June 13, 2001 

This Date's Issues:   5296 • 5297 • 5298

Johnson's Russia List
#5298
13 June 2001
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Reuters: Jon Boyle, Summit will be "chemistry" lesson for Putin, Bush.
2. Interfax: Putin's aide says Russia will never agree to revise ABM treaty.
3. RIA: Putin backs free press as "guarantor" of democracy.
4. Washington Post letter: The Bankrupt Russian Press.
5. Profil: POLL RESULTS: THOUGHTS ABOUT THE WEST AND PUTIN SOUVENIRS.
6. International Herald Tribune: Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, How to Get Europe and Russia Into a Consensus on Defenses.
7. Washington Post: Peter Baker, Nuclear 'Milestone' Divides U.S., Russia. Failure to Construct Joint Warning Center Suggests Bigger Problems on Missile Defense.
8. Kompaniya: Andrei Vaganov, FUNDING FOR RUSSIAN SCIENCE CHANGED. Will Russian science survive without state funding or Western grants?
9. Wall Street Journal: Andrew Higgins, Russian Tycoon's Whim Drags Friends, Bodyguards Into Aiding Blighted Region. (Abramovich)
10. WPS Monitoring Agency press review: POLITICAL FORECASTS. TEN YEARS OF DEMOCRACY IN RUSSIA: THE TRIUMPH OF ORDER.]

********

#1
Summit will be "chemistry" lesson for Putin, Bush
By Jon Boyle

MOSCOW, June 13 (Reuters) - Vladimir Putin and George W. Bush meet on
Saturday for their debut summit, with aides hoping this presidential odd
couple will hit it off despite the gulf in experience between the ex-KGB spy
and the unworldly Texan.

The Russian president, child of an atheist Communist system that died a
decade ago, meets his born-again Christian counterpart in the Slovenian
capital Ljubljana for talks that some say could set the tone of their
personal relations, even if little concrete is expected from the encounter.

"The president is very intrigued about his meeting with President Putin. He's
read a great deal about him," said senior Bush advisor Karen Hughes. "He's
very eager to have the opportunity to talk with him about the way we see
Russia and its great potential."

"It will put an end to the period of uncertainty in Russian-American
relations," said a Kremlin aide who asked not to be named.

"But I think the main thing is not to expect any big breakthrough. If a
personal chemistry is born that would be brilliant. But you cannot tell that
in advance."

The two men have, on the surface, little in common except holding the keys to
nuclear arsenals large enough to destroy the world many times over.

Putin has already visited almost 30 states and flown the equivalent of four
times around the world in his first year in office. Bush's two trips outside
U.S. borders, to neighbours Canada and Mexico, would have taken him across
the equivalent of only a quarter of the globe.

FITNESS FANATIC VERSUS BASEBALL FAN

A former security service chief, Putin, 48, is a judo fanatic whose work day
is built around a personal fitness regime light years from the hard-drinking
habits of his ailing predecessor, Boris Yeltsin.

A graduate of Russia's elite law faculty in his home town St Petersburg,
Putin is a workaholic, a consumer of dossiers driven by the desire to restore
order and a modicum of prosperity to a former superpower battered by a decade
of tumultuous change.

He is also a notorious latecomer, a trait that may tax the famously punctual
Bush, although Hughes insists the U.S. leader is "not hung up on formality."

A poor student, a modest Texas oilman, an avowed lover of baseball who gave
up the bottle for God, "Dubya" is a "big picture" rather than detail man, say
aides, unlike his father and former president George Bush Senior.

"I think they'll find he's a strategic thinker, but that does not mean that
he doesn't pay attention to detail," says Hughes, adding that the 54-year-old
White House chief "really enjoys one-on-one meetings."

Western leaders like Britain's Tony Blair and German Chancellor Gerhard
Schroeder have found in private meetings that while uneasy in the limelight,
the Russian leader is witty and engaging behind closed doors. He is however
easily roused by criticism over Chechnya and media freedom.

CREDIBILITY GAP

Whatever happens in Ljubljana, Viktor Kremenyuk, deputy director of Moscow's
respected USA-Canada Institute, says the backslapping era of "Bill and Boris"
summitry is over, and that ties are being rebuilt from close to ground zero.

Bush has dismayed Moscow by pledging to link aid to progress on combating
corruption, and to build a national missile defence system even at the cost
of a decades-old arms control treaty.

Kremenyuk said Putin also faces a credibility problem with Bush over the
hostile takeover of independent NTV television by the state-linked gas
monopoly. By denying any role in the affair, Putin put a question mark
against his veracity.

"That has left a very deep scar, because it was an evident lie. People don't
like being treated like idiots, and they don't like it when someone lies to
them," he said. "If you cannot trust the word of a president with whom you
are going to make deals, that is a catastrophe."

Ljubljana will be a first chance for Bush to answer the

questions "Who Is Mr Putin?" and "Where Is He Taking Russia?" says Kremenyuk.

"Is Russia really a growing democracy, with high chances of becoming an
integral part of the West? Or is Russia evolving in a different direction,
something more like a Chinese regime, a police state with a weak economy?" he
said.

"If, finally, Bush comes to the conclusion that what Mr Putin is doing is
counter to U.S. interest he will never cooperate. He will fight against it."

(Additional reporting by Steve Holland)

*******

#2
Putin's aide says Russia will never agree to revise ABM treaty
Interfax

Moscow, 13 June: Moscow will never agree to revising the fundamental
provisions of the 1972 ABM treaty, presidential aide on strategic stability
Marshal Igor Sergeyev told Interfax on Wednesday [13 June].

This was his comment on US President George W. Bush's remark that the treaty
is "a relic of the past" and it needs revision.

Russia's position rejecting a missile defence system that would protect the
entire country has not changed because this would spell dismantling of the
treaty, Sergeyev said.

Russia or, for that matter, other countries have not heard coherent arguments
in favour of Washington's plan to deploy a national missile defence shield,
he said.

The alleged threat posed by "threshold nations" does not seem likely,
Sergeyev said. Scud systems, made in the USSR back in the early 1960s and
owned by those countries, cannot be transformed into an intercontinental
missiles because one "cannot jump two generations of missiles".

*******

#3
Putin backs free press as "guarantor" of democracy
RIA
June 13, 2001

Russian President Vladimir Putin said on Wednesday that a free press was the
"most important guarantor of the irreversibility of our country's democratic
course", the Russian news agency RIA reported.

Putin's message, delivered through the Kremlin news service, was addressed to
participants of the Our Times news forum being held in St Petersburg.

Putin went on to support the new national media union, the agency reported.

"The new national organization, Media Union, is seeking to consolidate
journalists who work constructively, in the interests of all society... Its
activities should contribute to the formation of Russia's single information
space and protect democratic rights and liberties," he added.

*******

#4
Washington Post
June 13, 2001
Letter
The Bankrupt Russian Press

Three recent items in The Post have contentiously discussed aspects of
Russia's press freedom quagmire ["Russia's Un-Free Press," op-ed, June 1;
"Exaggerating Russia's Media Mess," op-ed, June 2; "Key to Free Speech in
Russia," letters, June 6].

But none has revealed a fundamental impediment to Russian press freedom:
Advertising expenditures are not fully tax deductible for companies in
Russia. Newspapers are allowed no more than 40 percent advertising content.
(By comparison, American newspapers average almost 60 percent.)

As a result, most newspapers can't get the legitimate support they need to
operate. Many are in a practical state of bankruptcy and have fallen prey to
such financial overlords as Boris Berezovsky, and regional governors and
mayors -- all of whom seek to use their media holdings to present distorted
news advancing their private business or political interests. It isn't, as
Mr. Berezovsky contends, that commercial advertising is simply too weak. Laws
stand in the way of true press freedom. Without the legal ability to gain
wide-based advertising support, there's no way out for the newspapers.

Recently, several organizations -- the International Center for Journalists
in Washington, and the Media Research Center Sreda in Moscow, among them --
have backed a project called the Russian Media Fund with an aim to remedy
this problem. The project has requested and received an invitation from the
Russian government to work out a remedial plan, and is expecting financial
backing from about a dozen Russian and Western multinational companies that
account for the bulk of advertising expenditures in Russia.

This approach will cost far less than Mr. Berezovsky's estimate of $30
million per year, it won't create the relationship of dependency that he
advocates and it will cut to the heart of the matter: the needed legal
environment to let freedom ring throughout all Russia.

WILLIAM DUNKERLEY
New Britain, Conn.

*******

#5
Profil
June 11, 2001
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
POLL RESULTS: THOUGHTS ABOUT THE WEST AND PUTIN SOUVENIRS

In the lead-up to the meeting between President Putin and
President Bush, the National Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM)
has done a poll on attitudes to Russian-US relations. When asked
whether the West's opinion ought to be taken into account when making
political decisions, only 21% of respondents said it should; the
majority (70%) were sure that Russia is free to make decisions without
taking the opinion of other countries into consideration, and 9% of
respondents were uncertain.

When asked what they think of Russian-US relations in general,
38% of respondents say relations are normal; 13% think relations are
currently tense; and 1% of respondents think relations are hostile.

When asked whether Russia has really become an equal member of
the G-8 - or if not, why not - only a quarter of respondents said yes,
it has. The remainder disagreed, and 22% consider that Russia cannot
be called an equal member of the G-8 because it lags behind the
world's leading nations in economic development.

VTsIOM also asked how President Putin's authority might be
affected by the widespread use of his image on portraits, T-shirts,
etc. Only 8% of respondents think such "popularization" will increase
the president's authority and popularity, while 42% think this will be
treated as a joke, and does not reflect well on Putin. When asked
whether they themselves had bought - or would wish to buy - any kind
of Putin souvenir, only 1% of respondents said they already own a
portrait, bust, T-shirt, button, or matryoshka doll in the form of
Putin. A further 10% of respondents said they would like to own such
an item.

*******

#6
International Herald Tribune
13 June 2001
How to Get Europe and Russia Into a Consensus on Defenses
By Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay
The writers are senior fellows at The Brookings Institution. They contributed
this comment to the International Herald Tribune.

WASHINGTON. Missile defense will figure prominently in President George W.
Bush's meetings this week with European allies and President Vladimir Putin
of Russia. Many expect these discussions to be heated. But if Mr. Bush plays
his cards right he can lay the foundation for a consensus on how to move
forward with defensive deployments.

On May 1 Mr. Bush set forth his overarching vision of missile defenses and
the future of the U.S.-Russian relationship. He subsequently sent high-level
envoys around the globe to consult with allies, friends and other countries
about his vision.

European governments welcomed the consultations, but also raised many
questions. What would a missile defense system look like? What specific steps
did President Bush have in mind when he said a new policy needed to include
nonproliferation efforts as well as defenses? What is the future of arms
control and negotiated agreements?

President Bush's answers to these questions will be critical. Some in his
administration favor proceeding with missile defenses in ways that ignore or
dismiss European concerns, on the presumption that Europe has little choice
but to follow the American lead. But the unilateralist prescription posits a
false choice, and would lead to a diplomatic disaster.

It is possible to reconcile the desire to protect the United States from the
threat of long-range missiles with European worries that defenses will cause
more harm than good.

That requires moving ahead on the basis of four principles.

First, defenses must be imbedded in a broader nonproliferation strategy.
Active and passive defenses are one important element, and the administration
is right to highlight them. But a reinvigorated policy to prevent countries
from acquiring missiles and weapons of mass destruction in the first place is
also needed. This means strengthening export controls, arms control regimes
and regional security alliances. And the United States should continue its
efforts to persuade countries to abandon ballistic missile programs.
Washington had great success in the 1990s in persuading Argentina, Brazil,
Egypt and South Africa to "de-proliferate." It should now work to replicate
these successes in North Korea, Iran and Iraq.

Second, the overriding objective of any missile defense system should be to
defend the United States, friends and allies against the rogue state missile
threat. It should not be aimed at Russia or China. As Mr. Bush his said, they
are not America's enemies. That means that defenses can be limited in scope,
be based on earth rather than in space and rely primarily on intercepting
ballistic missiles in their boost phase. Such interceptors must be located
near the enemy missile launch point to work, and hence would pose no threat
to missiles located in the interior of large states like Russia and China.

Third, missile defenses should be deployed only after they have been shown to
work. Neither the threat nor the technology warrants a rush to deployment.
North Korea continues to abide by its pledge not to test long-range missiles,
and Iran and Iraq are still years away from building them. And while the
prospects for developing effective defenses against at least small attacks
are good, the Pentagon has yet to translate this promise into reality.
Finally, the administration should make good on its pledge to cooperate with
Russia where it can. It should push Moscow to help stop the spread of
advanced technologies to countries like Iran, but also it should increase its
support for bilateral programs designed to secure Russia's dilapidated
nuclear, chemical and biological weapons infrastructure against theft.

In adapting arms control policies to meet the needs of a new world, the Bush
administration should not forget that formal agreements continue to be in the
fundamental interest of the United States.

On the defensive side, the administration should pledge to modify or replace
the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with an agreement that allows limited
defenses against rogue states but bars the United States and Russia from
developing defenses that threaten the other's nuclear deterrent.

On the offensive side, the administration's pledge to cut U.S. forces
unilaterally makes sense if this helps accelerate deep cuts in Russian
forces. However, such force reductions must be translated into binding
agreements that promote transparency and verification. To paraphrase Ronald
Reagan, trust, but codify. As Mr. Bush visits Europe he faces a choice. He
can follow the siren's call of the unilateralists to build large missile
defenses come what may, thereby undermining the Atlantic alliance. Or he can
take these four principles, make them his own and forge a new trans-Atlantic
understanding on how to proceed with missile defenses.

*******

#7
Washington Post
June 13, 2001
[for personal use only]
Nuclear 'Milestone' Divides U.S., Russia
Failure to Construct Joint Warning Center Suggests Bigger Problems on
Missile Defense
By Peter Baker
Washington Post Foreign Service

MOSCOW -- To prevent false alarms about missile launches with catastrophic
consequences, the United States and Russia decided to build a joint nuclear
early warning center to share information. They liked the idea so much that
they announced it twice.

Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin first unveiled the plan to "avert nuclear war
by mistake," as Clinton put it, in September 1998. When Clinton came back
here in June 2000 the two countries pulled out the news release again. "A
milestone in enhancing strategic security," said Yeltsin's successor,
Vladimir Putin.

Yet now, as the presidents of Russia and the United States prepare for
another summit, this "milestone" remains nothing more than an abandoned
kindergarten building surrounded by overgrown shrubbery on the outskirts of
Moscow. Planning for the early warning center has ground to a halt, stymied
by conflicting priorities, geopolitics and legal issues.

After Clinton and Yeltsin first agreed to the plan, the war in Kosovo the
following spring soured Russia on the West and everything was put on hold for
nearly a year. After relations thawed a bit, Clinton and Putin signed a
memorandum of understanding last June to put it back on track.

But it became mired in details -- Russians said their law required Americans
to pay taxes on the equipment brought into the country and to assume
liability for construction, while the U.S. side did not want to set a
precedent that would affect larger aid programs. More important, the project
lost momentum in the lame-duck days of the Clinton administration and has
remained frozen pending the Bush team's review of its Russia policy. The two
sides have not met for months.

The three-year odyssey of the early warning center that wasn't offers a
lesson in how good intentions can go awry when it comes to relations between
the world's two major nuclear powers. The failure to establish the center
underscores the limitations of international summitry and the difficulty of
turning rhetoric into reality.

It also serves up a cautionary tale for Washington at a time when the
administration of Clinton's successor, President Bush, is talking about ways
to cooperate with Moscow in building a ballistic missile shield. Bush and
Putin will meet for the first time in Slovenia Saturday with missile defense
at the top of the agenda. But if the two countries cannot find a way to
jointly build an $8 million center considered non-controversial by both
sides, collaboration on a hotly disputed $100 billion missile defense system
promises to be far more problematic.

"This shows very clearly that if it's just a political ploy to make everybody
look better, then nobody will move it forward," said Pavel Podvig, a
researcher at the Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies
in Moscow. "We are no longer in that mode where anything cooperative is such
a great idea that all the bureaucracies would just clear away."

Perhaps more ominously, in the view of arms control specialists, the
stalemate over the early warning center leaves unaddressed a problem with
potentially disastrous ramifications: Russia's huge blind spots in detecting
missile launches. A mistaken warning could lead Russian leaders to launch
their own missiles and trigger an unintended nuclear conflagration.

As it was, the joint warning center was seen by experts such as Podvig as an
inadequate response to a serious problem, one that would be useful mostly if
it served as a first step to a more meaningful solution. Critics asked
whether Russians would really trust American data showing that the United
States was not attacking.

Theodore Postol, a national security expert at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, said that initially he considered the joint plan not serious
enough, but at least "a good thing" in the context of a broader approach to
the issue. Now, given the result, he has come to see it as nothing more than
a propaganda tool by the Americans.

"This has just been a smoke screen to look like they're doing something when
they're not," Postol said. "I really lay this at the feet of the Americans
because they have the resources. The Russians don't, and to turn around and
blame this on the Russians is really disingenuous."

The notion of shared early warning information arose shortly after the end of
the Cold War. As far back as February 1992, just weeks after the collapse of
the Soviet Union, U.S. and Russian officials began discussing the creation of
a center where each side would have access to data from the other.

The danger of misunderstanding became vividly evident in 1995 when Russian
military officials briefly mistook the launch of a Norwegian scientific
rocket for a U.S. intercontinental ballistic missile. Yeltsin was brought his
black suitcase known as the "nuclear football" to make a decision about
whether to retaliate, but the Russians came to conclude that they were not
under attack.

The potential for trouble has only intensified since then with the
deterioration of the Russian early warning system. Only two to four of the
nine high-elliptical satellites that Russia had in orbit in 1995 are still
functioning today, according to arms control experts, and at least seven
hours a day Russia is blind to possible launches from U.S. missile fields.
Just last month, a fire at a ground control center cut off communications
with several military satellites.

Russia built seven satellites to reestablish full coverage but has never
launched them, apparently for lack of money. Likewise, it has struggled to
rebuild its ground-based radar network since losing some facilities to newly
independent countries in the breakup of the Soviet Union.

The route chosen by Clinton and Yeltsin was to share what information already
exists. The decision to build a Joint Data Exchange Center would create the
first permanent U.S.-Russian military facility, modeled on a temporary joint
center established in Colorado to deal with the Year 2000 computer bug.

According to Pentagon briefing papers, the center would be staffed 24 hours a
day by a detachment of 16 U.S. officers joined by a similar number of
Russians. U.S. and Russian officers would sit back to back, each with
computers linked to their respective early warning headquarters. Although
they would not receive raw data, they would have access to information
processed in less than a minute that would show generic missile type, launch
location and time, and launch path, impact area and time if known.

Officials picked a site for the facility and even designed a layout that
would include a fitness center, with showers and steam room. But today the
building sits empty and unrenovated in a leafy residential neighborhood in
the Babushkin area of Moscow, some of its windows boarded up or cracked, its
walls marked with graffiti. Instead of being in its operational test phase,
as planned for this month on the way to a September opening, it serves mostly
as a clandestine hangout for young beer drinkers.

"It's basically come to a halt," said a senior U.S. official who asked not to
be identified. "It's tough doing business in Russia. We're not the only group
to find that out. . . . Nothing is easy in Russia."

Bruce Blair, president of the Washington-based Center for Defense
Information, attributed the impasse to deepening Russian suspicion of the
United States, particularly since Kosovo.

"It's a psychological thing," he said. "It's hard to believe these petty
little disputes over things like liability would prevent an important project
from being completed if it were deemed important by the Russians. So it shows
that they've basically turned their backs on the Americans."

Still, even U.S. officials involved are careful to acknowledge that their
side bears some blame. The Clinton administration did not make it a
consistent high priority; nor has the Bush administration. And the Russians
say they are simply waiting for the Americans to finish their review and
return to the table.

*******

#8
Kompaniya
No. 22
June 11, 2001
FUNDING FOR RUSSIAN SCIENCE CHANGED
Will Russian science survive without state funding or Western grants?
Author: Andrei Vaganov
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
RUSSIA IS SETTING UP BUREAUCRATIC BARRIERS TO FOREIGN COMPANIES THAT WANT TO COOPERATE WITH RUSSIAN SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH INSTITUTES. AT THE INITIATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN SCIENTIFIC ADMINISTRATION, CONTRACTS OF RUSSIAN SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH INSTITUTES WILL HAVE TO BE REGISTERED.

Western companies are at a loss: Russia is setting up
bureaucratic barriers to foreign scientific corporations that want to
cooperate with Russian scientific research institutes. At the
initiative of the Russian scientific administration contracts of
Russian scientific research institutes (SRI) will have to be
registered. This deals a severe blow to cooperation between Russian
SRI and Western scientific organizations. State funding for Russian
science has sunk to 10% of its 1991 level. However, the state is wary
of foreign companies letting Russian scientists earn some money.

George Soros, who has invested over $100 million in Russian
science, is not the only investor. In 1993, experts of the
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development noted in their
report on scientific-technical and innovation policy of the Russian
federation that foreign enterprises often employ tens and even
hundreds of Russian high-quality specialists from scientific
institutes for several years. Scientists are selected on the basis of
a competition between SRI in many branches. This fact was pointed out
as an important factor for development of Russian exploration system.
It was stated in the report: "Foreign funds cover about 30% of all
Russian funds supporting science, including the military sector." It
was also stated in the report that the Russian scientific community
had received $250 million from the West by that time.

In general internationalization and globalization of scientific
research is one of the most important tendencies of development of
modern science. For instance, expenditures on R&D conducted by other
countries' companies in the US amount to $20 billion. This is about
15% of expenditures of all private enterprises of the US on R&D. At
the same time, US companies have spent $14 billion on conducting R&D
abroad.

The Russian scientific community is almost an ideal complex for
scientific research. About 4,000 organizations are involved with R&D.
Besides, despite economic disasters, there are a lot of high-quality
specialists ready to take up any work. According to statistics of the
Ministry for Industry, Science, and Technology, about 800,000 Russians
are involved with R&D.

In 1992-96, American companies alone concluded contracts with
Russian SRI to the value of about $100 million. In December 1998,
Director of the Center of Scientific Research and Statistics Levan
Mendeli stated at the international seminar devoted to formation of
innovation policy, "If in 1991 there were practically no foreign funds
in Russian scientific organizations, in 1998, the share of foreign
capital in SRI amounted to 10%, i.e. the same sum of money as Russian
enterprises spend on science."

At that time the Science Ministry was benevolent toward
cooperation between Russian SRI and foreign enterprises. In 1996, then
minister of science Boris Saltykov stressed, "It is those enterprises
depending on the budget by only 15-25% that survive in modern Russia.
In these enterprises most of funds are provided by foreign orders,
grants, joint programs, economic agreements, etc."

Currently, scientific cooperation with the West is often
criticized. The state has realized that it is losing the possibility
to conduct an independent scientific-research policy. According to
some officials, an academic organization that starts to cooperate with
foreign enterprises on market terms becomes a firm, but not an
ordinary scientific organization. Any such contract envisages that
even the name of the firm the scientific organization cooperates with
should not be publicized.

Another important aspect of this issue is that the structure of
the scientific system is being changed. For instance, Chairman of the
Russian Foundation of Basic Research Mikhail Alfimov says,
"Theoretical chemistry is lost: only those who were involved with
production of new substances and materials have survived." It is clear
that such changes are initiated by those who financially support
scientific organizations.

The Science Ministry is displeased that a lot of know-how is
handed over to foreign enterprises. According to the ministry's
estimates, up to 80% of technologies and results gained within
international projects may be of dual application.

Academician of the Siberian branch of the Russian Academy of
Sciences Nikolai Dobretsov says, "At present, we can preserve about
60% of Russian scientific lines. If there is no state funding, this
figure will be 30%. But this will be not Russian science but
subsidiaries of transnational corporations."

Pessimists say that about 8,000 Russian scientists are now
working on 40 scientific projects in favor of the Pentagon and the US
Department of Energy.

A manager from the company Kaiser Research Inc. involved with
broking activities in the field of technologies, has said, "Our
company has a lot of applications from Russian scientists looking for
a job." And Mr. Vinus, President of the firm Plancon engaged in
consultative services in the field of investments, has stated, "It is
easy to employ a specialist in chemistry or biology in Russia and pay
them ten times less than an American specialist."

Simon Kordonsky, Director of the Expert Department of the
Presidential Administration, said in his interview with the Strana.ru
website, "A great deal of research in Russia is done using foreign
money. However, scientific organizations practically keep silent about
results of their work." Recently, the Russian government decided to
influence the situation. For instance, the concept of the Russian
Federation's state policy in the field of scientific-research
cooperation adopted in 2000 states: "It is necessary to perfect the
mechanism of obligatory registration of contracts in the field of
international scientific-research cooperation. It is also necessary to
register grants received by SRI. Implementation of the state policy of
the Russian federation in the field of international scientific-
research cooperation should answer interests of the national
scientific-technical security, which is an important component of the
national security."

The presidium of the Russian Academy of Sciences has issued a
regulation on a "plan of prevention of damage to the Russian
Federation."

Actions of the presidium of the Russian Academy of Sciences have
aroused protests of Russian human rights advocates. For instance,
Sergei Kovalev has severely criticized this document on Echo of Moscow
radio. He said, "State power has been obtained by KGB agents, and they
are doing what they have learnt in their agency."

Will Russian research be able to survive without state funding or
Western grants? Of course, state funding will not be discontinued
completely, and neither will contracts with Western enterprises.
However, the system of relations between Russian SRI and foreign
corporations may undergo some major changes.

(Translated by Kirill Frolov)

********

#9
Wall Street Journal
June 13, 2001
[for personal use only]
Russian Tycoon's Whim Drags Friends, Bodyguards Into Aiding Blighted Region
By ANDREW HIGGINS
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

ANADYR, Russia -- The first time oil executive Andrei Gorodilov landed here
in the capital of the Arctic's Chukotka region, he had a sudden craving "to
get back on the plane and immediately fly out."

Entombed in ice and lashed by savage storms, Chukotka is so desolate that
even reindeer tend to flee this autonomous district. The human population,
blighted by alcoholism and grinding poverty, has shriveled to around 72,000,
half what it was a decade ago.

So why, two years later, has Mr. Gorodilov ditched a cushy job in Moscow and
moved to Chukotka? The short answer: His boss had a brainstorm.

Until he fell for Chukotka, Roman Abramovich, Russian oil tycoon and Kremlin
insider, was the most secretive and perhaps most powerful member of a small
coterie of moguls known as oligarchs. Now, after years of snatching up
valuable state assets on the cheap, the 34-year-old billionaire says he is
"fed up" with making money all the time.

"I started business early, so maybe that's why I'm bored with it," says Mr.
Abramovich, who owns nearly half of AO Sibneft, a big oil company, and last
year helped create Russian Aluminum, the world's second-biggest aluminum
combine in terms of production after Alcoa Inc.

Many in Moscow say the mogul has some money-making scheme in mind. But it is
hard to see why a man whose favorite place is the French Riviera town of Nice
would move to the Arctic when he could control any resources there from
warmer latitudes.

Mr. Abramovich himself offers no motives except to say that he wants to
foment a "revolution toward civilized life" in Chukotka, a Texas-sized chunk
of tundra across the Bering Sea from Alaska. And he has asked baffled
friends, bodyguards and colleagues, such as Mr. Gorodilov, to join him.

Pledging to make life in Chukotka less miserable, Mr. Abramovich ran for
governor in December and won 92% of the vote. His nearest rival was an
impecunious local expert in reindeer herding.

'Roman Is the Boss'

Mr. Gorodilov, a close friend of the oligarch, was one of two senior Sibneft
managers recruited to serve as deputy governors. "For me, for all of us,
Roman is the boss," Mr. Gorodilov says. "If he makes a decision to build
Chukotka, then, naturally, we build Chukotka."

Many rich Russians, keen to burnish their reputations, now splurge on good
causes. President Vladimir Putin, who came to power vowing to "eliminate
oligarchs as a class," has helped pry open their wallets. Last fall, he
called a group of tycoons to the Kremlin for a lecture on civic duties -- and
hit them up for $52 million for a church-run charity fund.

But Mr. Abramovich, a college dropout whose parents died when he was a small
child, has outdone them all. He has adopted an entire region and now spends
up to three weeks a month in Chukotka and tens of millions of dollars of his
own money.

The region needs a lot. Anadyr has no trees, no roads to anywhere and no
hotels. Its Pizza House restaurant doesn't serve pizza. Its professional
soccer team played -- and mostly lost -- in Moscow, 3,700 miles away until it
folded late last year. The airport, a decrepit former military base, offers
the only way out.

These days, people keep flying in. Chartered jets from Moscow deliver
executives, bankers, engineers and -- ahead of a recent ice-fishing festival
-- fireworks experts, Mr. Abramovich's wife and two big-name Russian pop
bands. Some, such as the mogul's spouse, stay just a few days. Others, such
as Mr. Gorodilov, are here for years: Mr. Abramovich's term ends in 2005.

The Subtleties of Snow

A 30-year-old bachelor, Mr. Gorodilov says he is learning to appreciate the
subtleties of snow. He has a room at the governor's "mansion," a
prefabricated two-story house with aluminum siding. It was flown in
unassembled from Canada and put together on a bluff overlooking a frozen bay.
Bodyguards stay there, too.

Their boss, Mr. Abramovich, hasn't completely left his business past behind.
He recently got summoned by prosecutors in Moscow to answer questions about
an alleged $500,000 tax dodge by his oil company, Sibneft. The company says
it owes nothing.

As governor, Mr. Abramovich gets an annual salary of around $11,500, which
includes an Arctic bonus. Not bad for a Russian civil servant but hardly a
big draw for a billionaire. His stake in Sibneft alone is worth more than
$800 million. He says a third of Chukotka's 2001 budget will come from his
income-tax payments of around $35 million.

Mr. Abramovich says he'll spend a further $60 million to $80 million out of
his own pocket this year to help keep locals warm and fed -- and entertained.
Among projects on the drawing board are a heated, indoor ice rink (it's too
cold to skate outside), a bowling alley, new television and radio channels
and a movie house.

'The End of Geography'

The aim, he says, is to bring "civilized life" to the "the end of geography."
It isn't easy. The bands he flew in for the ice-fishing contest whined about
the weather and lip-synched all their songs. Not used to dealing with crowds,
local police sat back as scores of youths battled to get into the concert
hall. Mr. Abramovich himself finally waded through the melee, bodyguards
trailing behind, to rouse officers dozing in a heated jeep.

Mr. Abramovich says close friends, who include Tatyana Dyachenko, the
daughter of former President Boris Yeltsin, "can't understand and can't even
guess" what he's doing.

Also puzzled, but mostly delighted, are Chukotka's residents. "I used to
think oligarchs all had pistols in their pockets," says Vladimir Etylin, a
leader of the minority native population, the Chukchi, and defeated
gubernatorial rival. "I don't know what's really going on inside his head,
but it's a blessing for Chukotka."

How it affects his oil company also isn't clear. Buried deep beneath the ice
lie oil, natural gas and gold. Sibneft will start drilling this summer and
has plans for a pipeline to transport gas to Anadyr's power plant. But proven
reserves are modest and separated from markets by an oceanic expanse of snow.

A meat factory that Sibneft owns in Omsk, six time zones away, flies in
supplies. The company also has taken over a bankrupt Anadyr bakery. The wife
of a Sibneft manager runs Pole of Hope, a charity organization that has just
brought in 100 trucks and is flying out 8,000 local children for beach
holidays and dental care. And MDM, a Moscow bank close to Sibneft, just
opened its first Arctic branch.

"We all understand that, sooner or later, we'll all be working out here,"
says Mr. Gorodilov. Chukotka's desperation, he says, does have an upside: "If
you start to do anything here, you see the result right away." It's hard
these days to leave a mark in Moscow, he adds.

Sergei Koptsov, a consultant who used to run Sibneft-funded election
campaigns in Omsk, says he initially turned down Mr. Abramovich's latest job
offer but then relented. "I decided to return to the roots of history --
namely to Chukotka." Now in charge of shaking up sleepy local media, he's
busy purging staff members he says "are frozen in another world." Chukotka's
main newspaper, the Far North, has just started to use color.

"People here don't live, they just exist," says Mr. Abramovich after a
helicopter trip to an impoverished settlement where residents survive on meat
chiseled from the carcasses of dead whales.

The tycoon prefers Chinese cuisine himself -- and has asked a favorite Moscow
restaurant to find chefs in China willing to decamp to the Arctic. His other
enthusiasms include listening to a Russian rock group called Spleen and
watching violent movies like "Straw Dogs," "Pulp Fiction" and "Brat 2," a
Russian film about a hit man.

Most of his time in Chukotka, though, is spent listening to complaints and
pleas for help. On a visit to Anadyr's ramshackle hospital, he invites
doctors and nurses to explain their problems. A torrent of woe engulfs the
room. They need medicines, bedding, books, housing and, most urgently of all,
a way to get out of Chukotka.

Larissa Ponomareva, the mogul's personal assistant, scribbles down each
request in a notebook. "They have absolute faith that he can solve all their
problems," she says. "They think he's God."

********

#10
WPS Monitoring Agency
www.wps.ru
POLITICAL FORECASTS
TEN YEARS OF DEMOCRACY IN RUSSIA: THE TRIUMPH OF ORDER
June 13, 2001
[press review]

Exactly ten years ago - on June 12, 1991 - the first president of
Russia was elected. As the [Vremya Novostei] newspaper notes, this was
Boris Yeltsin's last election: from then on, he "merely confirmed his
right to power, his right to be the tsar". He made a convincing
monarch, in all respects - from unlimited political authority to his
personal habits.

[Vremya Novostei] says that in those days it was Yeltsin alone
who made politics - "everyone else was only acting in the plays he
staged". Those who thought they were manipulating the president were
misleading themselves. "Of course, they would find out the truth in a
luxurious country home, a parting gift after their dismissal. Boris
Yeltsin was tsar-like in his generosity." [Vremya Novostei] emphasizes
that Yeltsin wasn't just any tsar - he was a reforming tsar. True, he
didn't manage to deliver consistent reforms: it's not that easy to
combine widespread trembling awe toward one's power and constant mood-
swings with "any specific firm course". Although Russia has changed in
recent years, [Vremya Novostei] says the most important thing has
remained unchanged: "The institution of the monarchy, even spiced up
with a few democratic processes, has grown substantially stronger."

People now expect from Putin what they once expected from Yeltsin
- a tsar's favors and actions: "making people's careers, sweeping
projects, and all other symptoms of monarchy", when one person alone
sets policy, while others are only free to agree or disagree, follow
his orders or not. "It's another matter entirely that the monarchy
created by Boris Yeltsin was tailored to his own requirements. Now the
realm will have to change into something quite different."

[Vremya Novostei] got some interesting replies when it asked a
range of politicians and analysts what Yeltsin was like as president.

Valerii Saikin, a Duma deputy with the Communist faction, thinks
Yeltsin was a real leader only in the days when he headed the Moscow
municipal committee of the Communist Party. Subsequently, having made
his reputation in the battle against privileges, Yeltsin himself
became bogged down in them. That's why the Communists remember him as
"two-faced".

Yeltsin's dual nature was also noted by Vladimir Lysenko, leader
of the Republican party. He says Yeltsin in 1989 was "bold, decisive,
the most promising politician in Russia. But by the end of his time in
power he was a leader who hadn't fulfilled his most important mission,
and in many respects had reverted to authoritarian rule."

Vyacheslav Nikonov, president of the Politika Foundation,
remembers Yeltsin as "an extremely colorful personality, a
revolutionary at heart, a romantic, and someone with a great passion
for life". In Nikonov's view, the paradox of Yeltsin lies in the fact
that he managed to carry out a democratic revolution by completely
undemocratic methods. "It seems there is no other way of making
revolutions happen in Russia."

Viktor Anpilov, leader of the Working Russia movement, Yeltsin
was a "satrap". But Anpilov qualifies this by adding that "having a
satrap in power is better than indecision" - and the first Russian
president couldn't possibly be described as indecisive.

Vladimir Zhirinovsky has a huge grudge against Yeltsin - he says
Yeltsin was "the most terrible person in history". Zhirinovsky
asserts: "I won the election in 1991. People in the KGB told me so.
But Yelstin was declared the winner."

Viktor Pokhmelkin, deputy leader of the Union of Right Forces
faction, thinks Yeltsin's major flaws were his love of power and
indifference toward anything which didn't directly threaten his power.
"When it was a matter of fighting for power, he was always decisive.
But when it came down to using power to do something of substance, he
was often surprisingly passive."

Gleb Pavlovsky, head of the Effective Policy Foundation, says
that while Yeltsin was in power "there was a revolution in terms of
freedom - in the Russian sense of the word - but it was by no means a
political revolution". That is why no foundations for political
stability were laid while Yeltsin was president: "We still have no
institutions capable of protecting private property. And many people
still understand liberty as being a kind of atmosphere rather than a
guarantee of various things, including security." Pavlovsky is sure
that Yeltsin was essentially a good person, but finds it necessary to
note that "in an era of disasters it's not enough to be a good person
in order to really help people."

"Real-world democracy in Russia has turned out to be very
different from textbook examples and systems of government in the
West," says the [Vek] weekly. But despite these differences, Russian
democracy is doing better these days than a year or two ago. The
"Putin system", says [Vek], has turned out to be stronger than the
"Yeltsin system": "The old regime didn't prevent internal
disintegration within Russia, but the new regime has set about
unifying the country. For the first time since 1993, the political
elite has started to comprehend that despite all the competition in
its ranks, it is a single entity. Consensus has been reached on
foreign affairs and Federation unity issues; the right and the left,
which until recently were categorically opposed to each other's social
and economic policies, are turning to persistent - but manageable and
peaceful - political bargaining." That's why all talk of "unorthodox
democracy" is groundless: it is unlikely that any other system of
government could have coped with such an idiosyncratic country as
Russia.

Of course, the regime could have been more tolerant - toward
independence for the regions, for example. However, [Vek] considers
that this would have posed a real threat of the Federation breaking
up: "if market economy rules are strictly followed, the existence of a
single state stretching from the Pacific Ocean to the Baltic Sea is
economically unviable, by definition". That's why the federal
government is forced to redistribute resources from wealthier regions
in favor of the poorer regions. [Vek] says: "Can this be done without
authoritarian rule? One day, maybe - though it's unprecedented."
Meanwhile, understandably enough, the nation has to be preserved
"right here and now", and from this viewpoint "strong presidential
rule is the lesser evil, if not a good thing (even a costly good
thing)".

[Vek] asks: "How much authoritarianism is enough?" And answers
its own question decisively: "No more than there is at present."
However, it is quite possible that authoritarian trends will become
stronger if no relevant legislative safeguards are set up - primarily
against further concentration of power in one person and against any
restriction on the principle of regular changes of the head of state.
Of course, says [Vek], right now this problem isn't as urgent as it
was in the Yeltsin era, but there is no guarantee that it will not
recur - "apart from Putin himself". Hence, there is some cause for
concern: "It's not every time that Russia gets a leader who is better
than the previous leader. Citizens and the state must have some
guarantees against the luck of the draw."

"President Putin is just about the most 'accidental' ruler in
Russian history," says [Obshchaya Gazeta]. Indeed, even the more
unusual monarchs of past centuries were born into the circle of those
capable of aspiring to power (though [Obshchaya Gazeta] forgets
Empress Catherine I, formerly the completely unknown Marta
Skavronskaya). Even for the general secretaries of the Soviet era, it
was a long road to the top (also an arguable point). In any case,
[Obshchaya Gazeta] is sure that Yelstin was no accident - "neither as
a member of the Politburo nor as the leader of the 'democratic
revolution'".

But Putin's ascent was entirely a matter of chance: "This person
was appointed as the successor by a president who has long since
become unpopular, without any consultation with anyone other than his
close associates, even less popular than himself - people like Boris
Berezovsky." Nevertheless, not only was Putin elected president by a
convincing majority in free democratic elections, but he remains to
this day a popular president, with a high and stable approval rating.

This conundrum gives political analysts no peace; and [Obshchaya
Gazeta] presents its own version of an answer - a social psychology
version, so to speak. After 1991, says [Obshchaya Gazeta], Russian
society found itself in a fairly humiliating position: the glittering
hopes for a better life had been dashed, the nation was ruled by a
group of people "who were shamelessly robbing it, and the citizenry
was completely helpless against this group". Most bitter of all, this
was not helplessness in the face of "powerful, terrifying totalitarian
rule like autocracy or communism". All external signs of democracy are
currently in place: terror is absent, while freedom of speech and free
elections are present. "It would seem to be just a matter of electing
someone different. But Russian society is so unprepared to organize
itself, so accustomed to submission, so afraid of liberty and of
itself, that it is simply incapable of doing so." Yeltsin's election
as president was to some degree explicable: Yeltsin was "the hero who
had overthrown communism", and even voting for him in 1996 (when his
rivals were the Communists) could be presented as choosing the lesser
of two evils. However, once Yeltsin started choosing and re-choosing
his successor, and finally chose the most insignificant person in the
full confidence that the people would vote for him - this had become
"the ultimate demonstration of the citizenry's powerlessness against a
regime which can basically feel free to disregard the people".

Hence [Obshchaya Gazeta] considers that the present "overwhelming
love for Putin" is nothing other than an attempt by the people to deny
the humiliating truth. "It is shameful to vote as you're directed to
vote by very bad and unpopular leaders, simply because you're not used
to acting independently." However, there is a way of evading that
sense of shame - you have to "fall in love with the person you've been
instructed to vote for". "After all, if you really love him, it's as
if you are free and independent. And the question of where that person
came from becomes irrelevant." Of course, if love should fade away,
the sense of shame will return, and a "self-respect crisis" will
become unavoidable anyway. But it is precisely because love for Putin
is a defensive mechanism intended to save our national honor that "we
will try to love him up to the last, as long as possible".

Meanwhile, analysts are increasingly asking how long the people's
love will last, and how long the president's approval rating will stay
high as the government pursues its chosen course. For example, Otto
Latsis looks at this issue in [Novye Izvestia], in a detailed
examination of recent government decisions with an impact on social
services and the economy - from housing and utilities reforms to the
ban on imports of used cars.

It's clear, says Latsis, that the era of spontaneous economic
prosperity due to the ruble devaluation in 1998 has come to an end.
Now it's essential to have some well-planned measures to support
growth targets. The auto industry is the driving force of the whole
economy, as we know from America's experience; so the government's
ability to resolve this sector's problems is most indicative of the
general situation. Latsis says no one ought to be misled by the recent
resolution to protect the Russian market against imports of old cars.
In reality, the auto lobbyists have achieved the exact opposite: poor-
quality Russian-made cars are now securely protected from market
competition. In the near future, the car market will become busier and
stocks of unsold cars will now be sold; after that, the industry will
continue to produce uncompetitive Russian models. Thus, the
government's decision is against the interests of Russia's long-
suffering middle class - and it perpetuates the existing backwardness
of Russia's auto industry.

A similarly conservative approach is taken in many other areas.
Housing construction is usually viewed as the second most important
driving force in the Russian economy. The government has also failed
to create a new model for this sector to replace the model which has
exhaused its resources.

The government's approach to housing and utilities reforms
combines "brutal radicalism" with profound conservatism: rather than
changing the monopoly structure of housing administration, all we get
is increases in payments for utilities and housing.

But the most frightening manifestation of conservatism in policy,
says Latsis, is the government's approach to the problem of Chechnya:
"the war is being conserved".

It would appear to be obvious to everyone by now - including the
Kremlin - that the situation cannot be improved using the current
methods. New approaches are needed, but they are not being sought.

It should be acknowledged, says Latsis, that all these problems
were not created by Putin, and neither was the conservative approach
to solving them. "Putin's misfortune - and his fault - is that he has
not rejected that approach. But he received widespread support in the
election as a candidate from whom people expected changes."

Latsis sees the reason for Putin's adherence to conservative
methods of problem-solving in his lack of real "democratic support".
"Having ascended to the top 'from nowhere', without a party of his own
(yet another 'pro-government party' can't be taken seriously in this
regard), without even his own political clan, Putin is seeking
consensus with the political elite as a whole."

According to Latsis, the principle of such consensus is
reminiscent of the Brezhnev era: "Don't bother me, and I won't bother
you." This is exactly what was known as stagnation. However, Latsis
stresses that this policy devoured all the reserves of stability in
the Soviet system within 20 years: "Russia today has no such reserves
- neither does it have years to spare on an attempt to resurrect
conservative policies."

[Novaya Gazeta] describes Putin's policies as protective rather
than conservative. "Putin came to power in order to protect the
existing system," says [Novaya Gazeta], adding that this is the system
of oligarchic capitalism.

Of course, a few particular oligarchs - now known as magnates -
don't feel as secure as they did under Yeltsin: Boris Berezovsky and
Vladimir Gusinsky have gone into hiding abroad, "just like Herzen and
Plekhanov"; Rem Vyakhirev is out of Gazprom - despite his
conscientious implementation of the plan to take over the NTV network.
Even the ultra-loyal Roman Abramovich has been summoned for
questioning by prosecutors. He hasn't been charged with anything so
far, and it's an old case which has already been closed once, but this
is still an unpleasant experience for him.

However, [Novaya Gazeta] notes that during Putin's first year,
the oligarchy, although it was "let down" in political terms, received
several valuable economic gifts at once. A flat-rate income tax was
introduced, and now the government will attempt to plug the gaps in
the budget by reforming housing and utilities. (The government plans
to save around $3-4 billion a year on housing and utilities - "that's
about the same as the handout received by the rich via the tax
reforms".) Then the oligarchs received a new gift, even more valuable:
deregulation of hard currency laws. Besides everything else, this is a
good security guarantee for the oligarchs - now none of them can be
retrospectively accused of illegal business dealings.

The contradictions between the government's political and
economic decisions, embodied by the current policy of the carrot and
the stick, are easily explicable: Putin came to power in order to
protect "the system itself, not individuals within it". In order for
the system to function, discipline within it must be maintained - but
"the oligarchs got out of control in the Yeltsin era".

That's why "Putin is like a schoolteacher, punishing children for
their own good". The recalcitrant pupils, Berezovsky and Gusinsky,
have been expelled; Abramovich, who is a good boy but "was getting
above himself", has received a warning. Vyakhirev has been sent into
honorable retirement, as "too old to be a pupil".

Will these lessons suffice for the others? "Yes, most likely,"
says [Novaya Gazeta]. "Potanin, for example, is trying awfully hard.
But in any case, the Kremlin has some replacements ready and waiting."
The students in Yeltsin's school were too spoilt, too free in their
ways. The newcomers know the meaning of discipline very well. [Novaya
Gazeta] names a few names: Miller, Kogan, Klebanov. "These are quiet,
well-disciplined St. Petersburg oligarchs who have worked with
President Putin in law enforcement or government. They understand the
new rules of the game very well; most importantly, they know the
meaning of discipline."

The story of how Vitalii Tretiakov was dismissed as chief editor
of [Nezavisimaya Gazeta] bears witness to the fact that discipline is
becoming the primary, unconditional requirement of the new era - both
for the Kremlin and its allies, and for those who proclaim themselves
to be in opposition.

Boris Berezovsky, who has set out to unite the anti-Putin forces,
has also decided to put his media troops in order. The [Vremya
Novostei] newspaper says Berezovsky is thus providing proof that "free
speech is no more than a tool for Russian oligarchs".

[Vek] says: "Tretiakov, who refused to sing along with the
'defenders of media freedom' during the media war over the NTV
network, apparently doesn't fit in with the new structure. In the
chain of 'money - ideas - platforms - power', someone like Tretiakov
turns out to be an unnecessary architectural detail."

[Vek] considers that none of Berezovsky's explanations about the
market niches of [Kommersant] and [Nezavisimaya Gazeta] intersecting
can be said to hold up. These two newspapers are targeted at entirely
different audiences. It's another matter entirely that it has been
decided to expand the target readership of [Nezavisimaya Gazeta],
reaching out to the "new middle class", to whom the former oligarch is
now trying to appeal.

[Vek] says that the readers whom Tretiakov addressed over all
these years are being transferred to the category of "superfluous
people". "Five years ago, the intelligentsia really did have some
influence on government thinking and decision-making processes... Now
it is the day of the bureaucrats, functionaries, bankers, the military
- those who are still missing will be brought in, those who are no
longer required will be crossed off the list and deprived of funding."

"The opposition rejects outsiders just as effectively and
mercilessly as the government. Especially if the opposition is being
created by Boris Berezovsky," notes the [Vedomosti] newspaper, which
is certain that Tretiakov "was dismissed because he visited the
Kremlin too often and was 'insufficiently oppositional'".

Tretiakov himself, in his final edition of [Nezavisimaya Gazeta],
says "strictly speaking, this newspaper lived and thrived against the
laws of nature. It ought to have perished long ago, but it lived - and
that's a miracle!"

Like many others at the moment, the founder and now ex-editor of
[Nezavisimaya Gazeta] recalls the early 1990s, "the cruel and refined
early days of Russian democracy, when the new order was emerging from
chaos (and still hasn't managed to emerge)" - the new order which gave
rise to new media, including [Nezavisimaya Gazeta]. "I only delivered
the child and set it on its feet," says Tretiakov. "It was all set to
go far..." But he says that from now on, all this will have to be
dismissed as poetic fantasy.

"Social darwinism is grabbing us by the throat, and we can only
free ourselves by sober and completely honest assessment of what is
going on. No sentiment - the romantics are the first to perish. Of
course, cynics never win out either," concludes Tretiakov in his
farewell article, entitled "The Cherry Orchard of Nezavisimaya
Gazeta".

But [Vedomosti] has no doubt that Tretiakov "will find yet
another unusual investor like Berezovsky and revive his personal
project in the form of a newspaper".

No one is venturing to make specific predictions about the
consequences of fundamental changes in the position of the media as a
whole and in public consciousness. As Chekhov, whom Tretiakov quoted
in his farewell article, said: "If only we knew..."

(Translated by Arina Yevtikhova)

*******

Johnson's Russia List Archive (under construction):  http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson

CDI Russia Weekly:  http://www.cdi.org/russia

CDI Headlines:  http://www.cdi.org/

Defense Monitor:  http://www.cdi.org/dm/2001

Weekly Defense Monitor:  http://www.cdi.org/weekly/