January 17, 2001   

This Date's Issues:   5031 • 5032

Johnson's Russia List
#5031
17 January 2001
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Moscow Times: Igor Semenenko, Illarionov Warns of Looming Gloom.
2. TIME EUROPE: Paul Quinn-Judge, The Politics of Mind over Matter. In his first year Putin delivered hope - not reforms - and quashed dissent. But the Russians still love him
3. TIME EUROPE: Andrew Meier, The Death of a Nation. Drug abuse, HIV and tuberculosis, combined with the old scourge of alcoholism, are lowering Russia's population.
4. Andrew Gentes: a Russian Sonderweg.
5. Robert Bruce Ware: re 5030-Graham/Chechnya.
6. Reuters: UNESCO boss fears for media in Putin's Russia.
7. Itar-Tass: NATO Never Said No to RUSSIA'S Membership, Robertson.
8. AFP: Russian Ultra-Nationalists Urge Gorbachev to Speak out on Soviet Debt.
9. George A. Marquart: Princess Vera.
10. Michael Ellman: The Russian economy under El'tsin.
11. Reuters: Envoy urges Russians to show "decency" in Chechnya.
12. Interfax: Russian speaker welcomes US warning on credits.]
 
******

#1
Moscow Times
January 17, 2001
Illarionov Warns of Looming Gloom
By Igor Semenenko
Staff Writer  
 
Presidential economic adviser Andrei Illarionov painted a bleak picture
Tuesday of what awaits Russia over the next 12 months, saying the soaring
economic growth seen last year is grinding to a halt.

"The party is over and the hangover is about to begin," said Illarionov in
opening remarks of a presentation to members of the European Business Club.

"Actually, it has already begun," he added ominously.

Illarionov gained wide recognition after correctly predicting the 1998
economic crisis.

When President Vladimir Putin assigned roles in his administration last
year, Illarionov was picked for the job of the president's chief economic
adviser. He has since repeatedly lambasted the Cabinet's efforts to reform
the economy and criticized Anatoly Chubais, the head of Unified Energy
Systems and godfather of a hotly disputed plan to revamp the lumbering
electricity giant.

In a presentation Tuesday that left many of the attending business
executives stunned, Illarionov predicted that the economy will enter a
tailspin this year, adding that the first hiccups have already been heard.

Seasonally adjusted, industrial output was down 0.6 percent in November for
the first time since the middle of 1998, he said.

Other signs of an impending shake-up are also looming, the adviser warned.

The money base is growing at a faster pace than the inflation rate,
repeating the scenario that preceded the 1998 crash.

"Inflation can grow at a lower pace over the short term, but such a trend
is not sustainable in the long run," said Illarionov.

In 1996, the money base expanded 30.6 percent, while inflation surged 21.8
percent. The following year, the money base grew 29.8 percent, while
inflation stood at a meager 11 percent, triggering a string of optimistic
comments by then-Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and his government.

But in 1998 the bubble burst. Consumer prices shot up to 84.5 percent as
the currency base grew a meager 21.5 percent.

But monetary authorities ignored the red flag and keep marching forward.

In 1999 and 2000, the money base grew 55.7 percent and 55 percent,
respectively, but inflation stood calm at 36.6 percent and 20.2 percent.

Thus, Illarionov reasoned, prices should sooner or later shoot up, beating
the government's forecast of 12 percent to 14 percent for this year.

At the same time, the ruble should start devaluing, though probably not as
abruptly as it did 2 1/2 years ago.

But the government is once again closing its eyes to a looming crisis by
allowing the ruble to appreciate, undermining the competitiveness of the
economy, Illarionov said.

"The Russian economy is gradually becoming less competitive," he said.

An appreciating ruble is gradually fueling a growth in imports. In physical
volumes, imports grew at a rate of 22.7 percent in the first quarter of
2000 and 38.6 percent in the fourth quarter. Exports increased at a slower
rate of 9.3 percent and 6.2 percent, respectively.

Over the last 12 month, orders placed with industrial and construction
companies clearly show a declining trend on a yearly basis, Illarionov said.

Meanwhile, unemployment was up month-on-month 2.4 percent to 7.37 million
people in November, according to the State Statistics Committee, implying
that approximately 200,000 people lost their jobs in one month.

Illarionov downplayed the work of Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov and his
economic team in promoting economic growth last year, saying the 7 percent
jump in GDP was sparked by sky-high oil prices and the rapid depreciation
of the euro to the U.S. dollar.

A combination of these two factors fueled Russia's foreign trade to such an
extent that its exports grew 169 percent in value compared to the price
levels of 1996, he said. However, the value of imports, a large portion of
which come from Europe, was down 38 percent compared with 1996.

Oil prices averaged $17.2 per barrel from January 1992 to June 1999, while
the dollar fetched the equivalent of 0.83 euros, measured by a basket of
currencies that now comprise the euro.

Then in 2000 Brent oil prices shot up to $32.2 per barrel, while the dollar
appreciated to 1.15 euros.

As a result, in terms of the European currency, oil surged to 36.9 euros
per barrel as compared with an average of 14.2 euros in the period from
January 1992 through June 1999.

The nation enjoyed a windfall of $35 billion in additional revenues last
year, which in turn fueled the economy to grow at the highest rate since
the 1960s.

To prevent an abrupt economic downturn, Illarionov said the government
needed to devalue the ruble to restore Russia's competitiveness on the
world stage.

The presidential adviser also suggested that the government help sterilize
an excess inflow of hard currency into the economy by making payments on
its sovereign debt. The government has said that it can only afford to make
miniscule payments on its debt in the first quarter.

"We should reverse the flow of capital," said Illarionov. "That will solve
several problems at once."

So far, the Central Bank has been printing rubles to soak up excess dollar
liquidity in the economy, increasing pressure on the money supply side.

Creditors should not hold their breath, however. While Illarionov's
forecasts have often proved right on the nose, his advice is often ignored
by the government.

The 1 1/2 hour presentation Tuesday left many of the jaws of the attendees
slacked in disbelief.

"It is clear that his views are contradictory to those of the current
administration," whispered one of the participants, walking out of the room.

"Is it a joke?" asked another.

But Illarionov, saying that his authority rests on "the power of ideas,"
was unshaken about his economic convictions.

"The best way is to wait and see," he said.

*******

#2
TIME EUROPE
January 22, 2000
The Politics of Mind over Matter
In his first year Putin delivered hope - not reforms - and quashed dissent.
But the Russians still love him
By PAUL QUINN-JUDGE Moscow

On the last day of 1999, Russians turned on their TV sets and received the
shock of their lives. Instead of his traditional New Year's message, Boris
Yeltsin painfully slurred out the news that he was leaving office that day,
handing the country over to a "powerful man, worthy of being President,"
his 47-year-old Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. Within hours Yeltsin had
disappeared from the Kremlin and people's lives.

The change was exhilarating. Gone was the inarticulate, feeble old man
whose tippling and endless vacations were the stuff of black jokes. In his
place was a crisp young graduate of one of Russia's best universities, a
judo black belt and a former officer in the élite foreign branch of the
KGB. His biography became a best seller, and even the quality of his
Russian received rave reviews. The new President stimulated a sea change in
the public mood. Putin's first aim, his p.r. guru Gleb Pavlovsky remarked
at the time, was to help Russians overcome the mass inferiority complex
that had set in since the 1991 breakup of the Soviet Union. By most
accounts, he has succeeded brilliantly. Concludes Yuri Levada, one of the
country's top sociologists, looking back on Putin's first 12 months: "He
has given Russians hope."

Putin was supposed to have given them a lot more than hope. At the
beginning of his second year in power, he has consolidated his grip on
power and enjoys unprecedented popularity, but Russia faces a host of
economic and health problems. Promised economic and military reforms have
yet to happen, while government conduct seems to be sliding back toward
what some observers call "the new autocracy."

This time last year expectations were different. Then, Kremlin officials
described his appointment as the final victory of the old fox Yeltsin.
Putin would continue Yeltsin's line, at the same time protecting the former
presidential "Family" of relatives and hangers-on - a term consciously
borrowed from the Mafia - from political or legal retribution. Putin's
aides quietly put out a sharply different story. As soon as he was elected
President in his own right, they said, he would embark on sweeping economic
and political changes. Neither happened. Putin has indeed protected
Yeltsin, but the Family is not pulling the strings: the price of their
safety is silence and loyalty. One Family intimate, Boris Berezovsky, the
billionaire power broker who played a major role in promoting Putin's
career, challenged the new President. He is now chafing in exile, sometimes
in the U.S, sometimes in France, trying to reinvent himself as a dissident,
while his business empire is being sold off.

On the other hand, Putin's first year has turned out to be a remarkable
example of mind over matter in public opinion. There have been few major
achievements, several disasters and some ominous developments in the field
of human rights and press freedom. Chechnya, Putin's signature policy
initiative, has not been pacified as he promised and is instead sinking
deeper into a brutal quagmire. Putin mentions it rarely these days. The
loss of the submarine Kursk, played out in agonizing slow motion last
August, showed the Russian military at its incompetent, mendacious worst.
His team is weak and largely untested, while reforms in key areas like
banking and land ownership have failed to materialize. Recently Putin's
economic adviser, Andrei Illarionov, accused the government of squandering
a year of booming world oil prices. Imports were down and foreign reserves
were up, he noted, yet the government had made little headway in
restructuring the economy, and a new financial crisis could occur as early
as this summer. Modernization of the military, another of Putin's constant
promises, is still on hold. An erratic foreign policy has worried the West,
but even the flurry of official Putin visits has not led foreign capitals
to take Russia any more seriously as a world power. And as the population
continues to drop by about 750,000 a year, the work force is being ravaged
by alcoholism, drug abuse and a growing HIV/AIDS epidemic.

Yet most Russians do not care. Putin's public approval ratings have
remained phenomenally high - even the Kursk triggered only a brief dip. At
the end of last year one nationwide poll asked Russians whether they looked
to 2001 with more hope than in the outgoing year. The vast majority said
yes, though few could explain why.  

If Putin has his way, in years to come Russians will care even less about
such problems: they will not hear about them. Political opposition has
already been muted and the press partly muzzled, and this tendency seems
destined to continue. Putin's treatment of criticism has, in fact, been a
dominant feature of his first year in office and is central to
understanding the mix of ideology and animosity that he runs on. Like so
many Russian and Soviet rulers, Putin believes that a powerful state is
vital to the country's security, well-being and unity. Criticism of the
state is, therefore, not only unwelcome, but destructive. Coupled with this
is his own deep sensitivity to criticism and a streak of what some close
observers like Levada believe is vindictiveness. "Putin's main motivating
force is a sense of grievance" at the world, says Natalya Gevorkian, one of
his official biographers.

Among the first to feel the wrath of the new regime was Andrei Babitsky, an
outspoken correspondent for the U.S.-funded Radio Liberty, who infuriated
Moscow by covering the war from the Chechen side. Arrested by Russian
troops in Chechnya, Babitsky, a Russian citizen, was detained, beaten and
handed to alleged Chechen guerrillas - the implication being that he was
one of them anyway - in exchange for Russian prisoners. In fact, the
"guerrillas" seem to have been Chechens close to Russian intelligence
services. A month later he was released. Throughout the affair Putin was
studiously low-key about Babitsky, pretending to know little about him. In
private, according to an eyewitness, he appeared extremely well-informed
about the affair, referring to the reporter as "a son of a bitch."

The main target, however, has been ntv, the highly opinionated flagship of
Vladimir Gusinsky's Media-Most empire. ntv failed to rally behind Putin
during his presidential campaign, then made matters worse by criticizing
the Chechnya operation and the Kursk fiasco. As a result, the firm has been
embroiled in on-again, off-again criminal investigations and civil suits,
its founder Gusinsky briefly imprisoned and his property impounded. He is
now fighting extradition from his home in Spain. Last week, when news broke
that cnn founder Ted Turner might buy a stake in Media-Most, police raided
the company again. This time they searched the offices of the executive who
had been due to leave for London that day for discussions on the Turner
purchase.

Much of the motivation for the campaign against Media-Most is pure power
politics. "TV made a KGB colonel President," a Media-Most executive
remarked, "and he knows TV could make another colonel President if he does
not control it." But the issue is not just politics: Putin has also been
known to describe Gusinsky as his main personal enemy. Chances are the
Kremlin wants to control TV news, with its nationwide reach, while leaving
newspapers, largely the preserve of well-heeled urbanites, more or less
untouched. But self-censorship is already setting in. The editor of a major
daily sympathetic to the Putin administration says he has endured enough
late-night summonses to the Kremlin - usually for a dressing-down over some
minor infraction - that he has become cautious in what he writes. Many
observers fear that curbs on the press are only the beginning. Political
scientist Liliya Shevtsova of the Carnegie Moscow Center warned recently
that the country is heading "in the direction of the annihilation of
parliament, the multiparty system and independent media."

The Russian legislature has also become a quieter place since Putin was
elected. Many of the curbs, though, were self-inflicted from a desire to
pander to the new strong man or avoid the price of resistance. Putin's own
obedient bloc, Unity, dominates the lower house, or Duma, and the President
gets on well with the Communists, who like his neo-Soviet tendencies.
Making masterly use of the skeletons most public figures have in their
closets, Putin has chipped away at the power bases of Russia's autocratic
and often venal governors. Some, like St. Petersburg's Vladimir Yakovlev,
switched from strident opposition to loyal support when the government
hinted it might investigate corruption in the city. Others were caught on
technicalities, like Kursk governor Alexander Rutskoi, removed from the
ballot hours before elections began by a judge who found discrepancies in
his official financial statement. Perhaps not surprisingly, the
legislature's upper chamber - composed mostly of governors - voted itself
into oblivion at Putin's request. It has been replaced by a consultative
body, the State Council.

The name is revealing. It harks back to an institution created at the
beginning of the 20th century by Czar Nicholas ll. There are differences:
Nicholas allowed part of the council to be elected, while Putin appoints
all of his. The revival of the name, though, along with other elements of
the past, like the Soviet national anthem, shows a striking characteristic
of the new President. When he searches for an innovation, he tends to look
backward - not to one specific period, but to a mix of the late-Soviet and
a little Nicholas ll, an idealized blend of paternal authoritarianism and
diluted democracy. (People can criticize in moderation, as long as they are
polite and do not touch the President.) In this respect, says a Russian
businessman who for years worked closely with the KGB, Putin is the perfect
product of his background: "Chekists [KGB officers] above all like social
order and predictability," the man said. "They want a country where their
own people respect the state and which is respected by the rest of the
world." This worldview explains why KGB men now populate the upper reaches
of power. They include security adviser Sergei Ivanov, arguably the second
most powerful man in Russia, as well as several of the "supergovernors"
appointed to oversee the regions.

The KGB credo may provide guidance for controlling Russia but not for
reforming it. Moreover, Putin was not even a KGB high-flyer. He was a
middle-level bureaucrat who, far from doing James Bond-style espionage or
weighty analyses of Western economies, probably collated intelligence
reports at a small East German listening post in Dresden. And public
euphoria will not last forever. So far its rosy haze has covered the
inexperience of the President and his team. But the feel-good factor can
fade and oil prices go down.

The optimistic assumption is that, faced sooner or later with a real
challenge, Putin will look for serious solutions to the country's problems.
This presupposes that he tempers his passion for the traditional Russian
state. The pessimistic variant is that, when major problems arise, Putin
will opt for the easy way out - blaming enemies, stifling criticism and
muddling through. Russia tried that before, in Czarist and Soviet times,
with disastrous results.  

******

#3
TIME EUROPE
January 22, 2000
The Death of a Nation
Drug abuse, HIV and tuberculosis, combined with the old scourge of
alcoholism, are lowering Russia's population
By ANDREW MEIER St. Petersburg

In his 20 years on this earth, Dima has seen a lifetime of abuse. At 16 he
shot his first heroin, and in the years since he has lived on and off the
streets of St. Petersburg. What life is left for him is likely to be brutal
and short. "I can't say this is how I hoped to die," he says. "But at least
I'll have plenty of company where I'm going."

Dima's humor may be black, but sadly, his prediction may be right.
Something terrible is happening in Dostoyevsky's old city. Doctors believe
that as many as 40,000 young people in St. Petersburg, mostly addicts, were
infected with HIV last year. Five time zones to the east, in the Siberian
outpost of Irkutsk, the toll is rising with equal ferocity. The same in
Tolyatti, a grim city of automobile workers on the Volga in Russia's
heartland. Moscow leads the nation with as many as 100 new HIV cases
registered each day. In fact, virtually no place in Russia has been spared.
Says Irina Savchenko, the head HIV specialist at the Ministry of Health:
"By now wherever you look, from Kaliningrad to Kamchatka, from Grozny to
Murmansk, HIV is not only there, it is moving faster and faster."

After a false lull for most of the first post-Soviet decade, HIV is now
sweeping across Russia faster than almost anywhere else in the world. In
the last year alone, the number of registered cases of HIV has more than
quadrupled, from 15,652 to 80,300. Experts believe the actual number is 10
times higher. "It will not be long before we have 1 million Russians
infected with HIV," says Dr. Vadim Pokrovsky, who has directed the
country's federal center for the fight against AIDS since 1985.

Vladimir Putin describes Russia as "a great power with unlimited
potential." But given the rise of HIV, tuberculosis and other diseases,
Putin's Russia is in danger of becoming known as a land of unending
affliction. Even the most ardent patriots concede that their country is
dying. Fewer and fewer Russians are able to escape the clutches of the old
scourge of alcoholism, and the new one, drug abuse. In the past decade, the
death rate has risen by a third, while the birthrate has fallen
precipitously. Last year alone, the population dropped by about 750,000.
Hepatitis B and C rage, while old world diseases largely extinct in the
West - measles, typhoid and diphtheria, to name a few - are staging a
comeback. But HIV poses the greatest danger. "The HIV epidemic is a tragedy
in itself," says Pokrovsky. "Far worse will be the eventual depopulation of
the country. Not only will those with AIDS die, but they will not have
children."

On one recent frigid night in St. Petersburg, near a metro stop on the
city's desolate southern edge, two dozen teenagers gather outside a
retrofitted bus. They are there to get clean needles, free condoms and, for
many, their first HIV test. In the first 10 months of last year, St.
Petersburg registered 3,652 new cases of HIV, compared with 400 in 1999.
"From 13-year-olds to over-30-year-olds, they come to us," says Sergei, a
former addict on the Médecins du Monde team that has been providing
anonymous HIV tests and psychological counseling - something the state does
not offer - since 1998. In recent months, the crew has seen the HIV rate
skyrocket. "Nearly one out of four kids we test is positive," says Dr.
Vladimir Musatov, the team's medical coordinator and deputy head of St.
Petersburg's AIDS clinic. "The epidemic is growing faster than anyone dared
imagine."

Tolyatti, home to the giant AvtoVAZ car plant, offers a terrifying example
of the epidemic's speed. The city has 3,250 registered cases of HIV. A year
ago, it had 11. "We are waking up late," admits Dr. Larisa Mikhailova, head
of the city's drug treatment clinic. "We should have started working with
the addicts years ago. Now for thousands it's too late."

Tolyatti also reveals the economic and social forces behind the rise of HIV
in Russia. The trouble is drugs - to be precise, heroin. Nearly every
registered case of HIV in the city stems from a shared needle, primed with
$2 worth of smack. "If we didn't have heroin," proclaims Mikhailova, "we
would not have HIV."

The tragedy is born of prosperity. "We're a young city, and we're a
well-off city," says Mikhail Khoutorskoy, head of the local health
department. Once a boon, that combination is now lethal. Jobs at the car
plant pay well by Russian standards. And nearly one out of five residents
is under 16 years old. "These are the kids who wanted to live free," says
Alexander Ablamonov, a weary doctor who nightly crisscrosses Tolyatti's
most populous region - "Car Factory District" - answering SOS calls in one
of the city's 44 ambulances. "They've got freedom now, and this is what
they do with it." One recent night, Ablamonov and his crew responded to
seven calls. Four were drug overdoses.

The Ministry of Health - whose AIDS department comprises a staff of three -
cannot cope. It cannot even keep an accurate tally of the HIV cases
registered. The federal statistics lag far behind the numbers reported in
the provinces. In Irkutsk, the Siberian city that thanks to a sudden flood
of Central Asian heroin witnessed an HIV explosion in 1999, seven out of 10
addicts tested are infected with HIV. "The numbers grow by thousands each
week," Savchenko concedes , while the federal funds budgeted for all AIDS
programs in 2000 was a scant $1.75 million. "We need more than an education
campaign," says Pokrovsky, the federal AIDS center director. "Putin must
see this as a national security threat. He must declare war on HIV."

As grim as the epidemic is now, the prognosis is worse. Unlike the early
stages of the AIDS crisis in the West, HIV in Russia is spread among the
country's burgeoning population of intravenous drug users - an estimated 2
to 3 million nationally. "Today the infected are mostly addicts, but
addicts are sexually active and addicts also become prostitutes," says Dr.
Yevgeny Voronin, who heads a clinic in St. Petersburg that is Russia's
largest facility for mothers and children with HIV. As the virus spreads
through sexual contact, experts foresee a heterosexual HIV boom in three to
five years. Condoms, once scarce in the U.S.S.R, are now in every pharmacy.
But they are rarely used.

The virus moves swiftly but invisibly. Only 741 Russians are known to have
died of AIDS to date. "It's hidden because we haven't yet had one known
case of AIDS in our city," says Mikhailova in Tolyatti. "But in a few
years, the plague will appear before our eyes." Pokrovsky explains:
"Treatment today costs $10,000 a year, and in eight years we are likely to
have a million people with AIDS. And so the state would have to spend at
least $10 billion on treatment. The question 'To treat or not to treat'
will arise, and given our federal budget, I think I know the answer we'll
hear."

Still, those on the front lines have hope. More and more Russian cities are
launching prevention programs, like those in St. Petersburg, Irkutsk and
Tolyatti, where former addicts have teamed up with doctors to stem the HIV
tide. Not all understand the urgency of the cause. In Irkutsk, local
officials have thwarted attempts to distribute clean needles, but in
Tolyatti two needle exchange points opened last fall. "It may be a small
step," says Mikhailova, "but it's a big one psychologically." She notes
that the city even funded the program, giving a grand total of $28,571.

"No one can save us except ourselves," says Aleksei Surikov, a 25-year-old
former addict who works in a fledgling Irkutsk detox center that has helped
more than 50 young addicts go clean. "If we do nothing, we'll lose every
addict here. They believe in nothing. Not the state, not the church, not
school, not their parents. But if we can reach them, something changes. We
can help them change their lives."

These street warriors know well they face a Sisyphean struggle. Russia's
health care system is antiquated, worn-out and desperately underfunded. The
World Bank is expected to lend Russia $50 million for HIV and AIDS
prevention and $100 million for TB treatment. "Russia still has a window,"
says Jean-Jacques de Saint Antoine, head of the World Bank's Russian health
program. "The virus has barely entered the mainstream population." But from
the country's head AIDS doctor to the prevention activists on the St.
Petersburg bus, people involved in the HIV fight know that the funds,
spread out over five years, will not suffice. They complain above all of
the silence in the Kremlin. "It comes down to economics and a political
will," says Voronin, the young doctor in St. Petersburg. "Putin must make
HIV his top priority. Never mind Chechnya. This is our future and we are
losing it."

Late last year the author and Nobel laureate Aleksander Solzhenitsyn
described the crisis bluntly, questioning the urgency of Putin's campaign
for a new state hymn and flag. "You cannot save a dying country with
symbols," the writer chided. "When men are dying without any hope in the
prime of their lives, it makes no difference what hymn is sung over their
heads." Adds Mikhailova in Tolyatti: "Attention must be paid, and something
must be done." The politicians may not like it, but as more and more young
Russians succumb to HIV, it will become harder to hide the obvious: Russia
stands to lose a generation.  

******

#4
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2001
From: Andrew Gentes <katorzhnik@yahoo.com>
Subject: a Russian Sonderweg

Dear David,
With regard to #5028 (Moscow Times: Anatoly
Khodorovsky, Zoya Kaika, Roman Khrapachevsky and
Mikhail Sudo, Russia's Peculiar Path)I don't have much
to say about the article's content, since it
essentially concerns economic issues about which I
know little. However, with regard to the title, and as
demonstrated by my "translation" of it in my subject
box, I think there is much to be said.
An explicit comparison with the case of Germany is I
think warranted given the fact that, like Bismarck and
his successors prior to the 1918 revolution, the
Stalinists wanted to enforce a governmental power
structure which was fundamentally at odds with the
social structure their own rapid industrialization was
giving birth to. As a result there were in both
countries' cases profound tensions between society and
state which, though they seem to have been largely
resolved in Germany, remain to be addressed in Russia.

What I found missing from the Moscow Times article,
which largely consisted of a litany of what I guess
were meant to be economic accomplishments, was any
discussion of those social trends historians would
somewhat traditionally refer to as "modernistic." This
has been and remains Russia's largest "structural
weakness," to paraphrase the article's authors. At
some point the Russian people are going to have to
alter the power balance which disproportionately
favors the state at their expense. How this can be
achieved without a liberal tradition to draw upon
remains to be seen. Perhaps now there is developing a
middle-class or bourgeoisie which can effectuate some
sort of truly progressive liberal reforms. But the
several months I spent a couple of years ago in
Vladivostok and Irkutsk proved disheartening in the
extreme in the narrow sense that they revealed how
very far Russia beyond the (Moscow) beltway has to go
in this area. Cities in Siberia and elsewhere are
still run as personal fiefdoms by ex-Party bosses who
have merely shaved their eyebrows and put on wigs in
some pathetic vaudvillean charade to fool--who? The
West? Because they're certainly not fooling fellow
Russians. Like The Who sang years ago: "Meet the new
boss, same as the old boss."
These "leaders" (a term conferring far more respect
than they deserve) are more concerned with stocking
their fridges and liquor cabinets and with acquiring
the latest SUVs than with undertaking any sort of
significant reforms. And in a sense, who can blame
them? Since Moscow continues the age-old practice of
sucking like a viper the life out of the rest of the
country in the form of raw materials and wealth, these
guys are just getting what morsels are left. And
Moscow, despite its remarkable physical transformation
over the past decade, is indeed the major problem. Its
parasitic relationship to everything surrounding it
does not seem to be about to change anytime soon.
For these and many other reasons, although we may
read, for instance, that "Russian consumer spending is
now equivalent to 1998 levels," such temporary and
fragile accomplishments do little to obscure the truth
that there are no large-scale signs coming from Russia
or its leadership that an agenda exists for moving
forward. I sincerely hope events prove me wrong (as
long as these events are peaceful), but I'm quite
pessimistic about the present population's future.
Sincerely,
Andrew Gentes

Andrew A. Gentes, Instructor     email: katorzhnik@yahoo.com
Department of History                 ph.: 207 753-6938
119 Pettengill Hall
Bates College
Lewiston, ME  04240
Those who cast the votes decide nothing. Those who count the
votes decide everything. -Iosif Stalin

******

#5
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2001
From: "Robert Bruce Ware" <rware@stlnet.com>
Subject: re 5030-Graham/Chechnya

Thomas Graham deserves much credit for the relative balance of his analysis
of the war in Chechnya, which considers problems and abuses on both sides,
and for his constructive effort to propose a plan for peace. Graham
recognizes that there are limitations to his plan, and is interested,
appropriately, in initiating consideration of a workable solution. With a
view toward that worthy objective, it is important to recognize why his
plan would not work..

First, as Graham realizes, negotiation of a cease-fire with Aslan Maskhadov
is unlikely to stop the fighting. Had Maskhadov been capable of controlling
the situation the war would not have started in the first place. Graham's
suggestions that the rebels could be disarmed and that the West might play
a role in this process simply ignore the reality of the situation. The
rebels will surrender their arms only in the unlikely event that they are
defeated militarily. Moreover, the entire Northeast Caucasus is bristling
with weapons that no authorities will ever locate. Additionally, any direct
Western involvement in the region would be counterproductive. It would be
catastrophic if Western troops, peacekeepers, or aid workers were
introduced on the ground, where they immediately would become fodder for
hostage takers and other extremities of the region s cultures.

Graham also suggests that Western orgnaizations might work with regional
authorities to close militant sanctuaries and supply roots outside of
Chechnya. While diplomatic pressure might usefully be placed upon Georgia
and Azerbaijan to close sanctuaries, anyone familiar with the terrain and
cultures of the region will recognize that the supply lines cannot be
closed, and that they may be strengthened by attempts to do so. Poverty,
alienation, and cultures that empathize with underdogs and place a premium
upon risky and illicit
enterprises will combine with the rugged mountains to ensure that supplies
get through.

Graham proposes Western economic aid for the reconstruction of Chechnya,
and adds an important caveat: "Agreement would have to be reached on
monitoring to ensure that the money is used for its stated goals and does
not disappear into the bank accounts of Russian and Chechen operators, as
it has in the past."
Unfortunately, the latter result would be very difficult to avoid. Largely
due to close oversight from Moscow, neighboring Dagestan has had some
success in reconstruction and the administration of aid following the
invasions of 1999. However, criminal charges of corruption have been filed
against 16 local Dagestani officials. It is likely that misappropriation
and other abuses occurred in far more cases, and it is also likely that
administration of aid would prove more difficult in Chechnya. Still, in the
long-term, Western aid
will probably flow, and recent reconstruction in Dagestan may serve as a
useful model.

Graham's proposal of a postponement in a decision on Chechnya s status runs
the risk of reinstituting conditions of political limbo and lawlessness
that characterized the Republic from 1996 to 1999. But it is possible that
any short-term peace will require such a postponement. Most usefully,
Graham proposes election of Chechen officials and international access to
refugee camps.

While Graham's proposals should be the basis for constructive discussion,
they are unworkable because they ignore some of the situations harder
realities. As difficult as these may be, anyone who cares about peace in
the region must sooner or later consider them:

Though Graham recognizes that profiteering provides incentive for
perpetuation of the war, he underestimates the problem. The view of some
people in Dagestan, and the view to which I am coming tentatively to
subscribe, is that incentives to perpetuate the war operate roughly on two
levels: 1) Groups in Moscow, the Gulf, and Central Asia (and, according to
some Dagestanis, however implausibly, in Washington), all of whom are more
or less at odds with one another, all have interests in the continuation of
a type of proxy war in Chechnya. 2) People in the field locally, who are
ostensibly opposed to one another, have learned to profit in ways that
could not be sustained in peace time.

Thus while there is no suggestion that there is some sort of overarching
conspiracy to perpetuate the war, the war continues because it serves a
multiplicity of otherwise disparate interests. The suggestion is that the
situation is indeed chaotic but that there are extra-regional interests and
intra-regional incentives that tend toward the perpetuation of the war.
Players on all sides have found separate interests in continuing the game.
Those that suffer are 1) local families in Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia,
etc. 2) international security.

In short, yes the situation is chaotic, and no there is no
super-conspiracy, but it doesn't matter because there is an unspoken
convergence of interests.

At the root of the problem, however, is the social structure of Chechen
clans (teips) which traditionally fragments Chechen society and restricts
the development of an authoritative state. Second, Chechen warrior
mythology mitigates against peaceful solutions, rule of law, and empathetic
treatment of outsiders. Of course, Russian social structure and culture
have also played a role in the tragedy. Yet it must not be overlooked that
Moscow left Chechnya alone for three years. This period proved absolutely
horrendous for the people of the region when anarchy inside Chechnya issued
in the hostage trade and other medieval abuses, which resulted in terror
and instability throughout the region. Because these horrific problems were
exacerbated by Moscow s withdrawl from the region and Chechnya s de facto
indepencence, causes must be identified within Chechnya and in the near
term there are no realistic opportunites for Moscow to stage a second
withdrawl.

It is unfortunately the case that wars have often been necessary to alter
social structures and cultures, as in the case of German and Japan.

Most commentaries on the war in Chechnya, which are written by people
without considerable experience in the region, fail to understand the
extremity of cultures throughout the Northeast Caucasus, and not only in
Chechnya. Solutions that might work in the West, or in Asia, or Africa will
not work in the Northeast Caucasus. Anyone who truly cares about the
peoples of the North Caucasus, and who truly seeks peace in the region,
cannot afford the luxury of overlooking its harsh realities. However
difficult it may be, any workable
proposal for peace must take those realities into consideration.

*******
 
#6
UNESCO boss fears for media in Putin's Russia
 
MOSCOW, Jan 16 (Reuters) - The head of the United Nations' cultural body
UNESCO has written to President Vladimir Putin expressing concern over media
freedoms in Russia and the plight of the embattled independent television
station NTV.

In his letter, UNESCO Director General Koichiro Matsuura urged Putin to use
his authority to ensure Russia remained on a democratic path, despite the
difficulties facing the country.

"Your intervention in this matter would send a strong signal both to your own
people and to the international community. I for my part would welcome it
heartily," Matsuura said in his letter, a copy of which was faxed to Reuters.

Independent media professionals and press watchdog groups had written to
UNESCO warning that the situation in Russia "may well undermine severely
their critical reporting of news, personalities and events," he said.

"The case of the NTV broadcasting company is but one recent illustration of
this worrying development," he said.

Prosecutors on Tuesday detained the chief financial officer of the
broadcaster's parent group, Media-Most, over a fraud probe. Most's founder
Vladimir Gusinsky is currently fighting extradition from Spain over the same
probe.

Liberals have seen the legal moves against the media magnate and his business
empire as evidence of a Kremlin-orchestrated campaign to muzzle the only
major media group in Russia still outside the authorities' control.

Matsuura told Putin he understood Russia faced enormous challenges following
the collapse of Communism, but urged the Russian leader to intervene to
guarantee basic freedoms.

"I nevertheless hope that, in the very interests of a truly democratic and
progressive Russian Federation, press freedom in your country will not have
been a vain word," he wrote.

"Only you have the necessary authority to ensure that press issues in Russia
do not prove a stumbling block to the realisation of the high ideals that you
are so courageously pursuing," Matsuura said.

******

#7
NATO Never Said No to RUSSIA'S Membership, Robertson. .

YEREVAN, January 16 (Itar-Tass) - NATO has never said "no" about a
possibility of Russia's membership in the Alliance, Secretary General George
Robertson told students and professors of the Yerevan State University on
Tuesday.

He delivered an hour-long speech and answered questions of the audience.

Robertson said that the larger security their neighbors had the larger
security they enjoyed. He put an accent on a new nature of the international
relations after the end of the Cold War.

Armenia is a serious partner of NATO. It joined the Partnership for Peace
Program in 1994, and became its active participant since then, Robertson
said. He noted that the cooperation could be deepened.

He said that the Karabakh conflict of Azerbaijan and Armenia was the main
problem of the region instead of Armenia's relations with Turkey. As soon as
the Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict is settled, all problems in the relations
between Armenia and Turkey will be solved, Robertson said. He noted that the
Karabakh settlement would have a favorable influence on the regional
situation and Armenia's relations with other countries, and supported peace
efforts of the Azerbaijani and Armenian authorities.

Nine countries are waiting for the admission to NATO. The admission will be
discussed next year. There is not a single republic of the Southern Caucasus
on that list, Robertson said.

*****

#8
Russian Ultra-Nationalists Urge Gorbachev to Speak out on Soviet Debt

MOSCOW, Jan 16, 2001 -- (Agence France Presse) Russian ultra-nationalist
deputies Tuesday called on Mikhail Gorbachev, the last Soviet leader, to
testify to parliament about the 48 billion dollars of Soviet-era debt that
Russia has inherited.

Gorbachev should inform deputies "about the agreement he drew up with Western
leaders at that time," Alexei Mitrofanov, leader of the Liberal Democratic
faction in the Duma (lower house) told AFP.
 
Mitrofanov said he believed the loans made to Moscow between 1988 and the
collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 had been granted in exchange
for Moscow's consent regarding the unification of Germany.

Russia currently has more than 48.3 billion dollars in sovereign debt, of
which the finance ministry says 38.7 billion were inherited from the Soviet
Union.

Earlier this month Russia said it would delay a 285-million-dollar repayment
due to the Paris Club of creditor nations as its January installment,
delivering just 31.5 million dollars interest payment instead.

The issue of Soviet-era debt has sparked a lively debate in the Russian
media, with Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov warning that some of the
repayments to the Paris Club may have to be postponed in order "not to put
society at risk."

*****

#9
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2001
From: gamarquart@email.msn.com> George A. Marquart
Subject: Princess Vera

Dear David,
I was probably the only Boy Scout in a Russian Displaced Persons camp
after WWII, who did not have a drop of Russian blood in him, and was a
Lutheran to boot. Nevertheless, I was chosen by the leaders of the Scouts
in the camp to deliver a birthday cake to Princess Vera. It was either
1948 or 49, and I was 11 or 12 years old. I was chosen partly because I
spoke German, and was thus able to make my way from the camp into the city
of Hamburg, and to find the place where she lived. Princess Vera was a
frequent visitor to our home both in Europe and in the United States. She
was a person of true nobility, never presumptous, self effacing without
false humility. She was a gentle person. May her soul rest in peace and
rejoice with all the saints in heaven. With warm regards, George

The Moscow Times Monday, Jan. 15, 2001.
Page 4 Heir to Romanov Throne Dies in New York The Associated Press VALLEY
COTTAGE, New York - Princess Vera Constantinovna of Russia, the
great-granddaughter of Emperor Nicholas I and the last member of the Romanov
family to be born in Russia, has died at 94. She died of natural causes
Thursday in her private apartment at the Tolstoy Foundation in Valley
Cottage,
New York, said Catherine Larin, a foundation administrator. She had lived in
New York since 1951 and worked for charitable organizations, such as the
Tolstoy Foundation, Larin said. She was also a devoted member of the Russian
Orthodox Church in Exile. According to the Romanov Family Laws of
Succession,
the princess inherited the legitimate claim to the Russian throne after 1989
but never took advantage of it and viewed others' attempts to do so with
skepticism. The youngest of nine children by Grand Duke Constantine,
known in
Russian literature as the poet "K.R.," and Princess Elizabeth of
Saxen-Altenburg, Vera Constantinovna escaped - with her mother and one brother
- from the Bolshevik Revolution to Sweden in 1918, said Xenia Cheremeteff, of
the Tolstoy Foundation. Five brothers were killed in active duty in World
War
I, while her three other brothers died in what is known as the Alapayevsk
Mine
Shaft Massacre, Cheremeteff said. The Bolsheviks threw the men, together with
Grand Duchess Elizabeth Fyodorovna, into a mine shaft and bombarded them with
hand grenades. According to legend, they did not immediately die, and local
peasants heard them singing religious hymns. From 1918, Vera was a stateless
refugee. She never took foreign citizenship and never married, Cheremeteff
said. Vera Constantinovna will be buried Monday in the Russian Orthodox
Cemetery of Novo-Diveyevo in Spring Valley, New York.

*******

#10
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2001
From: "Prof. M. Ellman" <ellman@fee.uva.nl>
Subject: The Russian economy under El'tsin

An article by Michael Ellman entitled 'The Russian economy under El'tsin'
was published in Europe-Asia Studies for December (vol 52 no.8). The
conclusion is as follows:

During the El'tsin period Russia experienced major economic changes. The
initial hopes of Russian reformers and their international backers were not
realised. The Russian economic system did not change into a civilized
market economy. Instead, it mutated into a 'market economy with Russian
characteristics'. Important aspects of this system were kleptocracy,
criminalisation, subsistence agriculture, non-payment and barter, and
reciprocity. Nor did Russia achieve substantial and sutained economic
growth.Instead it experienced a deep depression, followed by an upswing in
the last El'tsin year caused partly by a currency depreciation which
initially led to a further sharp fall in the real incomes of the
population. As a result of the depression, the eternal problem of Russia's
economic backwardness has intensified. There were also important social
changes, many of them adverse. Some existing social problems, such as high
mortality and alcoholism, worsened. There was an increase in poverty and
inequality. There was a decline in the provision of public goods such as
order and education. The morbidity, smoking and narcotics situations
worsened. Entirely new social problems emerged, such as child malnutrition,
unwanted unpaid (or partially paid) leave, delayed wage (and pension and
unemployment benefit) payments, and unemployment. Not all the economic and
social changes, however, were for the worse. Not only did the availability
and variety of consumer goods and services greatly improve, but there was
also a significant demilitarisation process, the geographical location of
the population became more economically rational, and there was a
significant growth in the de novo private sector (though this remained
modest).

*******

#11
Envoy urges Russians to show "decency" in Chechnya
By Olga Petrova

KHANKALA, Russia, Jan 16 (Reuters) - A top European human rights envoy said
on Tuesday that "responsibility and decency" by Russian troops and officials
in Chechnya was vital if Moscow was to bring stability to the province.

British peer Lord Frank Judd, heading a Council of Europe delegation, also
said he would do his best to provide a fair assessment of the situation in
Chechnya nearly a year after Russian troops established tenuous control over
the region.

Judd toured the Russian military's main base at Khankala, near Chechnya's
flattened capital Grozny, and told the top commander in Chechnya, General
Valery Baranov, a constructive approach was needed to rebuilding the
province.

"There are still significant issues to be addressed. The question is how we
can help those people who want to make the situation right," he said.

"Not just by standing by and condemning. We should think how we can actually
strengthen those people who are there and want to handle things in a
responsible and decent way.

"Because responsibility and decency is the only way that we get political
stability in Chechnya," he said.

In remarks broadcast on Russia's private NTV channel Judd said it would be
wrong to suggest that all was well in Chechnya.

DELEGATION TOLD OF CIVILIAN SUFFERING

He said his delegation had "heard much about disappearances and suffering of
civilians, harassment, maltreatment and extortion" and would try to shed
light on the reports.

Judd has visited Chechnya several times since Russia launched its offensive
in October 1999 -- three years after withdrawing from the region in the
aftermath of a disastrous two-year war against the separatists.

His report will help determine whether Russia's voting rights are restored at
the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly, a largely powerless body
which nonetheless wields considerable moral authority in ex-Communist
countries.

Judd said the continuing troubles in Chechnya, with Russian troops subject to
persistent ambushes, made the situation "with security issues and abuse of
powers in some situations... much more difficult to deal with."

He said the delegation had to be "very careful" to ensure it had a proper
understanding of conditions.

Itar-Tass news agency said he held talks with Chechnya's Moscow-appointed top
administrator, Akhmad Kadyrov, who told him he was pursuing talks with rebel
leaders whose credentials and record were deemed acceptable.

The Council of Europe and many Western countries have called for a political
solution to the conflict with the separatists.

Judd also visited the Chernokozovo detention centre, where human rights
groups allege the Russian military have beaten and harassed inmates. Russia's
top human rights envoy for Chechnya, Vladimir Kalamanov, pledged on Monday
that Moscow would prosecute more troops charged with abuses in the region.

Judd started his day by visiting the Grozny headquarters of the Memorial
organisation, committed to finding Chechens missing in the Russian offensive.
Local residents complained they were not allowed to approach the delegation
during its two-hour tour.

"I have two children and don't know how I can keep on going," said Aiset
Aslanbekova, who came to the Memorial office seeking information on her
husband, missing for six months.

Ali Khadzhiyev said he no longer wanted to attend school.

"All I want is for one of my brothers to come back so I can join them and
fight," the 14-year-old told reporters.

******

#12
Russian speaker welcomes US warning on credits
Interfax

Moscow, 16 January: The warning of US President-elect George W. Bush, who
said that the USA may stop providing financial assistance to Russia, is
"absolutely right", State Duma Speaker Gennadiy Seleznev told a news
conference at the Interfax main office on Tuesday [16 January].

"We are tired of corruption and of our criminal leaders, who concluded
transactions to Russia's detriment," he said.

In Seleznev's opinion, "Bush's message is absolutely right", it is aimed at
"preventing us from thinking that the IMF or World Bank will always be
feeding us".

We should "raise our own economy ourselves, strengthen the budget and take
care of the financial policy", Seleznev said.

At the same time, he does not rule out that "as an addition to the
parliament's and government's efforts, one can take credits for completely
specific programmes, and the main thing is that the use of this money should
be strictly controlled".

*******

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