July 4, 2001 

This Date's Issues:   5334 • 5335

Johnson's Russia List
#5334
4 July 2001
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
DJ: Happy holiday!
1. Reuters: Alan Crosby, ANALYSIS-Russian basks in glow of renewal, investors wary.
2. Newsday: Liam Pleven, Seeds Of New Era? Private farmers struggle in Russia.
3. Luba Schwartzman: ORT Review.
4. gazeta.ru: Kremlin Law to Limit Spin Doctors' Influence.
5. strana.ru: First twenty of Russia's most influential politicians includes only one opposition figure, Boris Berezovsky.
6. strana.ru: The leading 100 politicians in Russia (June, 2001). Experts rate influence of Russian politicians.
7. strana.ru: About the nature of ratings.
8. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: Markus Wehner, Berezovsky Goes On the Attack.
9. BBC Monitoring: Russian tycoon-in-exile plans to return in near future - journalist. (Tretyakov)
10. Rossiiskaya Gazeta: ABM: PRO AND CONTRA. A round table on ABM
11. Program on New Approaches to Russian Security (PONARS: Celeste Wallander, Conference Report May 28, 2001 Policy Meeting Moscow.]

*******

#1
ANALYSIS-Russian basks in glow of renewal, investors wary
By Alan Crosby

SALZBURG, Austria, July 3 (Reuters) - Russia basked in the glow of a rare
stretch of political stability and a resurgent economy at the World Economic
Forum this week but still faces an uphill battle to lure back foreign
investors.

At the WEF's European Economic Summit, Russian business leaders and state
officials were out in full force talking up the country's "new" economy,
bolstered by recent positive economic data.

Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov told a working lunch on Tuesday that
GDP grew four percent or more for the January- May period, a figure in line
with government forecasts, adding the pattern of growth was encouraging since
it was boosted by increased domestic and investment demand.

Behind the conference stage, former Prime Minister Sergei Kirienko and other
Russian officials vigorously put forward Russia's case as an investment
destination.

The stakes are high: Russia faces debt repayment packages that will peak in
2003 at $18 billion.

Relations between Russia and the investors it needs to help provide the funds
to further restructure the economy and pay back its whopping debt have been
strained since Russia effectively defaulted on billions of dollars worth of
government treasury bills, or GKOs, in 1998.

"It is slowly turning around. People are asking questions, which is better
than it was a couple of years ago," said Bernard Sucher of Troika Dialog
Group.

********

#2
Newsday
July 3, 2001
Seeds Of New Era?
Private farmers struggle in Russia
By Liam Pleven. MOSCOW CORSPONDENT

Dyeulino, Russia - Alexander Gusyev first planted potatoes nearly a decade
ago on his sloping plot in the farmland north of Moscow, just a short
distance down the road from the large apartment blocks that house laborers on
the local collective farm.

At the time, Gusyev, a slender, weather-marked man who once shared their
work, was an enthusiastic pioneer in Russia's effort to supplant some of
those collective farms with something previously forbidden: private farmers.
But these days, Gusyev more often feels isolated in his modest farmhouse on
10 acres.

He is hamstrung by tax rules that change frequently, landing him on long
lines to fill out multiple forms. He is wary of signs of envy from former
comrades on the collective. There is no formal system to help small farms
obtain credit to buy equipment. And he says local officials won't sell him
more land, though much of the surrounding soil is underused.

Gusyev's explanation of his predicament is simple: Russia's leaders have
turned their backs on farmers like him. "There is nobody looking after our
interests," said Gusyev, who tends the land with his son, Sergei. "Not in the
government. Not in the Duma," the Russian parliament.

Eight years after then-President Boris Yeltsin took the first steps toward
shaking up the collective farm system, neither ordinary Russians nor some of
their leaders appear convinced of the merits of letting people freely
cultivate their own farmland.

Yeltsin's 1993 decree reversed nearly 80 years of Soviet doctrine and allowed
people to own, sell, buy and trade private property-abolishing a prohibition
established by Lenin during the Bolshevik Revolution. The government also
granted small plots to collective members who wanted to go out on their own.

Yet the people who were supposed to be at the vanguard of the momentous
change-private farmers like Gusyev-are still far from common. After a burst
of activity from the early to mid-1990s, there were 261,000 private farmers
registered in 1999, about 19,000 fewer than four years earlier. They work a
fraction of Russia's vast territory and produce only 3 percent of the
country's crops, according to data collected by the Russian State Statistics
Committee and the U.S. Department of Agriculture.

"The state never did anything to help farmers. It's like a bad mother,
delivering a child and then abandoning it," said Vladimir Frolov, whose
family owns a 30-acre farm north of Dyeulino.

Former collective farms, meanwhile, survive in other forms. Some have
transformed themselves into effective agri-businesses. Others soldier on with
the help of forgiven government debts, although the people who once tended
them have found jobs in nearby towns where the pay is more consistent.

Still, the government notes that a far greater percentage of the nation's
food comes from large-scale agricultural enterprises than from the kind of
small private farms that cropped up in the 1990s, the majority of which
comprise fewer than 50 acres.

In a recent interview with a Russian newspaper, Argumenti i Fakti,
agriculture minister Alexei Gordeyev said of "large-scale" agriculture, "This
is the most effective form of production in the whole world, and for Russia,
with its size, it is the only possible form." He noted also that only 50
percent of Russia's farms, large and small, are unprofitable now, down from
88 percent two years ago. "Agriculture is a very particular part of the
economy. Not everything is decided here by simple laws of supply and demand,"
Gordeyev said.

The handful of small private farmers in Gusyev's part of Russia meet once a
week at the local agricultural college to discuss how to survive despite the
obstacles they face. In the low-slung brick building, a statue of Lenin still
presides over the lobby, but the farmers in an office above are interested in
freer farm enterprise.

Most of them got their start in the early 1990s, around the time of Yeltsin's
decree. Besides the land they were granted, some were initially allowed to
buy land, paying about $100 for a hectare, about 2.5 acres.

Obtaining more land can be difficult now. The government is currently
proposing legislation that spells out how to buy and sell commercial land,
but not agricultural land, which is planned for later.

Gusyev harvests potatoes and cabbage on nearly 14 acres, but he actually owns
only 10 of them because the regional government won't let him purchase the
rest, or even formally lease it.

"If they allow me to register it as a lease, they're afraid that I'll have
the right to buy it," Gusyev said, a reasonable conclusion given the
country's vague rules on land ownership.

Private farmers also say they are sometimes resented and have occasionally
been treated like "kulaks." That is an ominous word in Russia, one that was
used by Bolsheviks after the revolution to describe prosperous peasants who
were, in some cases, exiled to Siberia, their land confiscated.

On the former collective farms now operated by big commercial interests, the
farmers said, life has changed little, and the farms don't face the same
obstacles they do. "The loans that were given to collective farms were
written off," said Sergei Gusyev as he led a visitor on a tour of the root
cellar he and his father built to store their produce. "But this loan was
paid off." Private farmers also contend they are productive, and that is
supported by official statistics, showing those who have stuck it out are
gradually harvesting more land and providing more food for the country.

"There are few of us," said Frolov. "But we show good results."

*******

#3
ORT Review
www.ortv.ru
Compiled by Luba Schwartzman (luba7@bu.edu)
Research intern at the Center for Defense Information
Research fellow at the Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology and Policy
at Boston University

HEADLINES,
Tuesday, July 03, 2001

- The government will sell 49% +1 shares of major state insurance company
"Rosgosstrakh."

- Russian divers arrive at the Scottish port Aberdin.

- The first blocks of nuclear waste may arrive in Russia for storage in
several years - President Putin is expected to sign the related bill
within two weeks.

- The commission working on the Labor Code is finally nearing a consensus.

- Mikhail Kasyanov sharply criticized European politicians at the World
Economic Forum for obstructing Russian entry into the World Trade
Organization.

- French President Chirac headed from Moscow to Samara, where he visited
space station "Progress" and opened a new regional office of the "Alliance
Francaise" organization.

- At least 30 Chechen fighters have been destroyed in the Sharo-Argun
canyon operation. Several prisoners have been taken; they include foreign
mercenaries.

- A military parade took place in Minsk to celebrate the Belorussian
Independence Day.

- Russian Justice Minister Yuri Chaika presented Boris Nemtsov with a
certificate of the official registration of the Union of Right Forces as a
political party.

- An operation to save miners in Kuzbass who were trapped in the
Sokolovskaya mine this past Sunday was successful.

- Reports from Chechnya indicate that Chechen commander Apti Kharaev and
six of his fellow fighters have been detained.

- Jacque Chirac met with former president Boris Yeltsin and with a number
of businessmen.

- The European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg has began reviewing the
appeal of General Lev Rokhlin's widow.

- Workers of the state traffic police (GIBDD, established as GAI on July
3, 1936) are celebrating their professional holiday.

*******

#4
gazeta.ru
July 3, 2001
Kremlin Law to Limit Spin Doctors' Influence
By Artyom Vernidoub

On Monday the chief of the Russian Central Election Committee (CEC)
Alexander Veshnyakov met with some of the nation’s most influential
spin-doctors. Veshnyakov arranged for the meeting after the scandalous
governor’s elections in the Primorye Region.

“It will be a very serious and frank conversation,” the CEC chief said on
June 18th after arranging the meeting with Russia's leading PR specialists .

Representatives of over 30 companies, specializing in providing assistance
to candidates in elections, attended the meeting at the CEC offices upon
Alexander Veshnyakov’s invitation.

The CEC’s secretary Olga Zastrozhnya greeted the guests and immediately
said that it is necessary to end the present circumstances whereby the PR
companies’ involvement in election campaigns is “invisible to electoral
legislation”. Zastrozhnaya announced that in the new draft bill ‘On the
guarantees of Russian citizens’ electoral rights and their rights for
referendum’ the CEC intends to include provisions pertaining directly to
the activities of political consultants, i.e. strict guidelines delimiting
spin doctors’ assistance in election campaigns.

According to the measures pertaining to the PR companies in the CEC’s draft
election law, due to be submitted to the State Duma in July, PR-firms shall
be obliged to register with the electoral committees in the place where
elections are held and publish pricelists for the services they render.

According to the CEC the draft bill is to be forwarded to the presidential
administration any day now, from where it will be submitted to the State
Duma on behalf of the president. Veshnyakov hopes the bill will be put to
the lower house before the State Duma closes for the summer break.

Naturally, the political technologists were far from pleased with the news
of such prospects. They objected and even claimed that such stringent
measures would constitute an abuse of powers.

According to the director general of the R.I.M. agency, Igor Pisarsky
“Political technologists would be replaced by administrative resources,
especially given the fact that use of such resources does not cost
extraordinary amounts. The powers that be have at their disposal means of
getting rid of extremely disadvantageous opponents,”

In addition to his argument that those in power could wantonly use their
positions to get rid of rival candidates, Pisarsky says the proposed law to
limit PR companies’ activities would inevitably force many experts
specialized in electoral campaigns “to train for a new job and to render
consulting services to entrepreneurs”.

On the other hand, both the electoral officials and the spin doctors
realize perfectly well that they are integral parts of the electoral
process, and hence, notwithstanding their differences, they still have much
in common.

The PR specialists proposed that a compromise should be sought and
suggested that a special advisory body should be formed.

The PR men suggested that such a special advisory board comprised both of
political PR specialists and election officials, be formed to discuss the
CEC’s proposed legislative measures.

Alexander Veshnyakov welcomed the proposal, thus leaving his guests with a
ray of hope that after all they could manage to dissuade the CEC from
introducing measures obliging PR firms to register with electoral
commissions.

*******

#5
strana.ru
July 3, 2001
First twenty of Russia's most influential politicians includes only one
opposition figure, Boris Berezovsky
Putin team holds very firm positions
By Nikolai Ulyanov

The National Information Service Strana.Ru is publishing on its site July 3
an expert poll called "100 Politicians of Russia" in June. Regarded as one of
the most authoritative gauges of political influence, the poll was founded a
few years ago by the editor-in-chief of Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Vitaly
Tretyakov, and the head of the Vox Populi sociological service, Boris
Grushin. In connection with the recent replacements at the top in
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, "100 Politicians" has left the paper along with its
originator Vitaly Tretyakov and will soon be published in the Internet on the
Strana.Ru site.

Leading in the June ratings with a considerable head start over the main
group of topmost politicians is Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin,
something that confirms once again the sociological data about the phenomenal
support the head of state enjoys in the principal population groups. Number
two in the ratings, also with much head start, is presidential chief of staff
Alexander Voloshin. This fact shows that the leading experts - journalists
and political scientists - are not inclined to believe periodical rumors
about his impending resignation.

Bringing up the rear of the leading threesome is Prime Minister Mikhail
Kasyanov. His high rating underscores his closeness to Putin and the
stability of his position in the hierarchy.

Three men - Sergei Ivanov, Gherman Gref, and Anatoly Chubais - are all on the
same footing, each holding places from 4 to 6. Ivanov is a poll leader of
long standing by virtue of his particular closeness to Vladimir Putin, based
on years of personal friendship. But he failed to distinguish himself in any
way as the Defense Minister last month, save for the tough position his
Ministry took at the talks with Georgia on the withdrawal of the Russian
military base from the territory of Abkhasia.

Experts had every reason to put Economic Development and Trade Minister
Gherman Gref and Anatoly Chubais of RAO UES in the 4 to 6 bracket because of
their serious victory in June over Governors and the presidential economic
adviser, Andrei Illarionov, in a stiff debate on how to reform the national
power industry.

The high ratings of deputy presidential chiefs of staff Vladislav Surkov (8)
and Dmitry Kozak (15) are indications of the stability and influence of the
administration Alexander Voloshin heads.

The First Twenty includes four members of the Big Business community, who
usually are known as oligarchs. Apart from Anatoly Chubais, they are Roman
Abramovich (Sibneft, Siberian Aluminum), Boris Berezovsky and Vagit Alekperov
(LUKoil). The fate of these oligarchs is of some interest. After Putin
realized his well-known concept of "equidistance between the oligarchs and
power," Boris Berezovsky (13) withdrew into opposition to the Kremlin and
left Russia, Vagit Alekperov (16) agreed to be "equidistant" and therefore
kept his good relations with the authorities, while Roman Abramovich (10)
formally left his companies and got himself elected Governor of the Chukot
Autonomous Area, one of the richest in mineral resources in Russia, thus
changing behind-the-scenes rope-pulling for open politics.

Interestingly, some former leaders in influence ratings - Yury Luzhkov, Yegor
Stroyev, and Gennady Seleznyov - are by far not in the lead in the
present-day political system, holding as they do 19th, 24th-25th, and 17th
places respectively. This state of affairs is the direct consequence of the
defeat the Luzhkov-Primakov block suffered in the 1999 parliamentary
elections and of Putin's reform of the system of authority, which has
dramatically reduced the role and importance of federal Parliament.

The general conclusion that follows from the June poll is that the Putin team
holds very firm positions and that the forces, which oppose it, currently
represent no serious threat (Boris Berezovsky alone has entered the group of
twenty most influential politicians). Still, it is clearly early to say that
this situation in the Russian politics is stable, because the opposition
forces normally become more active in fall.

*******

#6
strana.ru
July 3, 2001
The leading 100 politicians in Russia (June, 2001)
Experts rate influence of Russian politicians

The "VP-T" public opinion poll service is continuing to determine the leading
100 most influential Russian politicians, ranking them (from 1st to 100th)
and giving them the points they earned, establishing the "clout" of each of
them, both with a (plus or minus) sign, as well as without a sign for their
influence on the domestic and foreign policies of Russia.

The poll is based on a 10-point system. If this or that politician during the
past month did not in play any role in general, his rating was 0. On the
basis of the average number of points - without and with a sign of influence
- the experts compiled a list of Russian politicians who, in their opinion,
exerted the greatest influence on Russia's policies during the month of May.

The poll was conducted from the 20th to the 26th of June. (Following is a
list of the top 20 leading politicians in Russia.

1. Vladimir Putin (President of RF) - 7.97 (May - 7.81)
2. Alexander Voloshin (Chief of presidential staff) - 6.2 (6)
3. Mikhail Kasyanov (Prime Minister of RF) - 5.62 (5.8)
4-6. German Gref (Minister of Economic Development and Trade of RF) - 5.07
(4.97)
4-6. Sergei Ivanov (Defense Minister of RF) - 5.07 (5.04)
4-6. Anatoly Chubais (Chairman of the Board of Unified Energy Systems of
Russia) - 5.07 (5.19)
7. Viktor Gerashchenko (head of Central Bank) - 4.59 (4.3)
8. Vladislav Surkov (Deputy Chief of presidential staff) - 4.51 (4.35)
9. Alexiy II (Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia) - 4.4 (4.22)
10. Roman Abramovich (Governor of Chutkotsk autonomous district) - 4.38 (4.28)
11. Alexi Kudrin (Deputy Prime Minister, Finance Minister of RF) - 4.37 (4.36)
12. Sergei Shoigu (Minister of Civil Defense, Emergency Situations, for
eliminating aftermath of natural calamities) - 4.13 (4.47)
13. Boris Berezovsky (businessman) - 4.08 (3.89)
14. Nikolai Patrushev (Director of Federal Security Service) - 4.04 (4.3)
15. Dmitry Kozak (Deputy Chief of presidential staff) - 4.3 (4.03)
16. Vagit Alekperov (President of LUKoil Company) - 3.98 (3.49)
17. Gennady Seleznyov (Speaker of State Duma of RF) - 3.87 (3.84)
18. Boris Gryzlov (Interior Minister) - 3.84 (3.51)
19. Yury Luzhkov (Mayor of Moscow) - 3.82 (4.07)
20. Andrei Illarionov (economics adviser to president of RF) - 3.8 (3.96)

*******

#7
strana.ru
July 3, 2001
About the nature of ratings
Media effectiveness and influence in the rating of the top 100 politicians
replace political effectiveness and influence
By Marina Litvinovich, Editor in chief of National Information Service,
Strana.Ru

Today, with the kind permission of Vitaly Tretyakov and Boris Grushin, we are
posting the June ratings of the top 100 politicians in Russia. Temporarily,
these ratings will be posted on the pages of Strana.Ru. This will enable us
to follow up with our own commentaries, enabling the reader to look anew both
at the methods of compiling ratings as well as their results.

The rating experts, i.e., people that give politicians "points," in the given
case, are the leaders of the central media, well-known political observers
and political scientists. The experts attempt to gauge the role of
politicians, their "clout" on Russia's policies. The result is a list giving
"points for influence," as well as an assessment of that influence: positive
or negative.

Let's try to determine what the experts are guided by when they give points
to the politicians, and how the experts understand "influence."

As we follow the movement of politicians up and down the list, we shall see
quite a simple regularity - the more often a politician appears in the media
and the more the media talk about him, the higher his "rating of influence"
given by an expert.

This does not concern the top three - they are repeated from month to month
since they correspond to the long-standing notion about "the main people in
the country." The president, the chief of the presidential staff, the prime
minister.

But in Yeltsin's time, the picture was stably different: the main people were
the chief of the presidential staff and members of "The Family" since
precisely such a picture corresponded with the picture that the media drew
about the adoption of decisions.

Therefore, we can see that media effectiveness and influence in the given
rating take the place of political effectiveness and influence. The experts
are assessing already not the real "clout" of a politician on the adoption of
the most important decisions, but only their understanding of such influence.

Understandably, in the main, the expert's understanding is formed by the
media; it is shaped from talks with his colleagues (who also share their
"media" understandings), as well as from other sources of information, but in
no way from the real situation.

Of course, one may say that no one knows the real situation, but the
law-regulated climb by a politician up the rating ladder, coinciding with the
number of times he is mentioned in the media, allow us to come to the
conclusion about the exclusive media essence of the given rating. Whereas
real politics are built according to quite different laws, laws not of a
media nature. And the mechanisms of influence on the adoption of decisions in
the country are quite different from those that newspapers write about.

Therefore, we suggest viewing the given rating precisely as a reflection of
the media understanding of politicians. Alas, the media are the rulers of the
minds of our experts, and as long as other mechanisms of assessing
politicians have not been put forward, it is possible to make use of this
rating as well. Yet one must fully realize the nature of the rating.

Ratings in themselves represent a powerful instrument of influence that
fastens the brand that the media have slapped on a politician. This is
something that should not be forgotten.

*******

#8
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
July 3, 2001
Berezovsky Goes On the Attack
By Markus Wehner
Moscow Correspondent

PARIS. Boris Abramovich Berezovsky is sitting in the Hotel Bristol in Paris
drinking vintage red wine. He says he is doing well. He has a house and a
comfortable life here.

Nevertheless, even at this distance, Russia remains first and foremost in the
thoughts and actions of this high-class immigrant on the Seine.

Russian President Vladimir Putin does not want his country's most famous
oligarch to return home. Mr. Berezovsky does not want to be driven from the
airport to jail upon his arrival in Moscow.

But whether the setting is Moscow or Paris, the man is indefatigable. His
cell phone never stops ringing; his assistants all flutter about him
ceaselessly.

The current crisis: The Russian Prosecutor General's Office has just issued a
warrant for the arrest of one his colleagues concerning an affair surrounding
the Russian air carrier Aeroflot. Mr. Berezovsky is alleged to have funneled
$28 million from ticket sales by Aeroflot to two Swiss firms he founded. He
denies this.

"No one has been able to prove that. No one," he says.

From France, Mr. Berezovsky is sounding an attack on the Kremlin. He claims
that Mr. Putin will not serve out his term, which officially ends in 2004.

Asked if he may have lost touch with Russian reality while living abroad --
after all, the president's position appears to be growing stronger -- Mr.
Berezovsky replies that the president's "popularity is a soap bubble" that
has nothing to do with authority.

The Kremlin's candidates in Russia's regions have been losing one election
after another, a sign that people do not trust the president, he argues. What
is more, he adds, much of the country's elite disagrees with Mr. Putin on key
issues although they are afraid to admit it. As Mr. Berezovsky points out,
things can change fast in Russia.

"Who thought in early 1996 that (Boris) Yeltsin would be reelected?" he says.
"Who thought in mid-1999 that Yeltsin's opponents Moscow Mayor Yury Luzhkov
and former Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov wouldn't come to power?"

Intervention by Mr. Berezovsky helped turn the tide in both cases. Five years
ago, with the situation seemingly hopeless, he and six other oligarchs pooled
their money and media holdings to secure a second term for the ailing Mr.
Yeltsin. Three years later, Mr. Berezovsky helped build up Mr. Putin's
candidacy for president in another media campaign.

Mr. Yeltsin had few potential successors, Mr. Berezovsky recalls, adding that
Mr. Putin was a good choice, someone who would carry on reforms. Now he says
that was a mistake and consoles himself by insisting that Mr. Primakov,
another man with a KGB past, would have been worse.

But after Mr. Putin succeeded in becoming president, Mr. Berezovsky and Mr.
Putin were unable to agree on the rules of the game. Mr. Berezovsky wanted
Mr. Putin to ensure his continued political influence and says he hoped to
forge an "ideological alliance" with him. Mr. Putin, on the other hand,
expected Mr. Berezovsky's personal loyalty.

The disagreements grew between Mr. Putin and the man called the Kremlin's
gray cardinal and godfather, characterizations Mr. Berezovsky blames on those
he identifies as his enemies: the FSB -- successor to the KGB -- and the
Communist Party.

Mr. Berezovsky began to contradict Mr. Putin more and more frequently: first
on the war in the breakaway republic of Chechnya, then on the taming of the
Federation Council -- the upper house of Russia's parliament -- and then on
Mr. Putin's efforts to strengthen control over the regions.

The decisive conflict came after the sinking of the nuclear submarine Kursk
last August, Mr. Berezovsky says. The state-controlled television station
ORT, in which he held a major stake, criticized Mr. Putin's slow response as
indifference toward the sailors. Mr. Putin took this as a personal insult,
according to Mr. Berezovsky. The falling-out between the men was final.

Mr. Berezovsky brands Mr. Putin's desire to keep the oligarchs out of
politics as hypocrisy. He says the state needs capital, but that Mr. Putin
only wants to use it for his purposes. Mr. Berezovsky says he thinks that
capital determines world politics and deserves to play the leading role in
any state.

"When somebody told me (financier) George Soros was a CIA agent, I replied
that it was the other way around: The CIA is an agent of Soros," says Mr.
Berezovsky, a quip that encapsulates his view of the world.

Mr. Berezovsky says he is convinced that Mr. Putin's liberal economic reforms
will run aground on his authoritarian political regime. To stop the
president, he plans to found a liberal opposition party with the aim of
taking power legally. The party is to represent a determined, combative
opposition, not a "puppet opposition" like the Communists or the liberal
economists from the Union of Rightist Forces who curry favor with the Kremlin.

"The party I found will win the next parliamentary elections," Mr. Berezovsky
predicts. "It will be the strongest party in the country if the elections are
held lawfully." He does not regard his foreign residency as an obstacle.
Soon, he says, perhaps by year's end, the political situation in Russia will
have changed, and the powers that be will no longer be able to do as they
please. Then he can return to Russia.

Mr. Berezovsky, a 55-year-old former scientist who made a fortune in shady
dealings during the "robber capitalism" of the 1990s, has no plans to give
up. To illustrate his determination, he relates what the president of a
Slavic country once told him: "The Slavs fight until the first drop of blood,
the Russians until the last."

Mr. Berezovsky adds, "I could be wrong," but it sounds as though he were
saying, "So far it's always worked out." He still has a lot of influence, he
is a seasoned tactician, and he is prepared to act cynically -- or amorally,
as he says himself -- to achieve a goal.

"A politician can act amorally. That distinguishes him from a human rights
activist," he says. He considers himself a politician. "I've often acted
amorally, but never against my conscience." Mr. Berezovsky also has
weaknesses. One of them is that he can dissemble, but not for long.

Questioned about his poor reputation among the Russian people, he notes that
millions of Russians still supported his ideas when they elected Mr. Yeltsin
and Mr. Putin. He says that in the next election the media will no longer
play a decisive role, however, and that his party will therefore seek direct
contact with the voters.

But why should the influence of the media decrease? After all, the media
campaigns of 1996 and 1999 succeeded wonderfully in turning the tables.

"I'll put it this way," Mr. Berezovsky answers. "You told me once, and I
believed you. You told me again, and I had doubts. Now you've told me a third
time, and I don't believe you anymore."

*******

#9
BBC Monitoring
Russian tycoon-in-exile plans to return in near future - journalist
Source: Ekho Moskvy news agency, Moscow, in Russian 1145 gmt 03 Jul 01

[No dateline as received] [emigre Russian tycoon] "Boris Berezovskiy wants to
return to Russia politically and physically within the next twelve months,
and it is to this end that he has started behaving in an outspokenly
oppositional fashion," said former editor-in-chief of [Berezovskiy's]
'Nezavisimaya Gazeta' Vitaliy Tretyakov in an interview with Ekho Moskvy
radio.

At the same time Tretyakov emphasized that "Berezovskiy has good and
constructive ideas on the question of why Russia needs a strong opposition".

Tretyakov believes that "Berezovskiy is genuinely in conflict with the
Kremlin, specifically with [Russian President Vladimir] Putin".

[Omitted: Tretyakov said he had left his post in ' Nezavisimaya Gazeta' for
political disagreements with Berezovskiy]

*******

#10
Rossiiskaya Gazeta
July 3, 2001
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
ABM: PRO AND CONTRA
A round table on ABM, one of the key elements of Russo-
American relations, was held at Rossiiskaya Gazeta. It was
attended by Viktor KREMENYUK, deputy director of the Institute
of USA and Canada, Mikhail LYSENKO, acting director of the
disarmament department of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Mikhail
PORTNOI, section head at the Institute of USA and Canada, and
Grigory TISHCHENKO, section head at the Russian Institute of
Strategic Studies. Vitaly DYMARSKY, deputy chief editor of the
newspaper, hosted the discussion.

Dymarsky: I would like to ask all of you a preliminary
question: Why is it now that the USA is actively working on the
ABM idea? What interests stand behind this?

Lysenko: One of the reasons certainly concerns finance and
economy. The Americans have money to spend and they need to
spend it. The military-industrial complex is the first of the
potential recipients of financial resources. But there is a
deeper reason.

After the end of the Cold War the USA saw itself as the only
superpower, the world leader. And it set itself the task of
reinforcing its political and military-technical leadership.

Kremenyuk: I agree with my colleague but would like to add
two other reasons. The first is a desire to boost technical
progress through the powerful military-industrial complex. And
the second is a desire to revise the agreements that the Soviet
Union and the USA signed in the 1980s and which sealed Russia's
status of a great power.

Tishchenko: A few words about the US military-industrial
complex. Since the mid-1980s, the number of personnel employed
there went down by 30% and the volume of sales nearly halved.
The aerospace machine, the key element of the US
military-industrial complex, started malfunctioning. In other
words, the US military-industrial complex is sliding. The idea
is that NMD would encourage its rise.
In addition, the zone of US interests is shifting towards
Asia Pacific, which will become well nigh the main generator of
novel technologies in the next few years. This above all
concerns China, which is mentioned with growing worry in
virtually all American foreign policy documents. The deployment
of the NMD system is an indirect US reply to the growing
influence of China.

Dymarsky: Maybe the 1972 ABM Treaty has really become
obsolete? After all, times have changed.

Lysenko: We don't think it has become obsolete. The world
has changed, of course, but not so much as to discard this
fundamental treaty, which remains the cornerstone of strategic
stability. What does this mean? A whole system of agreements
allowing deep reductions of strategic armaments is inseparably
linked with this treaty.

The START-1 treaty, which is being implemented, and the
START-2 treaty include direct references to the ABM Treaty. The
spirit or the letter of the 1972 ABM Treaty can be found in
another 30 agreements. Who can say confidently that the
termination of the ABM Treaty would not lead to the collapse of
the nuclear non-proliferation treaty? Of course, the
architecture of security will not topple overnight and
everything will depend on the US ABM plans. But there will come
a time when we will have to view our national security
interests realistically. And the same goes for the other
countries.

Kremenyuk: I can understand the logic of Mikhail Lysenko,
but there are some things that cannot be disregarded. Why was
the 1972 ABM Treaty signed in the first place? To freeze the
evolution of the strategic balance and to create certain
relations between the Soviet Union and the USA. What did we
need this for? The treaty greatly contributed to the
termination of the Cold War. But what next? Cling to things
that were created 30 years ago without marching ahead? The
situation has changed.

Russia is no longer the Soviet Union, and the USA is the
largest power in the modern world. And it plans to review the
treaties that do not suit it.

The State Duma procrastinated with the ratification of
START-2 for seven years and this amounted to much too long a
pause in the evolution of the talks on the strategic balance.
That pause engendered the NMD idea. The Americans came to think
that START-2 might be a soap bubble. What should replace it?
This is when the NMD idea came to light.

Tishchenko: The entire system of agreements on arms
control was created during the era of Soviet-US confrontation.
At present the USA does not see Russia as a total adversary.
The system of international agreements was created to maintain
and strengthen stability in the world and we should respect
these rules. The system may be reviewed only in order to
strengthen it. To strengthen stability in the world.
The US proposals on revising the ABM Treaty are designed
above all to give the USA a chance to legitimately hold tests
and go over to another technological stage of the creation of
the NMD system.

Dymarsky: Russia failed to stop the Americans so far.
Vladimir Putin has made a harsh statement that actually amounts
to withdrawal from the START-2 treaty.

Lysenko: The Americans have not yet suggested anything.
They have shown us a pig in a poke. Or rather, they have shown
us a poke and we don't know what is in it. But we are already
thinking of abandoning the ABM Treaty. Why be so fatalistic?
There is another alternative: the maintenance of the treaty
allows us to carry out deep reductions of strategic offensive
weapons. There is a programme of warding off missile threats.
We should concentrate on it and search for a political way out
of this situation.

Kremenyuk: I support the idea of Mikhail Lysenko, who says
we reacted to the possibility of a revision of the ABM Treaty
too fiercely. The problem is too raw yet. This is a typically
American style. It would take 20 years to implement the idea.
But would the world collapse if the USA withdraws from the
ABM Treaty? And we will deploy more warheads and resume
military confrontation? But will we shoulder it, this military
confrontation?

Tishchenko: It is above the US aerospace complex, on which
the Republican Party relies, that needs the NMD idea. Naturally
enough, the Republicans will uphold the interests of those
companies that are linked with ABM, that is, encourage
investments into the aerospace complex.

Kremenyuk: The ABM problem shows once more that nobody
cares any longer for Russia's interests. And this is painful
for the national ego. This raises serious questions before the
president, the State Duma and our brass hats. How should we
react? Take it and smile? Pretend that this does not worry us
at all? Or start acting to prove that we still got what it
takes? I think there will be elements of the former and the
latter, and a third kind of reaction. The main thing is not to
overdo it. We should not drive ourselves into a corner.

Portnoi: A very complicated game is being played. If we
fall for propaganda tricks and start raising ado, this will
draw our attention for a long time from the key goals of
economic development. We will lose time again. And we will give
advantage above all to the enemies of the economic reform and a
market economy.

Kremenyuk: Russia is a large country that has certain
possibilities, but it is in the throes of a period when it
badly needs foreign capital, investments and technologies. We
are eating foreign foodstuffs, wearing foreign-made clothes,
and using foreign-made medicines and computers. There is
nothing humiliating in that. It only shows how much Russian
depends on the external world now. And Russia can play a large
positive role in this world - if it does not rush towards
confrontation and threats. For in this case the doors of banks
and credit organisations will be closed to us. This will be
dramatic.

Tishchenko: I believe that Russia's foreign policy in this
situation should be a policy of active neutrality. The Foreign
Ministry should prevent the country from falling into the
embrace of any bloc. The number of players on the world scene
will grow, together with contradictions among them. The battle
will become truly hot after Europe introduces its common
monetary unit, Euro.

It is believed already now that this would have much more
serious consequences for the USA than any conceivable Russian
counter-measures in the ABM sphere. Our diplomacy should
exploit these contradictions.

Dymarsky: It is believed that the NMD system is a
possibility for Bush to repay the companies that supported him
during the election campaign. Besides, can we assume that there
are contradictions in US society that could play into our hands?
Where to invest money? Into defence industries or into
transport?

Into ABM or into education? In other words, how free is the
Bush administration to act in implementing the NMD plans?

Kremenyuk: Good question. Yet I would speak not about
contradictions, but about the advantages of the American
political system. The delineation of powers and mutual
containment of different branches of power are the main
explanations of US success as a whole.

The system calls for balance; it wants to avoid the
usurping or over-concentration of possibilities in one pair of
hands.

Everything that the US president says is partially correct. It
is an attempt to repay, or at least thank, those who supported
him during the presidential campaign. But next to have their
say are the other participants in the political system. The
first will be the Congress, which will seriously correct,
proceeding from its interests, everything that the president is
doing. Next the media, a vital participant in the American
political process, will join the battle. This is why we should
calmly regard everything the US administration has to offer.

Portnoi: Russia and its leadership should in no way yield
to emotions and worsen the climate of relations with the USA.
We should elaborate a stand of friendly competition, of
pragmatic partnership. Today the USA can no longer live well
and calmly without Chinese investments. But it can live without
Russia.

Hence, the task of our country is not to dissociate itself from
the USA, but to become ever more closely integrated with it
economically, to search for free niches on the US market. We
need the USA as a source of investments. We need Europe as a
source of investments. We need very close cooperation, which
does not rule out competition and dignity. We should do what
China did, and China greatly strengthened its positions on the
US market in the past ten years.

The ado around ABM is nothing more than a propaganda
campaign, which suits Bush who wants to be remembered in
history as the man who advanced a new idea for his country.

Dymarsky: I believe that today's discussion of ABM, the
cornerstone of Russo-American relations, was fruitful. Thank
you.

(Prepared for publication by Maxim MAKARYCHEV.)

*******

#11
PONARS
Program on New Approaches to Russian Security
Conference Report
May 28, 2001 Policy Meeting
Moscow, Russia
By: Celeste A. Wallander (cwalland@csis.org)
Director, Program on New Approaches to Russian Security
[http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~ponars/
As of July 1, 2001, PONARS will be located at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS)]

On May 28, 2001, the Program on New Approaches to Russian Security hosted its
first policy workshop in Moscow with participants from the Russian foreign
policy community on the topic of the new US administration's policy toward
Russia. PONARS members are younger social scientists, primarily university
professors at leading American and Russian universities. Our mission is to
support a transnational network of social scientists and to make available
the policy-relevant implications of our research. To facilitate a productive
discussion, specific comments were off the record: this is a report of the
general points covered in the course of the discussion.

Session One

The first session focused on two fundamental issues: (1) the Bush
administration's personnel, policies, and priorities; and (2) how the United
States' position of unrivaled power in the international system affects its
propensity for unilateralism or cooperation, particularly with Russia.

Four points provide the basis for administration policy on Russia. First,
Russia's political and economic problems are enormous, and diminish its
capabilities at the international level. Second, while Russia's market and
democratic transition are in the interest of the US, we should not be deeply
involved in Russia's choices and policies. In particular, the US cannot want
Russian political and economic change more than Russians do themselves.
Third, the US should engage Russia internationally where the two countries
have common interests; but fourth, where our interests differ, that reality
should be faced and the US should not neglect pursuit of its own policy.

In US government organizational terms, Russia's policy community should
understand that the Security Council has been streamlined, and has been
designated a coordinating rather than a policymaking role. The office of the
vice president has its own foreign policy staff, which has a significant
role. Because of the administration's broader priorities, the Defense
Department will likely focus on certain strategic issues, particularly
missile defense and arms proliferation, that create the potential for
substantial differences in US-Russian interactions. The State Department's
Russia/Eurasia offices have been streamlined and reorganized as well, which
is likely to support the trend toward framing Russia policy in the context of
related issues (such as nonproliferation, European security, or US-China
relations) rather than as a stand-alone Russia policy.

Democratic control of the Senate (or even a very closely balanced Senate, if
control shifts back and forth several times more) may reinforce the emphasis
on consultation, a theme that emerged in the administration in May. It is
important for the administration to bring in the Senate on certain issues,
particularly missile defense. Divided government means that domestic politics
matter much more in all areas of American foreign policy, and Russia will not
escape these complications. American policy will be more firmly in the
political center, which potentially means compromise, but may also mean delay
or inaction because of controversy about Russia's intentions or actions.

Discussion during the session centered on whether the US under the Bush
administration will in fact tend to rely on unilateralism, or will be shaped
by Secretary of State Colin Powell's view favoring areas of cooperation among
the Great Powers. In his policies and priorities thus far (such as his major
trip to Africa and efforts to find a solution to the Iraqi sanctions crisis),
the Secretary of State has indicated that he believes that the US has
obligations to the international community, that the US must seek out the
views of other countries that are affected by the problems, and that
cooperation may support solutions that the US seeks. It is important for
Russian policymakers and analysts to understand that this is as important a
strain of foreign policy in the current Republican administration as is the
more commonly recognized skepticism of international institutions and
compromise expressed by influential politicians such as Senator Jesse Helms.
Russians should think hard about rebuffing initiatives by moderate officials,
because failure of attempts to negotiate and compromise strengthens
conservatives.

In addition to competition among officials, the question of cooperation vs.
unilateralism in US policy is affected by a fundamental American approach to
security that tends to believe that absolute security is necessary and
possible. Since absolute security for any one country tends to create
insecurity for others, American attempts to seek absolute security favor
unilateralist responses to difficult problems such as proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and missile technology. The tendency not to see
the insecurities of other states is reinforced by American confidence in the
appropriateness of our own values and system for other countries. It is
difficult to be a humble superpower when you believe everyone would be better
off if they were more like the US.

Although these tendencies are deeply rooted and unlikely to ever disappear
from American political culture, Russian foreign policy can manage the US
better if it understands the sources of its unilateralist tendencies. In
particular, a Russia that cooperates with Europe reinforces the Powell view
that Great-Power cooperation in areas of common interest can serve common
interests, and a Russia that does not seek countervailing alliances
undermines the idea that the external environment is one of threat.

Discussion also focused on potential areas of US-Russian common interest
(Europe, the Balkans, India, and possibly Iran), and areas where differences
in interests and assessment may prevail (China and NATO). Nonproliferation,
particularly in the context of potential terrorist threats, remains a strong
area for cooperation, but one still unrealized because of different
assessments about the most likely problem countries. In addition, Russia's
war in Chechnya and its perception of what needs to be done is incompatible
with close cooperation in anti-terrorism. Arms control may be an area for
future cooperation (if compromise on the ABM Treaty is possible), but if not,
fundamental differences about the role of arms control in national security
policy between the two countries will come to the fore. If it turns out that
the Bush administration chooses to pursue some form of limited missile
defense, in principle there is room for compromise, but the practical answer
will lie in the details of the program, and Russian assessments of it.

Session Two

The question of US perceptions of Russia was the focus of the second panel.
American officials and analysts recognize that Russian nationalism as a
component of Russian identity and national purpose has become important in
Russian politics and policy. However, these same people remain uncertain
about the precise form of Russian nationalism and its systematic effects on
foreign policy. They generally see the need for a Russian national idea and
its importance for national cohesion, but it remains a matter of debate
whether Russian nationalism in practice is necessarily a force for
imperialism in foreign policy--particularly toward the countries of the
former Soviet Union.

In theory, nationalism need not be tied to imperialism in foreign policy, nor
to discrimination against ethnic minorities within multinational states such
as Russia. A nation comprised of citizens defined in civic (that is, members
of a territorial entity) rather than ethnic terms is less likely to define
its national purpose in terms that inherently conflict with the independence
and well-being of other sovereign nation-states. It is also more likely to be
able to accommodate the cultural and political rights of diverse communities
within the state itself. Therefore, Russian nationalism defined in civic
terms could be a force for security in Eurasia, but an ethnic Russian
nationalism is likely both to be destabilizing and to make US-Russian
security cooperation in Eurasia more difficult.

While the bad news is that the American policy community is concerned about
Russian nationalism, it remains open to the possibility that a civic Russian
nationalism need not contribute to conflicts of interest. America's
perception on this issue remains open, and therefore can be affected by
Russian policy and behavior. Certainly, there are many at both extremes whose
views are well established, but the majority in between can be influenced in
either direction. The definition of Russia's national purpose and interests
is complicated and depends most on what the country and its citizens choose,
but it is important for Russians to understand that they can affect American
official and public perceptions. Although this distinction was generally
accepted in principle by participants, some pointed out that a non-ethnic
definition of the Russian nation is extremely difficult to achieve given the
historical reality of Russian expansion into Eurasia (in which ethnic
identity was important for national purpose and cohesion), and under
conditions of insecurity and economic deprivation.
One of the main mechanisms by which American perceptions of Russia (and other
issues) are formed is media coverage and focus. The media in the US is free
(not controlled by the government), but it is strongly influenced by
information and analysis coming from official US government sources. The
reason is two-fold: government attention serves as both an indicator of
significant issues, and as a source of authoritative information.

Therefore, the US media (and the American public) tends to pay episodic
attention to Russia simply because the US government does. It tends to focus
on issues that the government considers important as well, such as arms
control, regional security, and big issues in international economic
relations, such as large changes in trade or growth. Participants also
pointed out that America tends to be preoccupied by issues that are not the
priorities of others countries (including Russia). This means that issues
that are of much broader international concern, such as the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty, are neglected in high-level diplomatic relations and in the
international press. Because of the combination of its unmatched power and
specific priorities, the US does not play a constructive leading role on
issues it ought to pay attention to, such as nonproliferation and terrorism.

American perceptions of the Russian economy have shifted in terms very
important for future US policy toward Russia. Recognition that the Russian
economy has performed well since 1998 coexists with an understanding that
much of the country's infrastructure is crumbling, and that growth itself
does not solve the problems posed by the need for increased investment
(foreign or domestic). In addition, it is generally recognized that to some
extent the Russian government has increased its capacity to make and
implement elements of sound economic policy, such as tax reform, a balanced
budget, and debt servicing.

As a result, the West in general and the US in particular does not believe
that Russia is in need of substantial assistance from international financial
institutions. Furthermore, there is a recognition in the US that it was
counterproductive to bend IMF rules to support Russian government policies
that did not meet the IMF's usual criteria. As a result of political pressure
to loan money to Russia without the criteria being met, the IMF lost
credibility, and Russia itself suffered. The end of this pattern helped
Russia to renegotiate its debt with the London Club (private creditors),
because without IMF support Russia was less likely to be able to service its
debt, and so the debt was worth less to the private banks that held it. Since
the Paris Club (official creditors, i.e., countries) is not motivated by
purely financial incentives, it (like the IMF) has become tougher in its
policies.

The focus now, therefore, is on areas where failure to reform means a (still)
substantially dysfunctional economy. Capital flight, cheap domestic energy
pricing, barter, and other forms of covert subsidization are difficult
problems that Western countries and institutions expect Russia to solve, both
because this is in Russia's own interests, and because the Russian government
has already shown itself capable of defeating narrow interests blocking
change. Whereas in the 1990s Russian policy failure was often perceived in
the US as the result of political weakness and incapacity, failure now will
be perceived as the result of Russian political intentions.

Session Three

The third panel made clear that Russian perceptions do not accept fundamental
American intentions in Russia and Eurasia as benign. In discussing three
areas of security and regional issues-- nuclear safety programs,
Russian-Ukrainian relations, and US policy on the Caspian and
energy--participants expressed doubt about the strength of the US commitment
to a nuclear dismantlement program consistent with Russian interests, concern
about US unwillingness to allow Russia and Ukraine to work out bilateral
problems, and over a perceived strong measure of American interventionist
sentiment in the Caspian region.

From the American perspective, support for the Nuclear Cities Initiative
(NCI) to create sustainable nonmilitary industry in Russia's nuclear cities
is consistent with and necessary to the overall Cooperative Threat Reduction
program, the goal of which is nonproliferation. The US government has made a
commitment to help prevent the sale of knowledge of weapons development and
to help Russia accelerate the downsizing of the Russian nuclear complex. The
American program does not require access to the very sensitive areas related
to Russia's nuclear military programs, but rather to the cities where people
live and nonmilitary enterprises have been started. The program is meant to
provide expertise on how to attract investors, to market products, and to
facilitate access to investment. NCI reduces the cost to potential business
partners by providing seed money. There are important success stories, but
often when problems arise (such as breakdowns that require repairs), standard
Ministry of Atomic Energy practices limiting access to the entire city
complexes create costly delays that over time discourage investment. If
Russia considers these cooperation programs in its interests, it needs to
take these concerns seriously.

On Russian relations with Ukraine and countries in the Caspian region, the US
has a profound and growing sense that Russian policy is motivated not merely
by pursuit of economic advantage (although that is clearly a dimension of
Russian policy), but also by the objective of making the countries in the
region dependent upon Russia and subject to its preferences. In Ukraine, the
failures of the political leadership have left that country quite dependent
on Russia in both economic and political terms. In the Caspian, Russia has
favored pipelines that transit Russian territory. In order to limit Russian
domination of these countries against their will, the US has supported
diversification of production and pipelines. US policy is further motivated
by American commercial interests and, throughout the 1990s, containing
Iranian influence. These elements are further reinforced by the Bush
administration's energy policy, which seeks to increase and diversify global
energy as a way to cope with rising prices. Even if Caspian oil is not more
than 4-5% of world totals, it contributes to the goal of increasing supply,
and is a significant priority for America.

The discussion in this final session produced the greatest degree of
disagreement and strong criticism of US policy from Russian participants. In
particular, the perception that Russian interests and presence in the region
are inappropriate while the US mix of economic and strategic interests is not
was strongly criticized as a double standard. In particular, given the vital
importance of energy to Russia's economic well-being and the fact that Russia
itself is a Caspian country, several Russians made the point that attempts to
exclude Russia from the region affect core Russian national interests.
Important in this regard is the Russian stake in developing relations with
Iran, which is increasingly playing an important regional role--not only in
energy but in the development of political relations among the countries of
the region. This is particularly important to Russia given the war in
Chechnya, and Russian certainty that the conflict has been internationalized
by support from other Islamic countries. As one analyst pointed out, it is
possible that American objections to Russian-Iranian ties are motivated by
the intention of the US to replace Russia in the development of the Iranian
energy industry.

In conclusion, then, the workshop suggested that regional issues may be more
problematic for US-Russian relations than many assume, and may pose
challenges as great as those posed by the commonly recognized issues of
missile defense and NATO enlargement. One important implication of the
conference for both governments, then, is to devote sustained attention to
these regional issues and not to neglect them by focusing solely on NATO and
missile defense.

PONARS Policy Meeting Agenda
Carnegie Moscow Center
Moscow, Russia
May 28, 2001

Session I: Overview of Bush Administration Policies and Priorities

Policy Memos:

The United States and its Unipolar Delusion: Implications for US-Russian Relations, Ted Hopf

An Overview of Bush Administration Policy and Priorities on Russia, Celeste A. Wallander

The New Bush Administration and the UN: A Strategy of Great Power Consensus?
Kimberly Marten Zisk

Session II: American Perceptions of Russia and the Prospects for Cooperation

Policy Memos:

What Drives Russia Coverage in the Mainstream American Press? Mikhail A. Alexseev

Will the West Reduce Russia's Debt? Randall Stone

Western Perceptions of Russian Nationalism, Astrid S. Tuminez

Session III: Regional and Security Issues

Policy Memos:

Accessing the Inaccessible: The Case for Opening up Russia's Closed Cities, 
Deborah Yarsike Ball

America's Caspian Policy Under the Bush Administration, Douglas W. Blum

Ukraine, Russia, and US Policy, Mark Kramer

*******

Johnson's Russia List Archive (under construction):  http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson

CDI Russia Weekly:  http://www.cdi.org/russia

CDI Headlines:  http://www.cdi.org/

Defense Monitor:  http://www.cdi.org/dm/2001

Weekly Defense Monitor:  http://www.cdi.org/weekly/