March 7, 2001   

This Date's Issues:   5135 • 5136 • 5137 • 5138

Johnson's Russia List
#5136
7 March 2001
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Reuters: Russian group accuses army over Chechnya killings.
2. BBC Monitoring: Opinion poll shows early election poor option for pro-Putin faction.
3. BBC Monitoring: Influential Russian minister urges dissolution of State Duma. (Shoygu)
4. Interfax: RUSSIAN DIPLOMATS SAID TO HAVE BEEN AWARE OF EMBASSY EAVESDROPPING. (Vorontsov)
5. Interfax: RUSSIAN CARCINOGENICS INSTITUTE CONCERNED ABOUT HEALTH OF PERSONNEL OF RUSSIAN EMBASSY IN U.S. 
6. Itar-Tass: MP Believes Russia, USA Presidents May Meet Shortly. (Arbatov)
7. Itar-Tass: Russia needs to respond to new threats, says Kremlin adviser. (Pavlovsky)
8. Allen Lynch: news item on the Jedwabno massacre.
9. strana.ru: An ideological holiday that lost all ideology. (Women's Day)
10. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace meeting report: Mark Medish and Stephen Sestanovich, The Bush Administration In-Box on Russia and the Former Soviet Union.
11. Victoria Levin and Elina Treyger: re JRL 5130 - Helmer. The Man, the Rat and the Worm.
12. United States Institute of Peace March 8 meeting on RUSSIA'S FUTURE & U.S. POLICY. (re book by Peter Reddaway and Dmitri Glinski The Tragedy of Russia's Reforms)
13. CENTRAL ASIA-CAUCASUS ANALYST: Svante E. Cornell, THE "AFGHANIZATION" OF CHECHNYA.
14. Moscow Times letter: Not 'Neoliberal,' But 'Quasi-Administered.' (John Howard Wilhelm responds to David Kotz on economy)
15. RFE/RL: Paul Goble, The Kremlin And The Crescent.
16. Interfax: NEARLY TWO OUT OF FIVE RUSSIANS WOULD HAVE PUTIN FOR
SECOND TERM - POLL.]

*******

#1
Russian group accuses army over Chechnya killings
March  6, 2001
By Patrick Lannin
 
MOSCOW (Reuters) - A leading Russian rights group produced videotape Tuesday
showing bound and mutilated bodies from a Chechnya mass grave, and said the
film proved the army had murdered civilians and executed suspects without
trial.

Russia's Chechnya spokesman Sergei Yastrzhembsky and other officials were not
available for comment on the allegations, which surrounded the discovery last
month of dozens of bodies on the outskirts of the Chechen regional capital
Grozny.

Russia's prosecutor for Chechnya has already said the bodies were mostly of
rebels killed in action in 18 months of fighting.

But Oleg Orlov, president of the Memorial rights group, said he had seen, and
his group had documented on tape, clear evidence that some of the dead had
been executed.

"I know that there were people there who had not fought, who had not taken
any weapons into their hands," he told Reuters. "This is without a doubt the
remains of a crime committed by the federal (Russian) forces."

Orlov said he had seen 23 bodies after they had been moved from a mass grave
to a collection point for relatives. He said a colleague had later seen 50
bodies there.

Memorial's video, made available to Reuters, showed dozens of corpses lined
up at the collection site. Most were of men, many in civilian clothes, many
with hands and feet bound with rope in elaborate knots. Several skulls were
shown with small bullet holes in the center of the forehead.

Memorial is a respected organization that has documented the excesses of the
Stalin era since its foundation in the mid-1980s under Soviet President
Mikhail Gorbachev's glasnost policy of openness.

The authorities have put the number of corpses at 48, but Orlov said it was
more likely to be 54 or 55. In the video, Chechen civilians were shown
covering their faces from the stench and picking through the corpses, looking
for relatives.

More bodies are unloaded from a truck by men in gas masks.

Orlov said four of the bodies were women. He said some had been blindfolded.
Others had been mutilated, apparently by killers collecting souvenirs.

"I personally saw two people with their ears cut off," Orlov said.

PUTIN DISMISSES CHARGES OF BRUTALITY

Russia has many times denied that its forces committed systematic rights
abuses during a military campaign from late 1999 to the first half of 2000.

Orlov said the victims had been dead for less than a year, which meant they
were killed when the area was under Russian control. He said relatives had
already taken away seven bodies and identified them as corpses of people who
had disappeared after being arrested by Russian security forces.

President Vladimir Putin, speaking in a live Internet interview Tuesday with
the British Broadcasting Corp. and two Russian Web sites, dismissed
suggestions that Russian forces acted brutally in Chechnya.

"These questions reflect how a significant number of people in the West do
not understand what is happening in the Caucasus, especially in Chechnya,"
Putin said in response to a Danish woman's comment that Russia used "cruel
methods" in Chechnya.

He also parried the BBC journalist's assertion that Russia's campaign had
failed to win over Chechen public opinion. The reporter said she had been to
Chechnya and found locals were hostile to Moscow and angry at the military
intervention.

"Many people look at it negatively, many positively. We believe the Russian
army's actions are aimed at liberating the Chechen people from the terrorists
who had seized power there," Putin said.

*******

#2
BBC Monitoring
Russia: Opinion poll shows early election poor option for pro-Putin faction
Text of report by Russian news agency Ekho Moskvy on 6 March

[No dateline as received] Had early parliamentary elections taken place
today, they would have led to no serious changes, VTsIOM [polling agency]
director Yuriy Levada told Ekho Moskvy radio.

He said that early elections were not a favourable option for Unity, contrary
to the opinion of the Unity State Duma faction.

According to VTsIOM polls, the number of people who are ready to support the
Communists during the election is stable - 35 per cent, while the popularity
of Unity is slightly falling.

Levada said that had the State Duma election been held today, parties
represented in the State Duma would have gained the same number of votes as
during the last election. Yabloko and Union of Right Forces would have
received nine per cent of votes [as received]. Fatherland would have received
six per cent of votes, Liberal Democratic Party - almost five per cent.

Asked whether they are satisfied with the work of the State Duma, half of
those polled answered positively, while another half gave a negative answer.
"But most people are not satisfied with the cabinet," Levada said.

The presidential rating remains stable. He is being supported by 65-70 per
cent of those polled. Forty per cent would have voted for [Russian President]
Vladimir Putin, had the election taken place now.

Levada said that Putin's high popularity could be explained not by his
achievements but by people's expectations.

*******

#3
BBC Monitoring
Influential Russian minister urges dissolution of State Duma
Text of report by Russia TV on 6 March

[Presenter] Unity leader [Emergencies Minister] Sergey Shoygu commented on
the position of the party's faction in the State Duma [as regards the vote of
no confidence in the Russian cabinet] in the following way today.

[Shoygu] The Unity faction and the Unity party has always supported and will
support the cabinet. And in order to support the cabinet it is necessary to
put the issue of the State Duma's self-dissolution on the agenda as soon as
possible. Unfortunately, our constitution does not contain an article
allowing the State Duma to dissolve itself. This is why our colleagues in the
State Duma chose this way. I would not like somebody to use this opportunity
[for their own purposes].

In this situation I want everyone to understand very clearly that a vote of
no confidence in the cabinet is impossible today. This is not 1995 and not
1996 when such things were possible.

*******

#4
RUSSIAN DIPLOMATS SAID TO HAVE BEEN AWARE OF EMBASSY EAVESDROPPING

     MOSCOW. March  6 (Interfax)  - The  staff of the Russian embassy in
Washington knew  in advance  that the  U.S. intelligence  agencies would
eavesdrop on  them and  took the appropriate precautions when they moved
into their  new building in the summer of 1994, former ambassador to the
United States Yuli Vorontsov told Interfax on Tuesday.
     Vorontsov served in that capacity from 1994 to 1999, and was in the
post when  the embassy  moved into its new building. He is now president
of the Russian-U.S. business cooperation center and special envoy of the
UN secretary general.
     "I think we succeeded" in countering the eavesdropping, he said.
     The recent  U.S. media  reports about  a secret  tunnel  under  the
Russian embassy came as no surprise to him, Vorontsov said. In a country
with that  a high  level of  developed electronics,  one  should  expect
something like this, he said.
     He went  on to attribute the timing of the reports to the espionage
scandal surrounding  the arrest  of FBI  agent Robert Hanssen for spying
for the  USSR and  Russia and the desire to involving him in the causing
of tremendous damage to US national security.
     The new building for the Russian embassy in Washington was built in
late 1980s,  but stood  vacant for  over five years, Vorontsov said. The
United States  thus responded  to the  discovery  of  the  eavesdropping
devices riddling  the new  U.S. embassy building then under construction
in Moscow,  he said.  At the  end of  1991, Russia  officially gave U.S.
officials a map of the eavesdropping devices in the building.
     It would  not have been easy to move the tunnel to the walls of the
Russian embassy  in Washington,  because there  is  a  huge  garage  and
basements under  the building,  Vorontsov said.  He also said he was not
aware of any damage caused to the health of embassy personnel by what is
being called 'laser eavesdropping' from the tunnel.

*******

#5
RUSSIAN CARCINOGENICS  INSTITUTE CONCERNED  ABOUT HEALTH  OF PERSONNEL OF RUSSIAN EMBASSY IN U.S.

     MOSCOW. March  6 (Interfax)  - The  director of Russia's oncological
scientific center's  scientific carcinogenics  research institute,  David
Zaridze, has  said he does not rule out the possibility of serious health
consequences for  the personnel of the Russian Embassy in the U.S. due to
reported "laser  eavesdropping" on  the Embassy  from a  tunnel under its
building in Washington.
     "There are no direct scientific data on the connection between laser
rays and  cancerous tumors.  But equipment  used for  such  listening  is
capable of  having a  most negative effect on human health," Zaridze told
Interfax on Tuesday.
     He declined  to go  into what  diseases such  devices  might  cause,
saying that  to draw  such conclusions  it is  necessary to "clearly know
exactly what devices were used in a particular case."
     At the  same time, he added, "anything possible" could happen to the
health of  a person exposed to "laser eavesdropping," the scientist said.
It is so far unknown whether Moscow plans to conduct medical examinations
on embassy  personnel who  might have  been  exposed  to  such  listening
techniques.

******

#6
MP Believes Russia, USA Presidents May Meet Shortly

MOSCOW, Mar 06, 2001 (Itar-Tass via COMTEX) -- The chairman of the Russian
State Duma defence committee said on Tuesday that he believed the Russian and
U.S. presidents could meet shortly to settle disputed issues in bilateral
ties.

"Issues that concern the reduction of military potential of the two states
may only be resolved through negotiations," Alexei Arbatov said. He believes
bilateral efforts are necessary at present to settle the entire range of
Russian-U.S. ties.

Arbatov stressed that the situation is complicated by the fact that the new
U.S. administration "makes no constructive steps in that direction."

He said that if the USA persisted with such policy towards Russia, relations
between the two countries could enter a difficult phase, because Russia would
inevitably retaliate to the U.S. pressure.

Commenting on U.S. plans to deploy the national missile defence system,
Arbatov said such defence complexes would involve huge expenses and could
take up to 15 years.

*******

#7
Russia needs to respond to new threats, says Kremlin adviser
ITAR-TASS

Moscow, 6 March: Russia needs a full-scale system capable of reacting
immediately to new threats that arise and will continue to arise on the
strength of incorrect evaluation of the country's internal situation by other
world powers, says Gleb Pavlovskiy, a Russian political scientist who is an
adviser to the presidential chief of staff.

"For the army it means that we will have to accomplish two contradictory
tasks at the same time," he noted. The first task is to implement "a modern
military reform concept" which must engender "compact, effective and
inexpensive" armed forces. "On the other hand, while the reform is being
carried out, we must be prepared to counter a number of extraordinary global
threats arising because a new world architecture has yet to be formed,"
Pavlovskiy thinks.

"There are new threats relating, for example, to information security,"
Pavlovskiy said. "It is one of the most serious aspects of national
security." "In the modern world it is necessary, while preserving openness,
to either regulate the parametres of this openness or agree to another's,
sometimes anonymous, shadow control."

"Back in the Cold War period and then in the 1990s the United States has
practiced new, distant technologies in the information-political struggle. It
has identified groups in the elites of their adversaries prepared to respond
positively to any American activity, and then sought to turn these groups
into "the main representatives of the national elite" in the information
space.

Pavlovskiy discussed new threats in an interview published today by the
Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper.

*******

#8
Date: Tue, 06 Mar 2001
From: Allen Lynch <al4u@unix.mail.virginia.edu>
Subject: news item on the Jedwabno massacre

Dear David,

For those of your readers who saw Abraham Brumberg's
thoughtful and moving piece on Jan Gross's excellent book,
NEIGHBORS, I pass along the following item from today's DER
TAGESSPIEGEL (Berlin), March 6, 2001, p.6. The translation from
the German is mine.

Allen C. Lynch
University of Virginia &
Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer Auswaertige Politik, Berlin

Translation follows:

"Poland apologizes for anti-Jewish Pogrom

Massacre of 1,600 people is commemorated

Warsaw (KAN). Poland's President Aleksander Kwasniewski and the
Primate of the Catholic Church, Cardinal Jozef Glemp, have
recognized the responsibility of Poles for a massacre of 1,600
Jews during the Second World War. In a speech broadcast on
Monday on Catholic Radio, Glemp said that the guilt of Poles in
the murders at Jedwabno could not be contested. Glemp, however,
declined the idea of the collective responsibility of an entire
nation for the massacre. Kwasniewski explained on Monday on
Polish television that the 60th anniversary of the massacre in
July would be an occasion to apologize before the victims. The
most important thing for him was that the historical truth
should be admitted 'so that we can say what has to be said in
such a situation and that we thereby apologize for what our
countrymen have done.' "

*******

#9
Strana.ru
March 6, 2001
An ideological holiday that lost all ideology
 
Were one to attempt unearthing something that over time had changed into its
own opposite, one would hardly find a better example than women's day, which
is celebrated in Russia on March 8 of each year. Originally a dull,
"sexless," official occasion, this so-called international day of solidarity
of women has turned in Russia into a most hilarious "unisexual" holiday -
women's day.

The idea to express solidarity with women of the world in their struggle for
equal rights with men was the brainchild of German Socialist Klara Zetkin. It
was her initiative that stood behind the decision to mark March 8 each year
as approved by a congress of woman Socialists held in Copenhagen, Denmark, in
1910. A year later, it was first marked in Europe. Three years later, it was
celebrated in Russia.

After the 1917 revolution, March 8 became a powerful ideological weapon in
the hands of the regime. At least once a year the authorities reminded the
Soviet people, who were fenced off from the rest of the world by the Iron
Curtain, about the discrimination and humiliation of women in capitalist
countries. Against that background, they extolled the new image of the Soviet
woman, who harmoniously combined an exemplary wife, a loving mother, a fine
worker, and a politically active member of society.

The problem of three K - Kinder, Kuche, Kirche - was being solved via the
development of a network of kindergartens, public food outfits, and atheistic
propaganda. Thus "emancipated," women flew aircraft, drove tractors, and
attended sessions of Parliament. Some days before the International Women's
Day, the Government decorated female flyers, tractor drivers, weavers and
parliamentarians with orders and medals. There was also an unofficial but
faithfully respected order to fill one-third of elected posts on the bodies
of power with women.

With all that there was a deep abyss lying between the official equality and
the real state of affairs. In Parliament, women decided nothing. Neither did
men for that matter. The Politburo, which did decide the country's fates,
never had female members. There were practically no women in the Cabinet of
Ministers, the only exception being Minister of Culture Yekaterina Furtseva.
Women used to rise as high as factory directors only in "women's" industries
like light and food.

This official show has produced an opposite effect. A day of abstract
solidarity, March 8 has been transformed into a true holiday for women of
Russia.

With each passing year, it is more in the nature of Christmas with its ritual
felicitations, and presentation of gifts and flowers. In a country where in
just one day flower vendors get profits equal to the trade turnover of a
small developing country, where social patriarchy is an unquestioned truth,
and where feminist ideas get profaned to such an extent as to turn the
feminist holiday into its opposite, the international women's day represents
a very odd phenomenon. The holiday expands, not owing to ideology but because
it lacks any ideology at all. And, well, is it any surprising that men wish
to be particularly generous and women yearn to be worshipped on that day?

*******

#10
Date: Tue, 06 Mar 2001
From: Elina Treyger <etreyger@ceip.org>
Subject: Medish/Sestanovich report

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Russian and Eurasian Program  Vol. 3, No. 4, Feb. 21, 2001

The Bush Administration In-Box on Russia and the Former Soviet Union

On Wednesday, February 21, 2001, Mark Medish and Stephen Sestanovich
discussed the main issues awaiting the Bush Administration in its "inbox,"
concerning the states of former Soviet Union.  Mark Medish served as
Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Russian,
Ukranian and Eurasian Affairs at the National Security Council and as
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs;
currently he is a partner at Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer and Feld, LLP.
Stephen Sestanovich served as Ambassador-at-Large and Special Advisor to
the Secretary of State for the New Independent States; prior to that, he
was the Vice-President for Russian and Eurasian Affairs at the Carnegie
Endowment.  The discussion was moderated by Andrew Kuchins, Director of the
Carnegie Endowment's Russian and Eurasian Program. 

Introduction

Andrew Kuchins set the stage for the discussion, pointing to a general
perception of a downward trend in US-Russian relations. Members of the Bush
administration have described Russia as a threat to US security interests
in terms not heard in the last decade; while US relations with other
post-Soviet states are complicated by their weakness and the complex
geopolitics in the region. 

Sestanovich: Russia looms large in Bush's Inbox
 
Sestanovich emphasized that there has indeed been a huge transformation in
US relations with the non-Russian states over the past decade.  Contrasted
with 1991, the US no longer views these as simply nominal countries with
merely nominal sovereignty. Nevertheless, there is still a danger of these
states "getting lost" in the inbox among the bigger issues with Russia, and
only attracting attention in case of a crisis.

These states face serious "nation-building" problems, such as a lack
control over parts of their territory, insufficient investments for
long-term growth, a reliance on IMF disbursements, and a lack of active
regional cooperation. Sestanovich asserted that with respect to such
problems, the US can achieve considerable payoffs with only a small
expenditure of resources, since the post-Soviet states look to the US as a
"facilitator of solutions," rather than source of material resources.
Keeping this in mind, the new administration should not let the problems of
non-Russian NIS linger in the inbox.  

Russia on the other hand, is in no danger of getting lost in the inbox.
There is now a longer list of disagreements and points of tension between
the US and Russia, than the US has with any other country. Strategic
nuclear issues, European security, NATO expansion, the implementation of
the CFE treaty, the role of OSCE, non-proliferation, Russia's expanded arms
sales, Iraqi sanctions, Russian allegations of hostile geopolitical designs
in the Caucasus and Central Asia, Caspian energy development, Chechnya,
press and religious freedom, the detention of Pavel Borodin, debt
rescheduling -  and the list goes on.  There is a mistaken notion that
several of these are "make or break" issues.  In reality, the existing
framework of US-Russian relations is more stable than is commonly assumed,
and will not be significantly altered by resolution of or discord on any
one issue. 

There are certain disagreements the US and Russia had been able to put
behind them, and some that remain, precluding the formation of a real
post-Cold War dynamic.
Two sets of issues that only a few years ago were expected to shape
relations for a long time - financial ones such as the exchange rate, IMF
disbursements and tax collection, and the Balkans - are no longer the
urgent items in the inbox.  The lesson to be drawn from this phenomenon is
that the US should not evade the problems, but tackle them head on. 
 
Nuclear Missile Defense certainly requires such an active approach.  The
statements made on both sides of the ocean reveal that neither the Russian
nor American leadership has moved beyond the Cold War rhetoric.  Yet, it
does not mean that NMD will inevitably destroy any chances of improving
US-Russian relations. Bush's expressed desire to re-examine the strategic
Cold War postures has real resonance in Russia; managing the disagreement
over NMD offers the Bush administration the chance to give substance to the
idea of a post-Cold War nuclear relationship.  This is a difficult, but not
an impossible problem that should not, however, eclipse the consideration
of other issues in the inbox.

Sestanovich concluded with the thought that the tone of US-Russian
relations will depend largely on Russian internal development and its
relations with other post-Soviet states.

Medish: "Slouching bear, biting snake?"

Medish offered nine observations that are likely to characterize, or should
guide US-Russian relations, followed by a few words on the non-Russian NIS.

1. The overall US-Russian relationship can be characterized by a comment on
Wagner's opera:  "It's not as bad as it sounds, but is still quite
tumultuous."  That is, the relations between the two states are far below
from their "opportunity frontier." The issues in the inbox of the Bush
administration will largely resemble those in Clinton's; the difference may
be seen in the outbox instead.

2. The primary US national security interests with respect to Russia are
fourfold. These are strategic stability (questions of arms control);
non-proliferation; cooperation on issues of regional stability (in Europe
and elsewhere); and an interest in the success of the Russian internal
transition and its integration with international institutions.

3. The Clinton administration's operating assumption was a fundamental link
between Russia's domestic development and its external conduct. It would be
unwise for the Bush administration to move away from this assumption and
ignore the domestic affairs of post-Soviet states.
4. The American "toolbox" of influence is limited; the Bush administration
cannot hope for the possibility of any "grand bargains."

5. The US interests are best pursued through a policy of active engagement;
isolation is not an available strategy.  It is likely that the Bush
administration will not behave very differently in this respect from
Clinton's, as the policy of engagement enjoyed broad bipartisan support
over the last eight years.

6. There is an overlap of interests between the two states, which provides
a basis for optimism. Nevertheless, even when impartial experts see a
win-win situation and a compatibility of interests, the misperceptions of
both sides may preclude cooperation.  It should not be surprising that some
opportunities for cooperation are missed.
 
7. Russia's "identity crisis" and the concomitant struggle for direction
and purpose results in a foreign policy that is not always consistent or
coherent.  In a manner of speaking, there are two competing Russias - the
transforming Russia that is trying to integrate into the international
system, and the broken superpower Russia that is suspicious and adopts a
zero-sum view of its interactions with other states. The paradigm shift
from the latter to the former is not complete, but will hopefully continue.

8. Russia's economic and political weakness is the biggest dynamic risk to
the content of US-Russia relations, and the chief reason for the failure to
take advantage of the existing win-win opportunities. If the US's demons
are arrogance, too much self-confidence and too much unilateralism, then
Russia's are pride and resentment. Consequently Russia often appears as a
chess player playing "black"- that is, defensively to delay and thwart, not
to win.

9. Putin's approach to foreign policy is more pragmatic in the Russian
sense, and more activist. He is setting a contrast with Yeltsin, mostly for
the Russian domestic audience, who considered Yeltsin too soft on the
outside world.  The danger of setting too much of a contrast with Yeltsin
is, once again, the tendency to view the opportunity frontier as a zero-sum
game, and not a possibility for mutual benefit.

Medish characterized the situation of the non-Russian post-Soviet states
with the opening sentence of Anna Karenina: "Happy families are all alike;
every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way." Challenges that face these
countries are not monolithic. The overarching aim of US policy is to
support and promote their transitions; the Clinton administration has
approached them all on a bilateral basis, which should be continued.  It is
important to make it clear that the US does not have a hegemonic agenda and
is not supporting the movement of these states away from Russia, but
helping them to "get their house in order" and integrate into the
international system.

Question and Answer: "Lessons Learned"

Several of the questions sought to explore the theme of "lessons learned" -
which assumptions previously held by the speakers were overturned by their
terms in office, what misconceptions do Washington and Moscow harbor about
each other, what would they have done differently now.
 
Sestanovich cited the difficulty of making policy decisions on both sides
as somewhat of a revelation that one does not see, being on the outside of
government.  On the US side, the "structured pluralism" often impedes
taking timely and proper action, while "dysfunction" on the Russian side
has similar effects.  This dynamic may prevent coordination of actions in
situations where interests do converge. 

Medish pointed out the gap between "macro-objectives" and "micro-progress"
as not easily apparent to government outsiders.  While the overarching
stated goals may be correct, the magnitude of smaller steps necessary to
achieve these goals was a "humbling epiphany over and over again."

Addressing the past mistakes, both Sestanovich and Medish asserted that the
Clinton administration has managed as well as it could, given the available
information.  Sestanovich suggested that perhaps the administration should
have been less delicate on problematic issues such as non-proliferation,
pushing for a resolution with somewhat greater force.

As one of the "profound misunderstandings" between the two states Medish
identified the tendencies to ascribe a monolithic quality to each other,
conceptualizing the other as a single voice and a single path emanating
from each capital. Sestanovich added that the single path Moscow often
faultily ascribes to the US is one of hostile geopolitical intent. 
  
Summary by Elina Treyger, Junior Fellow with the Russian and Eurasian Program.

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR
INTERNATIONAL PEACE
1779 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036
Phone 202-483-7600
Fax 202-483-1840
www.ceip.org

*******

#11
Date: Tue, 06 Mar 2001
From: Victoria Levin and Elina Treyger <vlevin@ceip.org>
Subject: re JRL 5130 - Helmer

"The Man, the Rat and the Worm"

First, we would like to say that we fully support John Helmer's chosen
style, which followed the successful attempt of gazeta.ru's columnist
Valeriy Panyushkin (see www.gazeta.ru/2001/02/15/raspaljcovka.shtml) and a
less successful one by The Independent's Patrick Cockburn (see JRL 5118).
The "extended metaphor" genre has the benefit of immediately attracting the
readers' attention with a seemingly unrelated yet fascinating subject, only
to tie it into a politically-relevant, so-called "meat-and-potatoes"
analysis frequently found (and often appreciated) in Johnson's Russia List.
 For example, the aforementioned Panyushkin chose the heartwarming story of
a surgical replacement of a man's penis with his own (!) finger, to lead
into, quite skillfully, a provocative analysis of Putin's leadership style.
 Cockburn opted for the less stirring dispute between Ukraine and Russia
over the homeland of masochism, only to put in his five cents to the
discussion of Ukraine's current political crisis. 

We found John Helmer's attempt to be, well, somewhat more cryptic.  We
understood the initial comparison between man and rat (or some men and some
rats, in any case). We also followed the sophisticated scientific account
of the Human Genome project, as well as the moralizing tale of Harry Lime.
The rest of the piece, however, raised several troubling questions and
considerations, a few of which we list below:

· A zoological/mathematical quandary -- if man and mouse are separated by
300 genes, how many genes separate a) man and worm; b) worm and rat; c) man
and ant, and finally d) Harry Lime and John Helmer?  

· The interest of clarity demands elucidation of Helmer's purported divide
between aware and unaware creatures of all sorts, as well as between man
and rat.  We have spent a disproportionate amount of time drawing diagrams
of overlapping sets ("aware," "unaware," "man," "rat," "ant," "worm,"
"Harry Lime," "Anders Aslund," "World Bank") in a futile attempt to figure
out who's who and their level of awareness.

· In Helmer's opinion, how many genome-science aware rats, worms and/or
ants are "impatient with the new Putin administration?"

· How do those men/rats unaware of genome science manage to understand what
most of the Washington DC policy community does not -- that "Yeltsin left
so many rats behind, [and] Putin must be one of them"? In view of this, is
being unaware of the progress of genetic science such a hindrance to
understanding Putin after all?

· The poor genetically-unaware, but yet "resourceful rats," Helmer claims,
are only out to protect themselves. Should not Darwinian imperative have
killed off those rats by now -- or at least have them detained at Spanish
villas, driven into exile, or hounded by the Procuracy -- since their
"survival" techniques include "criticism directed at the president"? (see
Russian press for Gusinsky and Berezovsky adventures).

· Which tactic, of the ones Helmer sites as historically employed, does he
think is best for  "reformulating the networks and connectivities"
responsible for the large rat to man survival ratio? a) civil wars, b)
strategic bombing, c) concentration camps, d) mass terror, or e) genocide?

· Helmer draws the insightful conclusion that "cornered rats, everyone
knows, will eat each other."  We will have to somewhat disagree with
"everyone" on this point -- cornered Russian rats have the particular
proclivity towards eating, torturing, imprisoning and otherwise oppressing
worms and ants (who, naturally, stop their "infernal wriggling" and "moving").

Respectfully,
Victoria Levin and Elina Treyger
Junior Fellows
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

*******

#12
Date: Tue, 27 Feb 2001
From: Emily Metzgar <emetzgar@usip.org>
Subject: USIP RSVP info

You are cordially invited to a Current Issues Briefing in conjunction
with the Institute's publication of The Tragedy of Russia's Reforms:
Market Bolshevism Against Democracy, by Peter Reddaway and Dmitri
Glinski:

RUSSIA'S FUTURE & U.S. POLICY
Thursday, March 8, 2001, from 9:30AM - 11:30AM

Peter Reddaway's and Dmitri Glinski's authoritative analysis of Russia's
first post-communist decade points the way for U.S. policymakers seeking
to formulate a workable agenda in dealing with Russia. The panel will
  - discuss lessons learned from the Russian experience and U.S.
policies in the 1990s, and identify those that remain useful for the
Putin era.
  - consider the implications of Russia's continuing internal crisis
for future U.S.-Russian relations, and address the provocative
conclusions and policy recommendations of The Tragedy of Russia's
Reforms.

Discussants:
ARNOLD HORELICK, co-director of the U.S.-Russia Dialogue at the Aspen
Institute.
ANATOL LIEVEN, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, and was a Senior Fellow at USIP in 1996-97.
LILIA SHEVTSOVA, senior associate at the Moscow Center of the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace.
Respondent:
PETER REDDAWAY, professor of Political Science and International Affairs
at George Washington University, and was a Senior Fellow at
USIP from 1993-94.

Moderator:
TARA SONENSHINE, former senior advisor to the U.S. Institute of Peace
and deputy director of Communications and transition director
for the NSC.

The presentations will be followed by questions from the floor and the
internet audience. A book signing will take place at event conclusion.
"A monumental book, unsurpassed in sophistication and insight. 'The
Tragedy of
Russia's Reforms' is a must-read for anyone struggling to understand
Russia's past, present and future." -- David Johnson, Johnson's Russia
List

Please RSVP to 202-429-4144, or online at
http://www.usip.org/forms/cib20010308-reg.html.
Media inquiries, please contact Burt Edwards at 202-429-3878.

Event will be webcast on www.usip.org; Email live questions to
askusip@usip.org

United States Institute of Peace, 2nd Floor Conference Room
1200 17th Street NW, Washington DC (Closest Metro stop is Farragut North
on the Red Line).

*******

#13
CENTRAL ASIA-CAUCASUS ANALYST
THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY--SAIS
CENTRAL ASIA-CAUCASUS INSTITUTE
Wednesday/February 28, 2001

THE "AFGHANIZATION" OF CHECHNYA
Svante E. Cornell
AUTHOR BIO: Svante E. Cornell is a visiting researcher at the Central
Asia-Caucasus Institute, and normally teaches at Uppsala University
(Sweden). He is the author of Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of
Ethno-political Conflict in the Caucasus, Curzon Press 2000.

With the conflict in Chechnya as distant from a solution as ever, the risk
of Chechnya developing into a zone of permanent instability is significant.
In many ways, the developments there are reminiscent of what happened to
Afghanistan during and after the Soviet invasion. The destruction of
society's material and social fabric, the factionalization of the
resistance, the increase of Islamic radicalism, are all characteristics
common to the two cases. If history is of any guidance, this would indicate
that Chechnya is likely to remain an area of significant concern for the
foreseeable future.

BACKGROUND: Within several months, Chechnya will have reached the mark of a
decade of conflict. Whether the conflict has taken a political shape, as in
1991-94 and 1996-99, or a violent one such as in 1994-96 and presently, it
has put Chechen society under massive stress. The most apparent and
observable consequence has been the total destruction of the means of
economic livelihood in the Chechen republic. If the capital Grozny after the
first war was described as a pile of rubble, it was still used as a capital
city in the inter-war period; visitors to the city now agree this would be
impossible - it is deemed more feasible to build a new city next to the
remains of the old one. All forms of industry have been obliterated. In
addition, the near totality of Chechnya's livestock has been killed, and it
is questionable how much land is cultivable without major investment.

Less obvious to the outsider is the destruction of Chechnya's social fabric.
With less than half of the republic's erstwhile population in the republic,
the remainder either in exile or dead, the Chechens have for all practical
purposes suffered a second deportation. Obviously, flight and exile have
implied severe strain on social institutions such as the family and the clan
- the teip. Large parts of the male population is either fighting,
incarcerated or dead, and countless families have been split up or forced to
flee their habitations. There being little chance of a lasting peace in the
foreseeable future, an entire generation is presently growing up for which
peace and stability are merely abstract concepts, if that.

At a political level, the somewhat functioning central Chechen authority
that existed under Jokhar Dudayev's administration, and was later
transferred to Aslan Maskhadov's, has disintegrated into armed formations
with little or no acceptance of a single authority. Quest for power and
ideology divide the different groups. This situation is reminiscent of what
happened to Afghanistan in the 1980s and 1990s. The Soviet invasion,
resistance to it and subsequent infighting among Mujahideen groups led to
the killing of an unknown but significant proportion of Afghans, sending
several million into forced exile, mainly in Iran and Pakistan. This created
a situation where the fabric of Afghan traditional society, which had been
the key factor providing stability in an unruly area among and between
tribal groupings, disintegrated.

IMPLICATIONS: In Afghanistan, the breakdown of traditional society was
instrumental in tearing down the intrinsic impediment against extremism that
inherited family values and strong tribal codes had represented. The
emergence of the Taliban movement and their peculiar and often largely
uninformed interpretations of religion are to a certain extent a consequence
of this. In Chechnya, similar tendencies can already be observed. Chechen
traditional society, contrary to accepted wisdom, in fact forms a very poor
breeding ground for religious radicalism.

While a deeply religious society, Islam in Chechnya has been mainly mystical
in character, and customary, pre-Islamic law (adat) has historically had
precedence over Sharia. The very strong codes of behavior of Chechen
society, moreover, have formed a stabilizing factor. But protracted conflict
and its consequences risk unraveling this, and in fact the recent advances
of radical, Salafi Islam in the region can be interpreted as a consequence
of the war. As the conflict continues, and society weakens further,
radicalism is likely to gain increasing support among a population of
ostracized, impoverished and traumatized individuals.

On another level, the continuing conflict is likely to produce other
lingering side-effects. Just like in Afghanistan, foreign elements pursuing
the global Islamic holy war, or the so-called 'Jihadis', have flocked to
Chechnya. In lesser numbers than in Afghanistan or Kashmir, to be sure; but
given Chechnya's small population and territory, their effect is already
being felt. Most, the arrival of Islamic radicalism has resulted in a split
among the Chechen combatants along ideological lines, with some factions
espousing a hard-line attitude and refusing even to negotiate with the
Kremlin. The consequence of the factionalization of the resistance is highly
detrimental to the prospects for peace, as a future agreement arrived at
between Moscow and the elected leader of Chechnya, Aslan Maskhadov, would
not necessarily imply a cessation of hostilities.

CONCLUSIONS: Chechnya has already come to approximate a former UN
negotiator's depiction of Afghanistan: A wound so infected that no one knows
where to start cleaning it. Much like the Soviet Union was primarily
responsible for Afghanistan's descent into anarchy and chaos, the
post-Soviet Russian government must carry the responsibility for the
creation of a similar zone of instability within its own territory. Chechnya
is likely to seriously affect the security of other North Caucasian regions
and other parts of the Russian Federation.

Whereas there are numerous blueprints for how a feasible and realistic
settlement of the Armenian-Azerbaijani or Georgian-Abkhaz conflict could be
arrived at, there is no realistic plan for peace in Chechnya. Russia is
unlikely to be able to financially sustain its present military involvement.
What will happen when Russia is forced to reduce its military activities
there is anyone's guess. Irrespective of the military fortunes on both
sides, Chechnya is set to remain a bleeding wound in the Caucasus,
attracting extremism and spreading instability.

Copyright 2001 The Analyst
All rights reserved

******

#14
Moscow Times
March 2, 2001
Letter
Not 'Neoliberal,' But 'Quasi-Administered'

In response to "The Real Problem," a comment by David Kotz, Jan. 30.
[JRL 5059]

Editor,

As an economist who has followed with great interest economic developments
in Russia, I find myself troubled by Kotz's piece. I regard it as a
particularly egregious example of the type of misinformation and polemics
that feeds into the dysfunctional fantasy world in which too many Russians
live in thinking about domestic and foreign policy issues.

Kotz argues that after the 1998 financial debacle no one could deny the
abject failure of the Western-inspired "neoliberal" economic model for
Russia. He goes on to argue that it was the very economic model urged on
Russia, from 1991 to the present, which has brought Russia to its current
economic impasse. And he attributes the fall of real incomes to subsistence
levels to the freeing of prices in January 1992, which he asserts was
responsible for setting off runaway inflation that expropriated the savings
of Russian citizens. The basic problem with Kotz's argument is that it is,
unfortunately, a polemical misrepresentation of what really happened in
1992 to the present.

No one can deny that the population of Russia has been greatly impoverished
since the demise of the Soviet Union. But it is extremely questionable to
attribute this to "neoliberal" policies followed at the urging of Western
specialists. While prices were liberalized in January 1992, they were by no
stretch of the imagination freed. Price controls were kept on a number of
important products such as petroleum. In addition, the prices of many
products that were nominally freed, in fact continued to be controlled at
the local level. Also, even on so-called freed prices, limits were set at
the retail level on the markup allowed. The resulting price distortions
plus the hyperinflation that began in 1992 had a lot to do with the
impoverishment of the masses of the people and the enrichment of a few at
their expense.

Second, an essential ingredient of the "neoliberal" advice offered at the
time was the reduction of government deficits and limits on the printing of
money and creation of credit. One purpose of such austerity was to protect
the value of the ruble and hence the savings of the population.
Unfortunately, no such austerity took place and you had the creation of an
unstable economic environment that simply tore things apart and
impoverished the population even more. Within six months of Yegor Gaidar's
"reforms," you had budget-breaking deficits passed by a Communist
parliament and excessive money and credit creation by an irresponsible
Central Bank. On top of this, following erroneous IMF advice, you had the
continuation of the ruble zone that allowed the former Soviet republics to
also create money as a means of stripping resources off of each other and
especially off the Russian Federation.

None of this can be attributed to so-called "neoliberal" policies. An
economy in which no major business decisions can be taken by private firms
at the local level without the agreement of the political bosses can hardly
be labeled "neoliberal." And an economy that continues to operate on all
sorts of hidden subsidies, widespread barter and the like can also hardly
be so labeled. I would argue that the country simply replaced an
administered economy by what I would label as a quasi-administered economy.
Legitimate businesses cannot function normally in an economy where taxes
are continually being changed, with countless inconsistent and changing
regulations and the need to continually pay bribes.

Given the fact that most civil servants in Russia are, with some
exceptions, generally incompetent, venal and corrupt, it seems to me that
it does not make sense to advocate, as Kotz and some others do, greater
reliance on government development of the economy.

If I were a Russian citizen, my preference would be for a liberal economic
order in which the government does attach importance to smoothing the rough
edges of such a system for the less advantaged. To get to this two things
are needed. First a much more intelligent discussion in Russia of the
economic issues they face there than one finds in articles of people like
Kotz who fail to evidence a real understanding of the situation in the
country. And second, a discussion on the American side of what we can
really do to make a difference in Russia since without our help (and I fear
that President Vladimir Putin does not understand this), it is unlikely the
Russians have the resources to make it on their own, although they are
ultimately responsible for the outcome as they are for the current mess there.

John Howard Wilhelm, Ph.D.
Ann Arbor, Michigan

********

#15
Russia: Analysis From Washington -- The Kremlin And The Crescent
By Paul Goble

Washington, 6 March 2001 (RFE/RL) -- Russian political leaders appear to be
reaching out to the country's 20 million Muslims to show that their campaign
in Chechnya is not inherently anti-Muslim and to generate support for
Moscow's policies among the second largest and most rapidly growing faith.

But widely-reported statements by Russian Muslims in support of Moscow's
efforts in Chechnya and by Russian political leaders in support of Islam as
part of the Russian tradition may not by themselves allow Moscow to achieve
these goals.

Few Muslims in that country have forgotten Moscow's longstanding hostility to
Islam. And many of Russia's Muslims object both to the high-visibility
political role now being played by the Russian Orthodox Church and to
Moscow's efforts to recentralize control over not only Chechnya but other
Muslims as well.

On 5 March, Muslims around the world celebrated Eid Al-Adha, the day
commemorating Abraham's willingness to sacrifice his son and God's
willingness to accept the sacrifice of a ram instead. In Russia and most of
Central Asia, this holiday is known by its Turkic name of Kurban Bairam. And
Muslims across the region assembled in their mosques.

Russian President Vladimir Putin issued an official statement on the holiday,
saying that he shares "the aspiration of Muslim spiritual leaders for the
state and religious organizations to join forces, as an important condition
of civil harmony, good will, and mutual understanding among all peoples of
multi-ethnic Russia and the prosperity of our fatherland."

Other Russian officials, including Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov, attended Muslim
services. And state-run television broadcast the service at the largest
mosque of the capital. This attention was echoed in the Russian media with
articles about the state's support for 3,500 Muslims making the pilgrimage to
Mecca this year and Muslim support for Russia's campaign in Chechnya.

Russian news agencies gave prominent play to the words of Talgan Tadzhuddin,
the chief of the Muslim Spiritual Directorate in Ufa, that Moscow's efforts
in Chechnya represents "a necessary measure against terrorists rather than
being an attack against brothers in faith."

But beneath this image of cooperation are very real tensions that Moscow's
latest press campaign appears intended to address.

By an accident of the calendar, this Muslim holiday of Kurban Bairam this
year fell on the 48th anniversary of the death of Soviet dictator Joseph
Stalin. No Muslim in Russia is likely to forget either his repression of all
religions in general or his particular attacks on Islam, including the
deportation of Chechens and other Muslim peoples of the North Caucasus.

Moreover, the current Russian government continues one aspect of Soviet
policy toward Islam that many Muslims find offensive and that appears likely
to cause Russia troubles in the future. That is, the state backs an official
Muslim hierarchy and requires the registration of Islamic congregations.

While Moscow also requires the registration of other religious communities,
the impact of this policy on Islam is inevitably different. Because Islam
does not have a priesthood or clergy in any sense of the word, demands that
its congregations be registered tend to divide believers into those who are
willing to go along with the state and those who are not, even more than in
the case of other faiths.

Those who go along are viewed by many Muslims as having been coopted by the
state and therefore in some ways illegitimate, and those who don't, who go
underground as it were, become ever more radicalized precisely because they
lack the kind of acceptance that a more open-ended approach to religion might
allow.

That happened in Soviet times when underground or what was sometimes called
"the non-mosque trend" of Islam attracted far more followers than did the
government-controlled official version. That danger, widespread in Soviet
times, is now repeating itself in Central Asia where government officials are
seeking to control Islam in this way and thus virtually guaranteeing that
they will not control it at all.

But there is yet another and perhaps more profound reason why Russian
statements may have an unintended impact on Muslims: the increasing
willingness of the state to involve the hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox
Church in political activities. That has raised questions even in the minds
of some Christians about the impact of that involvement on Russia's efforts
to move toward a secular, civil society.

Church-state relations are seldom easy even for long-established democracies,
but for countries making the transition from totalitarianism toward civil
society, these relations can prove explosive. And that is all the more likely
in Russia, where the Muslims are increasingly numerous and assertive, and the
Orthodox Christians are declining in numbers.

As a result, Moscow's efforts to reach out to Islam reflect both Russian
hopes as well as Russian fears. But if the Russian leadership continues to
treat Islam as if it were a church like Christianity, the Kremlin is likely
to find that its hopes for cooperation with Muslims will be largely dashed
and its fears of Muslim opposition will be all too fully realized.

*******

#16
NEARLY TWO OUT OF FIVE RUSSIANS WOULD HAVE PUTIN FOR SECOND TERM - POLL

     MOSCOW. March  6 (Interfax) - As many as 39% of Russians would like
Russian President  Vladimir Putin  to remain in office for another term,
while as few as 17% would not like this to happen.
     The undecideds were the largest group, 44%, in a nationwide poll of
1,600 people  conducted by  the research  group monitoring.ru in all the
country's seven federal districts at the end of February.
     Residents of  the Volga,  Urals, Siberian  and Far  Eastern federal
districts were  more likely  than the others to respond in the negative.
Rural residents  and dwellers  in towns of populations less than 100,000
are more likely than residents of cities with population of over 300,000
to respond in the affirmative.
     The elderly are more likely than people younger than 44 to give the
president their  thumbs up.  As the  education level  of the respondents
increases, the percentage of Putin admirers falls.
     Russians whose income is average are more likely than the others to
say yes.  Pensioners are  more likely  than the unemployed, students and
businessman to share this view.

*******

CDI Russia Weekly:  http://www.cdi.org/russia

Johnson's Russia List Archive (under construction):  http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson