March 7, 2001   

This Date's Issues:   5135 • 5136 • 5137 • 5138

Johnson's Russia List
#5137
7 March 2001
davidjohnson@erols.com

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TITLE:  PRESS CONFERENCE WITH STATE DUMA COMMITTEE FOR DEFENSE VICE CHAIRMAN ALEXEI ARBATOV ON VLADIMIR PUTIN'S FOREIGN POLICY
[PRESS DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE, 16:10, MARCH 5, 2001]
SOURCE: FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE (http://www.fednews.ru/)

     Moderator: Good afternoon and welcome to the Press Development
Institute. Our guest today is deputy chairman of the Duma Committee
for Defense, Alexei Georgiyevich Arbatov who will share his
thoughts on the foreign policy of President Vladimir Putin.

     Arbatov: Good afternoon. First of all, I would like to take
this opportunity to congratulate our dear women on the upcoming
holiday. As far as I know, there aren't many countries in the world
that celebrate this day. Russia is one of the few countries that
does. Nevertheless, for us it is traditionally a very important
holiday, it is even a day off which just goes to show that in some
areas Russia is a head of the rest of the world in which feminism
has acquired a political tone. And I also appreciate your coming
here in spite of the heavy snow. I have no illusions about myself
being all that interesting, but I understand that the topic is very
intriguing.
     What can I say about the foreign policy of President Putin? It
is a year and a half since this policy was inaugurated and I can
say that it is a very active policy. Putin's diplomacy is an
intensive diplomacy which, without any apparent pattern, is being
pursued vigorously in all areas. And that is to be welcome.
     As for a certain lack of clarity, one is not sure what the
foreign policy priorities of the Russian Federation are. A year of
very intensive diplomatic activity has not yielded a clear picture
of what the priorities are by regions, and by problems. Is it the
West or the East? Or are we primarily focused on the negotiating on
debt restructuring? Or the problems of security such as NATO
expansion or anti-missile defense?
     And another point is that for all the vigorous diplomatic
activity it is, first a process and, second a result. The results
of diplomacy are generally expected to be important agreements and
not just exchanges of speeches and declarations of a general nature
or communiques.
     President Putin came to power at a time when Russia had built
up a huge backlog of foreign policy problems. So far, a year of
exceedingly intensive diplomatic activities and trips, we see no
progress on any one of them and indeed some problems have become
even more intractable, such as, for example, the problem of debt
restructuring or strategic arms reductions and the further fate of
the ABM Treaty, or the issues of further NATO expansion to the
East. These serious topics and many other topics that I will omit
in order to save time do not reveal any positive solutions or
progress towards solution.
     One could speak at length about the features of Putin's
foreign policy, and incidentally compare it to the foreign policy
of his predecessor, but I will single out just one point. For
Yeltsin the supreme goal of foreign policy was the integration of
Russia into the West, into the Western economic, political and
subsequently military organizations and institutions. All the rest
was secondary for Yeltsin. For Putin integration with the West is
not the main goal of foreign policy. It is not a strategic task of
the foreign policy of President Putin.
     He no doubt wants to have relations of partnership with
Western countries, mutually beneficial relations in the economic
field, in the security field. But he is not speaking about any
integration with the West and he is probably not contemplating it.
Putin has used a large part of his time in order to open new doors
for Russian policy or to reopen the old doors that were shut down
in the 1990s. He did not only broaden and invest with more content
the relations with such countries as China, India and Iran, but
renewed contacts and relations with some countries which were clean
forgotten in the 1990s. They are countries like North Korea, Iraq,
Libya, Cuba, the Palestine Liberation Movement led by Yasser
Arafat. Putin reopened these doors. And most recently Vietnam. It
would seem that we have all forgotten about Vietnam. What's Vietnam
to us?
     But the President has found time to travel such a long
distance and to spend a considerable amount of time there.
     What is more important for Putin, West, East or South? That
question remains open. I don't think he has decided himself. He has
left the doors to the West open, but he has opened many doors in
the South and in the East thus wittingly or unwittingly sending the
West a message that Russia has an alternative. And if the West acts
in a way to alienate Russia, Russia will not stand on its knees, it
has somewhere to go. Above all, we are talking about a closer
association with China and cooperation with those states which the
US calls rogue states.
     Now about the West. For Yeltsin the West was 90 percent the
US, 9 percent Germany and 1 percent all the other countries. For
Putin the West is primarily Western Europe. And, of course, above
all, Germany. And perhaps 10-20 percent the United States. That
shift in priorities is obvious. For Yeltsin the post-Soviet space,
even though in the 1990s it was on everybody's lips, has always
been something of a burden and it has never presented any interest.
He took it as a chore under the pressure from internal opposition,
as in the case of Byelorussia, all these organizations of the Union
State, or under pressure of the conflicts and crises that could no
longer be ignored. For instance, the Transdniester, Tajikistan and
a number of other.
     For this reason the main partners for Yeltsin in the
post-Soviet space, although in general he thought very little of
them, were the Byelorussians, Armenia, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan.
For various reasons. Byelorussia first of all under pressure from
the internal opposition. Armenia because it itself wanted to have
the closest ties with Russia. Kazakhstan because it took part in
the Belovezhskiye Agreements. True, on the second stage but it did
take part. It is a big state rich in resources, neighboring on
Russia. The common border exceeds 3,500 kilometers. Such an open
border is no laughing matter. And Tajikistan because there was a
conflict there in which Russian troops had taken a most active part
and are staying there to this day.
     For Putin, of course, the reference points are changing. For
him the most important partners in post-Soviet space are Ukraine,
Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan. This does not mean that all the other
partners are of no importance. But it is these countries that move
to the fore. This is because Putin, Sergei Ivanov, judging by
everything, have a different concept of Russian interests in
post-Soviet space. Not the re-establishment of some semblance of
the Soviet Union, not the creation of some universal organization
that would be very vague in terms of structure but would look like
some semblance of the Soviet Union on the new stage so that Russia
would appear better in the world, that it would not be alone, that
it would be possible to say inside the country that the 25 million
Russian speakers in post-Soviet space have not been abandoned to
their fate.
     Putin has no need to make any excuses. He does not bear the
stigma of the Belovezhskaya Pushcha agreements. His view of
post-Soviet space is a very pragmatic one. For this reason
bilateral relations move to the fore for him. Sergei Ivanov
recently stated this very openly in Munich. And right he was.
Post-Soviet space is not a space but a variety of most diverse
countries. Estonia, on the one hand, and Turkmenia, on the other
one. Just as Russia cannot have identical policies in respect of
Finland and China, it cannot have a universal policy in respect of
Latvia and Kyrgyzstan.
     That is why Putin is basing his policy in post-Soviet space on
bilateral relations. First of all, in bilateral relations Russia is
stronger than any other partner in these relations. All the others
are weaker. Secondly, Russia is not encountering a united front of
the type of GUUAM which as an entity and with assistance from the
far abroad is countering Russia's interests. Moving to the fore
depending to a concrete country are either military, economic or
political matters, or some organizational ones like joint
protection of the border. I regard this approach as a fully correct
one. I see many shortcomings in Putin's foreign policy but in this
case the change is the right one. And the switching of accents was
also done correctly. I mean in post-Soviet space.
     Now about the West. Several times recently, in one form or
another, Putin spoke about NATO. He said, for instance, that nobody
is inviting Russia into NATO. Remember, he was in Austria when he
was asked to comment on the prospects of Austria's joining of NATO.
He said, we cannot be delighted by this, because we are not being
invited into NATO, but really this is a matter of the Austrian
people's choice. And thus, indirectly, he several times dealt on
this theme.
     I believe this is evidence of an important circumstance. This
shows that while opening the doors in the south and in the east and
even across the ocean, take the example of Cuba or Vietnam, Putin
is giving much attention to the West for economic and strategic
considerations. If the West behaved more intelligently and
actively, I think Putin's foreign policy priorities could have been
determined more quickly. This would have depended not only and not
so much on the choice made by the  Kremlin as on the policy pursued
in respect of Russia by the West at this new stage. I mean there is
a new president in Russia, there is a new president in the United
States, there are many changes in Europe, the domestic political
situation has changed considerably both in Russia and the United
States.
     Alas, the West is passive. It is demonstrating its inability
to understand how great the stakes are now in relations with
Russia, the diversity of the roads that Russia can take in its
development. I mean both the international aspect and the evolution
of the economic and political system in Russia.
     I will give you one example to illustrate my point. Half a
year ago Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin proposed to Europe to create
a joint non-strategic ABM system. Recently, during the visit by the
NATO Secretary General Robertson to Moscow, he was presented an
already more concrete technical plan of the possible architecture
of such a system, its gradual creation. It also contained thoughts
on the contribution that could be made to this project by Russia
and the NATO countries. This would be a European non-strategic ABM
system created jointly by Russia and the NATO countries with the
participation, of course, of the United States because only the
United States in NATO can develop such a system. The other
non-strategic ABM projects that the NATO countries have are not
serious, really.
     Outwardly a polite interest was shown. Nothing more than that.
But if we think about it, such a proposal made by Russia is a
tremendous gesture. I will try to explain why. For five reasons.
     First. A joint non-strategic ABM system presupposes allied
military-political relations. Even closer ones than within NATO at
present. The United States and its NATO allies do not have a joint
non-strategic ABM system. They have a joint air defense system,
that is defense from planes and cruise missile, but not ballistic
missiles. Such a costly system is created for at least 20 years in
advance and requires the closest of relations. If you create a
tactical ABM system you will also have to create a joint air
defense system. It is pointless to jointly defend from ballistic
missile and individually try to defend from cruise missiles and
aircraft. You must remember that cruise missiles and planes may
become vehicles for the delivery of weapons of mass destruction
from the direction of pariah states.
     This means we are speaking about the creation of a joint
system of defense, both missile and aircraft defense. Only close
long-term military -- military and political allies can have such
a system. In simpler terms, what is implied within such a system is
Russia's accession to NATO, nothing more, nothing less.
     Second, the establishment of such a joint system would mean
the folding up of Russia's relations with those countries which
could acquire missiles against which such a system is designed -
and these are all those countries with which Russia is now actively
developing political relations and military-technological
cooperation, planning to expand them. These include, primarily,
North Korea and Iran, possibly Pakistan - Pakistan already has
medium-range missiles; so far it is a neutral state, not aligned
with any side, but it is quite possible that Islamic fundamentalism
will prevail in that country, and it will join the Islamic
fundamentalist world, and it will have its missile technology and
nuclear weapons, already in existence.
     Furthermore, such countries may include those nations which at
present are leaning towards the West, but in which Islamic
fundamentalist pressures are high and which can take the road of
Iran. These are Algeria, Egypt and, perhaps, Turkey, which is a
NATO member. This cannot be ruled out either. Saudi Arabia is
another such nation, incidentally. It already has ballistic
missiles, and it has the money to upgrade them. And Moslem
extremism can prevail there - not fundamentalism focussed on home
affairs, as today, but real militant extremism looking without.
     Incidentally, the Taliban-ruled Afghanistan can use its huge
proceeds from drugs production in principle to buy missiles and
even weapons of mass destruction in the next 10-15 years.
     As you see, some of these nations already are Russia's
adversaries, while others are Russia's allies - or rather,
partners. Simultaneously, they are rogue states, which the USA and
the West view as a threat. A joint ABM system would mean that
Russia rejects broad cooperation with those nations. You cannot
sell a lot of weapons to those countries whose ballistic missiles
you are trying to counter with a costly and very sophisticated
anti-missile defense system.
     Third, non-strategic anti-missile defenses jointly with NATO
would mean that Russia is cutting back her relations with China.
And this, perhaps, is the most important point. Indeed, in the USA
smart analysts - recently the Nixon Center released a report - see
the only potentially serious threat to US and Western security in
an alliance of Russia and China. So, Russian-NATO joint
anti-missile defenses would mean the folding up of military and
political relations between Russia and China. Why so? First,
Russia's position - in particular, as stated in the communique
signed in Vietnam - to the effect that in Asia Russia is opposed to
non-strategic anti-missile defenses - is absolutely inconsistent
and illogical. Such a position cannot be maintained. If US European
allies have the right to participate in non-strategic ABM systems,
US allies in Asia - primarily Japan and South Korea - will have a
similar right. And there are no logical reasons to deny them this.
     Moreover, Russia will itself develop such defenses in its
Asian part. Although at present it is called European non-strategic
ABM defenses, it is perfectly obvious that we cannot tell Russian
citizens living beyond the Urals that we would cover the European
part of the country, but leave them out there exposed to possible
missile strikes. This cannot be said, especially in a democratic
state. Meanwhile, we have 15 million people living in Asia, and
incidentally, Asia is within far closer range to many countries
having small- and medium-range missiles.
     Therefore, since Russia spans both Europe and Asia, and Asia
is more vulnerable to medium-range missiles, Russia will have to
develop such a system in both Europe and Asia. Therefore, it would
be absolutely impossible to tell Japan and South Korea they have no
right to such a system.
     China, for obvious reasons, is dead set against both strategic
and tactical ABM defenses. Therefore, any offer to China to develop
a joint ABM system is just a product of the difficult situation in
which Russia has found itself over this project, but by no means a
logical policy line. Indeed, it is absolutely clear that the US and
NATO will never develop a joint ABM defense with China. They view
China as their main potential adversary. Nor will Japan and South
Korea develop a joint ABM system with China. On the other hand,
Russia will be unable to develop two ABM systems - one with NATO
and the other with China. This is impossible both technically and
economically. Therefore, if the West supported and pursued this
idea, Russia would very soon have to cast its lot either with China
or with the West. And if such an important system were to be
deployed and many Russian military-industrial enterprises became
loaded and it became an important element of Russian armed forces
and defense, I think the choice would have been made in a favor of
a close alliance with the West and not with China. That is an
important point to be borne in mind.
     And the fifth point about non-strategic missile defense is
that by proposing such a project Russia has tacitly made a step
toward recognizing the possibility of a strategic missile defense.
That is, the missile defense of the territory which at present is
rigidly confined to the 1972 Treaty. By proposing to NATO to
jointly establish a non-strategic missile defense, Russia thereby
admitted that nuclear deterrence, especially offensive weapons and
the policy of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile
technologies is not in itself effective enough in warding off that
threat.
     In addition to these measures a technical system of defense,
anti-missile defense of a non-strategic character is needed, that
is, a defense against intermediate and shorter-range missiles. And
if so, the question of a strategic  missile defense is only a
matter of time, of when intercontinental missiles will appear
against which the strategic missile defense is aimed and when the
technical possibilities emerge of intercepting intercontinental
missiles.
     In terms of the theory of strategic stability there is no
basic difference between intermediate and shorter-range missiles
and intercontinental missiles. They differ only in that
intercontinental missiles have a greater range and a higher
velocity of warheads in the final stretch of the trajectory. That's
all the difference there is. If we recognize that Russia, Europe,
and possibly Japan and South Korea should protect their territories
against intermediate and shorter-range missiles, there are no
logical grounds for denying defense with the help of a strategic
missile defense that calls for a revision of the ABM Treaty.
     I have cited the arguments to show that some projects that are
being actively promoted by Putin are fraught with colossal
military-political and geostrategic consequences. Whether Putin is
aware of it, I do not know. Quite possibly he does. But all the
consequences of this system are not revealed. It would provoke
political tensions inside Russia and in the world and in our
relations with China and with other states where Vladimir
Vladimirovich Putin has been travelling recently. It contradicts
our tactics which is that we are against a revision of the ABM
Treaty.
     But I have demonstrated to you from the logical point of view
the magnitude of the consequences of the system which has been
proposed and technically validated. And to end where I began, I am
surprised at the short-sighted, passive and dumb policy of the
West, of the new US administration. One can say to justify them
that they have just come to power and have not yet established
their internal pecking order and who has the final say on the
shaping of foreign policy. It is so obvious that one is amazed at
such a bland and passive line on this key issue when in fact Putin
is making an offer and just stops short of calling things by their
true names.
     If I were to give advice to President Bush what to do and how,
without making any basic changes in American foreign policy, to
bring Russia closer to the US and to avert the threats that may
arise in the world for the United States, I would have told him,
just do three things. First, say, we invite Russia to discuss the
possibilities, terms and timeframe of Russia's entry into NATO. You
know our terms, we are prepared to provide you with details. If
they suit you, you are welcome to join. If they don't suit you for
some reason, let us look for some other forms of cooperation,
including military and political cooperation.
     But that single step would overturn the whole context of
existing tensions over the forthcoming expansion of NATO to the
East and the inevitable exacerbation of tensions with Russia. The
second bit of advice I would give Bush. So far, he knows very
little about foreign policy and he is in a good position to put
forward major initiatives. And my second advice him would be this:
say that we took your proposals of a European missile defense very
seriously, we have a number of questions regarding that system, but
we propose to immediately start full-scale negotiations on that
system, to discuss all the technical details and we treat it very
seriously.
     In our view it is a highly promising system. We do not see it
as an alternative to a national missile defense of the United
States. We see it as a first step toward the creation of a missile
defense which eventually will shield the civilized states from
intermediate and shorter-range missiles and from intercontinental
missiles which at present can only be warded off by a strategic
missile defense which is limited under the 1972 ABM Treaty.
     And I would seriously promote this project in all its tempting
economic and technical aspects. And the third thing I would have
said would be this: because we are embarking on such serious talks
in two areas, we suggest that the United States and Russia should
skip START-2 and together cut their strategic offensive weapons to
1,000 warheads on each side, and immediately start serious
negotiations on the issue.
     It is enough to do these three things without giving up any of
the things that are so dear to the new team that has come to
Washington to change the whole international situation radically.
Whether they will do it or not I do not know, whether anyone will
give this advice to President Bush or not is also unknown. But I
have given you an example which can show the huge historical
opportunities the new US administration and the European leaders
are losing while engaging in hollow declarations designed for
internal consumption and aimed at their public opinions and
parliaments. Thank you.

     Moderator: I open it up for questions.

     Q: Following up on your idea, I would like to understand this.
I understand that in the West Putin's initiative is seen in many
ways as propaganda ploy reminiscent of the Soviet times. You may
correct me if I am wrong, but what is the real financial basis for
these projects? Who will finance such a system of missile defense?
How would you comment on this?

     Arbatov: You have really asked me two questions there. First,
the perception of this as a propaganda ploy. Politics and external
propaganda are closely interconnected. If you say outright, no,
this is a propaganda ploy, this will remain a propaganda ploy. If
you say that you are ready to discuss this in earnest, let us start
discussing this and this propaganda move may develop into a new
central direction in international relations. This is possible. In
any case, you will not know if you do not try. If you start serious
talks and Russia suddenly develops cold feet and withdraws, it will
inflict a tremendous blow to its prestige, to its position in the
world. This is good enough reason to take this matter up seriously.
Not just reject it at once as shear propaganda.
     Of course, Russia has very limited financial possibilities.
But Russia has the necessary technologies, they are better than the
present technologies of the United States, much better. We are far
ahead of them. This is because of the historic reserve of R&D
inherited from the Soviet Union. As is known, the Soviet Union,
surrounded from all sides by bases, aviation, intermediate-range
and shorter-range missiles, traditionally devoted much more
attention to defense systems than the United States which was well
protected by two oceans. For this reason we are ahead to this day.
     But as to money, it is possible that if the system is
seriously developed the main money will be provided by the United
States, Western Europe, including to place orders with Russian
enterprises which will be drawn into this program. What is bad in
this? We are not speaking about commerce, we are speaking about a
crucial effort to strengthen international security. I see nothing
bad in Western Europe, which does not have its technologies,
investing some of its money in Russian military-industrial
enterprises which will produce these systems, including for the
defense of Western Europe. Not to speak of all the other far
reaching consequences of these five points that I mentioned.

     Q: Radio Odin. What can you say about the prospects of
Moldavia after the elections there, the idea to hold a referendum
on joining the Union of Russia and Byelorussia? What can you say
about plans to promote Russia's image abroad, in the West? How
could you describe Russia's present image?

     Arbatov: Concerning the referendum in Moldavia. If it is
conducted, if the majority declares for reunification with Russia,
Russia will not resist this. Why should it? It is a bit
disconcerting that it is a neo-communist government which wants a
reunification with Russia. After all we have in Russia a
non-communist government and a non-communist president, although
the Communist Party of the Russian Federation has become the main
pro-government party despite all its maneuvers concerning the
no-confidence vote and so on. But a referendum is something you
cannot just shrug off.
     If Moldavia decides to join the Union of Russia and
Byelorussia the doors definitely will be opened to it. Although I
do not rate the chances of this Union high. At the same time I
regard this as a very reasonable and lucky direction of policy in
post-Soviet space.
     Now concerning your second question. I think that the image of
Russia created in the press is a really non-attractive one. Russia
is very much to blame for this itself. Because it conducts its
affairs, including domestic ones, not in a manner that does it
credit. At the same time it is wrong to paint everything black even
though many bad things have happened during the past year and a
half, starting with the war in Chechnya and ending with the
campaign against the mass media, first of all Media-MOST and NTV.
This dents Russia's image abroad.
     But everything should not be reduced to this. A substantial
role can be played here by skillful propaganda which can embellish
even a very bad image. The purpose would be to present in a better
way the constructive, positive elements which we still have in our
life.

     Q: ITAR-TASS. What are the prospects of Russian-American
relations in the context of the coming of the new administration in
the United States? How real is a meeting of our president with
President Bush?

     Arbatov: Such a meeting is quite realistic. No doubt about it.
The question is different: what can be the outcome of such a
meeting? History knows many meetings that generated crises. So far
the new administration in the United States has taken a number of
steps that in my opinion are extremely non-constructive ones.
Perhaps, this is some sort of a propaganda game. But statements
like those made by the CIA director and the Secretary of Defense
create complexities in relations out of nothing. I do not
understand why this is being done. Perhaps, to impress Congress.
But I don't think that this is a really clever policy.
     But nobody is really thinking about important moments which
could drastically change both Russian-American relations and the
entire international policy within the first 100 days the
presidency. For example, the three moments that I mentioned. If
matters continue in this way, we will enter a very difficult period
when the United States will be punishing Russia for some actions
that it does not like and Russia, in response, will cause the
United States even more difficulties to demonstrate that Russia
will not stand such attitudes.

     Q: You do not rule out a compromise between Russia and America
on the strategic ABM and the ABM Treaty. What could be the essence
of such a compromise? And my second question. How real are the
prospects of the solution of the territorial issue and the signing
of a peace treaty with Japan during Putin's presidency?

     Arbatov: About the compromise. You must bear in mind that the
American strategic ABM or NMD is not a matter of the near future.
At best it can be deployed only after five or six years. As to a
system of a bigger scale, that the Republicans spoke about when
criticizing the Democrats for not working hard enough in this
field, this would take at least 12-15 years. So when we speak about
a compromise today we must first of all envisage the threat against
which such a system is to be developed. Because you cannot develop
just defenses against anything, just in case, against some
unidentifiable threat. You always have in mind quite concrete
missiles, which can fly in from some quite concrete direction. For
example, why did the Americans under Clinton, before the project
was cancelled, planned to deploy an ABM complex in Alaska, although
it seemed easier to start that with North Dakota, where they could
have deployed a complex without any breach of the ABM Treaty?
Because the paramount threat the Americans foresee in terms of
technological progress and regime characteristics is a threat from
North Korea. And if North Korea develops intercontinental missiles,
their trajectories will go over Alaska. I give you this concrete
example to show that you have to have a concrete threat in mind as
you develop an ABM system.
     Therefore, much will depend on what happens to this fervor and
almost religious belief of the Republicans in the need to develop
an NMD system. This is not the first time we see such a flare-up of
hopes and plans. It first happened in the late 1960s and early
1970s, under Nixon, when the Americans started to develop the
Safeguard ABM system, subsequently limited under the 1972 Treaty.
     The second flare-up happened again under the Republicans, in
the early 1980s. Under Reagan, if you remember, it was "star wars"
and sci-fi space-based systems. Then all that somehow subsided and
boiled down to ABM systems based on tactical missiles. There is no
reason to say that something like that could not happen now as
well.
     I personally think that when the Republicans have counted the
money and evaluated the technical characteristics, when they have
resumed tests, which they have the right to conduct without
violating the ABM Treaty, they will realize that, first, this is a
very sophisticated system from the point of view of technology,
while the possible threats are very limited. And I do not rule out
that if we don't absolutely spoil our relations over the next year,
the Republican Administration itself would go back to more or less
the same plan that was formulated by Clinton, that is, two or three
additional complexes. This question can in principle be resolved
without scrapping the ABM Treaty, simply by signing a third
protocol. I will remind you that initially the Treaty allowed two
deployment areas. Then, in 1974, another protocol was adopted to
allow one deployment area to each party. There is no reason not to
believe that a third protocol can be signed to allow two or three
deployment areas.
     But as regards space-based components and entirely new
systems, the ABM Treaty would not sustain that. But I am not sure,
first, that this would be technically feasible and efficient.
Second, I am not sure that even the Americans will have enough
money for that because, strange as it may seem, even with their
enormous military budget of close to 300 billion dollars they have
considerable funding shortages. These shortages are related
primarily to the general-purpose forces. In addition, they would
like to pay their servicemen better, to offer better medical
services, etc.
     There is never too much money, even in such a wealthy country
as the USA. In addition to ABM defenses, they have many needs, and
some of them may prove more sensitive and important than some
remote defenses from some unknown missiles.
     Then, finally, perhaps, the threat itself will not materialize
in such awesome proportions as predicted by the report of the
Rumsfeld Commission a few years ago - I think in 1997. Perhaps, the
spread of missiles and relevant technologies will be far more
modest, and then a compromise could be achieved.
     If you ask my personal opinion - what position would I take if
it depended on me - I can tell you, and this is absolutely no
reflection of the Kremlin's position, that a year or two ago I
would say: "Let's sign another protocol to the ABM Treaty to allow
another two or three complexes to be deployed, and in return you
will accept our terms on START-3, and we'll lower the ceilings, and
something else." It could all have been resolved long ago.

     Moderator: The second question was about the islands.

     Arbatov: The islands... you know, I don't believe that -
generally, territorial questions are very sensitive, and they
remain unresolved for decades. The entire orientation of Putin's
domestic and foreign policies somehow does not seem to have room
for concessions on territorial issues. Of course, you cannot rule
out anything in politics; anything can happen, especially in
Russia. If we suddenly see an economic boom, Russia will become
stronger economically and militarily and regains confidence and
gets rid of the huge inferiority complex, a sense of vulnerability
that haunts the public and the leaders and all that we would need
to achieve perfect bliss would be Japanese investments in the Far
East, then the issue of islands may be solved. But these are
prerequisites that are not likely to come about soon.

     Q: Boston Globe. In the beginning you said that the Putin
administration has not yet made up its mind about integration with
the West. And then you gave three pieces of advice to the Bush
administration on how to induce Russia to turn towards the West. As
deputy chairman of the Duma Defense Committee, can you give similar
three pieces of advice to Mr. Putin so that the US should be more
forthcoming with regard to Russia? I think "signals from the West"
and "signals from Russia" -- I think it has already started. Think
of remarks by Rumsfeld and Kenneth on one hand and probably the
trips to Cuba and then to Canada where these issues were discussed
behind the back of the United States. Perhaps, it can also be
perceived as a signal from Russia to the effect that the relations
with the US will deteriorate? How would you advise Mr. Putin to
conduct his policy to meet the US and not to distance itself from
it? And another small question. Do you have the powers, can you
meet with the President and make your suggestions?

     Arbatov: I cannot, of course, meet the President whenever I
wish, although we did meet with him before the New Year. The
leadership of the Yabloko faction met with the President and we
talked with him on many issues for 3.5 hours and much of the time
was devoted to military issues and security matters. But it would
be too good to be true if I could meet the President at my wish and
express my thoughts to him. But I can give any advice I like even
without meeting the President. It is another question whether he
will listen to it or learn about it. That is a somewhat different
question.
     What would I advise him? I would advise him, first, to think
clearly and to understand all the consequences, the five main
consequences I have named that follow from the very important and
sound initiative, which originally comes from Yabloko, by the way.
It was Yavlinsky who three years ago first put forward the idea of
a joint Russia-NATO European ABM. But at that time it was more a
political declaration, but now it has been invested with some
practical concrete substance.
     So, my recommendation to him would be to work on it thoroughly
and to have a clear idea so as not to be like Ostap Bender who was
playing a chess game in Vasyuki and discovered in the fifth move
that he was playing a Sicilian debut without even knowing it
because it was the second time in his life that he was playing
chess. In such important matters one should know all the
consequences and be aware of the seriousness of these issues.
     Secondly, I would recommend that the rest of Russian internal
and military policy should also follow the same direction and not
the opposite direction, so that the military reform should be more
radical and more decisive and aim to restructure the Russian armed
forces to the standards of advanced countries within five years,
including a transition to voluntary army service, that is, giving
up conscription, establishing effective civilian and parliamentary
control over the military with full openness as in civilized
countries where they openly discuss military policy. Unfortunately,
at present we witness a roll back even from the modest achievements
that we had in 1990s and this sphere is becoming ever more secret.
This would be my advice.
     And I would advise him to be very careful in our
military-technical cooperation with such countries as China and
Iran. We should deliver weapons to them. This is commercially
beneficial and it promotes our partnership (we want to be partners
with these countries), but we shouldn't deliver systems that will
lend a marked offensive character to their armed forces because we
can never tell whether that potential would not be directed against
us in 10-15 years time.
     We have made such mistakes in the part, with Germany in the
period between the two wars and with China in the 1950s. And then
we had to pay a dear price for it. My advice would be to pursue a
very careful policy.

     Q: Alexei Rozhkov. I wonder if you could tell me this. We
don't have a geopolitical committee. You have vast experience. What
do you think of the remarks by Alexei Mitrofanov, leaving aside
party loyalties, is there a rational element in what he has said
during his years of work at the Duma? And the second question. Can
propaganda noises in the field of geopolitics achieve anything and
do you know of instances when a person engaged exclusively in
propaganda, populist propaganda, nevertheless has achieved results
in this area?

     Arbatov: Your second question is a highly philosophical one.
History probably provides such examples. I wouldn't like to be
personal in characterizing deputies of the State Duma, even if
these deputies belong to parties which are diametrically opposite
to mine, which are, in fact, our adversaries.
     I don't want to speak about Mitrofanov personally, but I can
say that there are some rational elements in his remarks
occasionally. For instance, he and a number of other deputies who
joined him recently proposed approaching the United States to sign
an agreement to avoid incidents under way in addition to the
agreements that were signed in the early 1970s to avoid incidents
on the high seas and in air space.
     This is an extremely complex and highly technical issue and it
calls for profound study. But in view of the recent incidents,
first involving a Russian submarine and then an American submarine,
I think this issue is a pressing one and it should be addressed.
     It is another question that in addition to this a lot of ideas
are proposed that are not serious, I would go further and say that
are irresponsible so that these grains of rationality, when they
are encountered, are treated with mistrust and are rejected. But
when a person comes forward and says that Russia should revise its
policy on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and start selling
nuclear weapons all over the world, and when everybody has nuclear
weapons, stability will prevail, you know, I think that there are
certain things that a member of parliament has no right to
proclaim. This is a kind of arrogance and recklessness that are
characteristic of some members of that party which discredit
themselves and our parliament. And when they come up with something
sound that is already perceived with great mistrust.
     And as for geopolitics pursued by pure propaganda, I didn't
quite get the meaning of that question. I should imagine that
something like it has happened in history.

     Q: A question from ITAR-TASS on the policy of President Putin.
His recent statement on Kosovo. Can it be said that Russian policy
in Yugoslavia, including Kosovo, may change? According to KFOR,
today's statement indicates a change.

     Arbatov: There are serious grounds for being skeptical about
the role of KFOR in Kosovo. That role does not just not correspond
to the interests of peace and stability and the principles of
equality of all ethnic groups, it doesn't even comply with the US
Security Council resolution on the basis of which KFOR was
introduced into Kosovo.
     I think Russia is quite right in claiming that the
peacekeeping operation should be thoroughly revised to prevent
Kosovo emerging as a monoethnic province that would eventually
secede from Serbia in violation of the Security Council resolutions
and even in violation of the new agreements between the West and
Serbia, or the West and Yugoslavia after Kostunica came to power.

     Q: A question on the military reform. Your colleague in the
Duma committee, Andrei Nikolayev, has said that military reform has
not really started in Russia. He said that some staff and
operational activities have been carried out involving minor
changes and events, but military reform has not materialized. What
could you say about it?

     Arbatov: It depends on what meaning you read into the concept
of military reform. If you interpret it broadly, perhaps, what
Russia has seen does not qualify to be called a military reform.
But my approach to the issue is, perhaps, more pragmatic. In my
opinion, prior to 1997 we did not have any military reform. What we
had was simply lies and idle talk: the army was falling apart
absolutely spontaneously without any plan, without any military
reform.
     Serious attempts to carry out a reform of the armed forces
were started after 1997. This gives you an idea and explanation of
what Nikolayev said, that military reform is a very profound term.
It includes a reform both of the armed forces and other troops and
of the mechanism of controlling the armed forces, forming military
policy, all economic questions connected with mobilization
potential, even connected with the Constitution. This is what
military reform really means.
     But with the coming of Sergeyev to the post of Defense
Minister, he was General of the Army at the time, the reform of the
armed forces began. The armed forces were cut by 30 percent. For a
time of peace this is a very big cut. You can't compare this cut
with reductions that take place after a big war. In peace time a
30-percent cut is a very big cut.
     The structure of the armed forces was substantially
reorganized. The direction of integration was chosen very
successfully. And this reform would have successfully continued in
the right direction were it not for the economic crisis of 1998
which caused the military reform to collapse. The initial idea, as
you know, was to reduce numbers in order to save money and use it
to upgrade the armed forces.
     But when our budget collapsed no saving was possible. In other
words, in the course of three years the armed forces were cut by 30
percent and the military budget in real terms was cut 2.5 times. As
a result after three years quality dropped to a level lower than
what it was when the reform was started. This largely undercut and
discredited the reform.
     But I insist that the military reform was basically attempted
in the right direction. Unfortunately, the budget did not depend on
Sergeyev. These were already matters of the government and
macroeconomy. He was simply unsaddled. Now further cuts have been
announced. In my opinion, the planned measures are much less
radical and much less and in some instances very doubtful as
compared with what was done in 1997. This new stage of the reform
that has been now planned causes many more worries and more
skepticism in me than in 1997. That was a promising beginning were
it not for the collapse of the budget.

     Q: The Yabloko faction says that already now it is possible to
switch to army service on the basis of contracts. Is this
realistic?

     Arbatov: It is.

     Q: Rostbalt. Have the Union of Right Forces and Yabloko
decided to vote together on the motion of no-confidence? How is the
Yabloko faction planning to vote?

     Arbatov: There is no decision on a consolidated vote either
inside the Union of Right Forces or inside Yabloko. The more so
there is no decision on a consolidated vote by these two factions.
The Yabloko faction has formulated its position on this issue. A
lot of what the government is doing does not suit us. And we have
drawn up a whole list, which includes the military reform as well.
We want further steps to be taken. If no steps are taken in the
next 40 days or two months we reserve the right to join this
movement for expressing no-confidence in the government. But if a
motion of no-confidence is tabled now, the Yabloko faction will not
support it.

     Q: Public Radio. There is a lot of talk now that Sergeyev is
to retire and will be replaced by Klebanov. What do you think about
this? Will the political component change?

     Arbatov: I would advise against Sergeyev's retirement. That
would be wrong. As I said, starting with 1997 he very correctly
pursued the line of reforming the armed forces. If he is given
stable and sufficient financing, as is the case since the beginning
of this year with the increase of the military budget, I think
Sergeyev will manage to conduct the reform to its logical
conclusion. I do not know how Klebanov could do this. I have very
big doubts about Klebanov's ability to carry out this reform
resolutely and radically in the correct direction.
     Apart from everything, if Klebanov, a civilian, is appointed
Defense Minister but the law on defense is not changed, we will
have to give very serious thought to the distribution of powers
between the General Staff, the Defense Ministry and the services.
Otherwise, a civilian defense minister will be fully influenced and
controlled by the General Staff.
     Considering who is at the head of the General Staff now,
considering the role of the General Staff in a number of countries,
this would be an absolutely wrong move. The General Staff should
not become a state within a state. It should not stand at the head
of the armed forces and the other troops, it should not stand at
the head of important sectors of the economy and state policy.
     This path brought Kaiser Germany to disaster. I think that it
is not in Russia's interests to step on the same rake that other
countries had stepped on with such dire consequences for
themselves.

     Q: RIA Novosti. Returning to Nikolayev. At a press conference
he said that Iran is a strategic partner of Russia and that it is
in Russia's interests to have a militarily powerful state, Iran, on
the southern direction. He said that Iran and Russia are strategic
partners in such regions as the Caucasus and the Caspian. What do
you think about this?

     Arbatov: In the region you mention Iran is the most powerful
state in terms of population, economy and armed forces. Russia and
Iran have many points of contact which really turn them into
partners. Iran is our regional partner, no doubt. And it is a
counterweight to Turkey. As I said, in numerous areas Iran is
Russia's regional partner. And not only in the Caucasian region but
also in Central Asia, considering the Taliban factor and everything
that is happening in Central Asia. Here, too, Iran is Russia's
partner. We have not common but parallel interests and many points
of contact.
     Iran should be a militarily sufficiently strong state. But I
am against Iran having very effective long-range systems such as
missiles or supersonic long-range combat aircraft that would make
its potential offensive and trans-regional. I think it would be
wrong, first, because it would complicate Russia's relations with
other countries in the region and outside the region such as the US
or Europe which may find themselves -- first Europe and then,
perhaps, the US -- within reach of these offensive weapons of Iran.
It wouldn't be good for Russia, it would destabilize the whole
situation, destroy the ABM Treaty, etc., everything we have
discussed with you in such detail.
     But Iran can well be a strong state. Of course, it is a state
with a very unstable internal political regime. It is unclear which
way Iran may veer. Perhaps, in three or two years time Iran will
become mainly secular state and the Western countries will rush
there, Western diplomacy and Western companies will race to regain
what they lost in Iran beginning from the early 1980s. Or perhaps
Iran will toughen the fundamentalist regime which is creating
problems for Russia because Iran has several times taken an
extremely hostile position with regard to Russia over the situation
in Chechnya. It is another question that it was not widely reported
in the press. But we should bear in mind that fundamentalist
regimes are highly unpredictable.
     That is why I wouldn't like to see them possessing powerful
offensive weapons. For the rest, of course, Iran is our
geopolitical and economic partner in a large region stretching from
the Black Sea to Central Asia.

     Q: If the US withdraws from the 1972 ABM Treaty, will Russia
develop its national ABM or will it just improve its offensive
assets?

     Arbatov: I think that at the fist stage Russia will, of
course, improve its offensive weapons. And rightly so, because it
would at least offer a guarantee that a future American
anti-missile defense would not undermine the Russian deterrent
which is at present based only on offensive weapons.
     As for the United States, I would like to repeat that in spite
of all the propaganda and rhetoric, it simply doesn't make much
sense for it to withdraw from the ABM Treaty any time soon. It does
not have anything that it needed to test for which purpose it would
have to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. So, I don't think it will
happen in the near future.
     But if it does happen, then at the first stage Russia will be,
first, we will respond with our technical systems not to the
withdrawal of the US from the ABM Treaty, but we will respond to
the technical projects the United States will implement after the
withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. Most probably the response will be
linked to the improvement of Russian offensive weapons.
     And in the longer perspective, if the United States goes ahead
to deploy a large-scale missile defense in 10-15 years, if it turns
out to be effective, and if the threat from third countries grows,
I do not rule out that Russia may decide that it, too, needs such
a system as a complement to its deterrent aimed at other countries
than the United States. And then we will have to revise the
allocations of our military budget.

     Q: RIA Novosti. I often hear from experts that the creation of
an ABM is technically impossible in the near future. I have heard
it said on both sides. And yet Russia pretends that we are afraid
that the United States will go ahead. What is behind it? One
sometimes hears that the States is doing it in order to make a
technological breakthrough, to create a system or a weapon of the
new generation. Could you comment on this?

     Arbatov: This is an apparent contradiction. When people say
that anti-missile defense of a territory is impossible, they mean
that in the foreseeable future, say, in the next 20 years it will
be impossible to create a system of anti-missile defense to protect
the territory of the US from the strategic forces of Russia because
these are fairly large and effective forces. But the United States
is well able to create a system that would protect the territory of
the United States against much weaker forces even if they have
intercontinental means of delivery, such as intercontinental
missiles, for example those of Korea, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and
India. This does not require such a colossal missile defense system
as the one President Reagan dreamt of. It would be enough to have
a limited system that can protect the country from several dozen
warheads or from other mass destruction weapons. This is
technically possible.
    It is another question that this is also fairly expensive.
Even such a limited system will cost in the range of 60-100 billion
dollars and one wonders whether there are cheaper ways to solve the
problem. For instance, by toughening the non-proliferation regime
or by bringing pressure via the UN together with Russia on the
states that follow this way, or by creating a non-strategic missile
defense for Eurasia which these assets may nip in the bud at this
stage. It will show to the states that plan to create such weapons
that even at the stage of intermediate and shorter-range missiles
which they have now there will be a defense and so in the future
when they build intercontinental missiles, protection will also be
ensured. Why then should they waste such a huge among of money to
build these weapons?
     So, there may be different ways of approaching one and the
same problem. But it is only an apparent contradiction. But many
get bogged down over this contradiction. The subject matter is very
complex of course. It calls for a certain background in history,
international law and technical matters.
     As for basically new types of weapons, such huge systems are
not created in order to develop something else as a spinoff. Of
course, if it is a large-scale system, it may at some point, in 20
years time, perhaps, include new types of weapons -- controlled
energy transmission, laser and beam weapons. All this is quite
probable. But these weapons will be created for the purpose of
anti-missile defense. As for other purposes, weapons may be
developed apart from the anti-missile defense program because laser
and all other assets are created outside the framework of
anti-missile defense anyway.

     Moderator: Thank you, Alexei Georgiyevich. I think we have
exhausted you with our questions.

*******

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