close relationship with the state,
the media were equally skillful in selling their perceived importance to
politicians facing elections and to private businesses seeking state
favors. As a result, by the end of the Yeltsin era, the Russian media in
general (with hardly more than a hundred notable examples) had turned into
little more than PR and lobbying instruments for state institutions,
political groupings, and national and regional oligarchs. Since there were
quite a lot of them, media pluralism was flourishing. In fact, a good and
decent journalist even had a choice not to sell out because he could always
find an outlet to his liking and make a good living. This of course was not
a Golden Age any longer, but it was certainly a Gilded Age.

Why then today does the press “not cost anything?” By disenfranchising
Vladimir Gusinsky and Boris Berezovsky of their media empires, the Putin
administration sent a clear signal to other oligarchs: This is what is
going to happen to everyone who tries to blackmail us via the media. As one
analyst described the situation, the oligarchs had bought a sword that
suddenly turned into a guillotine for themselves.

To simplify a little, the oligarchs now face only three choices: continue
to underwrite the press in anticipation of the political weakening of the
Putin administration, learn how to run their media as businesses, or to try
to get rid of them altogether. Under all three scenarios, the bulk of the
media community brought up on the non-market values of glasnost, are in for
hard times.

Well, remember what Yegor Yakovlev said of a monkey?

Alexei Pankin is editor of Sreda, a magazine for media professionals.

*******

#12
Financial Times (UK)
4 September 2001
Labour shortages start to tell in Russia
The booming economy is forcing companies to look abroad to fill vacancies
By Andrew Jack

They board trains from Ukraine and Belarus bound for Moscow from where
special charter aircraft take them on to their final destination in
Siberia. They are technicians and engineers who every few weeks add to the
numbers on the drilling brigades of Sibneft, the Russian oil group, in the
oil town of Noyabrsk.

Russia is experiencing an unexpected labour shortage which is forcing many
companies to look beyond the regions where they operate - and even outside
Russia - to find suitable staff.

While much of the world is heading for a sharp economic downturn and
bracing itself for further job losses, Russia is in a period of strong
growth.

Gross domestic product grew nearly 8 per cent last year and is on course
for 5 per cent in 2001. Unemployment is now just 1.7 per cent, and average
wages have risen by nearly 50 per cent over the past 12 months.

"It's becoming really difficult to get the candidates that we need," says
Matthew Igel, general manager of the Moscow office of Kelly Services, the
international recruitment consultancy. "If Russia continues to expand,
there is a real question over what companies will do."

Never mind oil companies flying in specialists, he is busy enough trying to
find ordinary blue-collar workers with a minimum of education and work
experience to meet the demand from warehouses, assembly lines and shops.

"If you go to a McDonald's in Moscow today, the first thing you see is a
'help wanted' sign at the entrance," says Mr Igel, who has been
aggressively advertising recently throughout the Moscow region to meet
demand that he cannot match.

Among foreign companies, Ikea, the Swedish-based furniture retailer, is
gearing up to open a second store on the outskirts of Moscow, the
hypermarket group Metro is preparing to launch its first two outlets in the
capital in November and BP is expanding its network of petrol stations.

The Russian group United Heavy Machinery says it has over the last year
developed a special programme to find and retrain 400 Russian engineers
from throughout the Sverdlovsk region to work in its factories in
Ekaterinberg.

Others are looking abroad. Sibneft has almost trebled the number of
Ukrainians it is using in Siberia to 300 over the past two years, and
employed a third more from Belarus to cope with local shortages.

Ukraine and Belarus are popular targets because of the shared culture and
language, the relative ease of immigration and work permits, and the lower
level of economic growth. Western Ukraine was also a training centre for
the oil sector of the entire Soviet Union before it split up.

Other job-hunters are ethnic Russians from Kazakhstan, who complain of
persecution since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Aeroflot, the Russian national airline, says passenger traffic to and from
Ukraine alone has risen by nearly 30 per cent over the past seven months,
and it has added several new weekly flights to its schedule, partly to
carry migrant workers. "We are going to beat all records this year," it said.

But some Russian companies are even more ambitious. Simon Kukes, head of
TNK, another Russian oil company, recently said he was looking to hire on
very high salaries about 35 middle managers from Canada on two-year
contracts. They need not speak the language, but should be accustomed to
the extremes of the Siberian winter.

*******

#13
BBC Monitoring
Russian patriarch urges introduction of Orthodox culture subject in schools
Source: Russia TV, Moscow, in Russian 1847 gmt 3 Sep 01

The Russia TV programme "Details" interviewed Patriarch Aleksiy II of
Moscow and All-Russia on Monday, 3 September, on the occasion of his 40th
anniversary in the church. The patriarch recapped on the church's
tribulations over the past 40 years and how relations between the church
and state have changed, prompted by questions put by "Details" presenter
Sergey Pashkov. The patriarch stated that in the 1990s "we have tried to
establish completely new relations between the state and the church,
relations the like of which there have never been in Russia before".
Referring to the Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent "pilgrimage" to
the monasteries in the White Sea, the patriarch recalled that "masses of
our fellow countrymen perished" in the monasteries of the Solovetskiye
islands and that Putin backed the church in its efforts to restore the
monasteries.

The patriarch reproached the mass media for its attitude towards the
church's demands regarding its lands: "You see, this issue is being
resolved in a routine manner and the mass media have somewhat exaggerated
the fact that I posed the issue of all the lands belonging to the church
being returned. We did not put the issue like that and will not put it like
that. Today the monasteries cannot use those lands that once belonged to
them. But today the monasteries are receiving land that they can cultivate
to feed themselves and the pilgrims. I think that there is no need to raise
the issue of restitution, because it evokes many other problems, and we are
not posing the issue of having the property which belonged to the church
returned. Wherever possible the church should have returned to it the
infrastructure that it needs for the normal activity of the parishes and
plots of land that it can cultivate. And this is being done in a routine
manner."

Patriarch Aleksiy concluded that the church's main problem now was that of
education. "We understand that after 70 years of an atheistic education,
the issue should not be posed today of introducing religious education into
school or high school education. But we are proposing that the history of
Orthodox culture should be introduced as a subject, because our culture is
based on Christian principles, on Orthodox traditions, and every cultured
person should know about the principles of his or her Orthodox culture."

******

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