February 8, 2001   

This Date's Issues:   5080 • 5081 

Johnson's Russia List
#5081
8 February 2001
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. AP: Gorbachev Praises Putin Leadership.
2. Interfax: Russia has market economy, independent press and free elections - Putin.
3. Itar-Tass: Russian president set to free economy from bureaucratic fetters.
4. AP: U.S. Hostage Said Treated Well.
5. Trud: Sergei Ishchenko, RUSSIA, US STILL DIVIDED ON ABM ISSUES.
6. AP: Stalingrad Epic Opens in Berlin.
7. The Moscow Times editorial: New ORT Smells Like Old ORT.
8. Novaya Gazeta: The skills of an intelligence agent are not what we need in a president.
9. New York Times: James Risen, C.I.A. Chief Sees Russia Trying to Revive Its Challenge to U.S.
10. New book: Russia's Fate Through Russian Eyes: Voices of the New Generation.
11. Itogi: Dmitry Pinsker, AN EMPTY SPACE. There has been no real opposition in Russia for over a year.]

******

#1
Gorbachev Praises Putin Leadership
February 7, 2001
By ALEXEI VLADYKIN
 
YEKATERINBURG, Russia (AP) - Former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev praised
President Vladimir Putin's leadership Wednesday but urged him to offer a
clear program to reform the economy and the weak legal system.

Gorbachev told reporters in this industrial city 900 miles east of Moscow
that he had met with Putin in the Kremlin on Tuesday.

``We expect the president to offer a long-term program for reforming the
economy, social programs and the legal system,'' Gorbachev said. ``There have
been a few changes so far, but we must support Putin's initiatives to
strengthen law and order.

``It's time for Putin to deal with the law enforcement structures, court
system and legal reform in general, although the process has started.''

Legal reform advocates say Russian courts are too slow and often susceptible
to influence from government authorities and powerful plaintiffs and
defendants.

Gorbachev lashed out at his longtime foe, former President Boris Yeltsin, who
was shown making dismissive remarks about him in a recent documentary on
Russian television. ``I feel pity for Yeltsin and don't envy his fate,''
Gorbachev said, without explanation.

Gorbachev, who turns 70 on March 2, said jokingly that he would celebrate his
birthday with a drink. ``I will get drunk. For me that would be quite an
act,'' said Gorbachev, considered a light drinker.

*******

#2
Russia has market economy, independent press and free elections - Putin
Interfax

Moscow, 8 February: Russian President Vladimir Putin has said he is convinced
that the efforts of the Russian leadership should be concentrated on the
development of civilian institutions and the social sphere as a whole.

"Russia has walked a hard path to democracy, and things that are gained at a
high cost are usually prized highly. And for this reason, we will keep and
perfect what we have managed to achieve in our democratic development," the
president stressed in an interview with the Austrian newspaper Neue
Kronen-Zeitung.

Putin said he believes that all basic democratic institutions work quite
efficiently in Russia. "We have a real market economy, independent press,
free and open elections," the head of state said.

He said he identifies these achievements "to a large extent with First
Russian President Boris Yeltsin".

At the same time, Putin said, "we are not going to rest on our laurels or
slow down the pace". "For this reason, we are doing a lot to consolidate the
state system by creating such mechanisms of law that would reliably protect
the rights and dignity of people," the president said. "I am convinced that
it is precisely this that constitutes the leadership's chief task," he added.

******

#3
Russian president set to free economy from bureaucratic fetters
ITAR-TASS

Moscow, 8 February: Russia is seeking to free its economy from the fetters of
bureaucracy, from excessive regulation by the state and to ease the tax
burden considerably, President Vladimir Putin said in an interview with the
Austrian newspaper "Neue Kronen Zeitung".

According to him, much is being done to make the investment climate in Russia
more favourable.

"We are perfectly aware of the need to get rid of state control over 'all and
sundry' and to guarantee compliance with the market 'rules'," Putin stressed.
"Above all, we need to protect property rights and to secure equal conditions
for competitors by promulgating clear and high-quality direct-effect laws."

In the year 2000, the economic situation in Russia became much more stable.
The problem of the timely payment of wages and the repayment of wage, pension
and social benefit arrears was practically resolved. A no-deficit budget for
the year 2001 was adopted, Putin said. According to him, the Russian
Federation this year will be able to maintain these positive trends in its
national economy.

"We are now building an economic system which can be competitive, effective
and socially just. The main task for the state to accomplish in the economic
sphere is to create conditions for economic freedom," the Russian president
said.

He noted that the Austrian development model which organically blends the
best in the leading economic schools and trends is of great interest for
Russia. "The results of this well-considered synthesis are obvious," Putin
noted.

He said that it is undoubtedly useful to study the system of relations that
has taken shape in Austria between the state and the business. "I have in
mind the application of the new principles of social partnership oriented
towards the accomplishment of national tasks, not towards the production of
profits for a narrow group of persons," Putin said.

******

#4
U.S. Hostage Said Treated Well
February 8, 2001
By JUDITH INGRAM
 
MOSCOW (AP) - Freed U.S. aid worker Kenneth Gluck said Thursday that his
abductors in Chechnya had treated him well, feeding him three times a day,
getting him asthma medicine when his own stock ran out and ensuring that his
shirt was washed and ironed before he was released.

But Gluck refused to comment on who might be responsible for his abduction,
or even to say whether his captors were Russians or Chechens.

``I can't engage in speculation,'' Gluck told a news conference at the Moscow
office of Doctors Without Borders, an international humanitarian aid
organization. And he said with a laugh that the people who held him had never
introduced themselves by name.

Russian authorities blamed the abduction on Chechen rebels. But Chechen rebel
leaders, and some Russian media, accused the Russian security services of
being behind it. Critics said the kidnapping was either punishment for
Gluck's public accusations of Russian abuse of Chechen civilians, or was
meant to persuade European observers that Moscow's military campaign was
justified.

The head of the Amsterdam-based organization, Austin Davis, said that during
Gluck's captivity, nobody had contacted Doctors Without Borders to set any
conditions.

``We were never asked to participate in any form of negotiations and no
demands were ever made of us,'' he said.

When the group learned on Sunday that Gluck had been released the previous
night, it came as ``a complete and happy surprise,'' Davis said.

Gluck, who heads the North Caucasus mission of Doctors Without Borders, was
seized by unidentified gunmen Jan. 9 in Chechnya. He recounted Thursday how
masked men had surrounded the four-car humanitarian convoy and taken him out
of his car, leaving him enough time to grab his bag.

He was hit on the back of the head with a rifle butt, and a coat was thrown
over his head so that he couldn't see anything. He was moved twice before
settling into what would be his home for the next 25 days.

``Gratefully, I was never gagged, beaten or tortured in any way,'' he said.
``I always had enough to eat.''

After a few days, the 39-year-old New York native was given a kerosene lamp
so that he could read the long Arab history book he had in his bag. Then he
was given a radio, and he could follow news of the devastating Indian
earthquake.

On the night he learned he would be freed, his shirt was washed and pressed
and he was offered a shave.

``I declined, as I've always had a beard and I figured I should go back with
a beard as well,'' he said.

He was instructed to put his glasses in his coat pocket, and a hat was pulled
over his eyes before he was deposited in a car.

``I was driven by car for some time, during which I was repeatedly apologized
to and told that my kidnapping had been a mistake, that I was ordered to be
freed without any conditions or ransom,'' he said. ``They said that no
international humanitarian agencies would be attacked in the future.''

He was deposited outside the house of a doctor he knew.

The account called into question the claim by Russia's Federal Security
Service, or FSB, that its agents had freed Gluck in a special operation late
Saturday. The FSB is now leading the Russian campaign against Chechen rebels,
which is in its 16th month.

Austin called Gluck's abduction a tragedy for the medical workers in
Chechnya, since it caused international humanitarian organizations to suspend
their operations in the war-shattered republic.

******

#5
Trud
February 8, 2001
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
RUSSIA, US STILL DIVIDED ON ABM ISSUES
By Sergei ISHCHENKO
    
     The Cold-War ghost, which has once again been conjured by
those US intentions to deploy an NMD (National Missile Defense)
system, keeps wandering between Moscow and Washington. For his
own part, Sergei Ivanov, who serves as Secretary of the Russian
Federation's National Security Council, has said bluntly some
time ago that the abrogation of the ABM (Anti-Ballistic
Missile) Treaty would wreck the entire system of global
strategic stability, also creating pre-requisites for yet
another spiral of the arms race, a space arms race included.
    
     Doubtless, Washington understands only too well that the
United States is going to win such a hypothetical arms race in
circum-terrestrial space. The thing is that the cash-strapped
Russia will have to sink its Mir orbital station in the ocean
already in the near future; this decision highlights our really
unimpressive financial standing.
     Therefore Russia should apparently opt for a relatively
cheap asymmetrical response; and such is the main pre-condition
of that possible response. By all looks, Moscow would have to
"retaliate" on the ground, rather than in outer space. First of
all, the Russian side would be expected to install the required
number of ICBM warheads making it possible to penetrate any
projected US ABM system. The United States comprehended the
futility of specific "Star Wars" plans back in 1972 (that is,
when the ABM Treaty was inked), with mathematicians proving
that it was well-nigh impossible to destroy 15,000-20,000
Soviet nuclear warheads in case of war.
Russia now boasts much fewer nuclear warheads; consequently,
Washington is once again tempted to obtain some unilateral
strategic advantages.
     Russia doesn't have enough money for building new ICBMs in
no time at all. Therefore it would become possible to install
three MIRVs (Multiple Independent Re-Entry Vehicles) on every
Topol-M ICBM, the Russian Defense Ministry claims. In fact, the
current START-II treaty doesn't hinder such actions.
Besides, it won't take long to test those modified ICBMs. Each
Topol-M ICBM replete with three nuclear MIRVs would also have a
rather short, two-minute, boost phase. At the same time, our
older ICBMs, such as the SS-18, which has confounded US
generals and politicians for quite a while now, boast a
five-minute boost phase. Consequently, Topol-M ICBMs would
apparently find it much easier to breach a projected US NMD
system.
     Given current appropriations, the Russian side can begin
to deploy new-generation SLBMs (Submarine-Launched Ballistic
Missiles) aboard its Yury Dolgoruky-class submarines prior to
the 2005-2007 period.
     The Russian Air Force's Tupolev Tu-160 and Tu-95-MS
strategic bombers will soon be equipped with new-generation and
long-range cruise missiles. In their turn, such missiles can be
fitted with conventional and nuclear warheads alike.
It's therefore no coincidence that our Tu-95-MS bombers, which
were absent in the Arctic (that provides the shortest possible
"route" from our airfields to US cities) for many consecutive
years, began to fly over the North Pole several months ago.

******

#6
Stalingrad Epic Opens in Berlin
February  8, 2001
By GEIR MOULSON
 
BERLIN (AP) - Berlin's annual film festival opened with an epic opening salvo
from behind the Soviet front lines in the World War II battle of Stalingrad.

French director Jean-Jacques Annaud based ``Enemy at the Gates'' on the
legend of Russian sharpshooter Vassili Zaitsev - played by Jude Law - and his
duel with Major Koenig - played by Ed Harris - a top German marksmen sent to
kill him and break Soviet morale.

The movie opens with the five-year-old Vassili's attempt to shoot a wolf,
before flashing forward to show him among boatloads of terrified Soviet
soldiers crossing the Volga river into a ruined Stalingrad under German fire.

It's soon back into personal territory, as Vassili's shooting skills are
seized upon by Joseph Fiennes's political Commissar Danilov, who builds up
the soldier into a legend of Soviet heroism.

``It was a challenge to play someone who expresses himself better physically
than verbally,'' Law said of peasant hero Vassili.

Both are drawn to Rachel Weisz' Tanya Chernova, a university-educated front
line soldier.

``I do not believe you can make a film without concentrating on heroes,''
said Annaud, known for ``The Name of the Rose'' and ``The Bear.'' With a
budget of some $85 million, his new movie rates as the most expensive
European movie yet made.

The inspiration for the film came from the 1970s book of the same title by
U.S. historian William Craig. Annaud said he drew most of his material from
Russian archives.

The 200-day battle of Stalingrad ended with Soviet victory on Feb. 2, 1943.
It thwarted Nazi Germany's goal of isolating Russia's southern oil fields.

About 1 million Soviet soldiers and civilians perished during the Nazi siege.
More than 230,000 German soldiers are believed to have died at Stalingrad or
later in prison camps.

``One of the things about the film is there are no villains,'' insisted Bob
Hoskins, who puts in a strong performance as Nikita Khrushchev, Stalin's
front-line envoy who later became Soviet leader.

Weisz said that making the movie in Germany - with some German and Russian
extras whose relatives were involved in the fighting - made the experience
``extremely resonant.''

``Enemy at the Gates'' is not running in the official competition at the
``Berlinale,'' considered one of the major European festivals. The festival
opened Wednesday.

The event runs through Feb. 18, when its top prizes will be awarded by an
international jury headed by former Fox Filmed Entertainment chief Bill
Mechanic.

The 23 films in competition include Steven Soderbergh's ``Traffic,'' starring
Michael Douglas and Catherine Zeta-Jones; Gus van Sant's ``Finding
Forrester,'' which features Sean Connery; Spike Lee's ``Bamboozled'' and
Lasse Hallstroem's ``Chocolat,'' starring Johnny Depp, Juliette Binoche and
Judi Dench.

******

#7
The Moscow Times
www.themoscowtimes.com
February 8, 2001
Editorial
New ORT Smells Like Old ORT

With surprisingly little notice, Russia this week returned to having two
wholly government-controlled national television networks. Ascendant
oligarch Roman Abramovich purchased the shares of ORT formerly held by
oligarch-in-disgrace Boris Berezovsky and - in a gesture of almost
unheard-of generosity - allowed the Kremlin to appoint all 11 members of
the channel's board.

In the blink of an eye, the Kremlin announced plans to pack that board with
people like Press Minister Mikhail Lesin (who has been declared the
country's No. 1 enemy of press freedom by the Russian Union of
Journalists), Deputy Prime Minister Valentina Matviyenko and Kremlin Deputy
Chief of Staff Vladislav Surkov.

ORT now formally joins RTR (whose general director is Alexander Akopov, an
old pal of Lesin's from Video International) in the stable of obedient,
Kremlin-controlled media outlets. And maverick NTV looks more and more
lonesome - although all indications are that it will soon join its
competitors to form one big happy family.

Of course, it is difficult to think of anything positive to say about
Berezovsky's tenure at the helm of ORT. The station's record, especially
since 1996, has been truly shameful - and Berezovsky, no matter how hard he
tries to remake himself as a dissident civil rights activist, bears the
blame. It is also hard to lament the Kremlin's reported dismissal of Sergei
Dorenko, one of the most tarnished figures in Russian journalism today.

Nonetheless, Abramovich's gift to Putin is a nasty step in the wrong
direction, one that reinforces all our worst fears that the present
administration is simply the same old oligarchy with just a few different
details.

The practice of oligarchs funding state or nominally nonstate media and
ceding editorial control to politicians is nothing new in Russia. A study
issued by the Media Law and Policy Institute in 1999 documented this odious
phenomenon throughout the regions. It is a deal in which everyone, except
the public, wins: Politicians get a mouthpiece to further their political
ambitions and the oligarchs get access and favors from grateful officials.

When Berezovsky controlled ORT, of course, the situation was just the same.
As long as he was thoroughly entrenched in the Kremlin, having his daughter
or his business cronies or Dorenko on the ORT board was the same as having
the press minister himself there. You might even say that Abramovich's
solution is somehow more honest.

Whatever. Oligarchy is oligarchy and, any which way, it stinks. A country
that desperately needs a watchdog over the authorities has acquired one
more lapdog, thanks to Roman Abramovich.
 
******

#8
Novaya Gazeta
No. 8, February 5-11, 2001
The skills of an intelligence agent are not what we need in a president
THE NTV SCANDAL SHOWS THAT WE HAVE AN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER RUNNING
THE COUNTRY, NOT A POLITICIAN. THE STATE'S HARASSMENT OF MEDIA-MOST
AND ITS OWNER VLADIMIR GUSINSKY HAS BEEN PLANNED LIKE A SPECIAL
OPERATION. VLADIMIR PUTIN IS THE AGENT IN CHARGE, WHO REMAINS IN THE
BACKGROUND.
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]

     The NTV scandal shows that we have an intelligence officer
running the country, not a politician. Neither the media, nor voters,
nor Western leaders have known President Putin so well until now.
Everyone had noticed that Putin used certain "tricks" in some
interviews and public appearances - but all those "I couldn't get in
touch with him" and "Oh my, really?" lines were generously put down to
a young politician's lack of experience. What NTV journalists have
revealed about their meeting with the president does away with that
shallow conclusion.
     The war which the state - led by its president - has been waging
on Vladimir Gusinsky's media empire resembles a special operation
against an enemy target. The target in such situations denotes a group
or individual long engaged in unlawful activities within the framework
of a stable organization.
     The Kremlin views journalists as a criminal force. This
assumption is supported by numerous references to "anti-state
activities", which the president and his closest associates have been
making since May last year. It remains a key issue: are live on-air
debates a form of political process, or a crime? The Criminal Code and
the constitution give an unequivocal answer. They do not sanction
imprisonment on the grounds of personal opinion, whether for Gusinsky
or Voloshin.
     The problem is that Putin and his closest associates are used to
"working" against individuals or groups who have been identified by
their superiors. The question of what section of the Criminal Code the
target should be charged under has only seriously arisen just before
the evidence is sent to the courts. Provided the target has resisted
all attempts at recruitment, that is.
     Such habits ourght to be abandoned now that we're living in a
different state based on entirely different principles; but the crime
of the journalists was still judged to be ideological, even though the
relevant articles of the Criminal Code were revoked by Gorbachev. The
courts are not entirely tame yet, so the matter had to be handled
before it got to the courts. Work began in all earnest.
     The commanding officer - the Russian president, in this case -
should remain under cover. His contacts with the target are carried
out by his subordinates through various agents. For example,
Gusinsky's ex-subordinates keep in touch with their former colleagues.
Defectors are the best operatives. At the same time, systematic
pressure is applied to force the enemy to start thinking about his
personal future. Undermine self-confidence, and the battle is half-
won. On a more mundane level, this is done by local police officers.
However, something more powerful was needed against Media-Most, and
the Prosecutor General's Office, tax structures, FSB, and to a certain
extent the courts were used. Working over Media-Most generated so much
activity that entire directorates had to be involved - including
surveillance, according to what the president all but said straight
out to NTV chief executive Yevgenii Kiselev.
     It took the state months to set up the machine which is being
used against Media-Most. It will undoubtedly prove useful in future
too. The Media Ministry, headed by Mikhail Lesin, is involved. The
services of PR consultants are enlisted. An entire subsidiary of
Gazprom (Gazprom-Media) is used to fight for Media-Most. In reality,
Gazprom Media and its CEO Alfred Koch have absolutely nothing to do
with Gazprom, but... Specially-established headquarters coordinates
the operation, but mix-ups do occur. On the whole, however, the
colossal machine with several thousand agents is threateningly
approaching the NTV television network, indicating that only one way
out is left for NTV. A compromise has to be reached.
     The officer at the top of the pyramid pointedly remains
uninvolved. He waits, he analyzes the information submitted by his
agents. It is too early yet, they are not ready. Then NTV anchor
Svetlana Sorokina publiclyappeals to the president - and this means
the time is ripe. The president steps in, self-assured and all-
knowing. He says that talented journalists must be helped, rescued
from the tight corner in which they have found themselves. The
television network, so self-sufficient, has to be saved.
     The rules for contacts between an intelligence officer and his
target were not invented in Russia.
     Listen more than you talk.
     Don't let the subject catch on that you know more than you
pretend to know.
     Whenever possible, say what the subject wants to hear from you.
     In short, do not disabuse the subject of his illusions.
     Don't apply pressure unless you are absolutely sure of the
result.
     Of course, the president knew that NTV journalists would be
prepared for the meeting too. He needed to know exactly what they were
coming to the Kremlin with. Agents within the NTV network apparently
failed to sniff this out, and the decision was made to invite Sorokina
alone, for starters - just to gauge the situation. That is why she
could not explain afterwards what the whole audience had been about.
The plan for the meeting with NTV journalists was accordingly
corrected. The proposal to "turn in Gusinsky" and go on working was
not made bluntly; it was veiled. Well, our president is an experienced
intelligence agent.
     So it is not surprising that all the NTV journalists later
mentioned how well-prepared Putin had been. On the other hand, what
else should we expect from a man who sees the final phase of the
operation unfolding?
     The journalists were surprised at Putin's double standards:
presumption of innocence was valid for Khapsirokov, Lesin, and Ustinov
- but did not apply to Gusinsky. This is understandable. The crime
squad and counter-intelligence do work with people who have broken the
law. Cooperation with the authorities is considered to atone for past
misdeeds.
     Every now and then, this practice backfires. Criminals feign
cooperation with the police, and use them to promote their own
objectives. It does happen, and the Kremlin known it.
     The confidence that they're doing right is the best trait of
intelligence officers all over the world. Yes, they may be disliked -
like dentists - but they are protecting the interests of the
Motherland. Add here a bit of pathos and romanticism, and you get what
is known as the "chekist syndrome". Vladimir Shenderovich, an NTV
commentator, noticed this in Putin.
     Let's sum it up. What can we say about the people entrusted with
carrying out this operation? They are a bunch of incompetents, because
the state has very little to show for all its efforts. Such agents
would have been kicked out long ago in the good old days.
     What can we say about the officer at the top? The habit of
dividing everyone into "us" and "them", the certainty that he is
right, sincerity, sleeping soundly at night, no loss of appetite -
these are the signs of a perfect intelligence officer. He is hard-
working, patient, and competent. We need such people in the FSB, and
particularly in the Tax Police. But this isn't what is needed in a
politician. Russia is still being run by an intelligence officer, not
by a politician.
     For a politician, victory means enlisting the services of
opponents and the public in promoting the victor's objectives within
the framework of a political process. It means that the opposition has
to be consulted regularly, and the victor's own position amended every
now and then. All this is needed to prevent a new, stronger opponent
from appearing in the place of the defeated one. Essentially, it is
creation.
     For an intelligence officer, victory means destruction or
neutralization of the target.
     Life will change Putin. There can be no doubts that he honestly
wants to drag Russia out of the swamp. He will understand that
politics means partial sincerity in public, and candor in
negotiations. He will understand that you shouldn't say one thing
while doing the opposite. He will understand that the skills used in
special operations and intrigues are not very effective.

******

#9
New York Times
February 8, 2001
[for personal use only]
C.I.A. Chief Sees Russia Trying to Revive Its Challenge to U.S.
By JAMES RISEN

WASHINGTON, Feb. 7 - Russia is using international trade in weapons and
technology to improve relations with China, India and Iran while trying to
revive its status as a great power and challenge United States influence, the
director of central intelligence, George J. Tenet, said today.

In blunt testimony to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Mr. Tenet
indicated that the United States intelligence community was increasingly
concerned by the direction of Moscow's foreign policy under President
Vladimir V. Putin.

"There can be little doubt that President Putin wants to restore some aspects
of the Soviet past â?" status as a great power, strong central authority
and a
stable and predictable society â?" sometimes at the expense of neighboring
states or the civil rights of individual Russians," Mr. Tenet said.

He made his statements in a wide- ranging annual review of the global threats
that are facing the United States. The C.I.A. director's review amounts to a
tour of the horizon, and it was highlighted by warnings about terrorist
groups and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Mr. Tenet said that Russia "continues to value arms and technology sales as a
major source of funds" and was using that trade to improve ties with China,
India and Iran. The Russians hope that cementing better ties with those
countries will erode American influence, Mr. Tenet added. In addition, Moscow
wants to bolster its power over the former Soviet republics while reducing
United States influence, and it is demanding that its neighbors repay their
energy debts, is dragging its feet on withdrawing forces from Moldova and is
using pressure tactics on Georgia, Mr. Tenet said.

Mr. Putin, a former intelligence officer, has reinvigorated domestic and
foreign spy services. Mr. Tenet said Mr. Putin had transferred command over
the Chechnya conflict from the military to the Federal Security Service, the
internal secret service.

On other topics, Mr. Tenet reaffirmed the Central Intelligence Agency's
belief that the nature and structure of anti-American terrorism had radically
changed over the last few years and was now dominated by independent and
decentralized groups like that of Osama bin Laden. The United States has said
Mr. bin Laden and his group, al-Qaeda, were behind the bombings of two
American Embassies in East Africa in 1998, as well as other anti-American
terrorist attacks.

But the decentralized command structure of Mr. bin Laden's organization makes
it far more difficult to investigate. Al-Qaeda, Mr. Tenet noted, "is
continuing to place emphasis on developing surrogates to carry out attacks in
an effort to avoid detection, blame and retaliation. As a result, it is often
difficult to attribute terrorist incidents to his group."

That problem has frustrated United Sates officials who are investigating the
bombing of the destroyer Cole while it was in port in Yemen, with the loss of
17 lives.

Mr. Tenet also warned that the threat from the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction remained high in flashpoints like the Korean peninsula and
Iran. Iran continues to receive Russian missile technology and "has one of
the largest and most capable ballistic missile programs in the Middle East,"
Mr. Tenet said.

And despite recent political gains by reformist forces, he added, Tehran "has
not reduced its willingness to use terrorism to pursue strategic foreign
policy agendas."

******

#10
Date: Wed, 07 Feb 2001
From: Heyward Isham <hisham@iews.org>
Subject: Russia's Fate Through Russian Eyes: Voices of the New Generation

Dear David,
I've attached to this message two files containing information on my
just-published anthology, Russia's Fate Through Russian Eyes: Voices of
the New Generation. The first is a press release of sorts; the second is
the preface to the anthology. Perhaps this information will be of
interest to the readers of your venerable list.
Warm regards,
Heyward
Amb. Heyward Isham
Vice President
EastWest Institute
700 Broadway, 2nd Floor
New York, NY  10003
Tel: +1 212 824-4116
Fax: + 1 212 824-4149
Email:  hisham@iews.org
Website:  http://www.iews.org

-----

Russia's Fate Through Russian Eyes: Voices of the New Generation
Edited by Heyward Isham with Natan M. Shklyar
Introduction by Jack F. Matlock, Jr.
Westview Press, 2001; 429 Pages; 0-8133-3866-2; $30.00; hc

"Russia's Fate Through Russian Eyes makes an important contribution to the
West's understanding of the profound disorientation which the political,
economic, and social upheavals have had on the lives of ordinary Russian
citizens. These essays by rising young leaders of the post-Soviet
generation, as yet largely unknown in the West, speak with unusual candor
of the frustrations and deprivations, the loneliness and yearning for
leadership that pervade all regions and walks of life. Heyward Isham has
provided valuable insight into the issues that must be faced by the
architects of Russia's future."
-- Henry A. Kissinger

In this ground-breaking work, twenty-eight young Russian intellectuals
--representatives of a new generation who came of age during and after the
fall of the Soviet Union -- record the hopes, fears, and triumphs of recent
years. Their "reports from the field" form a mosaic of professional and
personal impressions, recollections, and recommendations bearing on Western
policies as well as domestic priorities.

As witnesses to Russia's troubled, episodic, and contradictory
transformation, the contributors have much to tell the West -- particularly
those observers who tend to deprecate the importance of Russia as a nation
following the collapse of the USSR.

It is unfortunate but true that multiple stereotypes about the sources of
Russian conduct continue to pervade the global political debate and shroud
that country's very real accomplishments in recent years. These personal
histories offer a much more complex -- and ultimately heartening -- picture
than the one the average Western newspaper reader is accustomed to seeing.
For example:

¨ In "Reshaping the Russian State," Professor Yurii Plyusnin recounts the
results of his 19 sociological expeditions into the Russian countryside in
the 1990s. His goal: to examine the "internal" responses of average Russian
citizens to sweeping external reforms.

¨ In "Striving Toward Rule of Law," founding president of the Russian Union
of Young Lawyers Vladislav Grib analyzes the slow but steady process of
judicial reform and the moral compass of young Russian lawyers.

¨ In "Civil Society Building Blocks," Nadezhda Azhgikhina, prominent
journalist and feminist thinker, illuminates the contradictory historical
and cultural forces that have shaped today's burgeoning Russian feminism.

¨ In "Preserving the Culture, Modernizing Education," Vladimir Mirzoev,
resident director of the Stanislavskii Drama Theatre, discusses the
central, subversive role of theatre in Soviet times and the paradoxical
"cultural wasteland" created by the rapid transition to free speech and
capitalism.

What do reviewers have to say about Russia's Fate Through Russian Eyes?

"...The contributors to this sturdy anthology are members of the
post-Stalinist generation born in the '50s or early '60s who have attained
success in various fields in post-Soviet Russia. The insights that they
offer into these times are fascinating..."
(Civilization, October-November 2000)

"A thoughtful anthology, presenting a plurality of views and explorations
of the tumultuous first decade of democratic Russia. EastWest Institute
Vice President Isham... has assembled a muscular array of 26 contributors,
ranging from academics to entrepreneurs, each distinctly Russian in
outlook.... These essays contain much that runs counter to accepted notions
of Russian malaise and entropy... Similar recent anthologies have attempted
to wrestle with the post-Communist chimera, but they usually were confined
to economic or political analysis. While Isham includes much of both, he
provides some refreshingly unorthodox commentary... A sober, comprehensive
volume that variously provokes unease or reassurance, but ought to have
something for all interested readers."  
(Kirkus Reviews,January 15, 2001)

Heyward Isham, the editor of Russia's Fate Through Russian Eyes, is a
thirty-five-year veteran of the U.S. Foreign Service. He served as
political and economic officer in Berlin, Moscow, and Hong Kong prior to
his appointment as Ambassador to Haiti. A long-time Russophile who has
followed the country closely since his first posting to Moscow in the
1950s, Ambassador Isham is a recognized expert on post-Communist societies
in Europe and Asia and samizdat (underground Soviet literature). Ambassador
Isham, who served as editor of Remaking Russia: Voices from Within, (ME
Sharpe 1995), is currently Vice President of the EastWest Institute, New
York.                              

To acquire a review copy of Russia's Fate Through Russian Eyes, please
contact:
Paula Waldrop, Promotion Coordinator
Westview Press and Perseus Publishing
5500 Central Avenue
Boulder, CO 80301-2877
Tel.: (303) 444-3541 x245
Fax: (303) 449-3356
Paula.Waldrop@perseusbooks.com

www.westviewpress.com

To order Russia's Fate Through Russian Eyes, please contact:
Customer Service, Westview Press and Perseus Publishing
Tel.: 1-800-386-5656 (U.S. orders only)
westview.orders@perseusbooks.com

For additional information on Russia's Fate Through Russian Eyes, please
contact:
Marisa Robertson-Textor, Program Associate
EastWest Institute
700 Broadway, 2nd Floor                                     

New York, NY 10003                              
Tel. (212) 824-4115                             
mrtextor@iews.org

------

PREFACE

The young Russian men and women who record in these pages the hopes, fears,
triumphs, and tragedies their country has undergone in recent
years--altering their own lives profoundly in the process--all come from
the first post-Soviet generation to achieve positions of leadership in
Russia.  They report on five challenges central to Russia's survival and
stabilization: reshaping the state, coping with new economic rules,
striving toward the rule of law, building a civil society, and preserving
the national culture and educational capacity.

They love their country, while understanding all too well the crippling
psychological legacy of seventy years of a dictatorship that was both
cunning and cruel in dispensing a plausible utopian myth and exacting
extraordinary sacrifices in the name of that myth.  They understand the
acute sense of disorientation that overcame all generations when the USSR
abruptly dissolved in 1991 and the Communist Party simultaneously lost much
if not all of its power.  As several of our authors recall, it was as if
you woke up one morning and found yourself a citizen of an entirely
different country, meanwhile discovering that your parents were not your
real parents at all and that you had acquired a brand new surname.

But these young Russians waste no time in historical retrospectives.
Unencumbered by fears of either a Communist restoration or a right-wing
coup, they have no taste for recrimination or resentment: they go about
their business briskly, boldly.  From the voice caught in these pages we
learn what the young generation of Russians is doing to help their country
recover from its precipitous decline, and how they see the future. For
example:
· a grain dealer deftly navigates the newly demonopolized commodities
market and competes on the world market;
· a real estate developer, responding to pent-up demand, builds functional
and affordable housing in the Moscow suburbs;
· an opponent of the compulsory registration system operate the first
center for the homeless in St. Petersburg and publishes a newsletter
advocating more humane treatment for them;
· a public policy lawyer, using his advocacy and legislative drafting
skills, protects consumers (unaccustomed to having a choice of goods and
services) from buying defective equipment or succumbing to false
advertisements;
· an anthropologist grounded in biology and philosophy explores the
radically changed outlook among Siberia's urban and rural inhabitants as
they struggle with fortitude and ingenuity to adapt to the pervasive
economic crisis, discounting any help from local authorities and meanwhile
turning to the worship of nature as an archaic source of unity;
· an entrepreneurial couple organizes an agency to inform, educate and
support those engaged in the long process of building a civil society
through a growing network of professional non-governmental organizations;
· an independent publisher introduces readers to a wealth of undiscovered
and unorthodox literary talents;
· a constitutional law scholar warns about the potential for totalitarian
abuses inherent in many provisions of the 1993 Constitution;
· a journalist directs a watchdog agency that publicizes reprisals against
investigative journalists by government officials or businessmen exposed as
corrupt;
· two scholar-administrators in St. Petersburg pioneer the country's first
undergraduate program offering a cross-disciplinary liberal arts curriculum.
These are only a few of the articulate young leaders we meet in these pages.

The Russia they set their mind and energy to restore and modernize is a
country that does not turn its back on the Bolshevik and Soviet past, but
acknowledges enduring bonds, common interests and ethical values shared by
every generation.  It is a Russia that sets aside raw envy of others'
entrepreneurial success, renounces the habit of subservience to the state,
and distinguishes between universal principles of justice and the cynical
distortions of the law by bureaucrats. A Russia that can be roused from
inertia to activism by reports of institutionalized torture, whether
occurring under police interrogation, in Russia's overcrowded prisons, or
in the army. 

It is above all a Russia borne up in its many travails by a stubborn will
to survive and by a capacity, especially in the new generation, to adapt
ingeniously and swiftly to changes imposed by the need to compete at home
and abroad under unforgiving market conditions.

It is, finally, a Russia that wants the West to demonstrate its interest
in a more informed, balanced and respectful relationship, shedding
disparaging stereotypes and a priori assumptions. Although increasingly
confident of its regenerative capacity (the 1998 crisis was surmounted) the
new Russia, our authors believe, welcomes an intelligent, sensible helping
hand as its citizens, with the new generation in the lead, rebuild their
country "from under the rubble."  The poet Boris Slutsky has written  about
the Russians: "worn out, like rails over which all the engines of the world
have driven, they can still receive any signals sent out by good."

The genesis of this collection of original essays on Russia's future was
probably my service as Second Secretary in Embassy Moscow during the
mid-1950s, when I discovered at first hand that Western assumptions about
the totalitarian controls imposed by the Soviet system failed to take into
account the marvelously ingenious protective devices developed within
society against secret policy informers and other forms of political
intrusion into their private lives.

In those years, apart from chance (and often very instructive) encounters
and conversations in parks, restaurants, markets, or train compartments,
diplomats seeking the reality behind the stage props had, for example, to
plow through Politburo speeches or Party Congress transcripts, note a
change of emphasis here or a telling omission there in the official press
reports, and compare how news was handled in Moscow and in the provinces.
The evidence of political disillusionment and intellectual resistance even
then was greater than many Western observers assumed. I was struck, for
example, by the buzz of debate among Moscow University students caused by
the publication of Vladimir Dudintsev's Not By Bread Alone, a novel that
portrayed a Party apparatchik in subtly unflattering tones altogether
inconsistent with approved iconic forms. Although Dudintsev's indictment
pales when compared to the torrent of revelations about Stalin's
repressions and the Party's degeneration that emanated from both official
and samizdat sources during the 1960s and 1970s, the reaction to the book
reflected the passing of an illusion and foreshadowed the role that
opposition-minded intellectuals, some of them allied with Gorbachev and his
team, would play in the eventual destruction of the Party's monopoly on
power and legitimacy in 1991.

The task of interpretation and analysis that faces foreign observers
almost 50 years after Stalin's death and some 15 years after the start of
Gorbachev's glasnost and perestroika is of course altogether different.
Deciphering post-Soviet puzzles requires a method that takes into account
the proliferation and tendentiousness of print and electronic information,
to the point that there seem to be not one but many Russias. Our authors
Sergei Vasil'ev and Vladimir Mirzoev observe this phenomenon from the
perspective of economic policy maker and theatrical producer. Fragmentation
characterizes those who live in Moscow and St. Petersburg, the provincial
cities, and rural villages and settlements; those over 50 and those under
40; citizens residing in republics or oblasts that border on West Europe,
Central Asia, and the Far East, and those living in regions which are
largely cut off from foreign ties, as in the Siberian North. Among the 89
regions of Russia, a few are relatively stable and growth-oriented but most
are seriously impoverished and backward. And all such differences, of
course, are compounded and manipulated by recurrent "information wars," the
use of compromising material (kompromat) to crush political opponents, the
hidden agendas of oligarchs who control much of the media, the intertwining
of bureaucracy and organized crime, and mercurial changes in patterns of
patronage.  At the same time, the Internet links among universities and
individual subscribers (some 3 million) are increasingly important in
providing independent sources of information, although government
monitoring is a latent threat. The rise and fall of confidants and
courtiers, scoundrels and scholars, reformers and restorationists--such is
the context in which these reflections, reminiscences, and observations
must be viewed.

The approach I have taken in this book, therefore, follows that taken my
earlier volume, Remaking Russia: Voices From Within, published in 1995,
which presented the views of some 20 outstanding intellectual figures of
the older generation. For the present collection, I have concentrated on 29
representatives of the new generation of Russian leaders, those between the
ages roughly of 25 and 40. Their perspectives find an arresting
counterpoint and commentary in the epilogue contributed by one of Russia's
most respected scholars, the historian and Slavicist Vyacheslav Ivanov.
My suggestion to the authors, once they were selected, was straightforward:
using your personal voice, as if you were writing a letter to American
friends, share with us your professional evaluation of the profound changes
in your country; note the implications for the future development of
Russia; and describe what is necessary to move Russia toward a more
civilized, responsible and vibrant society. The classic questions: "Who are
we? Where are we going? How do we get there?" are within your power to answer.
The authors responded well to these proposals. Indeed, their written
contributions (in some cases interviews) convey effectively the troubled,
shocking, perplexing, contradictory evolution of their country from a
coercive imperial system asserting a monopoly on faith and power to a
national condition that seems far less clear, less predictable, less
equitable and certainly less effective than that which had preceded it, but
one which increasingly offers new opportunities for independence of
thought, collegiality of action, entrepreneurial boldness--and, above all,
new hope for Russian society as a whole.

What these young leaders have to say also offers new ideas for the design
and implementation of foreign assistance programs, for much has changed,
and continues to change, since those programs were first initiated; and a
resurgent Russia under a new and younger president will present problems
and opportunities of an altogether different order. The West more than ever
will need to study the particular historical and psychological context, the
nuances of words and actions, the smoke screens put up to mask weakness and
confuse the potential antagonist -- and it will also need to assess at its
proper value the defiantly resilient and tenacious Russian character imbued
as it is with memories of a more coherent and authoritative past.

Heyward Isham
New York City
May, 2000

**********

#11
Itogi
No. 5, February 2001
AN EMPTY SPACE
There has been no real opposition in Russia for over a year
By Dmitry Pinsker
THERE MAY END UP BEING TWO, FIVE, OR EVEN TEN POLITICAL PARTIES IN
RUSSIA; BUT IT CERTAINLY SEEMS LIKE A SINGLE-PARTY SYSTEM IS BEING
RESTORED. NO REAL OPPOSITION EXISTS. AND IF THIS SITUATION REMAINS
UNCHANGED, IT WILL ONLY CONFIRM THE ILLUSION THAT RUSSIA'S UNBALANCED FORM OF GOVERNMENT IS REALLY DEMOCRACY.
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]

     Russia's political system has been in an unnatural state for over
a year. At first sight, Russia has all the democratic institutions -
political parties, a parliament, and so on; but it lacks a vital
component to make the structure viable. All the more or less
influential forces in Russia support the regime to some extent. To be
more exact, they support Vladimir Putin. Russia has not had a real
opposition for over a year. It lacks a force which would plan to
compete for power at the next election, which would consistently
criticize the president and the government and keep them on their
toes.
     The amazing consolidation which preceded the presidential
election can be attributed to the fact that the political elite saw
Putin as the favorite and the certain winner. After March 26, 2000 the
number of Putin's supporters did not fall, not even when Russia grew
suspicious about his authoritarianism, or when Kremlin ideologues came
up with the slogan of a "liberal economy with authoritarian
government".
     The right and the left backed the president, some of them for
ideological reasons and others out of purely pragmatic considerations.
Along with that, any semblance of unity within the elite is absolutely
out of the question. Liberals and advocates of a strong state have
been, and remain, antagonists. They always end up appealing to Putin,
and almost always find him sympathetic.
     Putin does try to tell people exactly what they want to hear.
     Either because of a lack of determination, or because of a lack
of awareness of the challenges he is facing, the president inevitably
gets confused when he has to choose a particular solution from a
number of mutually exclusive ones, and when he therefore has to
clearly indicate his political position. Issues end up being shelved.
This has already happened to the land and military reforms; and it
happened recently to amendments to the Criminal Code, which were
submitted to the Duma and immediately withdrawn.
     This situation doesn't affect Putin's approval rating, but does
complicate things enormously for any potential opposition. Public
opinion doesn't even try to voice any complaints. For some reasons,
the public is prepared to blame everything on anyone other than the
president.
     The Russian political arena lacks a force capable of opposing the
regime on the basis of a clear and coherent ideology of its own.
Russia doesn't have any political leader who would challenge the
president in public debates, much less in the battle for the
presidency. The niche reserved for an opposition in a civilized
society is sparsely scattered with various regional leaders, tycoons,
and journalists. An pposition should have been speaking on behalf of
professional groups, victims of Putin's state reforms. Unfortunately,
most regional leaders and business leaders prefer to play along,
instead of challenging the regime.
     There are many political parties in Russia (for the time being),
but only the Communists and the right may claim the honor of
representing an opposition. Neither, however, is a real opposition -
because neither is bold enough to become critics of the regime. The
Communists have a leader and a program, but they abandoned all hope
after 1996; and Gennadi Zyuganov's participation in the last
presidential election was just a formality. While condemning the
regime, the Communists are careful not to criticize Putin. The right
wing backed Putin on the eve of the election, and still appeals to the
president as though he were its leader. As things stand, it is
considerably more comfortable for the right to play along than to
become a truly independent opposition, deprived of even illusory
participation in decision-making. In other words, there may end up
being two, five, or even ten political parties in Russia; but it
certainly seems like a single-party system is being restored.
     Politicians themselves explain the absence of a full-fledged
political opposition by the fact that such a force wouldn't last a
week in current conditions. Perhaps. Any such political movement would
certainly run the risk of finding insufficient support, in a nation
where 70% of citizens support the president. It would probably
encounter problems with recruiting supporters among political and
business leaders. The Russian establishment prefers to maintain the
illusion of unity and consolidation, whatever its reasons or motives.
     The longer this situation persists, the more difficult it will be
to force the regime into democratic channels. Total "unity" corrupts
the powers-that-be, and confirms the opinion that the unbalanced form
of government we have in Russia nowadays (the tsar and the people, the
leader and the nation) is democracy.
(Translated by A. Ignatkin)

*******

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