January 10, 2001   

This Date's Issues:   5016 • 5017 • 5018

Johnson's Russia List
#5017
10 January 2001
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Interfax: Big rise in capital flight from Russia.
2. AFP: Half of Russian population could have HIV in 10 years: top official.
3. Katrina vanden Heuvel: request for writings on FDR's New Deal.
4. Rossiyskaya Gazeta: Anatoliy Shapovalov, "Bush's Personnel -- A Paternal Affair." ('Diminution' of 'Russian Factor' Seen under Bush Administration)
5. Itar-Tass: Academic dismisses allegations about Kaliningrad nuclear weapons.
6. AFP: Record freeze in Siberia, but no panic among hardy population.
7. The Onion: Communists Now Least Threatening Group In U.S.
8. BBC Monitoring: Russian Communist leader says government policy must change. (Zyuganov)
9. Vladimir Shlapentokh: Putin's Uniqueness in Russian History: The Prospects for Prolonged Corruption in a Nondemocratic Society.]

*******

#1
Big rise in capital flight from Russia 
Interfax 

Moscow, 9 January: Russia's capital flight totalled 24.6bn dollars in 2000, 
almost 30 per cent up year-on-year, director of the Russian institute for the 
problems of globalization, Mikhail Delyagin, told Interfax. 

The volume of capital unofficially leaving Russia was almost 10 per cent 
higher in 2000 than in pre-crisis 1997 (22.5bn dollars), just 3.5 per cent 
under the catastrophic level in 1998 (25.5bn dollars) and almost a third 
higher than in 1999 (18.6bn dollars). 

A 20-per-cent drop in capital flight was observed in the third quarter of 
1999, as compared to the second quarter (from 3.9bn dollars to 3.1bn 
dollars), but in the same period of 2000, capital flight rose 12.5 per cent 
from 4bn dollars to 4.5bn dollars. Thus, capital flight was almost 50 per 
cent up year-on-year in the third quarter of 2000, Delyagin said. 

"The decrease in the volume of non-returned export earnings and fictitious 
imports was unexpected in 2000," he said. In the first three quarter of 2000, 
non-returned export earnings and fictitious imports accounted for just 318m 
dollars in capital flight, plummeting from 3.8bn dollars in the same period 
of 1999. 

******

#2
Half of Russian population could have HIV in 10 years: top official

MOSCOW, Jan 9 (AFP) - Russia could have a million citizens who 
are HIV positive by the end of this year and half of the population 
could become infected by the deadly disease within 10 years, the 
country's top AIDS official said Tuesday. 
"If this rate of infection continues, more than a million people 
will have the HIV virus by the end of the year and half of the 
Russian population will be infected within the next 10 years," said 
Vadim Pokrovsky, head of the government-run National Centre for the 
Fight against AIDS. 
There are 145 million people living in Russia. 
According to official statistics, Russia has 80,000 cases of the 
HIV virus that causes AIDS but "in fact half a million Russians are 
infected," said Povrovsky, speaking on Moscow Echo Radio. 
He said that 70 million dollars would be needed to combat the 
epidemic but the Russian government had only allocated three million 
dollars in the 2001 budget. 
According to Pokrovsky, a promised loan of 50 million dollars 
from the World Bank to fight AIDS in Russia was generous but 
insufficient. 
"These credits are spread out over a period of 10 years and we 
will need more resources between now and then," the official said. 
"The new anti-AIDS programme will only be put into effect in 
2002. Until then we have to continue our work on the basis of a 
programme set up in 1995," Povrovsky added. 
A UNAIDS programme published in November reported that the 
number of new HIV infections last year exceeded the total of all 
previous years in Russia. 
According to the estimates of the UN at the time, some 130,000 
people were infected with the virus at the end of 1999, and this was 
expected to rise to 300,000 by the end of 2000.

*******

#3
Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2001 
From: Katrina vanden Heuvel (kat@thenation.com)
Subject: writings on FDR's New Deal

Dear David:

I would be grateful for any references to high-quality RUSSIAN scholarly or
political writings on FDR's New Deal that your readers may know.

Thanks,
Katrina vanden Heuvel
kat@thenation.com

*******

#4
'Diminution' of 'Russian Factor' Seen under Bush Administration 

Rossiyskaya Gazeta
January 5, 2001
[translation for personal use only]
Article by Anatoliy Shapovalov: "Bush's Personnel -- A Paternal Affair" 

U.S. President-Elect George Bush Jr. has completed 
his cabinet. He said it will be one of the strongest governments a U.S. 
president has ever formed. 
It has to be said that the New President is doing a skillful job. 
Bush is not a major asset himself (that is the assessment of U.S. 
political scientists), but he has managed to put together an energetic 
and skillful team, with his father's proven people as its backbone: 
Cheney, Powell, Rice.... Another feature is the fact that Bush contrived 
to play in the Democrats' park by offering them a number of posts and, 
most important, by using their personnel methods, so to speak. Energy 
Secretary Spencer Abraham is of Arab and Labor Secretary Linda Chavez of 
Latin American origin.... Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice are 
Afro-Americans. 
Commenting on the top officials, U.S. observers point out the 
different priorities from those of Clinton and Gore: In particular, 
there are virtually no members of the U.S. Jewish community among the 
appointees. Even the Christmas and New Year holidays did not diminish 
world 
interest in how the new administration will operate, first and foremost 
in the foreign policy arena. There are more than enough forecasts and 
suggestions, particularly as both Bush himself and his candidates for the 
top jobs made many statements during the election campaign. But a number 
of commentators were inclined not to attach particular importance to 
them: The presidential race is one thing, they say, the presidency 
itself is another thing altogether. But, apparently, the election 
rhetoric should nonetheless be taken at face value. The point is that 
the basic elements set out by Bush will probably remain, and they are: 
In his view, America needs to curb its foreign policy ardor somewhat, be 
more egotistical and less idealistic, and interfere in world affairs only 
if actual U.S. vital interests are affected. If the Europeans want to 
put their own affairs, including Yugoslavia, in order, why do they need 
constant assistance from the other side of the Atlantic? The expansion 
of NATO, which Albright, Talbott, and other diplomats with East European 
experience have constantly advocated, will not be a simple matter either. 
The leading role in the Bush administration will now be played by 
people with military experience, principally, of course, top general and 
now secretary of state, Colin Powell, who tends to give careful 
consideration to the military aspects and implications of admitting, 
says, Romania and Bulgaria, not to mention the Baltic countries, to NATO. 
Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice have already said enough to make it 
clear that U.S. policy toward Russia will be dominated by a particularly 
realistic approach. These relations will now be handled in the State 
Department not by a separate structure, but by a European bureau. This 
may mean that Russia will no longer get the "special" attention it has 
been afforded by the Clinton administration these past eight years. Bush 
and his entourage will probably prefer in relations with Russia a 
combination of cooperation and competition. This has happened before 
under Republican administrations and the stability of U.S.-Russian 
relations has not suffered as a result. The diminution of the "Russian 
factor" is also evidenced by the recent meeting of representatives of 
U.S. special services and financial corporations. Its participant 
reached the conclusion that U.S. "global leadership" will face a number 
of military-political challenges: introduction of euro cash, "expansion" 
of China.... No special consideration was given at the meeting to the 
"Russian question." But it may come to the surface, observers believe. 
Making forecasts and suggestions is a thankless task anyway. Winston 
Churchill said: You have to be able to predict what will happen in a 
month, in a year, and then be able to explain why it did not happen. 

*******

#5
Russia: Academic dismisses allegations about Kaliningrad nuclear 
weapons
By Anatoliy Yurkin 

MOSCOW, January 8 (Itar-Tass) - Russia's 
deploying tactical nuclear weapons in its Kaliningrad enclave would make 
no military sense, said Vladimir Petrovsky, a member of the Russian 
Military Academy. 
His comment followed the recent claims by Western media that Russia 
has been trying to build up its military potential by moving tactical 
nuclear weapons to the Baltic region. 
"Considering the small flight time, the geographic position and the 
lessons of the initial period of the Second World War, one can hardly 
seriously assert some build-up in this European region of Russian 
tactical weapons with nuclear warheads," Petrovsky told Itar-Tass on 
Monday [8 January]. 
He said the recent allegations and demands for "inspections" of 
Russia's troops in the Kaliningrad region pursued two political goals. 
One is to divert the world community's attention from the scandal over 
low-enriched uranium bombs which NATO rained on Yugoslavia during its 
recent assault of it, Petrovsky said. 
The second is a "shot of a trial ballon" before the US 
administration's final decision to deploy the national missile defence 
system, he said. 
"Russia's position on tactical nuclear weapons in Europe has been 
clearly stated by President Vladimir Putin during his meeting with 
(German Chancellor) Gerhard Schroeder. However, the question remains 
open about international law regulation and withdrawal from the European 
continent of 150 nuclear bombs B-1 of the US which are staying in ten 
storages of seven European states of NATO," Petrovsky said. 

*******

#6
Record freeze in Siberia, but no panic among hardy population

IRKUTSK, Russia, Jan 9 (AFP) - 
The big freeze gripping Siberia, with temperatures reaching below minus 50 
degrees, is unprecedented for decades, but has not provoked any major 
catastrophe or panic among a hardy population used to harsh winters.

The arctic weather in the region, north of the city of Irkutsk, is the 
coldest for half a century, according to the head of the regional 
meteorological service, Leonid Prokhovnik.

The streets here were enveloped Tuesday by a thick freezing fog, forcing cars 
to move around with their headlights switched full on in broad daylight.

Passers-by hurried along the snow-covered pavements, wrapped up with layers 
of clothes and breathing carefully to avoid burning their respiratory tracts 
with temperatures in this city of 640,000 inhabitants below minus 40 degrees 
for days.

The usual temperature in early January in Irkutsk has been closer in the past 
few years to minus 20 degrees, exceptionally reaching minus 30, according to 
Oksana, a young woman in her 30s.

The local authorities extended school holidays until January 15, advising 
parents to keep their children at home and only to go outdoors in case of 
real necessity.

According to an official from the burns department of the Kirov hospital in 
Irkutsk, doctors perform amputations every day on frost-bitten limbs.

More than 60 people have been treated in the last few days for chillblains, 
and 17 were hospitalised in a serious condition.

Heating systems in some buildings of this city located close to Lake Baikal 
were not powerful enough to ensure temperatures of more than 12 degrees in 
people's apartments.

Some heating networks broke down altogether in certain parts of Irkutsk.

But most people's homes were warm enough, according to Oksana, who said it 
was about around plus 20 degrees in her apartment.

"It's no problem. It is hard, you have be careful, but we're Russian after 
all," she said with a smile.

In Irkutsk, the airport remained open and public transport functioned 
normally.

A driver, Nikolai, said it was "no problem" to start cars in such 
temperatures. "If necessary you can use a blow-torch to heat the crank-shaft. 
We're used to it," he added.

The inhabitants of Irkutsk conceded nonetheless that they were luckier than 
some other more isolated places, where the mercury has plunged below minus 50 
degrees.

The freeze affected the whole of Siberia, with temperatures no higher than 
minus 40 degrees, in a zone stretching from Khabarovsk in the Far East to 
Krasnoyarsk and Novossibirsk (western Siberia), several thousand kilometres 
(miles) and several time-zones away. 

In various places, cracks in heating pipes left entire buildings without heat 
for hours, affecting thousands of people, while the emergency services tried 
to repair them in extremely difficult conditions.

In Krasnoyarsk, the cold claimed one death and put 30 others in hospital with 
frostbite, mainly homeless, but also drivers whose cars broke down on 
isolated roads.

******

#7
The Onion
www.theonion.com
December 20, 2000
Communists Now Least Threatening Group In U.S.

WASHINGTON, DC-- According to a report released Tuesday by the Pentagon, 
Communists rank last on a list of 238 threats to national security. 
"Communists may now safely be ignored," Secretary of Defense William Cohen 
said. "The Red Menace has been surpassed by militia groups, religious 
extremists, ecoterrorists, cybercriminals, Hollywood producers, and angry 
drivers." Other groups deemed more threatening than Communists include 
rap-metal bands (#96), escaped zoo animals (#202), and Belgians (#237).

******

#8
BBC Monitoring
Russian Communist leader says government policy must change 
Source: Russia TV, Moscow, in Russian 1730 gmt 9 Jan 01 

Russian Communist leader Gennadiy Zyuganov said the government must change 
its policies, particularly with regard to privatization. Interviewed by 
Russia TV's "Details" programme on 9 January, he said the government should 
ensure everyone has a decent income before paying off Russia's debts. 
Zyuganov said the Communist Party was drawing up its policies for the next 
six months. He said he thought President Putin agreed with him on some 
issues. The following is an excerpt from the TV report: 

[Presenter] This is the "Details programme". Good evening. The holidays that 
members of parliament have are the envy of any schoolchild. The 
schoolchildren go back tomorrow. The MPs have another week off. That refers 
to more or less all the factions, with the possible exception of the 
Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF). We learnt today that the 
CPRF intends to campaign for a change in economic policy. Big changes are 
coming, according to the leader of the Communist faction, Gennadiy Zyuganov. 
Today our guest in the "Details" studio is Gennadiy Zyuganov. Good evening, 
Gennadiy Andreyevich. 

[Zyuganov] Good evening. 

[Presenter] You talk about changes. Do you have some information about a 
major coming reshuffle in the Russian government, for instance? 

[Zyuganov] No, but I think the new year, the cold winter, the new century and 
the new millennium commit us to serious changes... 

On the other hand, last year's policies, including the attempts to wipe out 
social guarantees, to push through the sale of the land and policies on 
natural monopolies, as well as a whole series of other measures entirely 
directed against the people ran into stiff resistance, both within the State 
Duma and in the workplaces. This refers in particular to the new labour law 
code proposed by the government. These things compel us to consider 
qualitatively new economic policies. 

On the other hand, at our congress we proposed a new version of a policy 
along these lines. We are currently completing the drafting of our 
legislation proposals. Today we debated all the main measures we are to carry 
out in the next few months. We thus have a clear-cut programme. 

When you talk about holidays, some people did take time off, but we continued 
our meetings with working people, scientists and experts. Our main council, 
the presidium, is to meet at the beginning of next week and will map out our 
policies for the next six months. 

[Presenter] Gennadiy Andreyevich, you said that some policies, such as 
restructuring the natural monopolies and passing a new labour law code 
through the State Duma ran into major resistance. Yet I think that people 
were saying all year that the State Duma was supportive as never before of 
all the new bills and proposals put by government. Isn't that right? 

[Zyuganov] Not quite. The attempt to sell off land was turned down. No 
decision was made on the natural monopolies as [Unified Energy System of 
Russia chief executive Anatoliy] Chubays said. The proposals on the labour 
law code were more or less taken back and they will not be proposed again in 
the next few months. On the social guarantees issue, we successfully managed 
to have some decisions put back. 

I also think that the government failed to look forward so as to make an 
intelligent decision on the budget. We proposed that Rb200-300bn be included 
in the budget from the start and if that had been done they would not faced 
with the demand to pay off debts immediately, as they now have... 

I believe that the structure, the management and the political policies of 
the government should be radically changed... 

Putin and I spent almost three hours discussing these problems on the eve of 
the New Year and I am certain that Vladimir Vladimirovich will have to make 
some very responsible decisions in the next few weeks. 

[Presenter] On the government membership? 

[Zyuganov] That will be one of them. 

[Presenter] Is this something you got from what Putin said or was it just the 
atmosphere or spirit of the meeting? 

[Zyuganov] This is something I realized from the issues we actually 
discussed. We looked into the question of construction... We talked about the 
problem of the railways and attempts to break up the natural monopolies. We 
all realized that the time for these issues has come and they have to resolve 
them... 

The government will have to change its policies, otherwise it will run into 
enormous difficulties and you can see it now... 

[Presenter] We are entering a new political year. 

[Zyuganov] Yes. 

[Presenter] And it is possible, and there are persistent rumours to this 
effect, that the State Duma will finally pass a Land Code. What are your 
views on that? 

[Zyuganov] We discussed this at our recent meeting. We are categorically 
against the sale, the free purchase and sale of agricultural land... We are 
insisting that the article on the purchase and sale of agricultural land be 
removed from the Land Code and if it is put to us with the article removed it 
is quite possible that the Duma will pass it... 

[Presenter] What about the president? 

[Zyuganov] He is thinking it over. At our recent meeting he said he would not 
insist on the land purchase and sale and I think it is quite possible that 
the government will itself remove this article from the Land Code... 

I am sure that the attempts to sell off the railways, the electricity 
networks, the last remaining oil and gas pipelines, the telecommunications 
system, the land and forests will continue. 

[Presenter] Perhaps the problem here is that there is no law and everything 
becomes criminalized. Things are sold but without any legislation, any 
taxation or any strict accounting. 

[Zyuganov] Let us punish the people who do these things, like selling off 
industrial concerns cheaply... I think the government and the president 
should respond rigorously and should take the appropriate action. It is some 
time since I put in a submission on this but I see that they intend to do 
nothing about it and by hook or by crook will sell off these businesses to 
people they rely on... 

[Presenter] What we are talking about here is people doing exactly what they 
like, I think, Gennadiy Andreyevich. But surely, not paying one's debts, say, 
to the Paris Club, is in the same category, wouldn't you say? 

[Zyuganov] Sorry, but all that is needed is to set up the necessary machinery 
to do so. If you look at what actually happens in the world with countries in 
the same situation as ours, you see that none of them are in a hurry to pay 
their debts. All that is needed is to negotiate an agreement and determine 
the procedures for repayment. What is needed is a new policy. 

[Presenter] Could you say briefly whether you recommend the government pay 
its debts or wait a while? 

[Zyuganov] I am calling on them to pursue an intelligent policy on the debts 
and on debt repayment. They should not be in any hurry and should first 
ensure everyone has a decent minimum income and that teachers, doctors, 
engineers, military personnel and hardworking people get a good salary, and 
should also support our own producers of goods. 

[Presenter] Thank you, Gennadiy Andreyevich... 

*******

#9
Date: Tue, 09 Jan 2001 
From: Vladimir Shlapentokh <shlapent@pilot.msu.edu> 
Subject: Putin's Uniqueness in Russian History: The Prospects for
Prolonged Corruption in a Nondemocratic Society

Putin's Uniqueness in Russian History: The Prospects for Prolonged
Corruption in a Nondemocratic Society
By Vladimir Shlapentokh
(Professor of Sociology, Michigan State University)

As President Putin's first year in office draws to a close, there are still
two basic questions on everyone's mind: Who is Putin, and Where is he taking
Russia? Perhaps a better question, one that underlies both inquiries, is:
Where does the new president fit in Russian history? That is, what does his
regime look like beside the fourteen regimes of the last two centuries?
Comparing and contrasting Putin's first year in office to these regimes may
allow us to better predict Russia's future.
With the exception of the Provisional Government of 1917, the regimes of
the last two hundred years (with some variation from one to the next) have
all been authoritarian in nature. Even Boris Yeltsin's rule, the most
liberal after that of the Provisional Government, was authoritarian,
particularly after 1993. Putin's regime clearly falls into this category. In
his first year as president, he made several moves toward dismantling the
fledgling democracy and no moves toward improving it. He practically
eliminated the division of power and evidently reduced the freedom of the
press. The fact that Putin's Kremlin manipulates the courts is well-known in
society. According to the All-Russian Center of Public Opinion Studies
(VTSIOM), in October 2000, two-thirds of the people refused to label their
society "democratic."
All of the new Russian regimes can be divided into two groups according to
the changes which were implemented by the new ruler. Some of them emerged
with a more liberal ideology (i.e., the regimes of Alexander I, Alexander
II, the Provisional Government, Nikita Khrushchev, Mikhail Gorbachev and
Boris Yeltsin), and some with a more authoritarian one (i.e., the regimes of
Nicholas I, Alexander III, Vladimir Lenin, Joseph Stalin, Leonid Brezhnev
and Yurii Andropov). Putin evidently directed the course of history once
again toward authoritarianism.
Focusing on the new leaders' justifications for the changes they wanted to
make is another way of separating them into groups. Several regimes were
headed by "modernizers," who demanded changes, or even revolutions in order
to "catch up" with the West. Among these leaders, some favored liberal
reforms (i.e., Alexander I and II, the Provisional Government, Khrushchev,
Gorbachev and Yeltsin), and others used authoritarian or even repressive
methods (i.e., Lenin, Stalin and Andropov). The second group claimed that
their changes were the only way to save the country from chaos and
disintegration (i.e., Nicholas I, Alexander III and Brezhnev).
Putin belongs to the second group. His crusade to save Russia from
disintegration and separatism has become the theme of his presidency and the
legitimization of his regime. For instance, the war against separatist
Chechnia was the number one item on Putin's agenda when he came to power.
In most cases, the political course chosen by a new leader stayed the same
throughout the regime's existence, even if there were some which eventually
reversed the original direction. On one hand, there were no changes in the
authoritarian orientation during the regimes of Nicholas I, Alexander I,
Lenin (politically, Lenin's New Economic Policy did not change anything),
Stalin, Brezhnev and Andropov. On the other hand, Alexander II, Khrushchev,
Gorbachev and Yeltsin left the historical arena as liberals despite some
ideological fluctuation during their regimes. Alexander I was the only
leader to make a complete about-face. He began his reign with the liberal
Mikhail Speransky and ended it with the curmudgeon Alexander Arakcheev. It
is difficult to imagine that Putin will reverse his present course.
Considering his background, his respect for Stalin, Dzerzhinsky and
Andropov, and his decision in December to restore the old Soviet anthem, not
to mention his close rapport with Communists and nationalists, it is quite
probable that Putin will join the absolute majority of Russian leaders and
continue his original course until the end of his presidency.
Putin's regime is similar to the previous regimes in some respects, but
very different in others. First of all, no ruler rose to power from such a
politically obscure position as Putin's. He was virtually unknown in the
country only one year before he became president. All of his predecessors
had been seasoned politicians years before they took charge. This was true
even for the colorless party leader Konstantin Chernenko, who served as the
head of a department at the Central Committee for twenty years before he
became general secretary; eight years prior to his rise, he worked as the
secretary of the Central Committee.
The only politician who ascended to power as quickly as Putin was Alexander
Kerensky, who headed the Provisional Government in July 1917, though only
for a few months. Like Putin, no one could predict the course of Kerensky's
career even a half year before he came to power. However, Kerensky had been
more established in politics than Putin. Before the start of WWI, the
bureaucracy and the educated class recognized Kerensky as the eloquent
leader of the Labor Faction in the State Duma.
We should not overestimate the importance of the leader's past experiences
with respect to his future performance. There are simply too many different
circumstances which influence behavior, including one's ability to learn. At
the same time, it is impossible to ignore the fact that Putin came to power
with far less experience than his fourteen predecessors. Though there has
been disagreement on this issue, in the opinion of some historians, only
Nicholas I was as ill-prepared as Putin. Some historians also refer to Lenin
as a less prepared leader. While it is true that Lenin had no government
experience, almost two decades before the October revolution, his position
as the leader of the Bolshevik party prepared him to become the founder of
the Soviet totalitarian society.
Before his appointment as the head of the Federal Service of Security in
July 1998, Putin worked as an assistant to the head of the office of the
Leningrad mayor (1990-1996), and then as a second level manger in the
presidential administration (1996-1998). By all accounts, his two
predecessors, Gorbachev and Yeltsin, were much more experienced.
The exceptional character of Putin's regime lies also in the mechanism
which allowed this low rank politician to become president. When analyzing
the transfer of power from Yeltsin to Putin, it seems less provocative to
compare it to monarchic Russia. In the nineteenth century, all tsars had
been members of the imperial family—either sons (i.e., Alexander I, II, III,
and Nicholas II), or brothers (Nicholas I). The monarchic mechanism for
transferring power was relatively simple and worked even under critical
circumstances, such as during the Decembrists' revolt in 1825.
More interesting is the emergence of new regimes during the Soviet period.
Though all of the Soviet leaders were concerned about the smoothness of
moving from one regime to the next, none of them prepared their heir, or
gave instructions about who should succeed them. "Lenin's Will," a famous
letter written by the dying leader in 1923 to the next congress of the
party, did not contain a direct recommendation for the next leader. The same
is true for all Soviet leaders after Lenin. With the exception of
Khrushchev, who was ousted from his position, all of them had an opportunity
to appoint an heir, particularly those who were ill for an extended period
before their deaths (i.e., Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko). There are
various hypotheses which explain why none of them recommended their
successors. For instance, there may have been a silent assumption that the
second secretary of the Central Committee would serve as the next leader.
Another theory assumes that it was too dangerous for the current leader to
declare an official heir. This fear materialized for Yeltsin. After his vice
president Alexander Rutskoy participated in a coup against him in 1993,
Yeltsin decided to omit the position of vice president from his constitution.
Whatever were the real motives of the Soviet leaders, they behaved as true
republicans. Later, in "democratic Russia," the spirit of monarchism was
resurrected under Yeltsin. With pleasure, he assumed his title as "tsar
Boris," given to him by his retinue. Putin also declared his respect for
monarchy in both words and deeds, accepting his undemocratic road to the
Kremlin. Yeltsin appointed his heir as a real monarch to the great
stupefaction of his subjects and the world. He was able to impose his will
and bring Putin to the Kremlin. In fact, the multistage design to legalize
Yeltsin's choice through the presidential election was one of the most
brilliant in contemporary political history. Within a few months, the
Kremlin team elevated an unknown politician to the pinnacle of power. It
designed a plan which exploited the war in Dagestan, the explosions in
Moscow, and the all-out war in Chechnia. The Kremlin also led a devastating
TV campaign against Putin's rivals and created a new political movement from
scratch. Ultimately, it was victorious in both the parliamentary and
presidential elections.
Another uniqueness of Putin's regime is the extent to which various
elements of the old regime were preserved. This is not, at first, surprising
considering the fact that all new regimes temporarily prolonged the careers
of high officials from the previous regime. Khrushchev appointed Georgii
Zhukov as "his" deputy minister of defense almost immediately after Stalin's
death in 1953. However, he was unable to make Zhukov his full minister until
1995. Under similar circumstances, Brezhnev had to wait three years before
appointing his own minister of defense.
While the new leaders often kept officials from the old regime, they always
removed anyone who tried to obstruct their elevation to power. In the first
year of his tenure, Gorbachev dismissed two members of the Politburo,
Grigorii Romanov and Victor Grishin.
Putin, however, did not follow this almost universal trend. According to
Yeltsin's new memoir, Anatolii Chubais was an ardent opponent of Putin's
candidacy for the position of heir. At least for now, Putin has not
threatened his position. Chubais remains a highly influential politician.
Putin's regime was influenced by the previous regime more than any other in
Russian history. It would be absurd to talk about Stalin's influence on
Khrushchev's Kremlin, or to even suppose that the name of the predecessor
was mentioned in a positive light at the Central Committee when either
Andropov or Gorbachev was general secretary.
In contrast, Putin started his rule by praising his predecessor. He devoted
his first decree not to one of the numerous social problems, but to the old
president. He provided Yeltsin with immunity and assured him that his family
would live in material luxury in the future. He evidently promised Yeltsin
that he would halt any investigation into corruption that might lead to "the
family." Yeltsin was allowed to stay in the government residence Gorky-9,
which is similar to Camp David, with its numerous aids, servants and medical
personnel. He also has access to the presidential aircraft, another
unprecedented fact. Moreover, Putin visits regularly with the former
president, like a subordinate calling on his boss. On one of his visits,
Yeltsin condemned him for his behavior during the Kursk submarine disaster.
It is hard to imagine an American or French president being summoned and
then reproached by the previous president. During the appointment procedures
for the new attorney general, Yeltsin objected to Putin's first candidate.
In the end, Putin reversed his decision and followed "the family's"
recommendation.
What further separates Putin from the historical path is the fact that he
kept the head of Yeltsin's presidential administration as his own during his
first year as president. No tsar or general secretary in history has done
the same. Yeltsin's main advisor Alexander Voloshin continued his position
under Putin. He is widely considered the number two politician in the
country, more influential than the prime minister. Yeltsin's daughter,
Tatiana Diachenko, and his former aid Valentin Yumashev do not hold official
positions in the new administration, and yet both of them are ranked among
the fifty most influential political figures in the country, according to an
October survey conducted by Nezavisimaia Gazeta. Several other individuals
with ostensibly close connections to "the family" were included on the lists
of the top thirty (Alexander Mamut placed twenty-fourth) and the top ten
(Roman Abramovich placed ninth) most influential politicians. It would be
highly implausible to suppose that these people, all of them Yeltsin's
vassals, changed their loyalty and vowed allegiance to the new lord.
The close interaction between the two courts—the Kremlin and Gorky-9—has
been an object of intense debate in Moscow and abroad. One of the theories
insists that Putin feels morally obligated to those who chose him as heir.
Some Moscow political scientists talk about Putin's "highly developed
feelings of gratitude and fealty to friends." This theory is rejected by
experts who tend to agree with Nicollo Macchiavelli, who said that new
rulers are more prone to eliminate those who helped them rise to power than
demonstrate their virtues.
The second theory suggests that a hostile attitude toward Yeltsin could
undermine Putin's moral authority among the Russians. The people, as the
theory goes, expect Putin to show gentility toward the senior politician.
This assumption, however, is quite precarious. Surely Putin understands that
only 1 percent of the Russians maintain positive feelings for Yeltsin.
The third theory describes a scenario in which "the family" possesses some
mechanism of control over Putin. Though it lacks direct empirical evidence,
this theory seems most credible. It is highly unlikely that Yeltsin, who
feared being prosecuted after leaving office, would appoint an heir without
first establishing some way of controlling him. As some Moscow observers
contend, Putin's shadowy past, though perhaps less tainted than other
politicians, may serve as a potential form of blackmail. President Putin was
allegedly involved in corrupt activities when he worked for Leningrad Mayor
Anatolii Sobchak, who has also been suspected of corruption. As the head of
the FSB (the Federal Service of Security), Putin helped Sobchak flee Russia
illegally in 1998 when the attorney general called on him for questioning.
Yeltsin recounted this episode in his latest memoir in order to make a point
about Putin's loyalty to his bosses.
As another possible mechanism of control, several Moscow analysts, leading
Russian newspapers and the television station NTV connected the Kremlin with
the Moscow bombings in September 1999. The blasts were timed perfectly with
the presidential election and played an important role in Putin's rise to
power. Many ordinary Russians rejected the official explanation that the
bombings of residential buildings had been the work of Chechen terrorists.
Quite a few people supported the horrible theory that the Kremlin had been
involved in an attack on its own people. A VTSIOM survey conducted in
October 1999 asked the Russians to choose two alternatives from a list of
the most likely forces behind the bombings: 15 percent pointed to "the
Kremlin," 21 percent said "the forces that want to destabilize the country
and cancel the elections," 11 percent said "Berezovsky and other oligarchs,"
26 percent said "Russian criminal structures," 51 percent blamed "Chechen
warlords," and 33 percent pointed to "Islamic fundamentalists."
The Russian public is well aware of Putin's dependence on "the family."
According to an October 2000 survey by VTSIOM, one half of the Russians (48
percent) expressed their concern about Putin's dependance on Yeltsin, a
significant increase since August (35 percent). What is more, the people
have a clear picture of the realignment of forces in the Kremlin. When
asked, "Who does Putin rely on for his power?" the Russians ranked the
"power ministries" first, "the family" second, and the "oligarchs" third.
Whatever was the cause of Putin's dependence on "the family," he now has
the power to either maintain this relationship, weaken it, or destroy it
completely. According to Moscow sources, the Kremlin has been weighing the
costs and benefits of each alternative for some time.
The question now is, What strategy will Putin choose? Will he pursue a
"quiet" strategy, one that supports the status quo and allows only for slow
and rather insignificant changes? Or will he start a crusade against "the
family"?
Paradoxically, the decision making process in today's Kremlin is more
complicated than in the Kremlin before the start of perestroika in 1985.
Indeed, the major goals of the Soviet leadership were more straightforward
and consistent. The leadership wanted to maintain full control of society
and expand the country's geopolitical role in the world. At the same time,
since there were no real factions in the leadership (an invention of
Sovietologists of the 1970s), it was not necessary for the leaders to think
about the impact of internal conflicts on the decision making process. For
instance, there was no disunity among the leaders when it came to the
invasions of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Afghanistan in 1979.
Today's Kremlin is a different place entirely. Anti-democratic and
nationalist sentiments make up the core of Putin's ideology and determine
his long term goals. However, the different means by which he plans to reach
these goals are quite eclectic and inconsistent. Putin tries to entertain
good relations with the West while pandering to the anti-Western feelings of
the army and FSB. He also wants to enhance his relations with countries such
as Iraq, Iran, and Cuba which are at odds with America. He promotes a
liberal economy, but rudely intervenes in private businesses when it is
useful for his political purposes. While maintaining a good relationship
with Alexander Prokhanov, the editor of the antisemitic weekly Zavtra, he
recently attended the Jewish celebration of Hanukkah. Putin's eclectic
behavior often turns into blatant lies, particularly when he talks about his
respect for democracy, or the independence of the attorney general's office
and the courts from the Kremlin.
Putin combines his inconsistent goals and blatant lies with a weak
political will, a fear of making risky decisions, and feelings of insecurity
with respect to his power. Brezhnev and his team felt the same way during
the first few years after Khrushchev's ousting. The new regime worried that
the ousting itself could undermine its legitimacy. Putin is probably still
under the spell of his unusual and suspicious elevation to power. He was
reluctant to act as a strong leader during the Kursk submarine crisis. He
was also unable to stop the acrimonious public debates between Minister of
Defense Igor Sergeev and Chief of the General Staff Anatolii Kvashnin over
military doctrine. The deep rift between these top military officials
humiliated the army. The Kremlin is torn on all major issues by several
opposing factions, particularly in matters of economic policy. These
factions regularly denounce each other on television. For instance, Prime
Minister Mikhail Kasianov, the head of the Russian Energy System Anatolii
Chubais, and Putin's economic adviser Andrei Illarionov seem to be in a
continuous public conflict over many critical issues, demonstrating an
absence of any serious program for the country's economic development.
Putin's deeply contradictory interests, his evident weakness as a leader,
and his reluctance to make radical decisions explain why nobody knows how
the president will treat the "family" and corruption in the next years.
There are several good reasons for Putin to declare war against Yeltsin.
First, there is Putin's natural desire to free himself from Yeltsin's
influence. Indeed, the head of any organization in the world, all the more
the official leader of a big country, would be vexed by a restraint on his
power by the previous boss.
Second, a break with Yeltsin is essential for a serious fight against
corruption. A sharp separation from the previous regime is necessary for
cleaning society, overcoming the weakness of the state (particularly its law
enforcement agencies), curbing the arbitrariness of local governors,
creating authentic competitive markets, attracting massive foreign
investments and curtailing the intervention of big money and criminals in
politics.
By refusing to combat corruption, Putin would demonstrate his willingness
to accept the current level of lawlessness in society, which would encourage
the further criminalization and demoralization of society as well as
alienate the people from the authorities, particularly in the province.
According to an October 2000 survey conducted by VTSIOM, no less than 80
percent of the Russians believed that their moral values (including family
values, labor morale, concern about others, and tolerance) had been on a
steep decline for the last ten years.
Khrushchev faced the same challenges as Putin when he moved the country
away from Stalin's regime. During his famous speech at the 20th party
congress in 1956, he divulged and condemned Stalin's atrocities. This was a
vital step for the implementation of his new policy. If Putin wants to be
the "cleaner" of Russian society, he will have to attack corruption (and
certainly "the family") with the same passion as Khrushchev's denunciation
of mass repressions.
Third, there is no doubt that a resolute break with the old regime would
expand Putin's popularity, creating a reserve of mass support to counter
future economic crises (like the financial collapse in August 1999), or
technological disasters (such as the Kursk tragedy in August 2000). If Putin
staged a sort of "20th party congress" of his own, it would take a different
form and would not be as sensational as the actual event in 1956 when
Khrushchev disclosed Stalin's atrocities. If Putin denounced the corruption
of Yeltsin's regime and brought forth strong evidence to back his claims,
the facts probably would not surprise anyone.
However, it would be wrong to underestimate the effect of Putin's "20th
party congress" on the Russians. If the universal corruption of Yeltsin's
regime was confirmed by the Kremlin (the official leadership of the
country), and not only by the media which lost trust in society, it would
have a tremendous impact on public opinion. Moreover, the Russian people (no
less than two-thirds) would support Putin's attack on Yeltsin, who is seen
as an object of contempt, far more than they supported Khrushchev's
denigration of Stalin, who they regarded as a demigod.
At the same time, there are several reasons for Putin to maintain the
status quo, preserve his relationship with Yeltsin and tolerate corruption.
First, Putin may suffer serious consequences if he withdrew the promises he
made to Yeltsin before July 1999. The price of breaking with the old leader
may be so high that any rebellion in the foreseeable future will be excluded.
Second, a frontal attack against corruption would mean the revision of
privatization with some risk of economic disorganization. The government's
resources are meager. Its current ability to advance state investments is
insignificant. Attacking the oligarchs, who run two-thirds of the Russian
economy, may cause further economic setbacks. Many of them have intertwined
themselves in Russia's global economic activity. Their international ties
are no doubt important for the future of the economy.
A third, perhaps even more serious deterrent is the fact that the "stormy
strategy" would pit the new president against not only the oligarchs, but
the majority of the political and economic elite, who have been involved
with illegal activities. The contemporary Russian ruling class would be
hostile toward a public break with Yeltsin's regime and an anti-corruption
campaign just as the Soviet nomenklatura was angry with Khrushchev's
condemnation of Stalin and the sacking of Stalinists from the state and
party apparatus. The post Soviet elite, along with the media and experts who
serve them, see corruption as a "normal phenomenon." They suggest that
corruption in Russia is no worse than in the USA, or even "in clean
Switzerland." Having visited Russia in the fall of 2000, I found that it is
already non comme il faut to talk about corruption in a society of
successful Russians, who dismiss the calls for a fight against corruption as
quixotic.
Fourth, it is evident in Russia that the most efficient fight against
corruption is impossible without a significant improvement of democratic
institutions, particularly the judicial system. Meanwhile, all trends in the
country show signs of a retreat from democracy. The only other option would
be repressive measures. In this case, the Kremlin (which cannot rely on the
country's corrupt law enforcement agencies) would have to ask for the
support of rabid nationalists, particularly in the province (like Alexander
Barkashov's dormant units of the Russian Nazis). These steps would
inevitably unleash the most dangerous nationalist forces in the country. Any
public action by the nationalists would be inevitably joined by hoodlums.
The use of an aggressive mob for the achievement of a leader's goals has
never played a part in Russian political history. Even Nicholas II, a
reactionary and anti-Semite, did not want to support the notorious "Black
Hundred," an organization of extreme nationalists, in its fight against the
enemies of the monarchy. Lenin and all other Soviet leaders were afraid of
any spontaneous activity, even when it supported them. It seems clear that
Putin does not want to take the risk of appealing to the vengeful feelings
of the masses.
In his first year as president, Putin oscillated between a relatively
hostile stance toward "the family" and a far more amicable one. On a few
occasions, Putin publicly demonstrated his impatience with "the family" and
its head. During his emotional meeting with the families of the perished
sailors of the Kursk submarine on August 22, he came very close to directly
condemning the old regime. Another example of Putin's discordance with
Yeltsin involves the Soviet national anthem. Dismissing Yeltsin's strong
objections, Putin restored the old Soviet music as the current national
anthem. Even more important is that the Leningrad-Chekist group (people who
worked with Putin in Leningrad in the 1990s, and his colleagues from his
long service in the KGB under Sergei Ivanov, the secretary of the Russian
Security Council) is evidently staging an offensive against "the family" and
its representatives in the presidential administration and the government.
Moscow is full of rumors about the resignation of Voloshin and Prime
Minister Mikhail Kasianov.
However, the signals in favor of the "quiet strategy" are more convincing.
Yeltsin's place in Russian politics remains intact. Putin's visits with
Yeltsin have become a regular phenomenon in Moscow political life. At
Putin's suggestion, the State Duma is planning to endorse his edict on
Yeltsin's privileges and immunity. In December, the attorney general halted
the investigation into the corruption of "the family," in particular, the
case of Mabetex, a Swiss construction firm which, according to Swiss
prosecutors, bribed Yeltsin and his family along with several of his aids.
So far, Putin's vows to strengthen the state and establish law and order
sound like empty promises. On December 26, Putin met with friendly
journalists on Russian television to discuss the country's social problems.
Throughout the entire interview, neither Putin, nor his interlocutors
mentioned corruption.
The population does not see any change in the country in comparison with
the previous period. There have been very few investigations and no trails
of corrupt officials. The public does not believe that the president is
serious about combating crime and corruption. The murder of businesspeople
has continued at the same rate as under Yeltsin. Officials from Moscow and
Petersburg are the permanent targets of hired guns. In December, the
attempted murder of Iosif Ordzhonikidze, the first Moscow deputy mayor,
became the latest exploit of professional killers operating in the capital.
Ordzhonikidze was gravely wounded and his driver died. None of the suspected
killers were taken into custody. The incompetence of the police has only
grown worse. In a recent survey, the Russians were asked about the country's
biggest problems. "The mismanagement of society" ranked second, just behind
the "low level of the economy."
Putin's conspicuous protection of "the family" contrasts with the
persecution of Vladimir Gusinsky, the owner of NTV, the only independent
television station in Russia. Putin's treatment of Gusinsky looks like a
case of revenge for NTV's anti-Putin programing during the parliamentary and
presidential elections as well as for its commentary on the explosions in
Moscow in September 1999 and its famous satirical program "Puppets" which
regularly derogates the president and several other politicians.
In the course of Russian history, Putin's regime represents a move away
from democracy. Like several leaders of the past, he emerged on the
political landscape not as modernizer of society, who wanted to catch up
with the Western economy and technology (Russia spends only 4 percent of
what America spends on science), but as a ruler, who believes that only a
strong state, or authoritarian rule can protect the country from anarchy and
disintegration.
In the next decades, Russia will most likely remain an authoritarian
country deeply engulfed in crime and corruption. It has very little chance
of making democratic progress, or establishing law and order. Only an
economic boom, which is very unlikely in view of the low inflow of Western
capital, could radically change the political landscape of the country. With
Putin's policy aimed at freezing the current state of affairs, Russia's
economy will remain weak, even if revenues from the sale of oil (the
country's main export) continue at the current levels. The country will not
present a direct threat to the world, but will continue incrementally
declining in several key areas, such as the quantity and quality of the
population, morals and order in society, science and technology, the safety
of equipment in nuclear and chemical facilities as well as the public
infrastructure and the territorial and social cohesiveness of the nation.
Obeying the historical pendulum that has swung in Russia for the last two
hundred years, only a post-Putin regime could reverse the current trend
toward authoritarianism and move the country again toward liberal capitalism
and a break with its political and economic retardation.
In the last years, the results of the American policy which tried to push
Russia toward democracy were quite meager. By the end of the century,
Washington presided not over the progress of Russian democracy, but over the
country's move from a relatively liberal regime to a much more authoritative
one. Seeing the progress of Russian democracy as a major priority, the
American policy not only failed to gain the sympathy of the Russians, but
fostered anti-Americanism in the country. Ironically, the members of the
educated class, who benefitted most from the various forms of Western
financial aid (grants, contracts, funded travel abroad, and honorariums) are
more hostile toward the West, and particularly America, than ordinary
Russians.
With the lessons learned over the last years, the American policy toward
Russia and several other emerging democracies should no longer see the
encouragement of liberal reforms, or flirtation with the Russian public as
its major tasks. Financial support should be aimed only at disarmament under
strict American control. At the same time, the United States should be ready
to react to any serious emergency in Russia, such as technological
disasters, famine, or even the adventuristic acts of the Kremlin.
Of course, the American government will and should remain interested in the
progress of democracy across the world and particularly in Russia. It should
react publicly whenever Russia shows signs of anti-democratic actions. It
should also pay close attention to the worsening problem of corruption,
which was neglected by the American policy of the past. However, Washington
should not support the illusion that it can seriously influence the
political and economic processes in Russia.

Acknowledgment: The author wishes to thank Joshua Woods for his editorial
contribution to this article.

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