June 21, 2001 

This Date's Issues:   5312 • 5313 • 5314

Johnson's Russia List
#5313
21 June 2001
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. AFP: Russian transition period over: IMF's Fischer.
2. Interfax: MISSILE ATTACK BY ROGUE STATES AGAINST U.S. IMPOSSIBLE-RUSSIAN PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER.
3. Interfax: MOSCOW PATRIARCHY DISAPPROVES OF POPE'S VISIT TO UKRAINE.
4. Christian Science Monitor: Scott Peterson, The new neighborhood watch, Soviet style. (druzhina)
5. AFP: Beleaguered Russians charmed by Asterix the anti-globalising hero.
6. Luba Schwartzman: ORT Review.
7. Izvestia: ALEXANDER LEBED DOES NOT WANT TO GO TO MOSCOW.
8. Oleg Dschunian: a response to Dan Cisek (JRL#5310) -- Moscow vs the rest of Russia.
9. Vedomosti: Vitaly Portnikov, THE RUSSIAN KENNEDY. One can be certain of the reliability of Russian secret services.
10. Parlamentskaya Gazeta: Nikolai Shmelev, THE SHADOW ECONOMY ISN'T EMERGING INTO THE LIGHT: WHY NOT? Does Russia have enough stamina to survive?
11. Jamestown Foundation Monitor: Putin has fallen into the trap he set up for the governors.
12. Wall Street Journal: George Melloan, Putin Needs Bush More Than Bush Needs Putin.
13. New York Review of Books: A Free Press in Russia? (Boris Jordan vs. Masha Lipman)]

*******

#1
Russian transition period over: IMF's Fischer

MOSCOW, June 20 (AFP) -
IMF deputy managing director Stanley Fischer concluded his last official
visit to Moscow on Wednesday by declaring that Russia's tortuous
post-Soviet economic transition period was over.

"It is very good to see that the Russian economy is now out of this
difficult transition period," declared Fischer, whose term as the
International Monetary Fund's number two expires at the end of the year.

Fischer spent three days in Moscow to check on Russia's financial books and
acquaint himself with the latest team of economic reformers to take up the
seemingly unending task of digging the country out of its post-Soviet rubble.

It was a visit heavy in symbolism, the fund chief assessing results of
nearly a decade of work in Moscow that had come under heavy criticism from
both Russian and Western economists in recent years.

"These have been very difficult years for Russia, but I believe now after a
decade you can finally begin to see where the improvements lie and how to
get there," he said. "What happens in the future depends on you."

Fischer agreed that favorable world economic conditions had helped Moscow
over the past year, in fact so much so that Russia has turned down terms of
the latest assistance package offered by the Fund.

But he also praised President Vladimir Putin's team for tackling structural
reforms -- such as bank sector reforms and the adoption of a streamlined
new tax code -- that had been left unattended by earlier governments.

"The IMF at this stage of proceedings has a formula: when things are going
well, we say complacency must be avoided. Not everything is perfect, but it
is better than it was two years ago," he said.

Still, Fischer's praise for Russia's economic efforts was balanced by
warnings against repeating mistakes of the past -- over-dependence on
foreign borrowing and failure to invest in long-term reforms.

He said Russia's economy was strong enough now to again tap foreign
currency markets, but only to cover the most urgent expenses.

"I think it is not too early (to speak about borrowing) provided it is very
small amounts," he had earlier told the Interfax news agency.

The Russian government had earlier aired plans to raise 500 million dollars
(581.4 million euros) on foreign markets next year. It said it had no plans
to borrow from the IMF itself in the immediate future.

Fischer also set out tough conditions for a possible debt restructuring
agreement that could help Moscow cover the mountain of obligations that
mature over the next two years.

A debt agreement "is not out of the question," said Fischer. "It depends
how the external situation develops, but I think Russia should pay the
debts if it can -- that's what debts are about."

Such a deal could be discussed if world prices on Russian energy exports
suddenly plummet, or if the government "loses control of the budget,"
Fischer said.

Yet he stressed that Western investors expect Moscow to make a firmer
commitment on debt.

"Countries should build a reputation that they are a reliable partner,"
Fischer said.

Russia will have to refund Western creditors about 18.8 billion dollars
(22.1 billion euros) under the current debt repayment schedule in 2003.

It has already pencilled in 14.5 billion dollars in debt repayments in the
2002 budget -- sums that are coming due after a decade of Western
assistance aimed at financing Russia's stop-start economic reforms.

"The impression one has is that the situation is normalizing for the first
time, and the relations between the regions and the center are stabilizing."

The Russian government earlier this month adopted the preliminary draft of
a 2002 budget that foresees 3.5 percent growth in Russia and the first
budget surplus since the fall of the Soviet Union.

*******

#2
MISSILE ATTACK BY ROGUE STATES AGAINST U.S. IMPOSSIBLE - RUSSIAN PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER

MOSCOW. June 20 (Interfax) - The Russian presidential adviser on
strategic stability issues Marshal Igor Sergeyev believes that rogue
states are unable to launch a missile attack against the U.S.

"The so-called rogues simply lack the technical potential to create
conditions for a missile attack on America," he said.

In an interview being carried by the Izvestia newspaper on
Thursday, Sergeyev argued that at the current stage, "politicians and
the military" should be excluded from the debate over the ABM treaty's
problems and "construction designers and technologists should take their
seats at the negotiating table because they speak the same language and
are able to spell out an unbiased view better than politicians."

Asked what strategy he is offering to the Russian president,
Sergeyev replied: "Now, there is no need to have 10,000 new warheads. We
need mobile and flexible strategic nuclear forces. There is no nuclear
face-off between Russia and the U.S. any longer. We should think about a
control system that would allow to re-target our nuclear potential
completely."

*******

#3
MOSCOW PATRIARCHY DISAPPROVES OF POPE'S VISIT TO UKRAINE

MOSCOW. June 20 (Interfax) - The Moscow Patriarchy takes a very dim
view of the purpose of Pope John Paul II's visit to Ukraine, outlined by
him in an address to thousands of pilgrims on St. Peter's Square in the
Vatican on Wednesday.

The pope expressed the hope that his visit to Ukraine will enable
the people of that country to acquire a new faith.

"The Ukrainian people are firm in their traditional faith and do
not seem to need an outside agency to act as a catalyst for their
spiritual revival," Father Vsevolod Chaplin, a spokesman for the Russian
Orthodox Church, told Interfax.

The pope also said that he wants to promote an ecumenical
compromise with Orthodox Christians, but the Moscow Patriarchy believes
that preparations for the pope's visit alone has brought about adverse
effects for relations between the Orthodox and Roman Catholic churches.

"One can see even today that the Orthodox faithful are very wary of
and hurt by gestures that could gloss over their continuing sufferings
and make believe that all problems have been resolved."

"The papal visit could do good if the Vatican took steps enabling
the Canonical Orthodox Church in Ukraine to lead a normal church life.
But because the pope's trip will only perpetuate the situation of
injustice, pain and suffering, it will only contribute to the
deterioration of relations between the two churches, which is seen in
the way the Orthodox Church followers react to the trip," Father
Vsevolod said.

******

#4
Christian Science Monitor
21 June 2001
The new neighborhood watch, Soviet style
By Scott Peterson
Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor
ST. PETERSBURG, RUSSIA

Every afternoon in Russia's second city, a laser technician and two college
students don red armbands and big badges to play policeman. They are among
initial recruits in a controversial effort to revive the Soviet practice of
civilian street patrols.

"Once I prevented a crime," history major Sergei Svetlichny, says with
pride as he recounts rescuing a woman from her drunken and abusive partner.

The brigades are known as druzhina, a name that recalls the Brezhnev era of
the 1970s, when youth patrols worked hand in hand with police to keep order
and report suspicious behavior.

Some hail their reappearance as a healthy step toward citizen activism,
seeing the volunteer squads as similar to neighborhood watch groups in the
United States. But critics see the move as part of a broader strategy by
President Vladimir Putin to control lives and curb civil liberties and
point to the druzhina of the past, used by the state as an ideological
brigade to curtail subversion. "They want to set up a system to somehow
control people," says Vladimir Kovalyev, a writer for the English-language
St. Petersburg Times.

But Arkady Kramarev, a former police chief and head of St. Petersburg's Law
and Justice committee, counters: "Our so-called democrats see in this a
violation of human rights - that is, hooligans' rights. They even compare
the druzhina with the stormtroopers of Fascist Germany...[but] it is a
civil activity, and impossible to construct a civil society without it."

The renewal of the druzhina is in keeping with Russian president Vladimir
Putin's emphasis on law and order. In Moscow, druzhina reappeared several
years ago after a spate of bombing attacks.

The druzhina pilot project in St. Petersburg, Putin's hometown, began last
fall and officials say they want to double the current ranks to 400.

Helping with everything from crowd control to domestic disputes, the
volunteers fill gaps left by police units who are busier with more serious
crime in St. Petersburg, known as the crime capital of Russia because of
numerous mafia-style killings.

A day on patrol

Like young police recruits, the druzhina begin their shift by gathering at
the precinct with their notebooks to hear the police blotter read out by a
uniformed officer. At 4 p.m. at one subway station, a thief stole a woman's
bag, the officer reports; a burglar stole a video recorder; a man assaulted
a 9-year-old girl - medium build, black jacket, street address. Computer
composite portraits of suspects are passed around. The volunteers, who are
paid a symbolic $20 a month, divide up, with assignments to assist
policemen at points throughout the district.

While druzhina cannot themselves legally make arrests, they often step in
before police arrive. They take down citizens' reports of crimes and report
suspicious activities.

A do-gooder bonhomie reigns among the volunteers, who speak with pride of
their role keeping their community safe, and reversing negative stereotypes
about cops.

"This is a different country from 30 years ago," says Sergei Shilov, the
microbiologist. His hair is long and wavy, a style that would have been
suspect in Soviet days.

"In Brezhnev's day, the druzhina was just for people to show off. They made
no contribution," adds Michael Djachenko, the clean-cut laser technician.
"But the risks are greater now, because crime has jumped since the 1970s."

Officials say that incidents are "greatly reduced" in areas where the
druzhina forces are active.

On a typical patrol recently, an unlicensed sidewalk vegetable seller was
forced to put away her eggplant and onions. Documents of a man wheeling a
bulky load were inspected. And a man too drunk to walk was dragged and
carried from a vodka bar to the nearby police station and locked up.
Pedestrians stared warily at the patrol, reading the lettering on the back
of their green vests: "Municipal Druzhina #7."

"It's not correct to make only the police responsible - civilians should be
engaged because crime is a common problem in society," says Sergei
Vasilyev, deputy director of the city's Family, Childhood and Youth
committee, which runs the druzhina program along with the police.

"Reactions are good, because people feel the druzhina are a real source of
help," he says. "They do not look like an oppressor, or as a physical
force, and are much more merciful than police."

Disturbing trend

But some observers say the druzhina are part of a troubling anostalgia for
Soviet-style order. Evidence of a trend to revive the past is growing: A
new directive of the Russian Academy of Sciences that requires scientists
to report on any contacts with foreigners - just like in Soviet days. A
severe clampdown has hobbled the independent press; and a proposed state of
emergency bill is being criticized as allowing arbitrary arrests.

Plans to outfit the druzhina with police-like uniforms and nightsticks -
though legally they can't make arrests - compound concerns of critics.

Kovalyev, the journalist, says he has been stopped by four tipsy young men
in plainclothes, who said they were employed by police. He suspects they
were druzhina. He says using scarcely trained volunteers will do little to
stem crime. "Who are these people?" he asks. "Just ordinary people who know
nothing of the law."

While druzhina patrols may be a throwback, they could also be a limited
one. "Now in Russia, it is a fashion to revive some institutions of the
Soviet period," says Konstantin Preobrazhensky, a former KGB lieutenant
colonel in Moscow.

The new patrols could be an initiative by local security officers to "write
a beautiful report about working with the common people," he says, or "a
way to recruit new informants." Either way, they are likely to be less
"dangerous" to civil liberties than other steps the Kremlin is taking, he
says.

"It could be a good thing, to some extent," says Mr. Preobrazhensky. "They
could help stop hooligans."

For the students taking part, any greater aim of the Kremlin is lost among
their own, personal motives.

Mr. Shilov, pulling on an earring in his left hear, says: "Before, I
thought all police were bad people. Now I realize they can be a pleasure to
deal with, and that my beliefs were just prejudices."

Such thinking is what helped drive senior police inspector Andrei Gribanov
to propose the draft druzhina project in 1999. "It is important for youth
to be involved in something," says officer Gribanov, who wears the typical
Russian police black leather jacket, which usually inspires as much fear as
confidence. "Here, their mentality changes. They really grow up."

A history

Russia's first druzhina was organized in the 1880s as a loyalist volunteer
security force to help guard tsarist processions and statesmen. In the
early Soviet period, brigades of workers and peasants were used to crack
down on crime. Later, zealous Communist Youth League members became members
of druzhina units. But by the 1980s, with enthusiasm for communism and
ideological vigilance on the wane, most volunteers were in it only for the
extra time off offered as incentive for joining.

Mr. Svetlichny, who is now considering a career in the Federal Security
Service, the successor to the KGB, says he joined the druzhina because
there were few other positions left open at a university job fair. "I
didn't want to be a waiter, and at first, this didn't appeal to me either,"
he says. "Then I became attracted to the work itself, and even more when I
realized that we are contributing to a safe atmosphere."

*******

#5
Beleaguered Russians charmed by Asterix the anti-globalising hero

MOSCOW, June 20 (AFP) -
A French publisher is planning to cash in on the newfound passion for the
comic-strip hero Asterix in Russia where the battling Gaul has been
embraced as a doughty fighter against the globalising forces of the Roman
Empire.

"Asterix and the Goths" went on sale in Russian for the first time last
week and five more adventures are due out in the autumn, Emmanuel Durand,
an independent Moscow-based publisher, told AFP.

The initiative arose by chance last year when Durand heard from translator
friends that they had already written Russian-language versions of several
Asterix stories for the benefit of their children.

Its chances of success have been boosted by the timely release in Russia
last November of the French film "Asterix and Obelix against Caesar"ticket
sales) and its subsequent screening on Russia's main television channel in
January, which has given rise to a flourishing trade in pirated taped
versions and video games.

"It's a bit of a gamble as there's no tradition for strip cartoons in
Russia, and Russian readers rather look down on them as an inferior form,"
Durand said.

"However they loved the film, and its idea of a brave, beleaguered people
holding out against invading forces," he noted.

Placed on the margins of Europe, and with a tradition of resisting foreign
invasions that goes back to the time of Napoleon and beyond, it was perhaps
natural that Russians should identify with the mustachioed warrior and his
menhir-toting companion Obelix.

Albert Uderzo, one of the cartoon's creators (with the late Rene Goscinny),
told Durand he was "well aware there is a political side to Asterix, all
the more so since it is based on reality: the Roman colonisation is a
historical fact."

Asterix "has been adopted by minorities the world over," Uderzo noted,
recalling reproaches that he had given moral support to various separatist
factions ranging from Breton nationalists, the ETA extremists in Spain's
Basque country to the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland.

Around 300 million copies of Asterix albums have been sold since the first
rolled off the presses in 1961. The more than 30 adventures have been
translated into 80 languages, including regional dialects such as Bavarian
and Sorb.

Durand is planning to publish the entire Asterix oeuvre in Russia,
following up with "Asterix and Cleopatra" -- timed to coincide with the
release of the forthcoming film -- and four others in September.

The first print run of 5,000 copies of "Asterix and the Goths" has been
selling well, Durand said, though some readers had expressed disappointment
that the cartoon figures did not resemble Christian Clavier and Gerard
Depardieu, the actors who had embodied them in the recent film.

The figure appears low, but in the present depressed state of the Russian
publishing industry a print run of 3,000 is regarded as respectable.

The venture marks Asterix's first introduction to Russia, apart from a
limited edition of 100 copies that appeared in "a poor translation" in
Lithuania a few years ago, prior to that country's independence from the
Soviet Union.

The successful Russian launch accomplishes one Uderzo's two last ambitions
for Asterix. His remaining wish is to see his creation break into the
American market, which has so far remained impervious to his Gallic charm.

*******

#6
ORT Review
www.ortv.ru
Compiled by Luba Schwartzman (luba7@bu.edu)
Research intern at the Center for Defense Information
Research fellow at the Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology and Policy
at Boston University

HEADLINES,
Wednesday, June 20, 2001

- The President is not happy with the rate of reconstruction in Yakutia.
This morning Putin met with Gosstroi chairman Anvar Shamuzafarov and
expressed his displeasure with the fact that it took three weeks just to
create a nine-page plan.

- In the Crimean Parliament discussion of the work of the Council of
Minister led to violence. Cabinet members did not shy away from fighting;
Minister of Economy of Crimea Gennady Govorushchenko was scratched to
blood.

- State Duma deputies to be working on the second reading of the draft for
the new Criminal Code late into the night.

- Eight men have been detained in Gudermes in connection with yesterday's
triple car explosion in which three died and 34 were injured.

- Former governor of Primorskii Krai, Yevgenii Nazdratenko, spoke about
the results of the election for the first time. Now chairman of the State
Committee on Fishery, Nazdratenko said that Sergei Dar'kin is not a bad
choice, that the 39-year-old is well-versed in economics and isn't
spiteful.

- Tax evasion reported in Kaliningrad. A "champagne" wine factory is a
debtor on the books, while its port wine sales are through the roof.

- Miners continue to picket against the new Labor Code at the Gorbatyi
bridge despite lack of official approval. They plan to remain there until
the 22nd.

- Former KGB General Oleg Kalugin testified that U.S. Army Colonel (Ret.)
George Trofimoff (of Russian heritage) was a Soviet agent.

- Russian-German talks on compensation to Russian citizens used for slave
labor during WWII are ending in Berlin. Lack of faith in the Russian
banking system had been the main reason for the hold-up.

- June 20 is International Refugee Day. Over the last few years this
issue began to affect our country as well. According to international
organizations there are 300,000 forcibly displaced persons in the North
Caucasus alone - half are children.

- A military-historic conference to commemorate the 60-year anniversary of
beginning of World War II has began in Moscow.

STORY OF THE DAY


RUSSIAN PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN MET WITH BELORUSSIAN PRESIDENT ALEKSANDR LUKASHENKO AT THE KREMLIN TODAY.
THE TWO LEADERS DISCUSSED ISSUES FACING THE UNION GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING VITAL ECONOMIC QUESTIONS.

One of the more sensitive topics of today's discussions was the
introduction of an added value tax, to be collected in the producer
country. This would mean that, unlike in trade with other CIS nations,
taxes from oil and gas deliveries would remain in Russia. Vladimir Putin
tried to ease Belorussian concern.

Vladimir Putin: "We'll make sure that Belorussia does not lose out."

The Belorussian president is also sure that two governments that are so
close would find a mutually agreeable solution in any sphere.

Aleksandr Lukashenko: "I also think that we will always be able to reach
an agreement."

Another topic that worries Minsk is the 30-million [currency?] credit
promised by the Central Bank back six months ago. Also, the presidents
discussed the creation of an attractive climate in Belorussia for Russian
investment, and Minsk's participation in certain oil/gas projects in
Russia.

Vladimir Putin thanked Aleksandr Lukashenko for taking the time for a
two-day visit in this very heated time in Belorussian political life.
Less and less time remains until the presidential election. Candidate
registration has already began.

Vladimir Putin: "How many are registered?"

Aleksandr Lukashenko: "About 25... in short - the competition will be
serious."

Aleksandr Lukashenko doesn't hide the fact that he came to Moscow in order
to secure the support of his colleague before the elections. At the same
time, he explains, the two sides are discussing very important questions,
like the organizing the work of CIS observers at the upcoming elections.

ODNAKO

Today's "ODNAKO" program with Maksim Sokolov covered the following
points:

[Sverdlovsk Oblast Governor Eduard Edgartovich Rossel's suggestion that
the Sverdlovsk Oblast government should receive legislative control over
the fight against drugs and his earlier assertion that the death penalty
should be introduced for selling narcotics.]

Sokolov questioned how Rossel would deal with the police involvement
in the drug trade - not only as passive observers, but also as salesmen
and "krysha" (protection) providers. Sokolov noted that Rossel hadn't
been able to stop them in the past.

[Former KGB General Oleg Kalugin's testimony against U.S. Army Colonel
(Ret.) George Trofimoff]

Sokolov suggested that if a former spy claims to have "chosen
freedom" (over becoming a double agent) he should not rat out other
agents.

[The All-Russian democratic congress that took place in Moscow yesterday
on Yabloko's initiative.]

Sokolov recalled that fellow speakers Mikhail Gorbachev and Valeria
Novodvorskaya, currently allies in their struggle for democracy, had been
enemies in 1990, when the latter called Gorbachev a fascist and was
brought to court for this.

******

#7
Izvestia
June 20, 2001
ALEXANDER LEBED DOES NOT WANT TO GO TO MOSCOW
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]

On June 19, Krasnoyarsk Governor Alexander Lebed accounted for
economic achievements of his region for the past three years.

Lebed's main dream is to make the Krasnoyarsk Territory the
Russian New Hampshire. In other words, all Russian regions should
follow the example of Krasnoyarsk. For the sake of these plans Lebed
is ready not to return to Moscow.

Lebed has several reasons for optimism. For instance, influence
of the criminal community in the territory is going down, and
according to the latest opinion polls, up to 52% of inhabitants of the
territory consider themselves to belong to the middle class. The
governor believes that investments grow as long as crime is reduced.

*******

#8
From: oleg@btinternet.com (Oleg Dschunian)
Date: Wed, 20 Jun 2001 11:17:56 00100
Subject: a response to Dan Cisek (JRL#5310) -- Moscow vs the rest of Russia

A valid argument on the differences between Moscow
and provinces from Dan Cisek (JRL#5310) -- but a tired
one. It's one of the cliches "yes, but..." answers that can
possibly counter any meaningful discussion about
Russia's progress over the last 10 years.

When thinking about the life in the US, a foreigner is
much more likely to think of the developments in New
York and Chicago rather than San Jacinto, TX (no
offense to Texans on this list, I lived in Houston for a
year and loved it!). It's what happens in a few major
cities that determines what happens in the country. This
is a typical implication of the 80/20 rule -- 80% of life is
concentrated in 20% of territory. Civilization is about
CITIES. That's how most of the states started. The US is
not a very good example, because it's more evenly
spread-out, but take Greater London out of the UK, and
the rest of the country will rank in wealth between
Portugal and Greece -- the least developed in the EU.

Russia is not unique among northern countries --
Canada, Norway, Sweden and Finland have similar
concentration of economic life around major cities,
predominantly in the South where the climate is more
agreeable.

But it's size that matters. Officially at 10 million (but
unofficially I'd say as much as 12), Moscow's population
is greater than that of many COUNTRIES in Europe --
Austria, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Belgium,
Switzerland, Czech, Hungary to name but a few. Moscow,
and its new wealth, really determines what's happening
in Russia. Yes, it has Mercedes dealerships and bowling
alleys, sushi restaurants and yes, 25,000 billboards,
which are not to be found in Klin, 80 km down
Leningradskoye chausse. But who cares? It's an
enormous country, there's too much space. And
besides, Moscow's wealth is spilling over. Just look at
the construction and infrastructure development within
150km radius from MKAD. Other big cities are catching
up as well. Give us some time.

I'd go as far as saying the following: consider Moscow to
be a European country. I think it qualifies. We also have
St Pete, Nizhniy, Novosibirsk, and a few other industrial
centers. The rest of the territory are remote, poorly
managed colonies. What should an observer be
interested in -- the wastelands of tundra with more
bears than people per square kilometer, or a few cities
which staged the grandest experiments that Russia
conducted upon itself over its short history? If you ask
me, the answer is obvious.

******

#9
Vedomosti
June 20, 2001
THE RUSSIAN KENNEDY
One can be certain of the reliability of Russian secret services
Author: Vitaly Portnikov
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
PUTIN'S SECURITY IS BEING STEPPED UP, AMONG CONSTANT REPORTS THAT HE FACES A THREAT OF ASSASSINATION. HOWEVER, THE REALITY IS QUESTIONABLE - THIS MAY JUST BE A CLUMSY ATTEMPT TO BOOST HIS POPULARITY. ECONOMIC PROGRESS SEEMS TO BE THE MOST EFFECTIVE MEASURE TO KEEP THE PRESIDENT'S POPULARITY RATING STEADY.

Somebody is always trying to kill President Vladimir Putin. Once
a certain, quite obviously not accidental, Russian-made car rammed
foreign cars of the presidential escort; another day the Chechen
terrorists made their presence known. On June 19 all mass media
reported a new reinforcement of the presidential security. In
Yeltsin's time, rebukes that the president had too much authority and
the Federal Security Service had been indecently expanded by Alexander
Korzhakov. Putin lacks Yeltsin's authority and his security. However,
nobody is resentful. Everybody understands: it's necessary to guard
the president, since he is very popular...

Actually, unskilled image-making actions, summoned to create an
impression that the president is under constant danger, only do Putin
harm. The fact that reports of possible murder attempts may restore a
shaken popularity rating, at least in non-democratic societies, is
well known. However, Russia is quite apparently not among the states
which have a dictatorship. President Putin doesn't suffer from a
declining popularity rating. Can it be that the PR structures close to
the Kremlin release reports different from what they really publish?

Another serious drawback connected with releasing reports of the
danger which seemingly threatens the Russian president is an attempt
to relate reinforcement of the president's security with the
increasing activities of the Chechen terrorists. Running in the
president's election campaign, which was taking place against the
background of the second war in Chechnya, the head of state promised
the Russian people to guarantee their safety and root out terrorism
once and for all. Over a year has passed since that time. What are the
results? President Putin himself is afraid of the Chechen terrorists;
they can threaten him during trips around the country, during
international visits... However, if even a person in the Kremlin
bewares of the terrorists, what an ordinary resident of Mineralnye
Vody, Stavropol, Budennovsk or a Moscow bedroom community is supposed
to think? Where's the safety which was promised during the
presidential election campaign?

Similar thoughts would never promote to an increase in the
president's popularity rating. Vladimir Putin shouldn't be turned into
a Russian Kennedy. One thing you can be certain of is the reliability
of the Russian secret services: in the long run, the state has been
developing them for eight decades without even an instant recollection
of ordinary citizens. President Putin possesses another more powerful
and effective means of increasing his own popularity rating - economic
changes, which would lead to an increase in the level of the life
standards in Russia ad would allow our country to be on equal footing
with the West not from the point of the military force and competence
of security agents, but from the point of life standards. That's when
the president's popularity rating is guaranteed without any additional
clumsy effort.

(Translated by Andrei Ryabochkin)

******

#10
Parlamentskaya Gazeta
June 20, 2001
THE SHADOW ECONOMY ISN'T EMERGING INTO THE LIGHT: WHY NOT?
Does Russia have enough stamina to survive?
Author: Academician Nikolai Shmelev
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
THERE HAVE BEEN QUITE A FEW SIGNS OF IMPROVING HEALTH IN THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY. IF THE GOVERNMENT MADE SOME EFFORT TO AID RUSSIAN INDUSTRY, THE IMPROVEMENTS WOULD SPREAD BY THEMSELVES THROUGHOUT THE ECONOMY, AND WE WOULD BE ABLE TO SURVIVE THE THREATENING YEAR OF 2003.

Eighty percent of the Russian population is living below the
poverty line. There is an energy crisis in the Far East. The bleeding
wound of Chechnya will not heal.

Despite this grim situation, I'm trying to be optimistic. Even
despite the gloomy forecasts from the west: until 2015 we will be
unable to integrate into the global economy, at best with all our
economic growth we will be able to produce one fifth of the GDP of the
United States....

By the way, one fifth is not such a bad index. In my opinion, if
we manage to produce one tenth, it will be fantastic. Are there
reasons to believe that we will be able to do this? I think, there
are. For, first of all, the "natural forces" will influence it. Aren't
"shuttle traders" good proof of these "natural forces", of great
stamina? And there are no fewer than 10 million of them; taking their
families into account, that's 30 million people. Of course, from the
taxation viewpoint, it is bad that the shadowy economy is growing
faster than the official one. However, on the other hand, it is a sign
of good stamina.

Are things as bad, that there is nothing else in Russia except
for "shuttle traders"? Can we see any light at the end of the tunnel?
There is some light. One can't fail to notice that presently there is
more or less enough cash money in circulation; there are very few non-
payments - in fact, these are signs of recovery. They say barter has
suddenly fallen from 50% to 20% - it is also a sign of improving
health of the state. Perhaps, the recent statement of the Russian
government that this year and the next year the economy is likely to
keep growing is also a sign of better health. However, is there any
economic growth at all? And if there is, what is it? I think it is
real enough. Actually, there is nothing unreal that we managed to
achieve a 5-7% annual GDP growth after the 1998 default, as well as
the 9-10% in the half-dead industry. The other thing is whether the
shadowy economy will come out finally? It is good that the government
has not made any serious mistakes. I wish it would not do any in the
future, or we will have to catch up with the missed today's level for
decades.

The main sign of the economic growth (which is not paid much
attention to) determined in 2000. The Russian business world finally
began to understand that the time of "crazy money" has come to an end
in Russia. Now it is impossible to legally receive 300% of yearly
profit!

The stage of financial pyramids is also over. It is time to get
used to normal profit norms, to normal capital interests of 10-15%,
which are usual all over the civilized world. To my opinion, the inner
chaotic dynamics of the economy, which is sometimes obvious, must
determine our development next year. If there is no any unexpected
disaster, such as an oil price fall or a dead loop tightened on
Russia's neck. But we hope that the IMF financiers are not sadists!
And the OPEC is hardly likely to allow oil prices to suddenly fall, as
it happened two years ago. The oil price is highly likely to remain at
the present $20-21 per barrel - hopefully, the sense of reality has
not let our strategists down. This or the next year are not very
dangerous for Russia. However, 2003 is rather scary. It is no accident
that according to the majority of economic horoscopes, in 2003 there
will again be a danger of financial crisis in Russia. We will have to
pay out about $15 billion dollars of foreign debts. And this is rather
frightful. However, we have two years ahead of us, and it is quite
possible to prepare for the worst in the next two years. So, at
present it is hard to believe in some financial disaster.

On the other hand, it is easy to believe in other thing: all our
major industrial resources are growing old. And it is necessary to
replace many of them. And this demands huge investments. And this is
really scary, because this is a colossal historical task for Russia.
To put it rough, we started reforms having a third of the industrial
potential of the country out of operation. This potential would not be
able to work under any conditions, it is necessary to close it.

In fact, the whole Russian industrial growth is provided for by
only two thirds of main resources. Last year, first signs of
improvement in this area appeared. Those were very small sing, but
they were. Oil and gas enterprises felt rather good. The metallurgy
industry slightly started stirring. The hi-tech sector of the defense
industry was partially involved.

Now, the main thing is to support all these moves and stirs. It
would be great to relieve investments to the technical progress from
taxes. And of course, it would be really great to receive
administrative and economic aid from the government. Then, the wave of
stamina and moving forward will spread all by itself, throughout the
whole Russian economy. I'm sure this will happen, and then we will be
able to survive the scary year 2003.

However, one more condition is to be met: we should not rush with
privatization of the three Russian natural monopolies: gas,
electricity, and railroads. I would also add postal services here.
Yes, they do need a reform, but a reform as a direction, as a goal; in
some years, gradually...

(Translated by Arina Yevtikhova)

******

#11
Jamestown Foundation Monitor
June 20, 2001

Putin has fallen into the trap he set up for the governors
PUTIN HOISTED WITH HIS OWN PETARD? On June 14, the State Duma
 passed in a third reading a law forbidding regional governors and city mayors who step
down from their posts before the end of their terms from running in the
next elections for their former posts. The measure was passed 302 to one,
with five abstentions. A measure requires at least 226 votes for passage
(Lenta.ru, June 14). The new law, which was in fact an amendment to
existing law, was drafted by the Central Electoral Commission and submitted
to the Duma over President Vladimir Putin's signature. It closes the
"technological move" much beloved by governors: relinquishing their posts
in order to win pre-term elections held at a time advantageous for them
(Vremya Novostei, June 14). Samara Governor Konstantin Titov and Kemerovo
Governor Aman Tuleev played this method successfully, even as the
preparations for Primorsky Krai's pre-term elections took place amid
constant warnings that former Governor Nazdratenko would run again.
Nazdratenko's decision not to do so was a magnanimous gesture on the part
of a regional leader whom the Kremlin had with great difficulty persuaded
to step down before his term was over and who had been compensated by the
post of head of the State Fisheries Committee.

The new law is part of a package of legislative initiatives aimed at
limiting the arbitrary power governors have in preparing and conducting
their election campaigns. Also included in the package are draft amendments
to the law on the formation of bodies of state power in the regions, which
would restrict the number of governors having the right to run for third
terms. Other initiatives would require all gubernatorial elections to be
held in two rounds, and that elections for regional legislative organs be
held according to a mixed proportional-majoritarian scheme.

These initiatives are unlikely, however, to have an easy passage. Indeed,
the law forbidding governors and mayors from stepping down early and
running immediately for their former posts is widely expected to become
bogged down in the upper house of parliament, the Federation Council
(Parliamentskaya Gazeta, March 14). Even if the law is somehow pushed
through the Federation Council, it will probably not be signed into law by
the president. That, at least, is what Aleksandr Kotenkov, the presidential
representative in the Duma, stated after the bill received its second
reading. The fact is that, during the examination of the law, Boris
Nadezhdin of the Union of Right-Wing Forces added an amendment to extend
the ban from the governors to the president himself (Russian agencies, June
13).

Pointing out that the procedure for electing the head of state is
established by the constitution and cannot be changed by a federal law
(NNS.ru, June 14) Kotenkov confirmed that the Kremlin would seek the draft
law's return in the first reading (NNS.ru, June 13). These attempts,
however, were apparently unsuccessful. The law has now gone to the
Federation Council. The current state of affairs gives the advantage to the
governors who do not, of course, want such limits. Thus it is that Putin
risks turning into the guarantor of the interests of those against whom he
has been waging a war for more than a year, attempting to limit the Russian
state's centrifugal tendencies.

*******

#12
Wall Street Journal
June 19, 2001
[for personal use only]
Putin Needs Bush More Than Bush Needs Putin
By George Melloan

One reason the Bush-Putin meeting in Slovenia went so well was that the
Russian president knows his country needs help. His response to George W.
Bush's affirmation that "Russia is part of Europe" was almost touching.
"This means so much to us," he said. Clearly, Vladimir Putin wants to
extract Russia from Europe's isolation ward.

The U.S. president called Mr. Putin a man Americans can trust, an even
greater leap than acknowledging that Russia is a part of Europe. Americans
are not accustomed to trusting Russians, for good historical reasons. But
it was a nice thing to say, and all the Russian president has to do now is
to prove it.

He surely will try, within the limited means available to him. He presides
over a state in which the forces of good and evil are delicately balanced.
Communist reactionaries are still trying to turn back the clock to the old
days when party bureaucrats made all the rules. Only the bravest foreign
investors are willing to take a flyer in an economy where legal protections
of property are nearly nonexistent.

Surface appearances conceal a sick society. Adam N. Stulberg of the
Carnegie Corp. of New York writes that "Russia is confronting multiple
subsets of tightly linked social, economic and national security problems
..." The total population has declined 3% since the Soviet collapse, with
the death rate exceeding the birth rate by 50%. The high rate of female
infertility is "the consequence of multiple (and frequently botched)
abortions and a surging incidence of sexually transmitted diseases." Life
expectancy at birth "dropped 3.2 years from 1987 to 1998 and only partially
recovered from the transition period low of 64 years in 1994."

As to national security, the Russian military remains mired in Chechnya
with no end to that nasty war in sight. Geoffrey Forden of MIT writes in a
Cato Institute report that Russia's early warning surveillance satellites
have started to drift off course and can be depended upon for only 17 hours
a day. That raises the danger of the Russian military getting a false
signal of a missile attack and responding in kind. This is a nation that
clings to an obsolete anti-missile treaty! Russia has just reneged on its
promised timetable for destroying its huge stockpile of chemical weapons,
citing a lack of money.

On the brighter side, the Russian economy has reversed the slide that began
following the Soviet collapse. Some Russians say that the collapse actually
began 83 years ago when Russia embraced communism, so last year's 8% gain
was a historical first. The state budget, which depends heavily on export
duties, has been in balance for two years and inflation diminished in 2000.

But all this was mainly a result of the upswing in oil and gas prices. Oil,
gas and metals account for 75% of Russian exports. Hence, continued success
is dependent on what happens in global markets, and the latest economic
news, showing the economic growth rate slowing, is less encouraging.

There are reasons to doubt Mr. Putin's capacity to deal with Russia's deep
problems. Although still in his 40s, he is a product of the old system,
having made his bones as a KGB officer monitoring the rotten East German
Communist regime. Human-rights observers fear that the KGB, now called the
FSB, is becoming more repressive. It is suspected that Mr. Putin and his
cohorts engineered the downfall of Vladimir Gusinsky, former owner of NTV,
whose commentators were often critical of the government, particularly with
regard to Chechnya. Mr. Putin built his popularity among Russians by
claiming the Chechens were terrorists who deserved no quarter.

But there is a flip side to Mr. Putin. He has a serious program for
building a Russian market economy. Moreover, he appears largely to have
overcome the Communist mossbacks in the Russian Duma who blocked so many of
Boris Yeltsin's reform efforts. The four pillars of Mr. Putin's program are
reforms of the tax code, the court system, banking, and land ownership.

Tax reform is moving nicely through the Duma under the guidance of
Alexander Zhukov, chairman of the budget and taxation committee. It calls
for a further reduction of the flat tax on personal income to 13% from 15%.
Mr. Bush mused in Slovenia that he wished he could sell a flat tax to
Congress. Mr. Zhukov told Journal editors in New York recently that the
flat tax has reduced tax evasion and increased revenues. The latest reform
also will cut corporate taxes. Russian exporters still complain about high
export duties on commodities, which are tied to world dollar prices and are
thus highly unpredictable. But most are able to retain enough hard currency
to carry on their businesses.

Court reform is a high priority for Russian business. The Russian Union of
Industrialists and Entrepreneurs wants a reliable system for resolving
contract disputes. Obviously, such a system would be a big factor in
creating trust among foreign investors.

Banking reform is vital as well. Most Russian "banks" are hardly worthy of
the name, since they mostly engage in speculation. They don't even offer
checking accounts, and are so weak at financing development that some
industries have set up their own internal banks.

The biggest issue is land reform. The goal is to provide farmers with clear
titles to the land they farm, making it possible for them to buy and sell
land. This is a direct challenge to the communist doctrine that all land
must belong to the "people," which in practice meant that it belonged to
nobody. State farms were unproductive resting places for underachievers.

Efforts by Mr. Putin's economics capo, German Gref, to shepherd this reform
ran into stiff resistance in the Duma Friday. Communist throwbacks unfurled
a banner declaring, "To sell land is to sell the Motherland." Later,
fistfights broke out among members. Yet the bill passed on first reading by
251 votes to 22 in the 450-seat house.

If Mr. Putin can keep these four reforms going, there is a prospect that
Russia will finally install genuine property rights. At that point, the
Russian economy will be set on a path of broad-based growth and
development. Living standards will improve, and social conditions with
them. Mr. Bush isn't offering big dollops of aid, à la Bill Clinton and Al
Gore. He knows that the only way these reforms will happen is if Russians
themselves grow tired of their sad lot and set about to make them happen.
Russians will then become a part of Europe, just as Mr. Bush promised.

******

#13
New York Review of Books
July 4, 2001
EXCHANGE
July 5, 2001
A Free Press in Russia?
[Boris Jordan vs. Masha Lipman]

BORIS JORDAN
General Director, NTV
To the Editors:

Masha Lipman’s lament on the demise of freedom of the press in Russia [NYR,
May 31] is fortunately premature. Unfortunately, her analysis of the recent
history of NTV and Media MOST omits crucial details and thus fails to
recognize that the real threat to freedom of the press in Russia comes from
financial mismanagement and irresponsible business decisions—the practices
of the Gusinsky regime, which brought NTVand Media MOST to the brink of
collapse.

On the question of freedom of the press, while I can only speak to the
future of NTV, I have made it perfectly clear that editorial independence
is guaranteed as long as I have anything to do with this network. Any
objective review of the news and commentary on the station in the period
since the management change on April 3 will show that there has been no
lack of hard-hitting journalism. Not a single journalist has been fired.
While some choose to leave, the majority of key reporters and staff members
have chosen to remain or have returned.

Our new chief editor is Tatiana Mitkova, a journalist of utmost integrity.
She is renowned for her defense of press freedom in 1991, when she refused
to read a script prepared by Mr. Gorbachev’s writers sanitizing a Russian
military intervention in Lithuania and was promptly fired. Her courageous
stand was recognized that year by the New York-based Committee to Protect
Journalists.

Further demonstrating our commitment to quality content and programming,
the entire team of reporters who defied government pressure to report ugly
truths from Chechnya remains with NTV, as do the reporters who covered the
Kursk disaster. The popular political satire program Kukly has lost none of
its sting. I have stated, categorically, that I will resign as general
director of NTV if there is any interference from the Kremlin in the
editorial independence of our news broadcasts.

But the real concern for the future of free press in Russia is whether an
autonomous television network can be built and operated on a sound
financial footing. A free press cannot exist on good intentions. Unless it
is to be dependent on government largess and good will, it must generate
revenues and profits and be run in a businesslike way. NTV under Media MOST
never was.

Ms. Lipman acknowledges that Mr. Gu-sinsky fell deeply into debt. The
magnitude of that debt is staggering: in the past five years, Media MOST
accumulated $1.6 billion in debt, all from entities with a connection to
the state. This is equal to the total value of the entire Russian
television industry, about $450 million, and more than three times the
industry’s annual advertising revenue. Media MOST had cumulative losses in
the period of $262 million. NTV itself ran up debt of $100 million, and had
cumulative losses of $62 million in the same period.

Under Mr. Gusinksy’s management, NTV did not produce a signed audit
statement in 1999, and the statement for 2000 is not yet complete. It also
did not produce a budget that showed a balance sheet and cash flow
statement for 2000. Thus, NTVshowed no evidence that it could cover its
financial loss of $9.2 million for the year 2000.

Indeed, at the time of the management change, NTV had incurred overdue
operating indebtedness of $14.6 million, including over $1 million in
unpaid salaries and over $6 million in unpaid production expenses. The
financial disaster was mirrored in the station’s declining audience.
According to the Gallup Media organization, the only internationally
recognized monitoring service in Russia, NTV ratings in Russia declined 24
percent from May 2000 to March 2001. In Moscow, they declined 21 percent in
the same period, costing NTV its top position for the first time in
eighteen months.

Given its precarious financial situation, it is a considerable stretch to
argue that Media MOST/NTV was ever an autonomous enterprise: it was so
beholden to the state that its signal could have been shut down at any
time. Nor is it reasonable to argue that NTVjournalists were ever truly
independent. With Mr. Gusinsky as the dominant shareholder, its news
reporting and editorial positions were subject to his shifting views and
interest. Mr. Gusinsky himself made this clear when he acknowledged to the
Los Angeles Times (February 10, 2001) that he used his media organizations
to support then President Boris Yeltsin in the 1996 elections and then in
1997 to attack government ministers after he lost out for a bid for a stake
in the state telecommunications company.

Only a network that is both free from dependency on the state and free from
the domination of a single shareholder can offer a platform for journalists
to report objectively. This is what I am committed to building at NTV—a
commitment that is supported by Gazprom, the largest share-holder. Our
management team is working with PricewaterhouseCoopers to complete the
audits for 1999 and 2000; we are developing business plans and a budget
that enable NTV to generate a profit within one year; and we will work to
bring in new investors, both to broaden the shareholder base and to inject
new capital into the station.

I welcome the international attention focused on NTV and press freedom in
Russia. I ask only that we be judged on performance, not speculation; on
facts, not rumors.

Moscow
MASHA LIPMAN

Boris Jordan believes that I lament the freedom of the press prematurely. I
don’t think my concerns are premature since seventy staff members of my
magazine, Itogi, are without jobs after we were all fired by our publisher.
The firing had nothing to do with financial mismanagement. The magazine was
making money.

Itogi, which we created five years ago, continues to be published using our
design, our format, our arrangement of sections and subjects. It is
produced by a wholly new team that the publisher has hired. The content,
however, differs from ours: the new Itogi is clearly drifting toward
becoming a less political magazine.

The Itogi that we produced was respected for its high editorial standards.
It promoted liberal values and took a critical view of Kremlin politics and
of the Chechen war in particular. The publisher was anxious to get rid of
us because he did not want to antagonize the Kremlin. He knew the Kremlin
would be pleased if he got rid of the people who produced a magazine which
had been started by Vladimir Gusinsky, the media tycoon whom the Kremlin
regarded as its enemy.

If the entire staff of a news organization can be replaced because its
publisher feels the need to show his loyalty to the government, it is, I
would say, probably time to be worried about freedom of the press in
Russia. As the newly appointed top manager of a Russian news organization,
Boris Jordan should, I suggest, be more alert to such signals.

Mr. Jordan pledges that he will resign as general director of NTV if there
is any interference from the Kremlin in the editorial independence of NTV
broadcasts. He appears to underestimate the sophistication of today’s
Russian rulers. He should not expect menacing censors to appear in his TV
offices and demand that he present videotapes and other materials for
inspection. Nobody in the Kremlin wants to take Russia back to Soviet times
when all media spoke in one voice, whether the subject was Communist
policy, the arts, or natural disasters.

Today’s government is not involved in petty surveillance; but it wants to
make sure that when it comes to sensitive policy or personal matters, the
public should be sent a “correct” message. In today’s Russia the press and
television enjoy the freedom that is granted to them; but with very few
exceptions, they tend to be cautious and cooperative when it comes to
sensitive matters.

One such matter is President Putin’s sensitivity to personal criticism. Now
that NTV is no longer part of Gusinsky’s media assets, it seems to take
this into account. While Mr. Jordan writes that the popular political
satire puppet show Kukly has lost none of its sting, a recent program
suggests the opposite. The show was about a mysterious evil monster running
around town and threatening the freedom of the press. Some begin to suspect
that the monster is, in fact, President Putin in disguise. In the end,
however, the puppet of Putin appears in person and calms all fears. The
puppet of Yevgeny Kiselev, a popular NTV anchor and the leader of the
“insurgent” team which left NTV after it had been taken over by Gazprom,
admits that there was never any monster; he had invented it. The Putin
puppet tells everyone not to worry, but to go ahead and get on with their
jobs. This looked more like soft political propaganda than the piercing
satire the program used to present. A show like this would have been
inconceivable on the old NTV. Yet, I believe Mr. Jordan when he says nobody
interferes with NTV performance. The Kukly producers were simply being
cautious and cooperative.

Mr. Jordan writes that “only a network that is both free from dependency on
the state and free from the domination of a single shareholder can offer a
platform for journalists to report objectively.” I cannot agree more.
However, what we had before Gazprom took over NTV was two national TV
channels controlled by the Kremlin and one, NTV, that was privately owned.
NTV may not have been “truly independent”—I wonder whether true
independence can in any case be achieved—but this is not the point. It
offered an alternative voice. It may at times have reflected some of Mr.
Gusinsky’s interests, especially during the past year when Mr.Gusinsky and
his channel were being persistently harassed by government agencies. But
this was not all NTV was about. Dozens of millions of viewers would not
have watched it if it had been merely a mouthpiece for Gusinsky.

What we have today is two channels controlled by the state and one whose
main shareholder is the natural gas monopoly Gazprom, which, in turn, is
controlled by the state. The state is its biggest shareholder (owning some
38 percent), and the chairman of the board of directors of Gazprom is the
Kremlin’s deputy chief of staff. In an interview with Nezavisimaya Gazeta,
a Kremlin insider—Gleb Pavlovsky—proudly listed the “capture”of MOST among
other achievements of President Putin.

The Kremlin, including the President himself, made it clear on many
occasions that it had an interest in getting rid of Gusinsky, who was, and
still is, regarded by the government as an evil force. It is also a fact
that the debt litigation, which lasted for over a year, was accompanied by
a campaign of harassment conducted by government law-enforcement agencies.
The campaign included, among other things, searches, interrogations, and
fabricated legal cases that later fell apart, all of which seriously
affected the performance of the media.

Mr. Jordan became the top manager of NTV as a result of Gazprom’s victory
in a struggle with Media MOST that was initiated, encouraged, and abetted
by the Kremlin. Now he vows that he will turn NTV into a journalistic
paradise: high quality, profitable, and owned by a broader number of
shareholders, so that none of them will dominate, and objective reporting
will be ensured. Mr. Jordan wants to be judged by facts, not rumors. What
he has offered so far is not facts but intentions. They sound like very
good intentions; however, the bad instincts of the Russian rulers and the
general loyalty to those rulers of the political elite and the media give
strong reasons for skepticism whether those intentions will be carried out.

******

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CDI Russia Weekly:  http://www.cdi.org/russia

CDI Headlines:  http://www.cdi.org/

Defense Monitor:  http://www.cdi.org/dm/2001

Weekly Defense Monitor:  http://www.cdi.org/weekly/