March 7, 2001   

This Date's Issues:   5135 • 5136 • 5137 • 5138

Johnson's Russia List
#5138
7 March 2001
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Reuters: Russian Communists hope to avoid Putin showdown.
2. Moscow Times:  Martina Vandenberg, We've Still Got a Long Way to Go.
3. AFP: Foreign consortium bids to save Russian TV channel.
4. AP: Russian Parliament Passes Anthem.
5. Reuters: Report slams conditions in Russian women's prisons.
6. The Guardian (UK): Amelia Gentleman, Anger as Pavlova's ashes leave London for Moscow. St Petersburg arts elite sees plot to hijack its most famous dancer.
7. Robert Bruce Ware: Chechnya.
8. Reuters: Hollywood submarine thriller sparks Russian ire.
9. Vek: THE RETURN OF RUSSIA. Many Hate It, Efficient Policy Foundation Director Gleb PAVLOVSKY Says.
10. WPS Media Monitoring Agency: Politruk/POLITICAL FORECASTS. Vladimir Putin: a remake of Mikhail Gorbachev?] 

********

#1
Russian Communists hope to avoid Putin showdown
By Peter Graff
 
MOSCOW, March 7 (Reuters) - Russian Communist Party chief Gennady Zyuganov
said on Tuesday he hoped to convince President Vladimir Putin to dismiss
his cabinet, but was prepared to stand in new elections if Putin opted to
dissolve parliament instead.

Zyuganov was due to meet the president later on Wednesday to discuss a
Communist-backed no-confidence motion against Prime Minister Mikhail
Kasyanov's government, which could yet blow up into the first serious
political crisis of Putin's presidency.

Any final showdown is still weeks away, because a first no-confidence
motion is not binding. But if parliament votes no confidence a second time
within three months, Putin must either fire Kasyanov's government or call a
new parliamentary election.

"I hope that in my meeting with Putin, we will find a common language,"
Zyuganov told Ekho Moskvy radio.

"The government of Kasyanov does not follow any instructions, not from
Putin, not from the (advisory) State Council, not from the times. It is
crawling along in the old rut of the last 10 years, which has proven to be
very deep."

The State Duma (lower house of parliament) has scheduled the no-confidence
vote for March 14 at the request of Zyuganov's Communists and their allies.
The vote was initially seen as a largely symbolic gesture by the
Communists, who are the largest party in the house but lack a majority.

But this week the pro-Putin Unity party raised the stakes by saying that
although it supports the government, it would also back the no-confidence
motion, in a tactical move to force a new parliamentary election that it
hopes will gain it extra seats.

On Tuesday Unity deputies split over the issue, making the waters still
murkier but suggesting the pro-Kremlin party may roll back.

COMMUNISTS READY FOR NEW VOTE

Zyuganov told  Ekho Moskvy the Communists were "absolutely prepared" for
early elections if necessary.

But he also told reporters earlier on Wednesday that he expected Putin
would eliminate the need for a decisive second no-confidence vote by
announcing in a speech to parliament later this month that he will replace
Kasyanov's government.

"I am sure there will not be a second (no-confidence vote). On March 26 we
will surely hear the president tell the Federation Council about a new
economic course and a team to put in into effect," he was quoted by
Interfax as saying.

Putin's address to the Federation Council, the upper house, is an annual
event in which the president sets out his legislative and political goals.

The Communists, who lost ground in the last election in 1999, accuse
Kasyanov's government of neglecting social spending to divert funds to
service foreign debt.

Russia's political talk shows have been debating the real reasons behind
Unity's decision to back the Communists in voting against the government.

The pro-Kremlin party could stand to gain some seats in a new election, if
not at the expense of the entrenched Communists than at the expense of
smaller groups. But the tactic seems to run sharply against Putin's style
of rule through consensus.

Alexander Veshnyakov, head of the Central Election Commission, said early
polls could create political instability.

"Lots of voters will probably raise the question that they elected deputies
to the Duma in December 1999 and after just more than a year that same Duma
may be dissolved," he said on NTV television. "Did voters really elect the
deputies for this?

"As a rule, it is extreme groups that win out in crisis situations," he
said. "So our politicians should seriously analyse the possible results of
these elections."

********

#2
Moscow Times
March 7, 2001
We've Still Got a Long Way to Go
By Martina Vandenberg
Martina Vandenberg, an attorney, is the Europe researcher for the Women's
Rights Division of Human Rights Watch. She contributed this comment to The
Moscow Times.

They carried placards. On March 8, 1996, a group of women, clad in black,
marched on Pushkin Square. One poster, held by a crisis center volunteer,
told a tale in hieroglyphics: One picture labeled "March 7th" showed a
woman being beaten. A second drawing, labeled "March 8th," showed the same
woman receiving a bouquet of flowers. And the third picture, labeled "March
9th," mirrored the March 7th rendition - the woman being beaten again. Not
without reason, one 31-year-old schoolteacher and mother of two told a
Canadian newspaper, "Women's Day is the most hypocritical holiday ever
invented."

Indeed, the flowers and perfume cannot mask the bruises. Lyudmila
Zavadskaya, formerly a member of the State Duma, has called domestic
violence in Russia an "undeclared war against women." One popular Russian
joke goes: "A husband starts to beat his wife. She cries, 'What are you
doing that for?' He answers, 'If I could think of a reason, I'd kill you
instead.'"

As Andrei Sinelnikov, a project director at ANNA, the Association No to
Violence, has pointed out, some of those husbands keep their deadly
promises. Between 12,000 and 16,000 Russian women die each year at the
hands of their partners, spouses or relatives. Thousands more face brutal
physical assaults in their own homes.

A UNICEF study published in 1999 stated, "A survey in Moscow showed that
more than one in three divorced women had been beaten by their husbands."
The Lana Crisis Center in Nizhny Tagil estimated in 2000 that only 2
percent of women managed to convince police to take their complaints of
domestic violence. The government still does not keep statistics. The
difficulty convincing police to take reports of domestic violence is only
exceeded by the near impossibility of forcing police to file reports for
the rape of adult women. Not surprisingly, perhaps, the number of reported
rapes has plummeted in Russia from 12,515 in 1995 to 10,888 in 1996. By way
of comparison, in 1995, law enforcement agencies recorded 97,464 rapes in
the United States. Similarly, convictions for rape in Russia have fallen,
from 10,314 in 1995, to just 9,766 in 1999.

In December 1997, Human Rights Watch published a report titled "Too Little,
Too Late" blasting the Russian government for its failure to respond to
domestic violence and rape. Sadly, continuing official indifference to both
domestic violence and rape have left Russian women at risk and without
recourse. Follow-up research indicates that little has changed.

According to the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights and
local women's rights activists, women still face formidable barriers that
prevent justice for violence. The Women's Alliance, a women's crisis center
in Siberia, told Human Rights Watch that police officers continue to refuse
to take reports in cases of rape and domestic violence. In 18 of 35 cases
between May 1999 and May 2000, women who called the crisis center's hot
line to report violence against them complained that police had failed to
take reports. In another six cases, police failed to respond to emergency
calls from women being subjected to domestic violence. In one case a police
officer told a victim: "I don't see any proof of that. There is no blood,
and your arms and legs aren't broken." Another quipped, "Is he drunk? If
not, we're not coming."

Despite the grim statistics and the continuing abuse, reflections on how
far the women's movement has come provide some perspective. The Domostroi,
a guide for pre-revolutionary men, included advice on beating one's wife:
"If your wife does not understand your words, or fails to follow them, you
must punish her with a beating." Beatings of pregnant women, the authors
cautioned, should be carried out ". in a careful and intelligent way, do it
painfully, fearfully, strongly."

In 1991, Russia did not have a single domestic violence or rape crisis
center. In 2001, it has more than 50 scattered across the country.
Thirty-five of those centers joined ranks in 1999 to create the Russian
Association of Crisis Centers for Women. Together, with minimal funding and
little or no government support, these crisis centers have opened hot
lines, established legal services, trained police and provided
psychological counseling to thousands of victims. Most importantly, they
have chipped away at society's tolerance of violence against women.

One recent study indicated that more than 80 percent of women and 63.6
percent of men now believe that violence in the family is a crime. With
ongoing anti-violence information campaigns around the country, the trend
should continue downward. The leaders of the women's human rights movement
- women such as Marina Pisklakova, Yelena Yershova and Valentina
Konstantinova - have begun the climb out of the rubble.

*******

#3
Foreign consortium bids to save Russian TV channel

MOSCOW, March 7 (AFP) -
A foreign consortium has bid for a stake in Russia's last major independent
television channel, NTV, which is owned by embattled business tycoon
Vladimir Gusinsky, his Media-MOST group said Wednesday.

US media magnate Ted Turner and New York financier George Soros have both
expressed an interest in buying into the group, which is fighting off a
takeover attempt by its main creditor, the state-owned gas giant Gazprom,
but company spokesman Dmitry Ostalsky declined to give details of the offer.

Gusinsky "received the offer at the weekend and discussions are still in
progress," he said.

Ostalsky gave no indication as to what role Gusinsky, currently under house
arrest in Spain fighting an extradition demand by Russia on fraud charges,
would play in the station if he accepted the consortium's offer.

NTV is the only private television station in Russia that broadcasts
nationwide and has been one of the Kremlin's most vocal critics.

Gusinsky has argued that the fraud charges against him are part of an
official campaign to bring his media group -- which includes several weekly
and daily publications -- to heel.

Turner, the founder of the all-news broadcaster CNN, and Soros, whose Soros
Foundation has campaigned on media and freedom of speech issues throughout
eastern and central Europe, are known to have discussed a joint approach to
Gusinsky to preserve NTV's independence.

The Wall Street Journal, quoting unidentified sources, reported Monday that
Turner and Soros were interested in buying around 60 percent of NTV.

The heavily indebted Media-MOST group has been seeking foreign investors
for the past several months. Gusinsky has said he is prepared to sell his
holding in the television station so long as its independence is guaranteed.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has said he would have no objection to
Turner taking a stake in NTV.

A spokeswoman for Gazprom-Media, Gazprom's media subsidiary, said it would
be prepared to give up some of the shares it already owns in the television
station amounting to 46 percent of the whole, "as long as the channel is
not controlled by Gusinsky."

The spokeswoman, Aelita Yakimova, refused to provide more details.

Spanish authorities are to begin hearings on a Russian request for
Gusinsky's extradition on Thursday.

The tycoon, who was arrested on December 12, is wanted by Moscow to answer
allegations of fraud amounting to some 250 million dollars (268 million
euros).

He has denied all charges, claiming that the action against him is
politically motivated.

*******

#4
Russian Parliament Passes Anthem
March 7, 2001
By JUDITH INGRAM
 
MOSCOW (AP) - Russia's lower house of parliament on Wednesday voted
overwhelmingly in favor of President Vladimir Putin's proposal for new
lyrics to accompany the recently resurrected Soviet-era anthem.

After a brief debate, the lawmakers in the State Duma voted 345 to 19 for
the text composed by Sergei Mikhalkov, the poet who also co-authored the
words to the old anthem that glorified Soviet founder Vladimir Lenin and
dictator Josef Stalin. One deputy abstained.

``Russia, our sacred power, Russia, our beloved country,'' the new text
begins.

``Glory to our free fatherland, age-old union of fraternal peoples, common
wisdom given by our forebears, glory to the country! We take pride in
you!'' reads the refrain.

The Duma vote was one of the final steps necessary to bring the Soviet-era
anthem back, this time as the national hymn of Russia.

Following the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia's then-President
Boris Yeltsin introduced a new anthem, its music composed by 19th-century
composer Mikhail Glinka. But no lyrics were ever written, and many Russians
complained that the melody was hard to remember.

Russia's Communists repeatedly tried to resurrect the music of the Soviet
anthem, but Yeltsin firmly blocked the attempts. However, Putin has been
more amenable to restoring Soviet-era symbols and the Kremlin led the
campaign to bring back the old anthem.

After divisive debate, the Duma voted to return to the old melody in
December. The move was welcomed by many Russians, who felt that the nation
had been too hasty in trying to cut its ties with the Soviet past. But
others fiercely protested it, arguing that the melody would forever carry
associations with Lenin and Stalin.

The new text is the third that Mikhalkov has written. He amended the
original version to remove mention of Stalin after the dictator fell from
grace in the Soviet Union.

Lawmakers in the State Duma put forward four competing versions of the
lyrics, but one of two Communist-sponsored versions was withdrawn on
Wednesday before the vote.

A text submitted by Sergei Yushenkov, a deputy from the liberal Union of
Right Forces faction, was written by satirist Vladimir Voinovich.

``The indestructible union has collapsed forever, Great Russia stands at
the crossroads, but how long it will be indivisible, I won't try to
predict,'' the text read.

``Glory to our free and easy fatherland, glory to the obedient Russian
people, who constantly change their symbols and don't have any more
important worries.''

*******

#5
Report slams conditions in Russian women's prisons
By Tara FitzGerald
 
MOSCOW, March 6 (Reuters) - Facilities in Russian women's prisons are
woefully inadequate and many female prisoners suffer permanent
psychological damage after long-term stays, research presented on Tuesday
showed.

There are around 50,000 women in prison in Russia, accounting for more than
five percent of the prison population.

The investigation, started in 1999 by the Justice Ministry's penal
department and supported by Penal Reform International, concluded that the
worst problems for female prisoners were a lack of adequate sanitary
provision and a lack of opportunity for mothers to see their children.

"Women are not receiving hygiene resources, although we know they need them
at least once a month," said Lyudmila Alpyern, deputy director of the
Centre for the Promotion of Criminal Justice.

"If we want to be civilised society, this is something we have to pay
attention to," she told a news conference to present the research ahead of
International Women's Day on March 8.

The report said that in some cases women were forced to tear up clothes and
bed sheets as substitutes during menstruation, due to the lack of sanitary
products.

The study was carried out in six strict-regime prisons across Russia. It
examined women prisoners' lives and whether they were able to return to
normal life and have a normal family after serving a jail term.

NOT DESIGNED FOR WOMEN

It concluded that Russian prisons, notorious for being crowded and
disease-ridden conditions, were not designed with women in mind and that
legislators lacked a fundamental understanding of women.

It said they did not understand that longer sentences could completely
destroy women's lives, often resulting in them losing husbands and
children, and added that after long sentences many women permanently lost
the ability to reintegrate into society.

The destruction of the mother-child relationship was also stressed in the
report.

In Russian prisons, female detainees who have families are allowed to spend
time with their children until the age of three within the prison
environment, but cannot live together.

"This leads to women rejecting their children...as prison conditions here
do not allow for mothers and children to live together," Alpyern said.

Officials at the news conference said women prisoners with children should
be granted a separate category within the penal system to allow for their
particular needs.

"Most working mothers are in a situation where they put their children into
the creche and go to work and then pick them up again in the evening --
this is how it should ideally be in prison as well," said Alexander
Dolgikh, one of the authors, who previously worked in the general
prosecutor's office.

*******

#6
The Guardian (UK)
7 March 2001
Anger as Pavlova's ashes leave London for Moscow
St Petersburg arts elite sees plot to hijack its most famous dancer
Amelia Gentleman in Moscow

Plans for Anna Pavlova's ashes to be moved in triumph to Russia next week
have been soured by the demand of her relatives and Russia's cultural elite
that they should be left in peace in Golders Green crematorium in north
London.

Two marble urns containing her remains and those of her husband will be
removed from the shelf in the crematorium where they have stood for more
than half a century and flown as cabin luggage to Moscow.

Next Wednesday they will be interred in a tomb in Moscow's most famous
cemetery, the Novodevichy, alongside the graves of the writer Anton
Chekhov, former president Nikita Khrushchev and the composer Sergei
Prokofiev.

Invitations to the ceremony have been sent to stars of Moscow ballet. But
the occasion has become the cause of bitter complaints from the dancer's
family and firm disapproval from the ministry of culture.

"We can't understand why her remains are being disturbed, or who stands to
benefit from the ashes going to Moscow," her niece Valentina Trifonova said
yesterday.

"In the name of all the ballerina's surviving relatives, I'd like to
request that she be left in peace."

Her disapproval echoed the concern voiced by the Russian culture minister,
Mikhail Shvydkoy, who said the ministry had "grave doubts about the
organisations which have initiated the burial of this great ballerina's
remains".

"It is better not to touch people's ashes unless their express desire
otherwise has been registered," he said last week.

"The people who have prompted this campaign refer to her last wishes but
cannot produce any evidence that this is what she wanted.

Moreover her husband, Victor Dandre, made no plans for a posthumous journey
to Russia. Therefore the legitimacy of such a burial is dubious in the
extreme."

The long battle over Pavlova's ashes has been complicated by the lack of a
will detailing her own wishes. After making her name on the stage of the
Mariinsky theatre in her home town, St Petersburg, she left Russia in 1914
with her husband and manager and settled in London, where she lived happily
until her sudden death in 1931, during a visit to the Hague.

The urn containing her ashes was placed in the Golders Green crematorium,
near her London home. Her husband later stipulated in his will that if a
serious request was ever made in Russia for her ashes to be moved there,
then the crematorium caretakers should agree to it.

Behind the campaign for the ashes' removal is Valentina Zhilenkova, a
passionate admirer of the ballerina and director of the Anna Pavlova
Foundation of Mercy, a charity devoted largely to securing the remains for
Russia.

Backed by Moscow's mayor, Yury Luzhkov, she has been negotiating with
crematorium officials since the early 1990s. A spokesman for the
crematorium said it had acceded "with sadness" to Ms Zhilenkova's request,
because it felt this was appropriate.

Opposition has increased as the plans for the reburial have been revealed.
The opposition in the St Petersburg ballet community has been particularly
intense. Leonid Nadirov, the director of the ballet school from which
Pavlova graduated in 1899, has written to President Vladimir Putin,
appealing to him to put a stop to the burial.

The project had "raised grave concerns in St Petersburg's cultural
establishment", he said; if there was a real desire to have her ashes
returned home, it made no sense to bury her in Moscow - a city for which
she had little affection.

Throughout her career, Pavlova danced only once at the Bolshoi theatre in
the capital. He proposed placing the remains in the small St Petersburg
graveyard where the dancer's mother is buried.

"There has always been a spirit of cultural competitiveness between Moscow
and St Petersburg," Ms Zhilenkova retorted. "The Bolshoi theatre has a
history of poaching the greatest dancers from St Petersburg and a lot of
bitterness remains. I think that explains much of this protest.

"In any case, the city has done nothing to honour the memory of this
wonderful dancer.

Pavlova was too ill to think about her final resting place when she was
struck down by pleurisy in Holland. Her last words were said to be:
"Prepare me my swan costume."

*******

#7
From: "Robert Bruce Ware" <bruce@brick.net>
Subject: Chechnya
Date: Tue, 6 Mar 2001

A series of entries on Chechnya in JRL nos. 5135  and 5136 provide a useful
encapsulation of confusions that have dominated  discussions of this topic.
5136 opens with an horrendous account of a mass grave near the principal
federal base outside of Grozny. Evidence of this sort must be fully
investigated. If allegations of torture, mutilation and murder can be
confirmed then they must be condemned and discouraged in the firmest
possible manner. 

However, serious inquiry is not assisted by  analyses such as that of
Svante Cornell, which appears later in the same  issue. Cornell's assertion
that wars in Chechnya precipitated the spread of religious radicalism in
the region is, at best, a simplification.  In fact, Islamic fundamentalism
spread from Tajikistan to Dagestan in the early 1990s, before the first
Chechen war, and was introduced to Chechnya by Dagestanis. Yet there was no
war in  Dagestan. Opposite Cornell, there is substantial evidence that
religious radicalism contributed to the origins of the current conflict in
Chechnya.  In any case, the causal relationship between religious
radicalism and war in the Northeast Caucasus is far more complex than
Cornell suggests. 

So are the other causes of the war.  Cornell holds Moscow fully responsible
for a war that has destroyed Chechen social structure.  He thereby begs
important questions concerning the degree to which Chechen social structure
and national mythology contributed to the origins of both wars.  To what
extent did the structure of Chechen teips render the Maskhadov regime
incapable of consolidating an authoritative political structure  capable of
supporting a legitimate economy and thereby sustaining a viable and
law-abiding Chechen independence?  To what degree did traditional warrior
culture contribute to military miscalculation?  Again,  this is not to
suggest that Moscow does not bear responsibility.  It is simply to point
out that actual causal relationships in the Caucasus are far less
transparent than those that Cornell recognizes.  Nor is  Moscow the only
outside force that has contributed to conflict in Chechnya.

However reassuring they may seem, simplicities such  as these only serve to
support the assertion by President Putin, in 5135, that the situation in
the Caucasus has been widely misunderstood.  Thus they only serve to
sustain further Russian abuses in Chechnya.  So long as Western analysis
indulges in simplicities it will be easily dismissed by Moscow.  Western
organizations cannot possibly begin to influence Russian policy in Chechnya
until they begin to recognize the complexities of the  situation in the
Northeast Caucasus.  Failure to do so does not serve the interests of
people in the region who are suffering on all sides of the  conflict.  If
we are effectively to condemn Russian abuses, then we must begin by
recognizing the full complexity of the framework within which they occur.

******

#8
Hollywood submarine thriller sparks Russian ire
By Rosalind Russell
 
ST PETERSBURG, Russia, March 7 (Reuters) - Forty years ago the crew of a
crippled Soviet submarine struggled heroically in the depths of the North
Atlantic to prevent a nuclear explosion that could have triggered a third
world war.

But the retelling of the story in a new Hollywood movie to star Harrison
Ford has angered veterans in Russia, who say the script has made them look
like fools not heroes.

The row has broken out in a country still scarred by a very recent
submarine disaster -- that of the Kursk, which sank with all 118 hands in
August last year.

"It makes us look like incompetent drunkards, sitting around drinking vodka
and swearing, playing cards while the alarms were sounding," said Captain
Igor Kurdin, head of the St Petersburg Submariners Club, referring to the
new film.

The K-19, the Soviet Union's first nuclear-powered submarine, ran into
trouble when its nuclear cooling system malfunctioned on its maiden voyage
in 1961.

Eight crew members died from radiation poisoning as they exposed themselves
to the reactor to avert a disaster which could have led to a confrontation
between the United States and Soviet Union at the height of the Cold War.

The film's retelling of the incident, "K-19: The Widowmaker," has Ford as
the captain of the vessel and is due for release next year.

But veterans say the screenplay is peppered with vulgar Slavic stereotypes,
despite assurances from the film makers that they would focus on the crew's
courage.

Ford visited St Petersburg in November last year with director Kathryn
Bigelow and spent what was described as a convivial evening with crew
members who toasted the 58-year-old star as "Comrade Captain."

"They said they wanted to make a film which told the truth about what
happened. The meeting was pleasant and we all believed them," Kurdin told
Reuters.

SHOCKED BY SCRIPT

Then the K-19 veterans, all now elderly, were shown a copy of the script.

Apart from the boozing and bad language, crew members also objected to what
they call an "imagined conflict" between Ford's character, Captain Nikolai
Zateyev, and his second-in-command, to be played by Irish star Liam Neeson.

"Their reaction was very emotional. Some of them nearly had heart attacks.
It is a very bad script and they felt it shamed the memories of the dead,"
said Kurdin, who is representing a group of K-19 survivors.

Emotions are running high in the wake of the Kursk disaster, caused when
explosions ripped through the submarine's hull and sent it to the bottom of
the Barents Sea.

"(The film) shows Russian submariners as brawling drunks and will only
portray those who died aboard Kursk in a very bad light while they are
still being mourned by their families," Kurdin said.

In reality, it was the elite of the Soviet navy who were recruited to man
K-19, the Soviet Union's most advanced ballistic missile submarine.

"You've got to remember this was 40 years ago and we were all fervent
communists. It was extremely strict and extremely well-disciplined. That
was the only way it could be," said Kurdin.

VETERANS SEND LETTER TO NAVY BOSSES

Enraged by what they regard as a distortion of their heroic efforts, a
group of K-19 survivors has sent an open letter to Russian naval chiefs to
denounce the script.

Despite what they say have been promises that the screenplay would be
reworked, veterans say numerous requests to see a revised copy have been
ignored.

An official at Intermedia Films, who are financing and distributing the
movie, said the script was being "constantly revised" but said film makers
did not claim to be telling the exact story.

"The thrust of the film is to portray the heroism of the sailors," said the
official, who declined to be identified.

"But it is a piece of dramatic entertainment and it doesn't purport to tell
the real story, exactly how it happened."

The film has also run into trouble at home. A Los Angeles lawsuit has been
filed against the film company by a rival producer who says she signed a
deal several years ago with Captain Zateyev and other crew for exclusive
rights to their stories. The Intermedia official declined to comment on the
suit.

Shooting of the underwater thriller has already begun in Moscow, and
filming will soon move to Canada's Atlantic coast where a decommissioned
Russian submarine is based.

Kurdin and his band of elderly submariners say they are resigned to the
idea that the multi-million dollar movie will go head despite their protests.

"We have shown our attitude and made our criticisms and now it's up to the
consciences of those making the film," said Kurdin.

"Lots of Americans want to see Russians portrayed the way they are shown in
this film. That's why these films are made. But we are concerned about the
honour of those who died."

******

#9
Vek
No. 9
2001
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
THE RETURN OF RUSSIA
Many Hate It, Efficient Policy Foundation Director Gleb
PAVLOVSKY Says
    
     Question: There was this scandal around the 'Borodin
case', there was a ranking FBI officer accused of spying for
Russia, and there were tough-worded statements addressed to
Moscow by presidential adviser Condoleezza Rice. Do you think
the two countries are sliding back to a new cold war? Is Russia
ceding its positions in the international arena?
     Answer: Let's not judge American gimmicks for public
consumption too severely. The US is living through a transition
period. It is down with post-Soviet globalism. The new
Administration stands a good chance of recuperating. Generally
speaking, Washington is only starting to review its post-Soviet
global heritage. Putin in Moscow has already done it, and is
getting better and better. One can hardly imagine that Russia
might cede more national positions than it did in the 1990s.
Russia had withdrawn from everywhere and had been getting on
everybody's nerves as a nagging retiree would. Russia had been
becoming a state without identity, and analysts had been
debating the face of the world without Russia in earnest. Putin
minced no words when he said that unless the problem of
national security were resolved, Russia would not survive "as
we had known it." This is an example of national sobriety.
Russia is returning to its place in the world, the place of a
global power by definition.
    
     Question: They say that Russia has effectively lost its
status of a superpower. Your opinion?
     Answer: Russia needs not be a superpower; being simply
Russia will suffice. Russia will not lose its global positions
for as long as it is a basic variant of human community. Russia
is a European state with an Orthodox Christian civilization
that has been restored after being destroyed and banned for
nearly a century. So what? Israel had not been in the maps for
much longer than Russia, for 2,000 years and had been restored!
Unlike a place in the market, a place in humanity cannot be
lost.
Therefore, Russia's return to Europe as a power that follows
the course of its national interests, something that Putin
insists on, naturally rejuvenates its international standing.
It is still weak, it is still in a precarious position
economically, but see how the interest in Russia has grown, see
how the status of head of the Russian state has changed in the
eyes of the international public! Fears of a future strong
Russia are growing in parallel.
They are based on the long-term habit of seeing the world in
disorder and a Russia of no self-determination of the 1990s.
The Western press increasingly writes that such an economically
weak country should not claim the status of a great power. This
is a piece of 'friendly' advice: Russia is being driven into an
eternal post-Soviet ghetto. Russia is returning, something that
does not gladden the hearts of those who decided in 1991 that
Russia would sink together with the Soviet Union. Russia is not
threatening anyone: it is simply settling down in the place it
belongs.
    
     Question: Your vision of Putin's activities seems to be
strictly positive. Do you think he has made no mistakes lately?
     Answer: Sure he has. As I see it, one mistake is Putin's
kindness. He spares the nerves of the nation, and that obscures
the vision of our reality, the pitiful state of the nation. The
apparat discerns stability and well being everywhere and
demonstrates insolence and lack of subordination to the people.
The inventory taking has been announced but not brought to a
point where one could draw organizational conclusions; it is
drowning in empty talk the way the 'process of reforms' has
drowned. There is no room for sobriety in our political life;
the Moscow 'crises' resemble brawls in cheap joints. The
inspector must act fast, for the nation is getting tired of
waiting for the results of the inventory.
     The key word - Europe - has finally been said in foreign
policy. It is also high time Russia had a concept of national
interests. What is Russia a global power? If it ignores the
matter of self-determination as a second state-legal community
in the continent convergent to the EU, Russia would find itself
in the trap of post-war globalism and in the role of a weak
player, at that. For even the rich and mighty United States
cannot cope with the global order destroyed in the Cold War,
and therefore artificially procrastinates normalization in
Eurasia.
     Since we have firmly decided to develop on our own global
basis, all Russia should rally to cope with the objective. This
objective should be made understandable to everybody in Russia,
elementary school students not excluding. All responsible
forces without exception, opposition forces including, should
rally behind the system of national objectives of Russia a
global power. Building and protecting what has been built is
today more important than struggling against somebody. Hence
the matter of a responsible power. Irresponsible power cannot
be national power and will someday trade the great power for
the illusion of apparat 'stability'. Will there be a power
responsible to the free nation besides the president? There
will then be parliamentary and governmental crises instead of
today's 'virtual' crises that are seeping people's trust in
Putin drop by drop.
           Transcript by Artur AKOPOV
    
******   

#10
wps.ru
WPS Media Monitoring Agency
March 7, 2001
Politruk/POLITICAL FORECASTS
Vladimir Putin: a remake of Mikhail Gorbachev?
Seraphima Verchoglyadova  

     Mikhail Gorbachev's 70th birthday has inspired among analysts not
only the quite understandable desire to reminisce about "how it all
began", but also an impulse to comment on the current revival of
interest in "the father of perestroika". The media, which usually
confines itself to today's headlines, has clearly demonstrated this
time round that post-Soviet Russia does have its own history - and
quite a packed history: there were probably more colorful figures and
events in the few years of perestroika than in the 20 years of
Brezhnev. And as for the emotional judgments, hopes, discoveries, and
disappointments of perestroika - well, there would be few periods in
Russian history comparable to this fairly brief interval of time.
     "Itogi" magazine titled its article on Gorbachev "The Man Who
Launched the Process". It doesn't matter that the Soviet Union's last
general secretary only wanted to "open the floodgates slightly", says
"Itogi". So he "tried to control democratization and measure out
glasnost in small doses at first". So he sometimes behaved like a
typical party functionary of the stagnation period. But still, the
most important thing was achieved: "The dam burst." The process which
was thus "launched" turned out to be uncontrollable - it couldn't be
stopped.
     Quite possibly, at some point in the process of political and
economic reforms, their initiator "realized to his horror that the
system was unreformable." After that, we started seeing a different
Gorbachev more and more often - "Gorbachev dashing to and fro, over-
sensitive, suspicious. Worst of all, indecisive." A clear stand and
determined moves were called for; but he still proffered only new
compromises. "Eventually, the communist elite came to hate him; and
the democrats turned away from him."
     "Itogi" examines the question of how we ought to view Gorbachev
today - as a great reformer who set out to change the Soviet system,
or a party functionary who only wanted to modernize it a little?
Fifteen years ago, when the last general secretary uttered his famous
phrase - "The process is underway!" - everyone asked: "Where is it
heading?" And there is still no answer to that question, says "Itogi".
Accoring to "Itogi", all we can do at present is paint a fairly
accurate picture of the place from which this process led Russia away.
All we need to do is recollect a few realities of 15 years ago.
     The "Moskovskie Novosti" weekly claims it's no easier to answer
the question of "Who is Mr. Gorbachev?" than it is to answer "Who is
Mr. Putin?"
     According to "Moskovskie Novosti", Gorbachev's tragedy was that
his dreams of reaching certain "high goals and ideals", realizing "the
people's desire for freedom and progress", ran headlong into harsh
reality: it turned out that all of these were "just fine words, not
expressing the interests of anyone in particular."
     Having rejected the traditional practice of relying on the party
elite, Gorbachev found himself caught in the crossfire - trapped
between those who opposed the reforms and those who wanted them to
move ahead more quickly. Gorbachev dreamed of expressing the interests
of the whole society, but he suddenly discovered that a united society
no longer existed; that from now on "there were two opposing camps,
and the nation's future would be decided in the battle between them."
     Such is the fate of all moderates, says "Moskovskie Novosti";
they live on illusions and the impression that "people are ready to
sacrifice their immediate interests for the sake of enthusiasm, a
sense of patriotism, serving the nation." Illusions like these are
very costly for a society, since after the inevitable defeat of the
moderates, "the radicals have to deal with all the leftover problems."
     "Novoe Vremya" magazine says: "No one in Russia today likes
Gorbachev." Well, the ladies might be the only exception - they have
finally forgiven the Soviet president for what they used to criticize
most strongly - his apparently "excessive" love for his wife.
     In most cases, as soon as Gorbachev's name is mentioned, it
elicits "complaints - not very passionate ones, but complaints which
have cooled slightly over the years, mostly because of the fresher
dislike for Yeltsin." People say: "All this started with Gorbachev!
It's his fault, he was working for the West! Big talker, traitor,
coward! We were getting on fine until he came along."
     Of course, plenty of objections can be made to this; but for
almost every negative memory from the Soviet past, there is another,
no less negative, from recent times: "Yeltsin was no less embarrassing
than Chernenko; and today's regional leaders aren't very different
from first secretaries of regional party committees"; not to mention
the fact that today's "free elections" often mean the freedom to
choose between crooks and outright bandits.
     So if Gorbachev is really popular anywhere these days, it's in
the West. However, even there things aren't quite so straightforward.
     According to "Novoe Vremya", for Western politicians Gorbachev is
something like a dream that never came true, a dream of an ideal - or,
more accurately, an ideally convenient - arrangement for global
politics: "Everything in its place, no nuclear proliferation, the USSR
still exists but it's no longer scary, it's still ruled by a general
secretary but he's a good guy!" There would have been no need to deal
with Russian organized crime, outbreaks of nationalism, armed
conflicts, and so much more. Therefore, "Novoe Vremya" concludes that
Gorbymania in the West today is only "nostalgia for the irretrievably
lost simplicity of a bipolar world"; or, in other words, "a form of
distaste for Russia".
     The West "digested Gorbachev's advantages fairly rapidly".
However, the Western world turned out to be completely unprepared for
a global revision of all its policies. At least, one thing that hasn't
disappeared is the drive toward NATO expansion, in order to "put up
barricades against Russia, which is unreformed and unreformable" -
just in case.
     Gorbachev himself was no saint, says "Novoe Vremya". His
dedication to reform wasn't based on a thirst for freedom, or a
"longing for democracy"; it was based on plain simple envy - a Soviet
functionary's envy of Western living standards.
     Nevertheless, "Novoe Vremya" is prepared to forgive Gorbachev for
his incomprehension of his own actions, and his ignorance of
economics, and for occasionally behaving like a communist boss from
the provinces.
     "Even so, he was the fairest flower that was capable of blooming
from the rotting compost of the communist elite. He had some good
intentions at heart. The happiest five years of our lives are
associated with his name."
     But some verdicts on Gorbachev are a good deal more harsh.
     Not without irony, the "Novye Izvestia" newspaper notes that
judging by the foreword to his book "The Years of Difficult
Decisions", Gorbachev seriously considers himself to be a person who
"presided over one of the 20th century's major upheavals", "taking on
the burden of transforming a great and complex nation." "Novye
Izvestia" comments: "Alas, he appears to be confusing a party title
(the official 'leader' of all the Soviet people) with the mission of a
Reformer who really does lead and direct the process of reforms."
     According to "Novye Izvestia", Gorbachev didn't shoulder any
weighty responsibilities at all: "He wasn't in charge of the
democratic reform process. He was in charge of a party-driven
government system, under which (from the early 1980s) the command
economy began to break down, and the first shoots of democratic
consciousness and democratic organizations began to appear."
     In the major dichotomy of the time - "the party elite versus the
people" - Gorbachev wasn't on the side of the people. Of course, this
view of things might seem strange if one accepts Gorbachev's image of
himself, and his repeated assertions that his ideal is "a society of
free individuals" and all his actions have been based on "the
interests of the individual, and democracy throughout."
     "Novye Izvestia" even allows for the possibility that Gorbachev
sincerely believes all he says and writes. But reality was quite
different.
     "Novye Izvestia" points out that it was Gorbachev who defended
until the last moment the notorious Article 6 of the Soviet
Constitution, which gave the Communist Party ultimate authority. It
was Gorbachev who spoke out against demands for "ideological
pluralism", agreeing only to "pluralism within the bounds of Marxism
and Leninism" ("Novye Izvestia" notes sarcastically that Stalin
himself wouldn't have objected to such pluralism). Gorbachev didn't
even risk an open, universal presidential election; he became head of
state following a Congress of People's Deputies.
     On the whole, says "Novye Izvestia", Gorbachev was a true "son of
the party elite", and a loyal defender of its interests. Moreover, he
fully shared the party elite's confidence that making any changes was
its own prerogative.
     This was the reason why "the Utopia of perestroika" failed: it
was because of blind faith in "all-powerful directives from the top",
in a strong regime capable of achieving anything, even a transition to
democracy via authoritarian methods.
     It's hard to resist a comparison with present-day Russia. "Novye
Izvestia" classifies as utopian the belief that "the leader's strong
rule" - and the state power hierarchy based on it - form the
foundation for a strong state.
     "True enough, without a strong state power hierarchy, it is
impossible to stop the highly dangerous process of fragmentation in
Russian society, the fraying of the social fabric. But a strong,
effective hierarchy can only exist if it is supported by horizontal
links - the structures and institutions of a civil society. Without a
strong horizontal framework, there can be no strong state power
hierarchy."
     And that's the real lesson to be drawn from "Gorbachev's reform
failures", according to "Novye Izvestia". The article is titled "The
Utopia of the Party Elite".
     The arguments used in the "Novye Izvestia" article are directly
addressed by Leonid Zhukhovitsky, writing in the "Vek" weekly.
     Yes, says Zhukhovitsky, Gorbachev was a party functionary - but
not an ordinary one. He was a genius. "Having climbed every rung on
the ladder of rank - from a common soldier to commander-in-chief - he
understood the mafia-like system of power better than anyone. He knew
the covert links, the vulnerable points. Gorbachev did the impossible
- he beat the system at its own game."
     Zhukhovitsky admits that Gorbachev's failures will inevitably be
discussed, and he has answers ready for all accusations against the
"father of perestroika". Did Gorbachev rely on the wrong people? "Who
else was there for him to rely on in the mid-1980s, or even in the
late 1980s? Political observers from the national newspapers, and
young TV anchors?"
     It shouldn't be forgotten, says Zhukhovitsky, that Gorbachev had
two bodies at his disposal in order to carry out democratic reforms:
the Communist Party and the KGB. He notes acidly: "It's futile to ask
which of these was more progressive - they were both progressive to
the same extent."
     Zhukhovitsky goes on to address the common complaint that
Gorbachev clung to a "Communist Party vocabulary", so irritating for
"clever people who were true supporters of democratic change". Indeed,
endless avowals of loyalty to the path of socialism, and endless
ritual references to the classics of Marxism and Leninism, couldn't
fail to irritate. "My deepest sympathy to those clever and democratic
people," says Zhukhovitsky, "but another point seems much more
relevant: all those evasively liberal phrases soothed the party
elite." In other words, says Zhukhovitsky, Gorbachev's style was a
deliberate move - it served the purpose of camouflage.
     (And here is another link to the present day: some supporters of
President Putin - at least during his first months in office - claimed
that he was only trying to conform to popular expectations of a
"strong hand" capable of restoring order in Russia; but in his heart,
the new head of state was a keen liberal and a true believer in
reforms. Their opponents feared that all the new regime's declarations
that reforms would continue were just a smokescreen, an attempt to
divert public attention during a forced transition to a police state.)
     Zhukhovitsky then turns to the criticism of Gorbachev for trying
to keep Article 6 of the Soviet Constitution in place: "The world's
wisest party had a very strange general secretary - he battled for the
party's privileges with great determination, but for some reason he
lost every battle. He lost to the democratic forces, which at the time
could have been suppressed with a single Politburo directive. How
poorly Gorbachev defended the Communist Party's monopoly on power!
Apparently he could handle everything apart from this..."
     Zhukhovitsky quotes Gorbachev's famous statement: "I'll never
reveal the whole story." Indeed, asks Zhukhovitsky, what can Gorbachev
really say to his critics? "If he says he wanted moderate reforms, but
got a different outcome, then he can be written off as a short-sighted
provincial functionary. If he says he deliberately led a totalitatian
system to its downfall, then from the viewpoint of Communist Party
functionaries he's a traitor." All he can do is keep silent.
     The "Argumenty i Fakty" weekly quotes Grigorii Yavlinsky on
Gorbachev: "He did one small thing for the reforms. He arrived at the
conclusion that people should not be executed or imprisoned for what
they think or say. Moreover, they should be permitted to say anything
they wish. And that was enough to launch the process."
     As a result, the "initiator" of the reform process found himself
"trapped between two political forces - the new-wave politicians he
had brought into being, and the party elite he came from."
     Gorbachev's approval rating went through all the stages common
for Russian political leaders: the people adored him, they grew
disillusioned with him, they hated him. But in the end, says
"Argumenty i Fakty", the nation forgave Gorbachev for everything: "The
Russian people are easily appeased, and compassionate. When
Gorbachev's wife Raisa died, millions mourned with him. Ten years
after he stepped down, the approval rating of the Soviet Union's first
and last president is slowly but steadily growing."
     Recently, there have even been rumors that the former leader
might soon return to politics, "to help the present master of the
Kremlin avoid errors". Some say Gorbachev could be an adviser to
Putin. True, Gorbachev himself denies these rumors: "I'm not needed in
the Kremlin. A president needs his own team. Of course, those of us
who are experienced and authoritative politicians may be capable of
helping in some way. But no official appointments are necessary for
that." (From Gorbachev's interview with "Komsomolskaya Pravda".)
Nevertheless, "Argumenty i Fakty" is sure that "Gorbachev is making a
come-back".
     "Literaturnaya Gazeta" has compiled an interesting collection of
replies from various political figures to the question: "What will
people say of Gorbachev in 2031?" As expected, the fiercest responses
came from nationalists.
     Alexander Prokhanov, chief editor of the nationalist newspaper
"Zavtra", describes Gorbachev as an "ill-starred and demonized"
figure. He says that the legend of Gorbachev the villain has been
firmly established. "Like the legends about Grishka Otrepiev or
Mazepa, this legend won't go away. It's part of our nation's history
now, and by 2031 it will be set in stone. Once Gorbachev is no longer
a living personality, this legend will become ever more tragic and
frightening."
     Dmitrii Rogozin, leader of the Congress of Russian Communities,
replies along the same lines: "Mikhail Gorbachev headed a state with a
population at 250 million and rising. This state had its problems, but
it functioned, and its GDP was growing. Gorbachev left it split into
feudal kingdoms, amidst the fire and bloodshed of civil conflicts."
     As for democracy, glasnost, and civil liberties, Rogozin says
these are "the objective result of scientific progress and the
development of communications technology. And the people take primary
credit for that."
     Rogozin is sure that all positive changes in Russian society were
achieved despite Gorbachev's efforts, not because of them. It is
interesting to compare his views with those of noted writer Tatyana
Tolstaya (quoted in "Moskovskii Komsomolets").
     "Gorbachev was driven out, ridiculed, blamed for all the
misfortunes, tragedies, disasters great and small that took place
during his time in power," says Tolstaya. However, she believes that
Gorbachev has been vastly underestimated as a Great Reformer ("Novoe
Vremya" magazine calls him "Martin Luther from the Stavropol
territory"); the public is extremely unfair to Gorbachev, even by
Russian standards. "Yes, there was corruption under Gorbachev; and
after him it came into full flower. Yes, poverty was a problem under
Gorbachev; and after him some people actually began starving to
death..." Tolstaya notes that no one considered Gorbachev particularly
honest, just, or noble: "But after his departure, the nation was
flooded with an unimaginable level of dishonor, corruption, outright
theft, and lies."
     Tolstaya believes that no one has managed to come up with the
definitive statement on Gorbachev: "The Gorbachev phenomenon remains
unexplained; and everything I've read on the subject seems like
varying descriptions of an angel given by a biologist, a psychologist,
a lawyer, an anthropologist, a statistician, etc."
     All the determined efforts to find the source of the Gorbachev
phenomenon, based on ordinary cause-and-effect reasoning, are doomed
to failure: "According to all the usual laws of nature, Gorbachev
should never have existed. But he did exist. And he still exists."
     However, debates about "Gorbachev's errors" refuse to die down.
     Moreover, as "Itogi" magazine notes, all the accusations levelled
at Gorbachev - "he avoided making the fundamental decisions which
require a leader to show political will, he tried to tell everyone
whatever they wanted to hear from the president, he engaged in
demagoguery" - are also being directed at Putin.
     When Gorbachev launched his reforms, he believed that the system
was reformable. There was no talk of smashing the system, as Boris
Yeltsin subsequently did. "Itogi" points out that the present regime
isn't striving to continue Yeltsin's reforms so much as restore what
has been destroyed over the past decade.
     "Just like Gorbachev, Putin has no clear plan of action, and has
only a vague idea of the ultimate goal of the changes he is making.
Putin instinctively turns to the models of managing and organizing the
state which he understands because they have been familiar to him all
his life." This gives the impression that Putin pictures the "state
power hierarchy", which he started building as soon as he took office,
as being in the image and likeness of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union.
     The regime is devoting all its efforts to ensuring that this
"remake" is successful. Internal competition in politics has been
practically eliminated: "What is presented as the consolidation of
society is actually the rejection by all political forces of a
democratic struggle for power, and a transition to covert intrigues,
battles for access to the president's ear."
     But times have changed, and these days it's not that easy to
force state officials into implicit obedience. There are many examples 
- one of the latest is the story of Evgenii Nazdratenko, which reveals
the state's present helplessness, even "with the FSB and the
prosecutor's office"; the president was forced to phone a recalcitrant
regional leader personally, to bargain with him rather than threaten
him.
     Politicians are also confidently saying that the state isn't what
it used to be, and does not inspire the same level of fear. Among them
are some who supported Putin at the start of his presidency.
     Boris Nemtsov, leader of the Union of Right Forces, was asked in
his interview with "Komsomolskaya Pravda" what he thought of the
president: "Unlike his predecessor, Putin is a rather cautious person.
He has a completely different personality. Yeltsin was a real Russian
tsar. Whether his decisions were good or bad, he did make them. But
Putin asks various people for advice. As I see it, he sometimes asks
advice too much. Some among the Moscow political elite think Putin is
afraid of making decisions. He's a novice president."
     As noted above, that same Moscow political elite also used to
accuse Gorbachev of being indecisive, even cowardly. According to the
media, the difference between Gorbachev and Putin could lie in the
fact that Gorbachev really didn't have to take much action; once
launched, the "process" continued of its own accord, based on general
enthusiasm.
     Now the situation has changed - the people have a different
attitude to the government, and even to themselves. Yevgenii Yasin,
the "grandfather of Russia's economic reforms", who is now head of the
Expert Institute, was interviewed by the "Vecherniaia Moskva"
newspaper. He said: "The biggest problem in Russia today is trust. The
government doesn't trust the people, and the people don't trust the
government. Even if Putin or Kasianov do have high approval ratings, I
wouldn't place too much emphasis on that. In their hearts, the people
expect no good from the government. And the government expects no good
from the people - it expects that they'll steal and conceal. The
business sector has a similar atmosphere."
     From this point of view, Mikhail Gorbachev really was on another
planet - he firmly believed in the good intentions of all participants
in the "process", from his own people to Western politicians. Maybe
that's why some can't forgive him for what he did, and others can't
forget him.
     And in this sense, it's most unlikely that the Putin era will
turn out to be a "remake" of the Gorbachev era.
(Translated by Kirill Frolov)

*******

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