May 25, 2001 

This Date's Issues:   5268 • 5269

Johnson's Russia List
#5268
25 May 2001
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Washington Times: Donald Devine, Prelude to rapproachment?
2. Moscow Times: Boris Kagarlitsky, The Continuing Class Struggle.
3. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: The Political and Economic Situation in Russia. (meeting with Anatoly Chubais)
4. BUSINESS WEEK ONLINE: Catherine Belton, More Static In Putin's Kremlin.
If economic advisor Andrei Illarionov resigns to protest plans for the country's power monopoly, reformers will have lost a key leader. 
5. Moscow Times: Ana Uzelac, Putin Wins Vote to Limit Parties.
6. The Economist book review: Not as old as it looks. A sweeping new history of Russia finds breaks as well as continuities in its past. (Russia and the Russians by Geoffrey Hosking)
7. The Russia Journal: John Helmer, STRATEGY VERSUS RESENTMENT -- WHEN TO 
STOP ATTACKS ON THE FEW FRIENDS RUSSIA HAS.
8. John Helmer: re 3254-Armstrong/Russian Vogue. [5254]
9. AP: Levin Wary of Dropping ABM Treaty.
10. Izvestia: Georgii Bovt, SURVEY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS EXPERTS.
Russia's elite sheds imperialist ambitions in favor of provincialism.]

********

#1
Washington Times
May 25, 2001
Prelude to rapproachment?
By Donald Devine
Donald Devine, former director of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management, is 
a columnist and a Washington-based policy consultant.

George W. Bush may be on the verge of making history. No, not for his 
tax cut that is already being torn apart in the legislative sausage factory. 
No, not for cutting spending his 4 percent limit has already been consumed by 
the congressional porkers. It certainly is not for his education policy to 
please Teddy Kennedy, that will end up worse than Bill Clinton´s.

The surprising answer is foreign policy. The State Department announced 
recently that President Bush will meet with Russia´s president, Vladimir 
Putin, at the end of his five-nation trip in June and, again, in July at the 
economic summit. Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov met with Mr. Bush May 
18.

With domestic policy blocked in an evenly divided Congress, Mr. Bush has 
wisely turned to America´s strategic position in the post-Cold War world. As 
Richard Nixon went to China to block the Soviets, the new president will go 
to Russia to contain China. An American tie to Russia not only stops China´s 
planned alliance with Russia and India but answers the question of who will 
supplement a weakened Europe in the U.S. alliance structure. It is not 
irrelevant that Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, just visited 
India, too.

A source within State tells me, "This administration is full of people 
who want a rapprochement with Russia." It is at least conceivable that Russia 
might confront historic opponent China over, say, Taiwan; it is inconceivable 
that Europe (with the possible exception of Britain) would. A generation or 
two hence, Europe will not have enough population even if somehow it regained 
the will. Europe might regain its soul the International Social Survey 
Program finds that most people there still hold traditional Western beliefs 
such as in God and in a life after death and there is an awful lot of praying 
going on (more than in the much more religious U.S.). Church attendance even 
if irregular might even be up a bit.

Other interesting things are happening too. The big victory of Silvio 
Berlusconi in Italy is a blow to left-wing control of the European Union. 
Both Belgian and French ministers threatened before the vote to sanction 
Italy if he was elected, as they did with Austria. A pre-election New York 
Times story labeled Mr. Berlusconi a "Reaganite," and he calls himself "an 
American-like success story," to explain his rise to wealth from modest 
roots. He is for tax cuts and for radically federalizing power to Italy´s 
regions, slimming the bureaucratic center. Austria, itself, became tougher in 
response to its isolation. Ireland is still smarting after being widely 
criticized for its "low" taxes. Denmark rejected the euro as its monetary 
unit in a referendum, against all of its political parties. Switzerland 
voters just rejected plans to join the EU, 77 to 23 percent.

A revived Europe, however, is chancy at best and it is wise to look to 
additional allies. At the moment, Europe only taunts little guys and holds 
the coats, while the U.S. does the fighting even in its Balkan backyard. It 
also makes mischief. On a trip to South America in 1997, French president 
Jacques Chirac told them the future of Latin America was not with the "north" 
(i.e. us) but with Europe. While President Bush is pursuing a free Trade Area 
of the Americas, Europe is infringing in the U.S. backyard. A mission to 
Moscow, would be a healthy wake-up call.

Bill Clinton tried to cosy up to the Russians too but he and his crowd 
were so moralistic (not to say moral), they could never say anything nice 
without hectoring them to be good liberal Americans, "or else." Like the 
left-Europeans, anyone not like them is a "fascist" and must be sanctioned. 
In fact, the respected Freedom House ranks Russia as "partially free." But 
foreign policy is not a liberal popularity contest. The question is, can 
Russia and the U.S. act in common for mutual gain? Mr. Putin has made it 
clear to American diplomats that he wants to be friends. He will play along 
on missile defense. He wants to contain China. He is very concerned about 
fundamentalist Islamic terrorism. How about making Russia America´s main, 
non-strategic weapons supplier with an exclusive contract forbidding sales 
that we do not approve and a pledge to keep hands off the Baltic and Ukraine? 
That is a good deal for both.

The right needs to rethink Russia too. Moscow was the enemy during the 
Cold War; but that is ancient history. George Bush could make the United 
States secure throughout the 21st century with this bold, historic move. It 
would be a tragedy if conservatives become the stumbling block to the kind of 
secure world they waged the Cold War to gain.

*******

#2
Moscow Times
May. 25, 2001. Page 8 
The Continuing Class Struggle
By Boris Kagarlitsky 

It often happens that the most important questions receive the least public
attention. The proposed changes to the Labor Code, I think, are a perfect
example of this. 

The present Labor Code, adopted in Soviet times, is hopelessly outdated.
From the perspective of employers, it simply gives too many rights to
workers while labor advocates think that it gives too little or that its
high-sounding promises are simply unenforceable. Everyone, then, agrees
that a new code is needed: The only question is what it will contain.

For more than a year, the government has been trying to get a draft labor
code through the State Duma that really deserves to be consigned to the
trash-heap of history. This draft not only sharply restricts the rights of
trade unions and encourages employers to spy on their employees and keep
track of their political views and personal habits — it also opens the door
to the widespread use of child labor and the gradual transition from an
8-hour to a 12-hour workday. 

Of course, the government won't force employers to do these things. It is
simply allowing them to institute "flexible" working arrangements to
introduce — with the "agreement" of workers — 12-hour workdays and child
labor. History shows that workers, threatened with dismissal or pay cuts,
will "voluntarily" agree to anything, especially if their rights to
unionize have been restricted.

Sweatshops exist in many countries and it must be acknowledged that Russia
is far from the worst place on earth for workers. However, we may be on the
way to becoming the first country in the world to legally defend sweatshops
by rolling back modern norms of labor relations.

And how about our unions? How are they resisting this government
initiative? The Federation of Independent Labor Unions, the largest such
organization in Russia, responded by introducing its own draft, which it
bills as a compromise between the Soviet code and the government proposal. 

For nearly a year, the federation has pushed this proposal while many
unions — adopting a more radical position — have threatened strikes and put
forward their own versions. The result is that the state draft, which was
expected to be made law more than a year ago, remains a bill.

Then, suddenly, the federation reversed itself and rejected its own draft.
Now it is calling for a joint commission to "correct" the Kremlin's
proposal. What is going on?

The answer is banal. As the heir to Soviet labor unions, the federation
received control over considerable property, which has been being slowly
privatized by its leadership although it continues to support an enormous
bureaucracy. The federation, after all, lives primarily off the revenues it
generates rather than from the paltry dues of union members. Real estate
speculation is more profitable than the class struggle.

The time when labor could have stood on principles is past. Soon a "second
wave" of shock therapy will begin, and it will sharply change the rules of
the game. Igor Klochkov, the former head of the federation, lost his job
for resisting the Kremlin and the current leadership has internalized this
experience. 

The proposed joint commission was supposed to buy time. If the federation
could put off the code until after its fall congress, its leaders would
have saved their jobs. But the Kremlin is insisting on pushing it through
in June, and the federation is caving in. But not its member organizations. 

Many have already announced their willingness to hold an independent
congress. Even with the federation in its pocket, the Kremlin faces serious
opposition with this bill. 

Boris Kagarlitsky is a Moscow-based sociologist.

********

#3
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
www.ceip.org
Russian and Eurasian Program
Vol.3, No.15, May 22, 2001
The Political and Economic Situation in Russia

On Tuesday, May 22, 2001, Anatoly Chubais discussed economic and the
political situation in Russia. Anatoly Chubais is the Chief Executive
Officer of United Energy Systems (UES) and co-chairman of the Union of the
Rightist Forces (SPS). The discussion was moderated by Anders Åslund,
senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Russia's "Real Revolution"

Ten years ago, the Russian economy was collapsing, the KGB was preparing a
coup d'etat, and the newly elected President Yeltsin lacked power. It was
a "great end" and a "great start," according to Anatoly Chubais, offering a
comparatively optimistic vision of Russia's decade of transition. Many
hopes were born, and although not all of them have come true, it is a
mistake to consider Russia's experience a failure. On the contrary,
Chubais asserted that the transformation in Russia was a "real revolution"
and a great achievement that brought about important changes in the
political, economic and social spheres. Chubais underlined Yeltsin's
unique role in this revolution. Today Russia has real democratic and
market institutions, and it is impossible to successfully propose and
defend opposite values. Even the Communist Party, Chubais pointed out, no
longer advocates re-nationalization of private property, since doing so
would marginalize them on the Russian political scene. 

The new values of capitalism and democracy however, are not yet "efficient"
- that is, not fully protected or enforced. There is no adequate means of
protecting private property, corruption undermines equal rights, and
democracy and the freedom of speech are under pressure, Chubais stated. It
is important to realize that the new democratic and market institutions can
become more efficient or less efficient, but there is no possibility of
reversing the transformations. 

Assessing President Putin's regime, Chubais reiterated the impossibility of
returning to the Soviet order. He said to be in agreement with Yegor
Gaidar's description of the contemporary period as one of
"post-revolutionary stabilization," with attempts to revitalize "some signs
of pre-revolutionary life." Putin is not Yeltsin, Chubais claimed, but
despite his decision to restore the Soviet anthem music, and the
contemplated restoration of statues of Dzerzhinsky, Putin's regime is not a
return to that pre-revolutionary past. 

Future Prospects and Priorities

Chubais was most optimistic about the economic transformation. He was
confident that the current positive economic trends will continue, and
within the next ten years Russia will become a dynamic and modern economy.
Aside from strong GDP and hard currency reserves growth, Chubais emphasized
the redistribution of resources from the virtual economy to the market
economy. Throughout Russia barter is shrinking, while taxes and wages are
paid, so the balance sheets make sense for the first time. Those companies
that follow the basic transparent business principles are growing much
faster than those who do not. Three years ago, UES made only 20% of its
transactions in cash, and 80% in barter, but today, barter is completely
eliminated in the company. As consumers began paying UES in cash, UES paid
its debts, wages and taxes likewise. This trend is transforming the
Russian economy, Chubais said. The new behavior is made possible by the
new generation of managers who really understand the market rules,
replacing the Soviet-era directors.

Chubais's confidence in the economy was also buoyed by the steps of the new
government. Chubais pointed to the adoption of tax reform and legalization
of private land ownership through a chapter of the Civil Code, as well as
proposed reforms of the pension system, the military, the legal system, and
the labor code. This is exactly what the reformers wanted to accomplish in
1995 and 1997, but could not, and it is an impressive record for any
government's first year. 

Chubais's major concern was political development. Russia really needs to
concentrate on human rights, civil society, democracy and freedom of
speech. These political values form the program for the Union of Rightist
Forces. Whether Putin will continue KGB-style policies is unclear, but the
Union of Rightist Forces is restructuring and strengthening itself to
defend democratic values and principles. However challenging, Chubais was
optimistic that democratic freedoms would survive and develop. 

Chechen War, SPS Prospects, and UES Restructuring

In view of his emphasis on human rights and democracy as the biggest
priorities on the political front, Chubais was asked to comment on his
previously expressed praise of the Russian Army, and his calling Yavlinsky
a traitor for disapproving of the war. Chubais affirmed that he still
adhered to this view. Whereas he had opposed the first Chechen war, the
second conflict was initiated by the Chechens invading Dagestan, another
Russian province. Any Russian politician could only respond militarily. A
military response required a serious army, and at the outset of the second
Chechen war Russia did not have such an army. A real Russian army was born
only during the course of the fighting in Chechnya. Public opinion also
approved a military solution, and in the December 1999 parliamentary
elections Yavlinsky and his views were barely supported by 5% of the
population. Yet, the Chechen conflict is a tragic situation, Chubais said,
with no easy solutions. In view of the complexity of the situation, he
supported President Putin's initial and "post-military" tactics in Chechnya. 

When asked about the electoral prospects of SPS, Chubais expressed optimism
for the next legislative election. In 1993, Democratic Choice of Russia,
SPS's predecessor, won 9% of the vote, on an "emotional" basis; people
simply voted for change that the new young team promised. In 1995
elections, DCR failed to clear the 5% threshold, because the emotional
impetus was gone, and the advantages of a market economy were not yet
apparent to many, the middle class being largely absent. In 1999
elections, SPS obtained almost 9% of the votes, as market economy generated
benefits, especially to the growing middle class that shares the values
championed by SPS. These trends combined with the internal restructuring
of the party under a single leader should lead SPS to success in the next
election.

Chubais's optimism also applied to the prospects of restructuring UES.
Despite a plunge in share prices each time the restructuring plan was
discussed and the opposition of some minority shareholders, Chubais was
confident that in the long term, restructuring will increase market
capitalization, attract domestic and foreign investment, and better serve
the interests of all shareholders. The basic idea behind the restructuring
plan is to separate the competitive part of the power sector -- generation
and sales, from the natural monopoly - the grid and dispatching. The
sector that can be competitive should be deregulated and brought into a
normal market environment, where several generating companies can compete.
Within the non-competitive sector, the role of the government and
management needs to be redesigned, redistributing power in favor of the
board of directors. Overall, it is vital that the Soviet-style management
of the energy sector is liberalized.

Summary by Elina Treyger, Junior Fellow with the Russian and Eurasian Program.

*********

#4
BUSINESS WEEK ONLINE
May 25, 2001
More Static In Putin's Kremlin
If economic advisor Andrei Illarionov resigns to protest plans for the 
country's power monopoly, reformers will have lost a key leader 
By Catherine Belton in Moscow (catherine_belton@businessweek.com)

The leading voice for economic liberalization in Russian President Vladimir 
Putin's administration, economic advisor Andrei Illarionov, says he may quit 
in a bitter dispute with the government over plans to restructure the RAO 
Unified Energy Systems (UES) electricity monopoly. 

Such a step would be a blow to Russia's already shaky foreign-investment 
climate because Illarionov has been the strongest proponent of liberal 
economic reforms inside Putin's team. In an exclusive May 24 interview with 
BusinessWeek Online, Illarionov accused leading members of the government of 
deliberately ignoring his alternative restructuring proposal. Instead, he 
alleges that on May 19 the government gave preliminarily approval to what he 
describes as a flawed plan that would bypass shareholders' rights and put the 
nation's entire electricity network under the control of UES CEO Anatoly 
Chubais. 

Asked whether he would resign if amendments were not made to the final 
version of the restructuring plan, due for approval by the government on June 
19, Illarionov said: "I am seriously thinking about it."

MONOPOLY POWER? Illarionov is sometimes given to rash statements, so it's 
possible his talk of possible resignation could be just another gambit in the 
struggle over the future of the nation's electricity network. But this fight 
clearly is important to him. It's a high-stakes battle over an electricity 
system that could give its potential owner immense economic and political 
clout.

The system, which is 52% owned by the Russian government, encompasses the 
nation's transmission grid, regional electricity generating companies, and 
dispatcher systems. But fears over the fate of investors' stakes in 
restructuring have seen its share price plunge to 10.5 cents, vs. 34 cents in 
April, 1999, when details of the overhaul were first announced.

Chubais, who has said the company's generator-to-socket monopoly needs to be 
broken, wants to see regional generating companies merged and dispatcher 
systems split off into separate units that would compete with each other, 
eventually being sold off with the proceeds used to boost investment. The 
federal transmission network would be kept as a separate whole.

That much is agreed. But the question that has Illarionov on the verge of 
quitting is how this will be done. He says a plan forwarded by the Economics 
& Trade Ministry and given preliminary approval by the government on May 19 
after more than a year of debate would put control totally in the hands of 
UES management. 

NOT OPTIMISTIC. Illarionov says the government-approved plan calls for 
spinning off the regional generating companies, the dispatcher companies, and 
the federal transmission network as stand-alone subsidiaries of UES -- wiping 
out shareholders' control and diluting the value of their holdings. Chubais 
himself said in a December interview with BusinessWeek that UES shareholders 
would not be able to use their representation on the board of the parent 
company to exert control over how these subsidiaries are run or sold off.

A plan to retain the federal transmission network as a subsidiary of the UES, 
as well as to give the parent company control over future sales, would 
"concentrate massive economic and political power into one person's hands," 
Illarionov said in the May 24 interview at the Kremlin.

Chubais was unavailable for comment May 24. But he told reporters over the 
previous weekend that the plan, which calls for liberalizing the electricity 
market in 2004, "could have been more radical."

Meanwhile, Illarionov accused Economics & Trade Minister German Gref of 
dancing to Chubais' tune by forwarding and approving a plan similar to a 
proposal drafted by the UES CEO last December. He claims the government 
ignored a proposal he helped prepare to keep ownership of the subsidiaries in 
proportions equal to the current ownership of UES, rather than giving the 
parent company's management 100% control. While he has called on Gref to 
honor earlier verbal promises to make amendments aimed at ensuring the 
independence of the companies created in the breakup, he doesn't hold much 
hope this will happen.

"HUGE LOSS." The government "wanted to cave in to Chubais and RAO UES so much 
that they had no intention of considering any alternative," says Illarionov, 
adding that the proposal he worked on was deliberately held back until 30 
minutes before the May 19 Cabinet meeting. "That was a totally cynical move, 
and it gives reason to believe they [the Economics & Trade Ministry] were 
working, and will work, on behalf of Chubais and RAO UES." Economics Minister 
Gref is closely linked to Chubais, having worked together on privatization 
schemes in the early '90s.

"If there is no change [to the restructuring plan], it would be a huge loss 
for the nation," adds Illarionov. "The loss could be as great as the damage 
wrought by the loans-for-shares scheme," in which state assets were sold off 
on the cheap to a group of well-connected moguls.

Illarionov is credited with forwarding measures to cut back the state's role 
in the economy and creating a plan to shield exports from the turbulence of 
global commodity markets. Until now, he has restrained government moves that 
could have pushed Russia further from the global economic mainstream. Earlier 
in 2001, for instance, Illarionov was able to overturn a proposal by Prime 
Minister Mikhail Kasyanov to delay payment on foreign debt by publicly 
accusing the government of "hooliganism" over the matter. It's too soon to 
know how this clash will play out, but Illarionov's loss would be a huge blow 
to Putin's reform efforts.

********

#5
Moscow Times
May 25, 2001
Putin Wins Vote to Limit Parties
By Ana Uzelac 
Staff Writer 

A bill with the power to wipe out the majority of the country's political
parties and put the remaining few under close government scrutiny was
passed by the State Duma in the second and crucial reading Thursday.

Amendments to the bill made it even more rigid than the harshly criticized
draft submitted by President Vladimir Putin and approved in a first reading
this winter. Deputies considered about 1,600 amendments in Thursday's
session, which stretched late into the evening. 

According to the bill, which passed 261-56, only an organization registered
as a "political party" will have the right to participate in elections on
any level — from regional to federal. 

To become a party, a group would have to open branches in at least half of
Russia's 89 regions, with no fewer than 100 members in each region and an
overall minimal membership of 10,000. On Thursday the deputies went a step
further, stipulating that any branches opened in the remaining regions have
at least 50 members. 

This provision is bound to wipe out the majority of the 188 existing
parties, whose membership falls far below the requested minimum. Statistics
are scarce, and the only ones to come up with membership figures were the
Communists, who say they have 300,000 members. 

Pro-Kremlin Unity is shy about disclosing its membership numbers, as are
all the other Duma parties. Yabloko and the Union of Right Forces are
estimated to have between 5,000 and 10,000.

But analysts agree that the veteran Duma parties will manage to boost their
membership in the two years given as a transition period. These include
Vladimir Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic Party of Russia and the Agrarians.

The ones condemned to certain extinction are the regional parties, which
will lose the right to participate even in local elections.

Many regional parliaments — in Tatarstan or Dagestan, for instance — are
filled with representatives of parties that exist only in those republics,
while the big federal parties have almost no representation. What these
local parties are likely to do is choose which of the national parties to
join.

These changes correspond with Putin's efforts to centralize political life
and limit the power of the regions. They further the president's wish to
see "order" imposed on the diverse Russian political scene, which will soon
have clearly defined parties numbering in the single digits.

Some have already read the writing on the wall and started merging — the
Union of Right Forces will hold its founding congress Saturday in order to
transform from a loose coalition of small parties into a large political
organization.

Even those parties that survive will not have an easy time of it. They will
have to submit their books for regular inspection to the tax police. The
government will have the right to ask for the personal data of party
members in order to check whether a party has the required 10,000 members.
And if a party does not participate in two elections in a row, it risks
closure.

Under the bill passed Thursday, a party's charter and political program can
be scrutinized by the Justice Ministry and the Prosecutor General's Office,
which will have the right to suspend the party or ask for its closure. But
the prosecutor's powers could still be curbed. 

By the end of Thursday's debate, the deputies changed their minds and
passed an amendment that forbids the prosecutor from supervising parties,
leaving this power solely with the Justice Ministry. They agreed to submit
the legislation to another second reading to address the contradiction
between the bill and the amendment.

Liberal lawmakers' only success Thursday was the passage of two amendments
forbidding the closure of a party after the date of parliamentary elections
has been announced or after the party has received its Duma mandate.

The only real battle was fought over an amendment allowing private citizens
to give cash contributions to the parties — a provision the Kremlin's
representatives fought hard against, accusing the Duma of enabling
contributors to launder money through the parties.

Deputies agreed that the maximum yearly cash contribution from a single
citizen cannot be more than 10 minimum wages (2,000 rubles, or about $70)
and that the donor should leave his full name and birth date with the
party. But contributions made by bank transfer can go as high as 10,000
minimum wages (2 million rubles or $70,000.)

Similar limitations go for companies and other legal entities, which will
be able to contribute a maximum of 100,000 minimum wages a year, or 20
million rubles, and only through bank transfer. Companies that are at least
50 percent foreign-owned or 30 percent government-owned will not be allowed
to donate to parties. The overall amount of private campaign contributions
a party is allowed to gather is 10 million minimum wages (2 billion rubles
or $70 million).

The president's representative to the Duma, Alexander Kotenkov, pushed
through an amendment banning parties from running commercial clubs,
libraries or schools.

"And the rest of the money a party should gather from selling its badges,"
the head of the committee in charge of the bill, Viktor Zorkaltsev,
commented sourly.

The other option for parties is to seek state campaign funding, available
to all parties that gather more than 3 percent of the vote. Under the bill
passed Thursday, the state will pay 0.005 minimum wages, or about 1 ruble,
for every vote – 2 1/2 times more than was initially envisaged.

The most ardent opponent of the provision, the Union of Right Forces, or
SPS, claimed such funding would make parties dependent on the state, but
the most it managed to win was a stipulation saying that a party may refuse
the money.

And a party that goes through all this trouble to have its representatives
elected to the government will face a recommendation that ministers or
other state functionaries "should not be tied by their party's policies
when making their decisions." Many of them — judges, prosecutors, justice
officials, members of various secret services and even simple policemen —
will not be allowed to be party members at all.

This, the bill's opponents argue, transforms the Duma into a sort of nature
reserve for the parties, which will be banned from executive government.

And while the parties are put under total bureaucratic control, "the
government agencies ruling the country will stay outside the public
scrutiny," the bill's loudest critic, Deputy Vladimir Ryzhkov, wrote in an
essay published on the web site Utro.ru. 

"This law should not be called the law on political parties, but rather the
law on governmental control over the political parties," he said.

Georgy Satarov, the head of the Indem think tank who was once a political
adviser to former President Boris Yeltsin, recently wrote that the
Kremlin's wish was "not to improve the party system, but to make
presidential and governmental influence on parties more efficient."

So why did the majority of deputies vote for such a bill? According to
Andrei Ryabov, a political analyst with the Moscow Carnegie Center, the
explanation is another "historical compromise" made by the political elite
with the Kremlin.

"They have just made themselves a virtually unchangeable political elite,
closed to all outsiders, in exchange for their cooperative attitude toward
the Kremlin," he said in a telephone interview Thursday. 

"It will be very difficult to form a new party now, so their position is
secure. They will have limited powers, but whatever they have will now be
guaranteed for a long time to come."

Kotenkov, however, did not hide his satisfaction about the outcome. "We
should finally start building a civilized multi-party system," Interfax
quoted him as saying.

SPS Deputy Boris Nadezhdin agreed the vote was "a huge victory for the
Kremlin" and said it meant "the end of liberal politics in Russia."

********

#6
The Economist
May 26-June 1, 2001
Russian history 
Not as old as it looks
A sweeping new history of Russia finds breaks as well as continuities
in its past 

Russia and the Russians.
By Geoffrey Hosking
Harvard University Press; 718 pages; $35. Allen Lane, The Penguin Press; £25

THERE used to be two kinds of Kremlinologist. One saw an almost unbroken
continuity between Bolshevik rule and previous forms of Russian statehood.
The other took virtually at face value the communist claim to have made an
irreversible break with the tsars, indeed with history. 

During its seven decades of existence, the Soviet state’s own theorists
themselves wavered on this question. In the early days of
post-revolutionary zeal, some Bolsheviks genuinely believed that they were
creating a new political formation that would transcend boundaries of
geography and culture, and belong in equal measure to the workers of the
world.

Less than 25 years later, at the height of the second world war when the
survival of Russia itself was in peril, Josef Stalin reverted dramatically
to memories of the tsarist past. His wartime leadership astonished its
western allies by ordering up huge quantities of gold braid and shoulder
straps to adorn officers’ uniforms. Stalin also instituted military
decorations named after Mikhail Kutuzov and Alexander Nevsky, the defenders
of the nation against the forces, respectively, of Napoleon and the
medieval Teutonic knights.

In the post-war years, a school of communist scholars known as national
Bolsheviks earnestly compared the achievements of Stalin with those of the
tsars, in party journals with large runs but small readerships, while a
rival school, in the same journals, continued to propound the ideals of
proletarian internationalism. These differences are of more than
antiquarian interest. Their traces are visible today in the newest
repository of east Slavic statehood, the semi-democratic Russian
Federation, which is as confused as ever about its cultural and historical
legacy. 

In this comprehensive and intelligent survey of Russian history for the
general reader, Geoffrey Hosking gives us the grand sweep. As he follows
the twists and turns of Slavic history from the principalities of Kievan
Rus in the late ninth century to the presidency of Boris Yeltsin, he holds
back from putting forward a single, all-purpose theory of culture or
geography to explain Russia’s idiosyncrasies. But certain strong themes
emerge.

One task facing any would-be ruler of the north Eurasian mass is to
establish a coherent administration in such a huge, featureless landscape
which is easy to invade but hard to occupy. A second difficulty is shared
by any tradition-bound, authoritarian state facing competition from suppler
societies. The strengths needed for success—economic prowess, intellectual
vitality, thriving cities—are things likely to undermine old hierarchies
and values. A third problem is imperial over-stretch. Russian history has
shown—not just in 1991—that, when defending distant borders proves too
much, the Russian state can contract as dramatically as it can expand. 

While alive to these continuities, Mr Hosking writes most originally about
the breaks with the past. As 150-year-old nationalist myths continue to
wear down the Balkans, he provides a firm and welcome reminder that an
ethnically defined Russia was a relatively recent and deliberate creation,
influenced by state-building elsewhere in Europe.

Only in the 19th and 20th centuries did Russia’s rulers attempt, in
different ways, to reconcile the multi-ethnic character of their dominions
with a Russification, first of the empire’s elites and then of the people
as a whole. Perhaps because this project failed, the state now ruled from
the Kremlin is smaller and more homogenous than either the Soviet Union or
the territory of the tsars. But as Mr Hosking argues in his final pages,
questions remain about the raison d’être of the Russian nation, and hence
of the Russian state.

Is Russia, he asks, the “creator and sustainer” of a multinational empire?
Will it be the core of an “eastern-Slavic union” which includes Ukraine and
Belarus? Even without them, the national question is still there. Is the
Russian Federation to be a standard-bearer for ethnic Russians or
Russian-speakers (not the same) beyond its borders? And, if so, where does
that leave citizens of the Russian Federation who are not ethnically Russian?

Prudently, Mr Hosking leaves these issues open, ending instead with the
cautious observation that, though Russia is one of history’s great
survivors, it will need “statesmen of unusual ability and vision” if it is
to last out the 21st century.

One looming challenge is demography. Can Russia’s declining population
retain control of northern Eurasia in the face of a fast-growing China?
With a population so tiny for its size, Russia faces a military choice. It
can try to organise its defences on western lines, paying for armed forces
from an essentially civilian economy. Or it can remain a semi-mobilised
society whose schools and enterprises, in many ways, serve military needs. 

A second challenge is common ideals. Beliefs matter in geopolitics as much
as guns. Communism, which turned industry and secularism into a kind of
religion, complete with clergy, was Russia’s way of being modern. How will
Russia be postmodern? Russian cities often seem to have the worst of the
new and the old: families are if anything weaker than in the West, while
the safety net of social-welfare does not exist either. An optimist would
argue that at least such atomisation makes it harder to imagine the return
to a totalitarian ideology such as communism or fascism. Perhaps so. But
Russians will need some stronger reason for holding their state together.
In the past, as Mr Hosking’s excellent historical survey reminds us, one of
the most dependable sources of Russian legitimacy was defence against
foreign enemies. Will Chechens be enough?

********

#7
From: "John Helmer" <helmer@atom.ru>
Subject: STRATEGY VERSUS RESENTMENT -- WHEN TO STOP ATTACKS ON THE FEW FRIENDS RUSSIA HAS
Date: Fri, 25 May 2001

Appearing in The Russia Journal, May 25, 2001
STRATEGY VERSUS RESENTMENT -- WHEN TO STOP ATTACKS ON THE FEW FRIENDS RUSSIA HAS
By John Helmer

Anti-semitism is not the only form of race hatred in Russia. But it is 
almost certainly the most costly form of prejudice Russians practice. 

You can count this cost in terms of population losses, as Russian Jews 
emigrated to Israel, the United States and elsewhere; and in terms of trade 
and other financial losses imposed on the Soviet Union, then on Russia, by US 
legislation connected to the mistreatment of Russian Jews. 

These huge costs are one reason the Putin Administration, like its 
predecessors since Mikhail Gorbachev, has been unusually sensitive to 
domestic attacks on Jews, and keen to make a public display of 
repudiation of such behaviour. 

I say unusually sensitive, because the incidence of anti-semitism in Russia
is very small compared to other forms of race hatred, and to the numbers of 
hate attacks involving other racial, ethnic or national groups. 

It is obvious that the politics of anti-semitism have helped sharpen Russian 
sensitivities, and curbed, at least officially, the most unpleasant 
practices. The alliance between the United States and Israel, and the 
post-Cold War attempts by Russian officials to reach new accommodations with 
it, have created powerful incentives which President Putin's policy of 
reaching out to conservative Jewish groups continues to pursue.

These incentives are so commercial, there is even a thriving business today
that manufactures anti-semitic incidents, so that the purported Russian 
victims can more credibly obtain immigration papers from Israel. According to 
press reports from St. Petersburg, a local company and its executives are now 
on trial for selling assistance to non-Jews seeking to be accepted as Jews 
under Israel's law of return. Anti-semitic letters were forged, and hate 
slogans scrawled near apartment entrances as part of this scheme.

But what of the hate attacks that are a daily occurrence in Moscow for
non-Russian orientals and Africans? And how do the city and federal 
governments reconcile what is happening on the streets with Russia's grand 
strategy -- the triangular alliance with China and India which former Prime 
Minister Yevgeny Primakov coined two years ago?

If politics and commerce have obliged Moscow to promise (and deliver) a 
crackdown on anti-semitic incidents, what is holding Moscow back from a 
comparable effort to deal with the surge of hate attacks on nationals of the 
handful of countries that comprise Russia's strategic friends?

This problem was addressed explicitly on March 21 when ambassadors of the 
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) met Mayor Yury Luzhkov.
They reported attacks on their diplomats, students, businessmen, and visitors
by individual youths and street gangs. They told Luzhkov the attacks have 
occurred in crowded areas in sight of many onlookers and militiamen, who have 
not intervened or responded to cries for help. The reported attacks have all 
involved violence. But a great many incidents that go unreported include 
spitting, verbal epithets, and other forms of abuse.

The targets of these displays of public hatred include Indians, Chinese, 
Vietnamese, Japanese, Indonesians, South Africans, Zimbabweans, and other 
African nationals. 

The problem for Indians has become so great, it has drawn several high-level 
Indian protests to the Russian Foreign Ministry, Luzhkov, and Moscow oblast 
governor Boris Gromov. Their replies of regret and promises to help have 
yet to demonstrate in a public fashion that racially motivated attacks
can be either deterred or punished. There has been nothing like the effort
of the Soviet era to make inter-racial friendship a moral and social
imperative.

The results are already obvious. Among those who are targeted by Russian race 
hatred, there is fear of appearing alone or unprotected in public. This in 
turn is producing a deep and abiding distrust and dislike of Russia itself. 

The Netherlands Foreign Ministry, for example, has already reacted
to the spate of violence by issuing a secret directive banning the appointment
of any Dutch diplomat to Moscow who happens to have negroid or other 
non-Caucasian racial characteristics, or whose skin might appear -- to 
a Russian skinhead -- to be "coloured".

What the Dutch can do quietly is impossible for the governments of Africa and
Asia.

It was Karl Marx first of all, then the French sociologist Emile Durkheim, who
saw the origins of these types of inter-communal violence in the 
breakdown of social and economic order. Alienation in Marx's vocabulary, 
resentment in Durkheim's, were the predictable outcomes in group thinking,
when individuals experience sudden and rapid loss of economic and communal
resources, and concoct quick theories of exploitation to explain their fates. 
For Marx and the Marxists, race hate theories were the propaganda by which
victims were reconciled to their real oppressors by venting their
spleen on scapegoats.

It doesn't take a Marxian education in Russia these days to understand why
Russian policy and state interests are being severely damaged by the 
uncontrollable sentiments of the streets. If the Kremlin knows how to count,
it should decide that it cannot afford to allow resentment to grow among the 
few friends Russia has in the outside world.

*******

#8
From: "John Helmer" <helmer@atom.ru>
Subject: re 3254-Armstrong/Russian Vogue [DJ: Misnumbered by me. Should be
5254]
Date: Fri, 25 May 2001 

Dear David:

In republishing a Times (London) piece about the editor of Vogue Russia
Aliona Doletskaya on May 14 (JRL 3254/14), you fell victim to a deception.
Not only are material facts in the published story false or misleading, but
the promo itself ignores extensive Russian media coverage of Doletskaya's
unpleasant career. The Russian press have reported a criminal conviction
and prison sentence; internal investigation for a variety of abuses;
involvement in the death of Russia's Ambassador to Botswana, Doletskaya's
third husband; and financial aggrandizement and manipulations. Doletskaya
is currently in five separate Moscow court cases. Far from being open about
that or her background, she refuses point-blank to speak to any
Moscow-based medium and threatens to sue any publication that prints the
evidence about her. Through her friends she has issued physical threats.
She also goes abroad to avoid court hearings, offering no defence of her
seizure of a Moscow apartment and its furnishings. They belong to me; they
make my home; and I have asked the Moscow court to return them to me. As a
veteran observer of the Russian scene, you should remember Potemkin's
famous deception, and realize that what you see is often what you are
intended to see by someone intent on fooling you, or worse. Newspapers like
Moskovsky Komsomolets, Moskovskaya Pravda, and The Russia Journal have come
to the conclusion that Doletskaya's motives in all of this are clear. The
curiosity in this case is why the New York-based corporation Conde Nast,
owner of Vogue Russia, is covering up for its Russian editor, and helping
her get away with her deceptions

Regards,
John Helmer

******

#9
Levin Wary of Dropping ABM Treaty
May 24, 2001
By CAROLYN SKORNECK

WASHINGTON (AP) - The soon-to-be chairman of the Senate Armed Services 
Committee says he's wary of any move by President Bush to abrogate the 
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty to build a national missile defense system. 

Sen. Carl Levin, D-Mich., said he's no longer sure that's the 
administration's plan. 

``The president has said he's going to unilaterally deploy on the one hand,'' 
Levin told a group of reporters in his office Thursday. ``On the other hand, 
he has said that he's going to consult with our allies, indeed with Russia 
and with China before he presumably makes a decision. 

``So I no longer know where the administration is on that issue, whether or 
not they have decided unilaterally to break out of that treaty.'' 

The views of the ranking Democrat on the Armed Services Committee gained 
traction Thursday as Sen. James Jeffords turned the Senate topsy-turvy with 
the announcement he will quit the Republican Party and become an independent. 
That tosses the chamber's majority power to the Democrats and the Armed 
Services chairmanship to Levin. 

At a news conference with Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and the 
committee's current chairman, Sen. John Warner, R-Va., Levin pledged to 
continue the committee's bipartisan spirit. 

Rumsfeld briefed about 15 members of the committee Thursday on the progress 
of his top-to-bottom review of the military's defense strategy but few 
details were revealed, even to the Senate. 

``I don't have a good grasp of where the secretary is headed,'' Levin said. 
``I don't think the secretary has a good grasp of where the secretary is 
headed. That's the very distinct impression that we have.'' 

Rumsfeld deflected a question about a report that he was planning to trim an 
Army division or two. 

``I don't know how many times someone can say something before it finally 
sinks in, but I'll try one more time,'' Rumsfeld said. ``We have not gotten 
to the point of addressing weapons systems or specifics. 

``There have not been any discussions by me with anybody along the lines you 
just described,'' he said. ``I have heard the same thing about aircraft 
carriers; I've heard one thing and another about weapons in space; and I know 
y'all have got your job, and I've got mine, but those stories are not 
correct.'' 

Levin said one thing he learned from the briefing was that details won't be 
available in time to have much effect on the budget for the fiscal year 
beginning Oct. 1. Instead, it will have an impact on the budget for fiscal 
2003, giving his committee and the two appropriations committees some 
breathing room this year. 

Showing some of the bipartisanship the panel is known for, Warner and Levin 
agreed on a need to close unnecessary military bases, as Bush recommended in 
his February budget. The idea is opposed vigorously by many members of the 
House, where a lawmaker's constituency can be devastated when a base closes. 

While Levin said he wants two rounds of closings, Warner pressed for one, 
citing the uncertainty and upheaval such events cause for communities. Levin 
said, ``I would accept one round if it's the best we can do.'' 

Yet important policy differences remain. 

Levin said the administration has placed too much focus on defending against 
missiles, ``the least likely means of delivering a weapon of mass 
destruction,'' at the expense of more likely vessels. 

``We have got to spend more resources on the World Trade Centers and the 
embassy bombings and the Cole attacks and invest in the defenses and 
strategies to beat those threats and to beat those terrorists and to try to 
avoid the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,'' Levin said. 

On the Net: Senate Armed Services Committee: 

http://www.senate.gov/committees/committee-detail.cfm?COMMITTEE-ID=4 08 

******

#10
Izvestia
May 25, 2001
SURVEY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS EXPERTS
Russia's elite sheds imperialist ambitions in favor of provincialism
Author: Georgii Bovt
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
WHAT DOES THE RUSSIAN POLITICAL ELITE THINK OF RUSSIA'S POSITION IN 
THE WORLD? THIS STUDY QUESTIONED ALL GROUPS OF EXPERTS WITH ANY 
INVOLVEMENT IN DEVELOPING FOREIGN AFFAIRS POLICIES: IN GOVERNMENT, ACADEMIA, THE MEDIA, PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS, AND PARTIES. THERE WERE A FEW SURPRISING RESULTS.

What does the Russian political elite think of Russia's position 
in the world - what our position is, and what it ought to be? After 
all, the elite will have to deal with these issues. This question was 
addressed in detail in a recent study done by the Russian Independent 
Institute of Social and Ethnic Studies (RNISiNP) in conjunction with 
the Moscow office of the Ebert Foundation. A look at the results 
elicits diverse responses - from "we thought as much" to "that's 
amazing".

The study (which compares results with data from the 1990s) 
surveyed all groups of experts with any involvement in developing 
foreign affairs policies, concepts, or even just statements on this 
topic: in government, academia, the media, public organizations, and 
parties. By the way, it became clear that our political parties don't 
have much input on foreign policy: not only because it's traditionally 
been the province of the president and the Foreign Ministry, but 
because none of the existing parties has a coherent foreign affairs 
platform. We thought as much.

The researchers report that experts have much the same views on 
foreign affairs as the rest of society does; the main dividing line is 
as old as Russia itself: "Should Russia follow the Western path, or 
should it find an alternative?" But among the experts, the "our own 
path" supporters don't outnumber the "Westerners" as clearly as they 
do in society as a whole.

The survey shows that most experts think Russia's foreign affairs 
achievements over the past decade have been modest: 45% of respondents 
think the changes in the style and substance of Russia's foreign 
policy have been "small but positive", 31% believe the changes have 
been negative, and only 17% believe the changes have been both 
substantial and positive. Most of the credit for the reforms is given 
not to democratic changes and Russia's increased openness to the rest 
of the world (this is noted by only 15.7% of respondents), but to 
three politicians: Yevgeny Primakov (24.8% of respondents name his 
appointment as foreign minister as the most important factor in 
transforming foreign policy), Boris Yeltsin (34.8% name his 
resignation), and Vladimir Putin (his rise to power gets about the 
same response as Yeltsin's resignation, which is fairly 
understandable). Moreover, Primakov and Putin are seen as politically 
alike: experts say Putin is developing the very best Primakov (anti-
Kozyrev) traditions. Most of the foreign affairs elite (64.3%) also 
believe that foreign policy has now become more balanced between the 
West and the East; and it is now more in line with Russia's national 
interests (57.9%). It is widely believed in the West that Russia's 
foreign policy has become more confrontational in relation to the 
West, but our experts reject this view (66.4% disagree, and only 12.1% 
agree). The sometimes-voiced opinion that Putin's Russia could return 
to a Cold War gets no support among the elite - neither Putin's 
supporters nor his opponents agree.

The most surprising finding is that over the past few years a 
substantial part of the foreign affairs elite has been cured of 
overestimating the prospects of Russia's foreign policy. The number of 
those who think Russia might become one of the top five developed 
nations in the foreseeable future is only 40% of what it was in 1993. 
However, the number of those who think Russia should turn aside from 
its global ambitions and concentrate on solving its domestic problems 
has risen six-fold.

Younger experts (under 40) are 3.5 times as likely as older 
experts (over 60) to believe that Russia will regain the superpower 
status of the USSR; but they are only a third as likely to think it 
necessary for Russia to give up its global ambitions. What will happen 
when these assertive young people attain positions of power?

Another interesting result: the Westerners are more inclined to 
take an "isolationist" stand. At least a third of them believe Russia 
ought to focus on its domestic problems. The researchers conclude that 
this might be reflecting Western opinions - Russia should not be an 
independent center of influence over global processes. The study 
reveals increased pragmatism among the elite, which is also 
significant. There used to be euphoria based on faith that rejecting 
the "legacy of imperialism" would instantly make Russia part of the 
civilized world; now this is being replaced by calm focus on defending 
our interests and finding a policy balance between West and East.

In recent years there has been a change of priorities among the 
Russian elite. Strategic partnership with the leading Asian powers 
(India and China) tops the list of Russia's foreign policy objectives 
for the first time (66.7% of respondents). Establishing strategic 
partnership with Europe is in second place (65.2%). (Only 17% of the 
experts think it's important for Russia to become a full member of the 
European Union.) Europhiles can take comfort in the fact that the CIS 
is even further behind (57.1% of respondents name protecting the 
interests of ethnic Russians in the CIS as a foreign policy priority). 
Strategic partnership with the United States gets the support of 48.6% 
(America is falling further behind Europe); 46.7% stress the 
importance of creating a system for managing global processes aimed at 
countering military, economic, and environmental threats; and 43.8% 
are concerned about countering globalization and attempts by some 
nations to dictate to others.

What does the Russian elite fear? The list of threats to national 
security includes: international terrorism, the expansion of Islamic 
fundamentalism (61%); Russia being uncompetitive (58.6%); falling 
further behind the West in terms of technology (54.8%); NATO eastward 
expansion (52.9%); pressure on Russia from international economic and 
financial organizations with the aim of eliminating Russia from 
competition (51%). However, the elite has virtually ceased to fear the 
danger of: Russia breaking up, even though some unbalanced politicians 
continue to warn of this; information warfare and psychological 
pressure on Russia - which devalues the Security Council's national 
information security concept papers; population growth in China - 
which will make it easier to boost arms sales to such a "harmless" 
neighbor; major industrial disasters - either we're getting used to 
them, or we're hoping for the best; unsanctioned proliferation of 
nuclear weapons - which makes it basically meaningless to hold talks 
with the US on many strategic issues; worldwide threats such as global 
warming, the destruction of the ozone layer, AIDS, exhaustion of 
natural resources, etc.

The Russian elite doesn't see much significance in the worldwide 
threats on which the global community is focusing more and more 
attention. It's hard not to agree with the following conclusion: the 
Russian elite has long since grown accustomed to taking each day as it 
comes, not looking very far into the future. It isn't interested in 
global problems, doesn't know much about them, and isn't capable of 
assessing them at present. And this makes it look all the more 
provincial.

Survey question

Will Russia become part of Europe? In the RNISiNP survey, 20% of 
experts consider that Russia will regain the status of a great power, 
and will play a decisive role in European affairs, without becoming a 
member of the European Union; 21% think Russia will not be integrated 
into European organizations, but will become a marginalized state; 15% 
think Russia will be integrated into Europe and become one of Europe's 
leading nations; and 33% believe Russia will end up as an ordinary 
member state of the European Union.

Survey question

Do US plans for a national missile defense pose a threat? In the 
survey, 28% of experts consider these plans do present a real danger, 
given that Russia has no appropriate response; 15% think there is no 
real danger; 41% say that while there is some danger, there is also a 
stimulus here for Russia to build up its defenses. Moreover, 49% of 
foreign affairs experts believe that Russia's security interests would 
best be served by prioritizing development of its nuclear deterrent; 
only 25% support prioritizing development of conventional forces.

Survey question

Will Putin's Russia return to a Cold War? This outcome is seen as 
very likely by 10.3% of Putin's supporters and 20% of his opponents. 
It is seen as not very likely by 82.9% of Putin's supporters and 74.5% 
of his opponents. It is seen as "completely unlikely" by 5.1% of 
Putin's supporters and 3.3% of his opponents. A further 1.7% of 
Putin's supporters and 2.2% of his opponents were uncertain.

(Translated by Daria Brunova)

*******

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