January 24, 2001   

This Date's Issues:   5047 • 5048

Johnson's Russia List
#5048
24 January 2001
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Reuters: Putin writes to Bush, wants better US-Russia ties.
2. AP: Bush To Have New Approach on Russia.
3. Moscow Times: Simon Saradzhyan, Defense Spending Could Double.
4. Washington Post editorial: Judging Chechnya.
5. The Guardian (UK) editorial: This war cannot succeed. The killing will not subdue Chechnya.
6. Reuters: Putin gathers Russia's "oligarchs" for talks.
7. Segodnya: WE SPOILED IMPRESSION ABOUT RUSSIA. The image of the USSR
in the world was more attractive than that of Russia.
8. Moscow Times editorial: Putin Must Fight for His Reforms.
9. AFP: Russian-Israeli businessman held on kidnapping charges.
10. Segodnya: "PUTIN PLANS NO GLOBAL OFFENSIVE." (Interview with Gleb Pavlovsky)
11. Izvestia: INTERVIEW WITH MAJOR GENERAL VLADIMIR DVORKIN, CHIEF OF THE DEFENSE MINISTRY CENTRAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE.
12. Washington Post: Susan B. Glasser and Peter Baker, Putin Plans to Eliminate Most Russian Political Parties.
13. RIA: THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION HIGHLY ASSESSES THE PROSPECT OF THE ADOPTION BY THE STATE DUMA OF THE DRAFT LAW ON POLITICAL PARTIES.
14. Vladimir Raskin: RE: 5044-Markov/Human Rights Movement.
15. Heinrich Vogel: re Soviet debt and CMEA/5039.]

*******

#1
Putin writes to Bush, wants better US-Russia ties
 
MOSCOW, Jan 24 (Reuters) - Russian President Vladimir Putin has written to
U.S. President George W. Bush congratulating him on his new job and setting
out Moscow's views on how to improve bilateral relations, the Kremlin said on
Wednesday.

It said Putin sent Bush the letter on Tuesday and also wrote to the former
president, Bill Clinton, to thank him for his good will and readiness to seek
compromises when dealing with Russia.

"Putin confirmed his continued willingness to act to deepen interaction
between Russia and the United States and jointly to find answers to the
serious challenges which confront us and the entire international community
in the 21st century," it said.

The Kremlin said Putin had presented his thoughts on "ways to develop
Russian-American dialogue further."

It also said Putin had touched on the question of possible summits and other
meetings and the agenda for them, but did not elaborate.

Asked for more details on the content of the letter, Kremlin spokesman Alexei
Gromov told Reuters: "We are not going beyond what's in our announcement."

The Kremlin announcement said Putin had noted that recent years had shown
"when Russia and the United States act jointly or along parallel lines, it is
possible to reach decisions which meet the interests of peace and
international stability."

Russia is keen to get down to business with the United States, particularly
in the area of arms control, not least because of Bush's stated intention of
pressing ahead with a National Missile Defence which Moscow opposes.

But the new Republican administration in Washington is unlikely to jump into
talks without a review of where relations stand.

Western diplomats also say Washington is still waiting for more details from
Moscow on what its proposed joint, limited theatre missile-defence system
might look like.

It would involve intercepting missiles soon after take-off, rather than in
mid-flight or close to their intended targets.

Letters from the Kremlin to new U.S. presidents are usually delivered in
Washington and typically state Moscow's position on the main questions in
bilateral relations. They do not generally break new ground.

*******

#2
Bush To Have New Approach on Russia
January  24, 2001
By BARRY SCHWEID
 
WASHINGTON (AP) - The key to the Bush administration's new relationship with
Russia is likely to be Bush's determination to push ahead with a national
defense against missiles.

Russia won't like it - nor will many U.S. allies.

Overall, more than a tactical adjustment is expected from the new president
in Russia policy, although little has been revealed in Bush's first few days
in the White House.

Like former President Clinton's decision to expand the NATO military
alliance, the ambitious missile defense program is sure to unnerve Russia and
prompt the new administration either to respond with no more than a few
placating words or to pursue a deal designed to entice the Russians into
going along.

One approach could be to negotiate deep cutbacks in U.S. and Russian
long-range nuclear warheads beyond the 50 percent reduction called for by the
1992 START II treaty.

That might help ease Russia's anxieties about the U.S. arsenal. But whatever
choice Bush makes, Secretary of State Colin Powell made clear at his Senate
confirmation hearing last week that ``our relations with Russia must not be
dictated by any fear on our part.''

For example, he said, if the new administration decides on another expansion
of NATO, ``we should not fear that Russia will object; we will do it because
it is in our interest.''

Powell depicted Russia as ``a great country'' that could derive enormous
benefits from its relations with the United States. He did not describe the
relationship in terms of benefit to the United States, though.

Eight years ago, the Clinton administration went out of its way to greet the
new Russia that emerged from the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Critics
complained that the warmth bordered on naive exuberance - it was as though
President Boris Yeltsin and the new capitalist oligarchy could do no wrong.

During last year's presidential campaign, Bush accused his opponent, Vice
President Al Gore, of looking the other way while Russia sold potent weapons
to Iran.

The new administration has set as a goal stopping such sales.

Further pinching the hard-pressed Russian economy, Bush warned after his
election that he would cut off direct U.S. financial aid that is aimed at
stimulating a market economy until significant reforms are carried out.

Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies does
not expect serious changes until the new administration completes its
intelligence and policy assessments, a process that could take months.

One policy Cordesman expects to see continued is a joint project with Russia
to help dismantle nuclear weapons banned by treaties. Cordesman said the Bush
administration might try to expand it to cover biological weapons as well.

And, he said, ``they are going to have to renegotiate the whole issue of arms
traffic with Iran.''

Michael Mandelbaum of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International
Studies said he expected two major changes: Going ahead with a ballistic
missile defense and extending membership for the Baltic nations in NATO.

``To the Russians this is unacceptable and will put us on a collision
course,'' he said.

Ariel Cohen of the Heritage Foundation foresees likely cooperation with
Russia in at least four areas: strategic arms reduction, economic
development, space exploration and fighting international terrorism.

In other areas, such as a national missile defense and the spread of weapons
of mass destruction, he said, ``Washington will need to be both careful and
cautious in addressing its concerns with Moscow.''

Ivo Daalder of the Brookings Institution said the biggest change he expects
in U.S. foreign policy is disagreement among Bush's advisers after eight
years of Clinton-era unity.

Powell's view of the world is very different from the view of Vice President
Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Daalder said. ``Powell, first
and foremost, talks about opportunities. They talk about threats and
challenges.''

*******

#3
Moscow Times
January 24, 2001
Defense Spending Could Double
By Simon Saradzhyan
Staff Writer

Under a new 10-year plan for its armed forces, Russia intends to almost
double defense expenditures if the new U.S. administration deploys a
national missile defense system, a pro-Kremlin web site reported.

Defense expenditures would be increased from some 2.8 percent of gross
domestic product to 5 percent, Strana.ru reported.

The Plan for Building the Armed Forces in 2001-2010, which was approved by
the Security Council late last year, was officially endorsed by President
Vladimir Putin on Jan. 16 and is to be presented to the Defense Ministry's
top brass as early as this week.

Reached Tuesday by telephone, Security Council spokesman Vladimir Nikanorov
declined to comment on the Strana.ru report.

The plan also provides for drastic personnel cuts, from 1.2 million to
850,000 by 2003, and a downgrading of the Strategic Missile Force, or RVSN,
which would be engulfed by the air force.

Officials at the central command of RVSN, which would bear the main
responsibility for countering a U.S. national missile shield, would not
comment Tuesday on how much Russia's defense expenditures would go up if
the United States deploys a missile defense system.

One RVSN official, who asked not to be identified, noted, however, that 5
percent of GDP would be enough.

The new U.S. administration of President George W. Bush strongly supports a
national missile defense system, which would violate the U.S.-Soviet 1972
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

If the United States goes ahead with such a system, the RVSN official said
Russia would respond by withdrawing from the START II missile reduction
agreement, which is yet to come into force, and installing multiple-reentry
vehicles on its newest Topol-M intercontinental ballistic missiles.

The official conceded that his force has not been able to commission more
than 10 of these ICBMs a year and this year saw only six put on duty.
However, he said, the RVSN can always extend the service life of those
Soviet-made multiple-warhead RS-20 ICBMs (NATO designation: SS-18 Satan)
that are "not too old."

Former President Boris Yeltsin decreed that 3.5 percent of GDP be spent on
defense. In reality, however, defense spending has not climbed above 3
percent.

The Defense Ministry is to receive at least 218.9 billion rubles ($7.8
billion) in 2001, with GDP forecast at 6.45 trillion rubles. In comparison,
about 110 billion rubles were spent on defense last year, with GDP put at
5.35 trillion rubles.
 
*******

#4
Washington Post
January 24, 2001
Editorial
Judging Chechnya

RUSSIAN PRESIDENT Vladimir Putin on Monday issued another of his
dramatic-sounding but subtly ambiguous announcements: The Russian army, he
said, would be withdrawing most of its troops from Chechnya, and control over
the war would be transferred from the generals to the police. On the surface,
that sounds like good news for the half-million Chechens still struggling to
survive in the bombed-out ruins of their republic. But Mr. Putin and other
officials have announced numerous times that the war is over, they have won,
the troops are coming home and so forth. In reality, the war only gets
uglier. According to numerous independent accounts by human rights groups and
Russian journalists, Russian army units in the region have deteriorated into
criminal syndicates that routinely arrest, torture and kill innocent
civilians, extort money and steal property. That behavior comes in addition
to Russia's continuing military operations, which involve indiscriminately
shelling villages and residential neighborhoods where Chechen rebels are
suspected of operating.

This time Mr. Putin acknowledged that his war in Chechnya, which he launched
and rode to power a year ago, is far from over. "On the contrary," he said in
remarks broadcast on Russian television, "it will be continued, and not less
intensively, but with the use of different means and forces." The different
means is the Federal Security Service (FSB), the successor to the KGB and the
favorite instrument of Mr. Putin, a KGB veteran, for consolidating his power
and suppressing opposition to his government. The FSB will beef up its own
forces in Chechnya and reportedly will begin focusing on the assassination of
Chechen rebel leaders. In other words, the Russian war on the Chechens will
get quieter, less conspicuous and even more directly under Mr. Putin's
control -- but in all likelihood no less brutal.

It's hard to believe that Mr. Putin could gain a propaganda victory from this
switch of tactics, and yet it appears he will be rewarded within days by the
Council of Europe, a 41-nation organization charged with promoting human
rights. Not coincidentally, Mr. Putin's announcement came as the Council of
Europe's parliamentary assembly came into session and took up the question of
whether to restore Russia's voting rights, which were subject to an
unprecedented suspension last April because of human rights violations in
Chechnya. A report by the council's official rapporteur on Chechnya makes
clear that Russia's behavior in the region has not improved, and that almost
none of the criteria for improvement set by the assembly has been met. And
yet, spurred by key European foreign ministries, the assembly appears likely
to restore Russia's standing in a vote tomorrow.

Though the sanction, and, for that matter, the Council of Europe, are largely
empty of substance, what is happening is a symbolic abdication by the
governments of Germany, Italy, France and Britain, among others, in the face
of Mr. Putin's continuing campaign of repression in Chechnya, and some of the
worst human rights violations recorded in Europe since the end of the Cold
War. Mr. Putin already has been blocking attempts by other, more substantial
international organizations, such as the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe and the United Nations, to send monitors to Chechnya or
impose other checks on his troops. Now he will no doubt demand that those
institutions ease up on him as well.

For the European parliamentarians who change their votes this week at the
Council of Europe, the question will soon arise: Where does the appeasement
of Mr. Putin stop?

*******

#5
The Guardian (UK)
January 24, 2001
Editorial
This war cannot succeed
The killing will not subdue Chechnya

A halt to Vladimir Putin's criminal war against the Chechen people is long
overdue. Even the Russian president cannot any longer pretend that his policy
of suppression and annihilation is working.

Unofficial estimates suggest that 6,500 Russian serviceman have died and at
least 20,000 have been injured in "anti-terrorist" operations that began 16
months ago. Civilian casualties are in the uncounted tens of thousands.
Chechnya and its cities have been laid waste; basic human rights are being
flouted on a tragic scale. Killings, disappearances, torture and extortion by
Russia's ill-disciplined, ill-led soldiers have become routine, as a new
Human Rights Watch report makes clear.

Mr Putin has imposed pro-Moscow puppet administrators and talks of
reconstruction aid. But such self-serving gestures ignore the reality on the
ground, where destruction goes on unchecked. The secessionists led by
Chechnya's elected president, Aslan Maskhadov, although much reduced, fight
on guerrilla-style and show not the slightest sign of giving up. Thus does Mr
Putin reap the harvest of hatred that his murderous blitzkrieg has sowed.

Mr Putin's decision to place the main KGB successor agency, the FSB, in
charge in Chechnya, and to withdraw some troops, may mean that the
indiscriminate army bombardments of civilian areas that usually follow
Chechen attacks will in time be reduced.

But it also means a switch of tactics towards what Mr Putin's spokesman calls
"neutralisation and elimination" - in other words, state-sponsored terrorism
and assassination. Yet more than that, Mr Putin's decree is a silent
admission of defeat.

His presidential campaign vow to subjugate Chechnya remains unfulfilled. He
can insist until he is red in the face that the war is now just a mopping-up
operation. The truth is that his clumsy use of brute force has proved to be a
disaster for all concerned and is the shame of all Russia.

It is time for this pointless carnage to end. Mr Maskhadov says he is
prepared to talk. The EU and the Osce, vapidly, and the Council of Europe,
more energetically, support a negotiated settlement. The Russian people
appear weary of Putin's war.

So are ordinary Chechens, whose unrelenting suffering should sting the
conscience of all who would do business with Mr Putin (including our own Tony
Blair). Russia's leader should stop shooting, start talking, and prove he is
not just a thug in a sharp suit.
 
*******

#6
Putin gathers Russia's "oligarchs" for talks
By Patrick Lannin
 
MOSCOW, Jan 24 (Reuters) - Russia's top businessmen prepared to meet
President Vladimir Putin on Wednesday for a brainstorming session on the
economy, and a leading lobbyist said tax and land reform were key issues to
be discussed.

A similar meeting was held last year amid tension over tax cases being
launched against top firms in what was widely seen as a crackdown on the
"oligarchs" -- businessmen who amassed power and influence under Putin's
predecessor, Boris Yeltsin.

Lobbyist Arkady Volsky, head of the Russian Union of Industrialists and
Businessmen, said in an interview with the daily Vedomosti that the agenda
for the talks, due to start later on Wednesday, would be broad.

"Taxes, the new single social tax, social issues in general," he told the
newspaper, referring to reforms launched by Putin to ease the tax burden and
simplify the tax system.

He said businessmen were also concerned about the restructuring of
electricity giant Unified Energy System (UES), which supplies power across
the vast country.

The 20 businessmen invited to the talks included Vladimir Potanin, who
controls metals giant Norilsk Nickel, and the heads of top oil and gas
companies.

Putin last year told the oligarchs he wanted them to stop trying to influence
government policy from the inside.

But he also reassured them that he would not overturn post-Soviet
privatisations, which were widely criticised as corrupt and the source of
vast fortunes of many oligarchs.

Media boss Vladimir Gusinsky and media-to-cars magnate Boris Berezovsky have
fallen most out of favour in the last year and are fighting prosecution.

However, other businessmen have increased their power and influence. These
include Roman Abramovich, a major private shareholder in oil giant Sibneft,
who was recently elected governor of a far east oil-producing region.

Vedomosti said the meeting might touch on Kremlin plans to dissolve the
regional administrations of two oil-producing districts in Siberia,
Khanti-Mantisk and Yamalo-Nenetsk, to bring their oil revenues under Moscow's
direct control.

Putin has shaken up the way the regions are run and further plans will be
unveiled in his state of the nation address.

Putin's representative in parliament, Alexander Kotenkov, has told reporters
the address is scheduled for the end of March or the start of April.

*******

#7
Segodnya
January 23, 2001
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
WE SPOILED IMPRESSION ABOUT RUSSIA
The image of the USSR in the world was more attractive 
than that of Russia
    
     What can be done to change the negative image of Russia in
the West? The former spokesman of the Foreign Intelligence
Service and currently the managing director of the
Renaissance-Capital investment company, Yuri KOBALADZE, gave an
interview to Segodnya correspondent Avtandil TSULADZE.
    
     Question: What is the problem with Russia's image?
     Answer: To begin with, a group of objective factors must
be singled out. To what degree do we meet the parameters
accepted in the civilized world? I am talking about the quality
of life, health care and education. The sooner we streamline
everything at home, the better. On the other hand, the state
must take the responsibility for what the West thinks about us.
This is how it was done in the Soviet era. A system was
maintained that included office of correspondents, the Novosti
Press Agency, the House of Friendship. They functioned, turned
out products, some delegations made visits. A paradox situation
emerged. Despite an extreme hatred for Communism, the image of
the USSR was much better than that of today's Russia.
    
     Question: How bad is our image in the West?
     Answer: We have done everything we could to spoil the
impression about ourselves. Unfortunately we continue
vigorously in this activity. It means for the investor that he
should stay out of Russia. For instance the 1998 default. At
the moment, it is unclear again whether we have refused to make
the debt payments or we were misunderstood...
    
     Question: Is it possible to improve the impression?
     Answer: To begin with, we must sort out things about
ourselves and straighten out the mechanisms of the country's
functioning. Are we right or wrong in the Chechen war? Given
the way it has been presented in the West we will receive
nothing but a negative assessment.
    
*******

#8
Moscow Times
January 24, 2001
Editorial
Putin Must Fight for His Reforms

"This is a big step forward," said former Moscow City Court Judge Vladimir
Mironov after President Vladimir Putin had introduced legislation that
would finally bring the Criminal Procedural Code in line with the
Constitution. Human Rights Commissioner Oleg Mironov said he "felt great
satisfaction" with Putin's action.

The Duma legislation committee was set to begin immediate consideration of
the proposal, which was widely expected to sail through with ease. The bill
- which would have mandated court-ordered arrest and search warrants - was
set to become the next major step in legal reform, following December's
passage of a bill that reduced the maximum period of pretrial detention
from 18 to 12 months.

Until, that is, Putin unceremoniously withdrew it on Monday, reportedly
under pressure from police and prosecutors. Dmitry Kozak, the Kremlin's
deputy chief of staff, told journalists that although Putin still supports
the bill, a number of legal, technical and organizational issues need to be
resolved. Supporters of the reform, though, fear that the proposal will be
worked to death behind closed doors.

We can only hope that these fears prove unjustified and that the government
quickly returns with a bill that is substantively the same. Legal reform
must remain a priority of the highest order, especially as the government
is moving very quickly to strengthen the police and security organs. Only a
strong legal foundation based on constitutional guarantees can prevent
Putin's much-ballyhooed "dictatorship of law" from devolving into mere
dictatorship.

The president's primary obligation is to ensure that all the provisions of
the Constitution are consistently and effectively enforced. By introducing
this legislation, Putin has shown that he takes this obligation seriously.
Now he must show that he has the determination to stay the course despite
entrenched interests pursuing less noble ends.

Serious reform is rarely easy. The resistance that we are now seeing in
regard to legal reform, we fear, is child's play compared to what is to
come when Putin moves seriously with the military reform that the Security
Council approved last November.

However, Putin has no excuse for backing down. His popularity rating is
astonishingly high, and there is significant public support for this
particular reform. The president has committed allies in the Duma, and the
necessary funds for implementing the reform can surely be found.

Yielding in this instance may undermine all of the much-needed reforms that
Putin has pledged himself to. Now Putin must prove he is ready for the
difficult fights to come.
 
*******

#9
Russian-Israeli businessman held on kidnapping charges

SAINT PETERSBURG, Jan 24 (AFP) -
Mikhail Mirilashvili, a prominent Russian-Israeli businessman and deputy
president of the Russian Jewish Congress, has been arrested on kidnapping
charges, prosecutors said Wednesday.

Mirilashvili, a director of Saint Petersburg-based company Russkoye Video,
was arrested Tuesday in Russia's second city of Saint Petersburg, a
prosecutor's office spokesman said.

Russian media immediately linked the arrest to the prosecution of media
tycoon Vladimir Gusinsky whose Media-MOST empire includes a company called
Russkoye Video.

However prosecutor Ivan Sydoruk said the arrest was not directly linked to
the long-running investigation into the affairs of the tycoon, who is
currently under house arrest in Spain awaiting a Madrid court decision on a
Russian extradition request.

The investigation has "nothing to do either with Media-MOST or
(Mirilashvili's) membership of the Jewish Congress," Sydoruk said.

Mirilashvili "was arrested (on Tuesday) following a criminal investigation
taken out last September," he told a press conference.

The businessman is accused of organising the kidnap of two people, he said.

ITAR-TASS, quoting local police, said that Mirilashvili was suspected of
either organizing or taking part in three Russian murders and was reputed to
be a prominent Saint Petersburg mafia boss.

Media-MOST, Gusinsky's media group -- one of the Russian authorities'
sharpest critics -- told AFP that it had no ties with Mirilashvili, and that
the Russkoye Video company which it owned was quite distinct from the company
of the same name owned by Mirilashvili.

However, Mirilashvili is the deputy president of the Russian Jewish Congress,
of which Gusinsky is president.

A leading member of the Congress, Tankred Golenpolsky, told AFP he did not
believe the claims made about Mirilashvili whom he described as "a pleasant,
cultivated young man ... about to accompany (Israeli) President Moshe Katsav
on his visit to Georgia."

Mirilashvili, who has dual Russian-Israeli nationality, had been living in
Israel, media reports said.

No confirmation was immediately available for reports that Mirilashvili had
been part of the delegation accompanying Katsav on his official visit to Kiev
and Moscow. The Israeli president, who was still in Moscow Wednesday, was due
later to fly on Thursday to Tbilisi.

Golenpolsky commented that "it's no great problem to get someone arrested.
We'll have to wait and see what the courts say before coming to any
conclusions."

Russkoye Video was purchased by Gusinsky's Media-MOST holding in 1997, but
that privatization sale led to the media mogul's brief imprisonment last
summer on fraud charges.

Gusinsky is accused of purchasing Rosskoye Video for a price that had been
fixed, effectively defrauding the state. He says the charges against him are
politically motivated.

*******

#10
Segodnya
January 23, 2001
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
"PUTIN PLANS NO GLOBAL OFFENSIVE"
Russia's standing in the world is becoming firmer despite
its refusal to pay back its debts in full and other moves
incomprehensible to the West, is the opinion of analysts who
are close to the Kremlin.
     In particular, such is the opinion that Gleb PAVLOVSKY,
director of the Efficient Policy Foundation, has expressed in
an interview with Segodnya's Avtandil TSULADZE.
    
     Question: Who do you think is called upon to form the
image of Russia?
     Answer: Russia is a combination of several meaningful
groups, each of which contributes to the image of Russia. The
state's task is to ensure the inviolability of the property
rights and the main elements of economic freedom, in particular
where the image is instrumental to investments. The businesses,
in turn, can use PR methods to highlight this or that aspect of
economic activities in Russia that is attractive to investors.
    
     Question: The state is expected to guard investments. How
come it has refused to pay debts, then?
     Answer: As I see it, it has not refused to pay debts. But
it has rejected the policy of using debts for a stick to prod
the Russian economy and Russia's policies with. Russia has
clearly said that it will pay debts, but it will not allow
anybody to use its debts as a political instrument. If need be,
it will pay all its debts. And there are other options.
    
     Question: Do you think Russia could lose its place in
global processes?
     Answer: On the contrary, Russia's standing in the
international arena is fast becoming firmer, although this does
not quite tally with the country's realistic economic
potentialities. There are attempts to slow the process down by
a variety of means. Russia is no longer soliciting. It is in
debt, but it is not soliciting. What we see is a part of a game
the two sides are playing. The realistic lining of what we see
happening is Russia's strengthening, rather than weakening, in
the global arena.
    
     Question: Does the West still employ the policy of
denigrating Russia?
     Answer: Yes it does, albeit as an auxiliary means. There
is the inertia that I regret to say has been created by Russia
over the past years when Russia has been playing a double role:
that of a country that is withdrawing from everywhere, and a
country that is soliciting something from everybody else. This
state used to be a mighty factor behind the inexplicable and
negative image of Russia. In a sense, Russia has been provoking
others to employ anti-Russian policies.
     It goes without saying that this card is being played
today.
In politics, no mistake is forgiven. But the main problem is
elsewhere. The problem is that the new American Administration
might be tempted to believe in this myth. That would be bad,
for conflict situations might arise.
     Bush's interviews tend to picture Russia as weak country
that is always soliciting something from everybody else. Bush
proceeds from a vision of this country that is absolutely
unrealistic. Russia is not that weak today. But the vision
might provoke the Americans to experiment, something that is
best avoided.
    
     Question: Do you think it might be useful to borrow some
aspects of the Soviet propaganda in this sphere?
     Answer: I see no reason for this. The really mighty
propaganda used to be a part of the Soviet Union's global
offensive. It was, in turn, built on a certain ideological
program. Putin has no program of a global offensive. His
program is that of seeking methods of realistically involving
the country in the life of the globe, in the international
economy and the global processes in the broad sense of the word
- on conditions that are beneficial for Russia. This objective
does not need to be propped by propaganda.
    
*******

#11
TITLE:  INTERVIEW WITH MAJOR GENERAL VLADIMIR DVORKIN, CHIEF OF THE DEFENSE MINISTRY CENTRAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE
[IZVESTIA DAILY, P. 3, JANUARY 22, 2001]
SOURCE: FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE
[for personal use only]

VLADIMIR DVORKIN: A NATION CAN HANDLE ITS SECURITY THE WAY IT SEES FIT

     The US Senate has unanimously approved Colin Powell as the US
Secretary of State. Shortly before his candidature was approved,
the Gulf War hero declared the White House would make "serious
adjustments" in the US policy towards Iraq, North Korea, Russia,
China and the Middle East countries. The general said the new
administration would not fully comply with 1972 ABM Treaty and
would not submit the bilateral nuclear test ban treaty to the
Senate for ratification.

     Below Major-General Vladimir Dvorkin, chief of the 4th Defense
Ministry Central Research Institute, an organization that plans the
use of Russian nuclear weapons, discusses the implications of the
US administration's actions for Russia.

     Q: What changes can take place in the relations between Russia
and the US over START treaties if the Americans deploy a national
missile defense?
     A: I think the relations may change radically. There are signs
of change even now, before the 1972 ABM Treaty has been broken.
There is practically no prospect of START-2 coming into force, let
alone of negotiations on START-3.

     Q: So, all the efforts to get START-2 ratified by the Duma
were wasted?
     A: Too much time was lost because of unpardonable
intransigence of the opposition in the State Duma. The only benefit
from the delay is the 1997 agreement on extending the deadline for
compliance with START-2 treaty by five years.  As a result we
wouldn't have had to pay anything for early disposal of several
dozen missiles if the treaty had come into force. At that time
ratification would almost certainly not have caused any allergy in
the United States, START-2 would have come into force and the two
sides would have started talks on START-3.

     Q: What measures can Russia take to neutralize a national
missile defense in the United States?
    A: The measures depend on the scale and pace at which NMD is
deployed and may consist in a dramatic upgrading of the capability
of the Strategic Nuclear Forces of Russia to overcome the
territorial NMD. And in a certain adjustment of the SNF structure
with an eye to the long-term perspective. For instance, the lifting
of numerous restrictions on the improvement of the Topol-M
intercontinental ballistic missile or the improvement of the
sea-launched RSM-54 ballistic missile. The number of warheads and
effective means of overcoming the NMD can be substantially
increased on these missiles. That would render the enemy's missile
defense largely ineffective. I am convinced that such asymmetric
measures are financially affordable for Russia today.

     Q: What did you have in mind by adjustment of the structure of
our nuclear forces?
     A: The President has fixed the minimum allowable level of
warheads in the SNF at 1,500 and one has to bear in mind that
parameters are adjusted regularly depending on how the strategic
nuclear forces of the US and other nuclear NATO member countries
are developing. The Americans revise their nuclear strategy at
least once every four years. We will probably have to do it even
more frequently. So, depending on the scale of NMD and the level of
strategic nuclear forces of other countries, not only the structure
of the Russian SNF, but the overall number of warheads may be
adjusted.
     The land-based Russian ballistic missiles have the biggest
potential to penetrate NMD. I can safely say this as the head of
the organization called upon to make the most objective assessment
of each component of our nuclear triad. For instance, one can
increase the number of warheads on Topol-M many times over. The
country's military political leadership may also decide whether or
not it is necessary to maintain a balance of nuclear forces or
simply ensure nuclear deterrence without maintaining such a balance
with the US.
     It should be borne in mind that such a decision cannot be
declared and not real. The actual nuclear deterrent potential will
be transparent for the US due to powerful observation means.

     Q: You have met with many Americans military representatives
and senators. How do they see the nature of the relations between
Russia and the US with the advent of the new administration?
     A: There are a fair number of opponents of the deployment of
NMD, including among scientists and Democratic senators. But their
forecast is the same: a national missile defense will be deployed.
If no agreement is reached with Russia on the adaptation of the
1972 ABM Treaty to the new threats, the US will withdraw from the
Treaty. The military attribute this to the American mentality: "If
we have the economic and technological capability to defend
ourselves against any threat, we do it."
     Some authoritative Americans cooperating with the new
administration claim that START and ABM are a legacy of the Cold
War. Russia and the US are no longer enemies and there is no need
for these treaties. Each country can do what it thinks is best for
its security.

(Interviewed by Dmitry Safonov)

*******

#12
Washington Post
January 24, 2001
[for personal use only]
Putin Plans to Eliminate Most Russian Political Parties
By Susan B. Glasser and Peter Baker
Washington Post Foreign Service

MOSCOW -- Even the Communists who ran the Soviet Union didn't stop Vladimir
Lysenko from creating his own political party.

The schoolteacher launched his democratic reform group in 1990 in the waning
days of Communist Party rule. But a decade later, his tiny Republican Party
faces extinction -- not by the Communists but by the former KGB agent who now
rules the Kremlin.

In the name of ending political chaos, President Vladimir Putin plans to
eliminate all but a handful of Russia's 186 political parties, effectively
closing Lysenko's party and scores of other such groups that sprang up with
the Soviet Union's collapse. The few that remain will find themselves
subjected to myriad new rules allowing Putin's government to wield greater
control over them, from policing their bank accounts to shutting them down
for failing to file proper paperwork.

"It may turn out to be the establishment of an authoritarian regime in this
country," said Lysenko, sitting in his office at the State Duma, the lower
house of parliament, which is poised to endorse Putin's proposal.

Putin's initiative to weed out "dwarf parties" is his latest move to
consolidate power, analysts say. Since taking office a year ago, Putin has
curtailed the authority of regional governors and restructured the upper
house of parliament while his government has waged a campaign against the
country's only independent television network.

Putin recently called the proposed law "the foundation" of his effort to
"embark on the civilized construction of a political structure for society."

"Today in Russia, we have this extreme form of democracy, which is called
anarchy," said Boris Gryzlov, head of the pro-Putin Unity party in the Duma.
"We would like to have democracy within a civilized framework." With the new
law, he said in an interview, only five or six significant parties should
exist -- "a normal, civilized system."

Politics is undoubtedly a confusing undertaking in the new Russia. Parties --
the building blocks of a democratic state -- have failed to take hold in a
society still suffering a hangover from more than 70 years of one-party rule.
Many parties these days are created as nothing more than vanity organs for
individual politicians with little to distinguish them ideologically;
virtually every former prime minister has his own party or parliamentary bloc.

Putin's proposed solution to this perceived chaos is to grant the state vast
new powers over what has been a relatively free-for-all political system. And
yet Putin, whose approval ratings consistently top 70 percent and who faces
little meaningful political opposition, would seem to have little reason to
act so decisively.

Small parties have been dying off at an abrupt pace. In 1999, only 28
competed in parliamentary elections, down from 43 four years earlier. Just
six of those parties managed to cross the 5 percent threshold necessary for
official status in the Duma. Perhaps most significant, only 19 percent of the
votes cast in the last parliamentary elections went to small parties not
represented in the Duma -- a huge drop from 1995, when 50 percent of votes
went to such parties.

"We believe the state doesn't need to destroy artificially small and
ineffective political parties. They should not be liquidated forcibly by a
state organ," Viktor Pokhmelkin, a deputy leader of the Union of Right
Forces, a reformist party, said in an interview.

The new law would require parties to have 10,000 members nationwide and more
than 100 in each of half the country's 89 regions. They would have to field
candidates for a variety of offices at regular intervals or risk being
closed. And they would have to garner at least 3 percent of the parliamentary
vote to receive new state funding included as part of the legislation -- a
particularly controversial provision that one critic called "food stamps" for
the ruling elite. Today, parties must collect all their funds privately.

"This is a draft law on how toughly to control parties, how to have a file on
every member of a political party, how to check every single kopeck that is
received or spent by a political party, how to prevent the registration of
undesirable political parties, how to ban at any moment any party that
decides to oppose the existing regime," said Duma member Vladimir Ryzkhov, an
independent who has emerged as the leading critic of the measure.

Criticism of the bill manifested itself in the form of several alternatives
debated yesterday. However, Putin's plan has enough support that, while it
may be amended, even foes expect it to pass easily -- at least in part
because it relies on a universal political principle: incumbent protection.

There are only a handful of parties in Russia that resemble Western-style
parties in having both a coherent platform and a reliable set of supporters
-- the Communists; the ultranationalist Liberal Democratic Party, led by
Vladimir Zhirinovsky; and two reformist parties, Yabloko and the Union of
Right Forces. With their survival in question under the proposed new law, the
two reform groups have revived merger talks.

Overshadowing them all in the last year has been Unity, an ad hoc bloc
created in 1999 by Putin supporters during his rapid rise to power. Like past
establishment parties, Unity is more associated with Putin than with any
platform.

Observing the precedent set by former president Boris Yeltsin, Putin has not
joined Unity -- an ambivalence that he proposes to write into law by
forbidding the president to belong to a party. That provision, like so many
of Putin's actions in the last year, has many politicians confused about his
attitude toward democracy.

"Either he must decide to support democratic institutions and reject
excessive interference by the state," Pokhmelkin said, "or he will have to
choose another path, toward authoritarianism. . . . Sooner or later, this
decision will have to be made."

*******

#13
THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION HIGHLY ASSESSES THE PROSPECT OF THE ADOPTION BY THE STATE DUMA OF THE DRAFT LAW ON POLITICAL PARTIES

MOSCOW, January 24, RIA Novosti correspondent Marina Uryvayeva - Minister of
Justice of the Russian Federation Yury Chaika highly rates the prospect of
adopting by the State Duma of the draft law on political parties. He said
this today at the session of the ministry's enlarged Collegium.

As the RIA Novosti correspondent reports, this bill, submitted for
consideration to the Lower House, has been drafted with the participation of
the Ministry of Justice.

Yury Chaika pointed out that if the draft law was accepted, one of the most
important tasks of the Ministry of Justice in 2001 would be re-registering
political parties and public associations.

According to the Minister of Justice, in Russia there are more than 153,000
public associations of different organisational and legal forms, including
over 17,000 religious organisations of sixty confessions, more than 53,000
trade-union associations, 150 political associations and 56 parties.

In 2000 the Ministry of Justice checked about 4,000 public associations and
made 2,000 warnings.

********

#14
Date: Tue, 23 Jan 2001
From: "Vladimir Raskin" <vladimir.raskin@attws.com>
Subject: RE: 5044-Markov/Human Rights Movement

Having been actively involved in the Russian human rights movement in the
1990s, I could not leave an article by Sergei Markov unanswered -- it struck
me as one full of inaccuracies and  distortions.

First of all, it is hard to agree with Markov's statement that the Russian
human rights movement is politicized.  True, some of the leaders of the
Russian human rights movement of the older generation were biased during the
first Chechen campaign of 1994-95.  But there were other influential human
rights groups like the Soldiers Mothers' Committee and Mothers Right
Foundation that worked with to try to decrease gross human rights violations
committed by both sides.  It is namely because of their selfless work that
the "Russian government's Chechen military campaign was very unpopular among
the population", as Markov correctly maintains.  The fact that Sergei
Kovalev ostensibly "failed to win popular support" and "found himself more
and more public and political isolation" because of his personal attitudes
does not offset this tremendous achievement of the Russian human rights
movement as a whole.

According to Markov, "the second problem is connected with
determining the causes of human rights
> abuses...In post-Soviet Russia the sources of human rights abuses changed,
> but the human rights movement retained its traditional Soviet-era human
> rights ideology."  It seems that Markov again confuses the whole human
> rights movement with the opinions of its few prominent leaders that do not
> necessarily reflect the attitude of the movement as a whole.  As a matter
> of fact, the human rights movement has been developing in a way that the
> vast majority of human rights NGOs in Russia are led by the people who
> have come to the movement in the 1990s and have a very vague idea of the
> "traditional Soviet-era human rights ideology."  Why attribute this
> "ideology" to the whole movement?  Besides, the movement has a strictly
> horizontal structure and opinions of its diverse members do vary. 
 
Markov goes on to say that "The rights of the overwhelming majority
of rank-and-file citizens in Russia
> today are being abused not by the State but by powerful "interest" groups
> that stop at nothing to satiate their bottomless appetites. For example,
> ordinary soldiers suffer not from abuses on the part of officers, but from
> mockery on the part of hostile national groups that have de facto seized
> control over army units from taps to reveille. It is precisely the
> organized
> criminal national groups that are responsible for the deaths of most
> Russian
> enlisted men. Those interned in prisons and camps also suffer not so much
> from the arbitrariness of the wardens as from the terror of criminal
> organizations that control life in such camps."  Where did this come from?
> Does it mean that the Russian bureacrats somehow miraculously converted
> into the human rights defenders and the State no longer abuses citizens'
> rights?  I wish it was so!  As for the sources of human rights violations
> in the army and prisons, I would simply refer Markov to the reports on
> these issues put together on a regular basis by the Soldiers Mothers'
> Committee, Moscow Helsinki Group, Prison Reform Center, Mothers Rights
> Foundation, Human Rights Watch or the U.S. Department of State.  In fact,
> this is what he should have done before writing this article.
 
The most absurd assertion by Markov though, is that "the isolation
of the human rights movement from the population is
> intensified all the more by the interest that human rights organizations
> display towards foreign grants.  ...Ordinary citizens who suffer from
> systematic abuse of
> their rights view the human rights champions not as their allies but as
> aliens pursuing some kind of policy of their own that has nothing to do
> with
> the needs of an ordinary person."  Any facts to prove these statements?
> In fact, the foreign grants have been playing a very positive role, namely
> to support the emerging Russian human rights movement in the country where
> tradition of philantropy simply did not exist until very recently.  Few
> recent polls have shown that the Russian population is not at all hostile
> to the fact that the foreign aid is still one of the sources (not the only
> source anymore!) of the existence of the Russian "third sector."  Markov
> is really unhappy with the fact that the human rights movement receives
> grants "mainly from NATO member countries"--hence, he writes, excessive
> politization, criticism of the government, and actions running counter to
> the majority of the country's population.  Sounds familiar, does not it?
> Why not just say that all those human rights activists are agents of
> influence and represent the "fifth column"?     
 
And what remedy does Markov offer?  Sure enough, "This movement will
become a really influential force in Russia when it
> rejects Western grants and faces the most humiliated sections of the
> population. Then it will get people's support and will be able to find its
>
> place in the Russian society. In fact, receiving Western grants for human
> rights activities is nothing bad in itself. But combining these grants
> with
> active political position of criticizing the Kremlin lead to alienation of
> human rights crusaders from the population."   Markov should really do
> some more ground work and familiarize himself with diverse activities of
> the numerous Russian  human rights NGOs not only in Moscow, where he
> resides, but in the Russian provinces.  This will sure convince him that
> they in fact face "the most humiliated sections of the population" in
> their difficult day-to-day work and are appreciated by it.
 
Why criticizing Kremlin will necessarily lead to "alienation of
human rights crusaders from the population", I really fail to understand.
Rejection of foreign aid will in fact lead to the loss of independence of
the movement from the very Kremlin it has been able to criticize so far.
Markov should give "the population" more credit for being able to understand
what the Russian human rights movement is about, foreign aid
notwithstanding.  As long as the human rights organizations help people
solve their problems in the social and human rights sphere, people do not
care where the funds come from.
 
By the way, I am somehow curious as to who funds Markov's Institute
for Political Studies?  And has not Markov himself worked for Carnegie
Endowment for Peace--surely NATO member country- funded, for quite a while?

*******

#15
Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2001
From: Heinrich Vogel <Vogel.heinrich@gmx.net>
Subject: Soviet debt and CMEA/5039

Again on Soviet Debt

Since Andrei Liakhov (#7, Friday, January 19) invites arguments, here are
some from an obstinate unconvinced:
 
I don't want to argue in fundamentalist neoliberal terms, but in my
understanding of the rationale for foreign trade barter (the principle CMEA
was based upon) generates at best second best volumes and structures of
trade. If in CMEA, as Mr. Liakhov argues, "exchange ratios where calculated
on the basis of domestic (read: heavily subsidized) prices for the relevant
goods" and if the exchange rate of currencies involved was a political
given, too, the resulting trade flows were bound to represent an
accumulation of distorted decisions. Carl Zeiss or Skoda (technological
leaders before WWII) would have fared infinitely better, had they had a
chance to stay in the private sector and to export to Western markets
because they would have been exposed to true competition and they would
have been free in their decisions to innovate while at the same time
improving the foreign trade balances of their respective countries.

Obviously, this is a totally different approach to the history of socialist
trade than Mr. Liakhov's. I am not to deny that there were no serious
attempts to calculate realistic prices or to keep clean books at CMEA
headquarters. But the price-mechanism of the CMEA was not as rational as
Mr. Liakhov claims: Siberian gas supplied to the GDR was by no means
"exactly the same as supplied to Latvia or Lithuania". The first was
calculated in Transfer-Rubles, the second  in domestic Soviet Rubles and
the ratio between these two "currencies" was a matter of fierce political
battles. Moreover, cheap energy created the illusion of rational economic
interdependence in the common pursuit of rapid industrial growth. Socialist
planning of industrial growth in CMEA member countries produced
· grossly distorted economic structures (priority of sector A, remember?),
· serious handicaps for technological progress (remember, how long it took
Robotron, leader in the socialist market, to present an electronic
processor, to be known as "the biggest chip in the world"?) and
· irresponsible waste of resources, the whole region is still suffering from.
Planned coordination of these processes in CMEA even aggravated these trends.

In my view it does not make much sense to try to verify the damage, i.e.
the opportunity costs, inflicted on countries doomed to the failed
experiment of really existing socialism. The secret minutes of meetings and
the accounts of CMEA, waiting for historians at the KGB archives, will shed
more light primarily on political arm-twisting and mutual blackmail of
those years. For a general assessment of the CMEA's role in European
economic history the balance of good intentions minus bad bureaucracy as
suggested by Mr. Liakhov is not adequate in my view, as it ignores the
geopolitical context of the evolving Cold War, particularly Stalin's
strategy which precluded the free choice of economic systems and foreign
trade-partners for countries which had been liberated by the Red Army. Not
to forget: The Marshall Plan offered help not only to ailing Western Europe
and it was not the decision of democratic governments in Prague, Budapest,
Warsaw or Berlin to turn this offer down.

Let bygones be bygones - this may indeed be the best conclusion for a
policy of healing the Russian-Central East European relationship. Also
looking at the problems of the present I consider the history of the
division of Europe too sad a story now to be used in "test probes by junior
members of the Russian government" to reduce the Russia debt burden as
Mr.Liakhov implies. Mr. Kazjanov's charme is wearing thin since he struck
that deal with the less principled members of the London Club in 1999.
After all that recent boasting with the amazing recovery of the Russian
economy and high foreign currency reserves of the CBR he and his cabinet
will be well advised to redesign the strategy for handling the Russian
debt. Claiming innocence for the past, bad luck for the present of an
unforeseen cold winter, and unrelenting reform orientation for the future
is no longer enough for a full member of the G8. Now it is time to pay the
dues.

The story of the last five years reminds me of the cartoon in a French
newspaper in 1998; it showed a "new Russian" couple (typically dressed up
in lavish fur-hats and
-coats and covered with jewelry) sitting in the loans department of the
Bank of America. The clerk, obviously doing the paperwork for their
application, asks: "Purpose of the loan?" And the Russian client answers:
"As usual - else the Commies rule in the Kremlin, civil war, and nuclear
chaos".

So far, this post-communist chuzpah was encouraged by a mix of political
naiveté and a good deal of collusion in the West. But now the Russian
economy is booming, we have got a strong, democratic, and reform-oriented
leader in the Kremlin, and the partners in the West have learned their
lessons. Did I get it right this time?

******

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