January 10, 2001   

This Date's Issues:   5016 • 5017 • 5018

Johnson's Russia List
#5016
19 January 2001
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
Nezavisimaya Gazeta: RUSSIA TODAY, TOMORROW AND IN TEN YEARS. THE COUNTRY AND ITS AUTHORITIES. (Views of Liliya SHEVTSOVA, Igor BUNIN, Igor KLYAMKIN, Sergei MARKOV, Andranik MIGRANYAN, Vyacheslav NIKONOV, Mark URNOV, and Alexander TSIPKO)

*******

Nezavisimaya Gazeta
December 21, 2000
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
RUSSIA TODAY, TOMORROW AND IN TEN YEARS. THE COUNTRY AND
ITS AUTHORITIES
     The unpredictable past is coming to an end. Is the
predictable future ahead?
     At the turn of the century and millennium the editorial
board of Nezavisimaya Gazeta turned to leading Russian experts
- political scientists, politicians and journalists - with a
request to share their vision of the current situation in this
country and how they see the contours of Russia at the end of
the first decade of the forthcoming century.
     Naturally, we also proceeded from the 10th jubilee of
Nezavisimaya Gazeta. We know what events took place in 1990,
when the newspaper was founded. So, what will we see in 2010,
when the newspaper celebrates its 20th jubilee?
     Seven, eight and even nine years ago our authors proved to
be able to foresee many aspects of the development of the
situation in Russia and predict much on the basis of scientific
analysis and their knowledge of Russian history, and, possibly,
to guess even more, although many of their forecasts did not
come true.
     In other words, ten years is quite a reasonable time span
making it possible to look into the future without relying
exclusively on imagination and intuition. Besides, this time
span correlates chronologically with the jubilee of
Nezavisimaya Gazeta.
     Below are the questions and the answers to them.
     1. What are, in your view, the main problems of the
incumbent Russian authorities? To what degree can the
authorities resolve them?
     2. What will Russia be in ten years?
     3. Will Vladimir Putin still run the country in ten years?
If not, who will replace him?
     The following persons were polled: Liliya SHEVTSOVA, a
leading researcher of the Moscow Carnegie Centre; Igor BUNIN,
director-general of the Centre of Political Technologies; Igor
KLYAMKIN, director of the Institute of Sociological Analysis;
Sergei MARKOV, director of the Centre of Political Studies;
Andranik MIGRANYAN, professor of MGIMO (Moscow State Institute
of International Relations), vice-president of the Reforma
Foundation; Vyacheslav NIKONOV, president of the Politika
Foundation; Mark URNOV, chairman of the Ekpertiza Foundation;
Alexander TSIPKO, a journalist and political scientist, and
others.
    
     Lilia SHEVTSOVA:
     "At a certain stage absolute power degenerates"  1. The
leader's omnipotence is the basic problem of the current power.
Indisputably, it is necessary to extricate ourselves from the
period of degradation seen under Yeltsin.
However, while the world civilisation is looking for ways to
improve power through the formation of independent
institutions, Russia is returning to the reproduction of
absolute rule. "This is the only way to revive society," the
advocates of new autocracy say frightening us with the horrors
of conflicts, if the leader fails to concentrate all power in
his hands.
     But is there a guarantee that the personification of power
will not be an end in itself? Secondly, is there any proof that
absolute rule will be effective from the economic point of
view? However, the economic effectiveness of the President's
power vertical was demonstrated already under Yeltsin. Thirdly,
I have doubts about the fact that in the conditions of our
society, with its traditions of connivance, the federal centre
will be able to create a new "drive belt." Most likely, all
these efforts will result in a new trap - while controlling
everything, the leader will have to be responsible for all
matters, including the failures of the President's entourage.
We are again running the risk of seeing the impotence of
absolute power. Or perhaps, is the aim of the advocates of new
authoritarian rule to make Putin omnipresent but powerless?
     Will the federal centre be able to become aware of the
threats linked with the concentration of power resources and
set up responsible political institutions? So far, movement is
in the opposite direction - towards the annihilation of
parliament, the multi-party system and the independent mass
media. This is surprisingly reckless! Even if the incumbent
authorities do not think about the efficiency of decision-
making within the framework of the "drive belt" system, they
should at least take care of their survival! The point is that
the impeccable purity of the political scene will sooner or
later begin to generate destructive forces and non-system
leaders.
     2. You can only be confident in the fact that in 10 years'
time Russia will continue moving along the road of state
capitalism. Howevere, it is still unclear what will be the
degree of freedom and coercion in society. There is no accord
in contemporary Russia as regards its past, present and future,
which puts in doubt the idea that final, universally recognized
rules of the game will be established in the country in the
near future. Most likely, the policy of leaps in various
directions will remain. Both the authorities and society will
continue to probe the limits of their possibilities and
aspirations. The Yeltsin era has already demonstrated that even
within the framework of autocracy there is a choice of
development models - oligarchic, bureaucratic or power-based
capitalism. The vertical power structure, which Putin is
creating, will also be inevitably elastic, at least due to the
fact that there have always been gaps between the facade and
the content in Russia. To all appearances, in 10 years even his
supporters will come to see what results the "drive belt"
system can produce. The question is how the situation will
develop after that - whether the pendulum will swing in the
direction of dictatorship (in this case, the question is how
much time it will take us to be convinced that this way will
lead us to a deadlock) or whether we shall begin to extricate
ourselves from the system of absolute rule. It all depends on
how quickly Putin will be able to test the efficiency of his
"civilised liberalism" and what its consequences will be:
either an inclination to have more order or a striving to rely
on institutions rather than on the saviour.
     3. If Putin is still in the Kremlin in ten years, this
will actually mean the establishment of an actual monarchy in
Russia. The "gutta-percha" nature of the current regime and the
servility of the ruling class do not exclude movement in that
direction. But the logic of the development of this regime
suggests that at a certain stage autocracy degenerates and, in
the conditions of a fragmented society and the regime's weak
power component, it can exist only at the expense of bargaining
introduced by Yeltsin. The essence of this bargaining consists
in the distribution of resources in exchange for the
preservation of power. That is why, the lack of rotation in the
Kremlin in ten years means the inevitable degradation of power.
     But it is hardly possible to avoid changes in the highest
post owing to the fact that the political class in Russia will
be inevitably renewed by virtue of demographic reasons. It is
possible to avoid the rotation of power only by violence. But,
fortunately, there are no means for such violence. But maybe
Putin will prove his exceptional qualities as a leader? In this
case, the ability to step down in time is the manifestation of
leadership. In any case, it is hard to presume that a new
country, which Russia will undoubtedly become in ten years,
will still have the same post-Soviet leader. Most likely, we
shall see a new person in the Kremlin.
Who this person will be depends on what Putin accomplishes and
what legacy he leaves behind.
    
     Igor BUNIN:
     "The successor nominated by the ruling elite will  succeed
Putin in his post"
     1. The first problem is the choice of the future path of
political development. Naturally, no choice between abstract
authoritarianism and ideal democracy exists. The real
alternative is whether to further emasculate the system of
checks and balances (with the preservation of the formal
democratic institutions) or preserve it at the current level,
even if somewhat weakened in 2000 (the independent role of
regional elites, non-state mass media has been sharply reduced
but has not disappeared completely, etc.).
     The second problem is to ensure that the policy of
authorities corresponds to the needs of society. At present,
both the Communist and liberal cultures are in the minority
(however, liberal culture has a chance, as the youth that has
been formed in market conditions is receptive to it). The
prevailing aspiration is the desire for a strong paternal state
with patriotic ideology. If the state performs at least the
minimum of paternal functions (due to the lower level of the
population's demands), the policy of the authorities will enjoy
the support of the majority of the population. However, if the
state proves unable again to pay wages and pensions on time,
society will be disappointed.
     The third problem is the relationship between economic and
administrative reform. The question is whether administrative
reform should create conditions for economic reform (the reform
of the civil service, the unification of legislation, etc.) or
whether it will become an end in itself, while the economic
reforms will be pushed to the background and may thus fade
away. The choice will have to be made very soon. It is clear
that there will be no second version of the Gaidar shock
therapy but the choice between the liberal and inertia options
of economic reform remains.
     The fourth problem is to determine Russia's place in the
world. It is necessary for Russia to become a state, which has
to be reckoned with in the world. At the same time, it is also
important for Russia not to cut itself off from the community
of civilised countries (its membership in the G-8, the Council
of Europe, its plans to join the WTO). Russia will evidently
preserve the western vector of its development. At the same
time, it will try to get rid of the inferiority and
apprenticeship complexes.
     The fifth problem involves the uneven development of the
regions. The difference is great between the centres of growth
(Moscow, St. Petersburg, large cities, the regions of the fuel
and energy complex) and depressed regions, and the
disproportions in their development do not get any smaller. In
depressed regions it is realistic to make a stake on the
"points of growth" with regard to enterprises attractive for
investments.
     The sixth problem is the fight against crime and
corruption. Authorities will hardly be able to achieve
revolutionary results in this respect, but by establishing the
universal rules of the game in the economy, they can contribute
to some reduction in the level of corruption in society.
     The seventh problem is Chechnya. Although it has now
receded into the background, it has not disappeared altogether.
The authorities have so far failed to resolve the main task of
the operation - to destroy terrorists. They have also been
unable so far to create effective governing structures in the
republic. It is obvious that the guerilla war and terrorist
acts will continue for a long time. It will also take much time
to "rear" the new pro-Russian elite.
     The eighth (last but no less important) problem is the
creation of an effective system of state governance and the
execution of adopted decisions. The way this problem is
resolved will largely determine the degree (or at least the
speed) of the solution of other problems.
     2. In ten years Russia will at best be able to catch up
with the less developed countries of Eastern Europe (for
example, Slovakia). The economic growth can continue, although
no economic miracle will happen. In politics, the main
democratic institutions will remain but the degree of the
development of civil society will continue to be at a low
level. This will be due to the insufficient demand for this
idea in society, rather than the policy of the authorities.
Naturally, there will be no victory of liberal values;
however, they will not disappear altogether and, on the
contrary, will be able to expand the area of their influence.
Russia's international role will to a considerable degree
depend on its ability to resolve its internal problems. The
western vector of its development will, on the whole, remain.
However, it will be accompanied by the demonstrative
manifestations of Russian self-identity.
     3. It is doubtful that Vladimir Putin will continue to run
the country ten years after. It will also be hardly possible to
carry out the constitutional reform that would allow the
President to run for office for the third time or increase the
term of presidential powers. This reform contradicts the
interests of many groups of influence, and not only those of
them which lost in the 1999-2000 inter-clan struggle. The
successor nominated by the ruling elite will succeed Putin in
his post.
    
     Igor KLYAMKIN:
     "The conservative wave that has brought up Putin will most
likely abate in ten years"
     1. These problems can be condensed to two main problems.
First of all, this refers to the principles and the rules of
the game, in compliance with which state power acts and the
observance of which it ensures. These principles and rules must
correspond to the tasks of modernisation and the latter cannot
be successful, if the state continues to be shadow (so far, it
remains as such) and fails to become a law-governed state (so
far, it only imitates being a law-based state and uses the law
instrumentally and selectively and not as a universal
principle).
     The second problem is linked with the first one and deals
with the subject of modernisation and the legal order necessary
for its implementation. Corrupted domestic bureaucracy, which
differs principally from that in the West and has not yet
passed through the school of modernisation, cannot be the
target of such modernisation. However, it seems that the
authorities make a stake precisely on it. The practice of
removing particular influential groups (the heads of regions,
oligarchs) from political decision-making does not eliminate
the privatisation of the state and only frees the main group
which privatises administrative resources (bureaucracy) from
rivals.
     Russian bureaucracy can contribute to modernisation in two
cases. The first one involves the subordination of bureaucracy
to dictatorship power. There were such examples in Russian
history and they are well-known. It is also well-known that in
these cases modernisation was quite specific and had nothing to
do either with a free market economy or legal order. The second
variant is the appearance of influential and independent
entities in society that are interested in having the
bureaucracy play according to the universal legal rules rather
than the norms of shadow business. In modern conditions the
Russian business circles could aspire for this role. Their
interests increasingly diverge from those of bureaucrats'
corporate interests and they have begun to formulate the norms
of extricating themselves from the shadow. However, the class
of entrepreneurs should stop being an appendage of the state,
i.e. an appendage of the same bureaucracy, to play this role
and thus stimulate the development of a civil society.
     So far, there is an impression that the authorities
understand that the first and openly dictatorial model holds no
prospects. At the same time, they are afraid of moving towards
the second model. This means that either consciously or
unconsciously the authorities make a stake on bureaucracy,
which they hope to make more dependent on them with the help of
additional bureaucratic structures (in supra-regional
administrative districts).
     The problems I am speaking about cannot be resolved if the
country moves along this road. Until explicit signs of the
country's movement in the other direction appear, there are no
grounds to say that the incumbent power will manage to cope
with the problems that have been outlined.
     2. To dwell on what Russia will be in ten years, it is
necessary to know what will take place during these ten years
and what policy the authorities will pursue. Of course, there
can be no talk of a historic miracle which we shall witness in
case the authorities choose a poly-subject scenario, under
which power relies not only on bureaucracy but also on business
which is extricating itself from its supervision;
Russia will not become a prospering country by modern standards
during the said period. However, in this case it will get an
impulse of modernisation development, which is quite doubtful
under the mono-subject (bureaucratic) scenario.
     By today it seems that the final choice has not been made
(at least, it has not been demonstrated to society, which leads
to the build-up of uncertainty and absence of confidence).
However, the observed trends make it possible to presume that
power is more inclined towards the bureaucratic model, which by
virtue of its inefficiency will be drawn towards its
transformation into the authoritarian and bureaucratic model,
which is more traditional for Russia (it will be implemented by
Putin or the politician of an openly traditionalist orientation
who may become Putin's rival already at the next elections).
And this despite the fact that the poly-subject model would be
more promising. It seems that Russia has entered a conservative
political cycle when reformist tasks give way to the tasks of
putting things in order and stabilising the situation
("strengthening the power vertical"). Considering the fact that
the former tasks are far from being resolved in this country,
there are no grounds to believe that the conservative
stabilisation can be stable.
However, ten years (approximately, of course) may be required
for the political class and society to get rid of the current
conservative hopes and illusions, after which the commencement
of a new reformist cycle is quite possible.
     3. I have doubts about this. It is not that in 2010 Putin
will be able to be the country's President only in case of the
change of the current Constitution. The point is that the
conservative political wave which has brought Putin to power
will most likely subside by that time and the demand for new
reformist leaders will emerge. However, I would not dismiss
constitutional norms either. The maximum that the incumbent
President can count on is to stay in power until 2011 (if he
succeeds in extending the presidential term to seven years).
However, even this looks unrealistic today, as well as the
introduction of the constitutional right to the third term.
So, what remains after all? Coronation? But let our monarchists
keep the privilege to indulge in fantasies on this score.
    
     Sergei MARKOV:
     "The task of authorities is to restore and nationalise the
state"
     1. The basic problems of the incumbent authorities:
     - to restore the state. Over the past ten years the state
has existed in a semi-destroyed and semi-privatised state. The
task is to restore and nationalise it, i.e. to wrest it out of
the hands of the financial and regional oligarchs, and also the
power oligarchs that have become stronger recently;
     - in doing so, it is necessary to restore a modern
democratic state instead of the Soviet or authoritarian
pre-Soviet one. This means that it is necessary to find a new
democratic form of Russian statehood, something that has never
been seen in Russian history so far;
     - it is necessary to form not only state institutions but
also non-state ones, such as the right of private ownership,
for example;
     - it is necessary to divide clearly the market and
non-market spheres. The market sphere is the area of the
application of private initiative while the non-market sphere
ensures general interests and is determined by the political
will of the majority of the population;
     - it is necessary to elaborate a strategy for Russia's
modernisation. The current programme stipulates tactics rather
than a strategy and not for the country as a whole but for the
economy only;
     - it is necessary to ensure the country's spiritual
revival and restore moral standards in their rights, including
labour morals. Russia needs a uniting system of values, ideals
and norms of behaviour, i.e. a broad ideology. Most people in
Russia are not economically oriented. Order for them is not
only social and economic stability but also a feeling of social
justice. The formula: "Russia must become European but keep its
Russian soul" could become the general idea of this integrating
ideology.
     To implement the strategic project of Russia's
modernisation, it is necessary to form the subject of
modernisation. It can include the modernistically-minded part
of bureaucracy, the socially responsible part of business
community, a part of the intelligentsia constructively oriented
towards cooperation with the authorities, and the part of civil
society that has found its bearing and that has got firmly to
its feet.
     There is evidence to suggest that the Russian authorities
can fulfil these tasks: the Kremlin team includes young,
brilliantly educated and Europe-oriented professionals largely
sharing patriotic values. They are striving to see the status
of a leading world power returned to Russia. The country has
accumulated vast experience of the reform process; the
authorities are supported by the majority of the population and
consensus as regards the basic goals of society is gradually
appearing in the country.
     At the same time, there are a number of characteristics
that impede the Russian authorities in becoming the leader of
swift modernisation: the economic "centrism," a narrow
ideological approach, an underestimation of the role of
spiritual and, in the broader context, social factors in the
transformations of society. The Russian authorities have a weak
feeling of responsibility before their citizens, and are
characterised by the high level of moral, economic and criminal
corruption.
     2. In 10 years Russia will not differ principally from
Russia today. In any case, its difference from contemporary
Russia will not be so stark as that between Russia 2000 and
Russia 1990. The government's economic policy rather than the
revival of the state will be the most important problem. Two
main groupings will take shape: the left-wing forces will
insist on protectionist measures for Russian producers and for
stimulating the internal market, while the right-wing forces
will stand for encouraging production. The right-wing forces
will advance two models: one of them will be oriented to the
growth of national capital; however, they will substantiate
their programme not so much by economic as by ideological
theses in the spirit of Russian conservatism. The second
programme of the right-wing forces will appeal to the need of
greater integration of the Russian economy into the world
economy and demand export promotion. It will express, on the
one hand, the interests of the largest transnational
corporations (both Russian corporations oriented to external
markets and Western corporations operating in Russia within the
framework of enclave capitalism) and, on the other hand, the
interests of the new generation, very cosmopolitan in its
views. Pensioners' political activity will decline while the
political activity of the youth will, on the contrary, rise
sharply. Some young people will support the radical right-wing
cosmopolitan project of the quickest integration of the Russian
economy and society into the world community, including
Russia's accession to some international organisations, which
will somewhat restrict Russian sovereignty. Others will opt for
the radical left-wing project linked with left-wing terrorism.
Inter-ethnic relations in Russia will become much calmer;
however, Chechen terrorism will remain a permanent factor. A
large role in the radical left-wing project will be played by
the youth that will act under the slogans of greater social
justice and a new sense of life.
     The extraction of mineral resources will continue to play
the leading role in the Russian economy; at the same time, a
new direction linked with a sort of production of software and
high flexible technologies will take shape. However, Russia
will not develop these ultra-modern directions independently
but in alliance with the largest Western corporations, which
will exploit Russia's intellectual potential and ensure at the
same time the promotion of these high-tech products on the
world markets. Russian corporations will not be able to do this
independently due to some isolation of Russia on the
international scene. There will be heated disputes about the
role of religion and the church in the life of society. There
will also be a heated discussion about the possible rapid
development of education, as by that time a contradiction
between rapidly developing education in the West (everyone will
speak about the education revolution) and Russian education
which will be seriously lagging behind (above all, due to
extremely insufficient financing from the budget) will have
taken shape.
     3. In 10 years Putin will be completing his second
(seven-year) term of presidency. The presidential elections
will be tentatively scheduled for the summer of 2011. There
will be a bitter debate in the country between the basic
contenders for the President's office. Two politicians will
aspire to be Putin's successors: one of them will be nominated
by the Union of Right Forces and the other by the state
bureaucracy. At the same time, the left-wing opposition will
also put forward its candidate. Putin will not be able to
clearly determine his successor, but the problem of the
successor will not be as acute as it was for the Yeltsin
regime.
     The Putin epoch will begin to be considered as the era
that inspired great hopes but realised only some of them. At
the same time, the general result of Putin's rule will be
considered as undoubtedly positive. The second Russian
President will be given credit for extricating the country from
crisis. So, the situation in Russia will increasingly remind us
of what exists in a whole group of states of Eastern, Central
and South-Eastern Europe. That is to say that as a result of
Putin's rule, Russia will become a much more normal country
that will resemble other countries to a greater extent. In this
sense, it will be a more European state. At the same time,
there will be some disillusionment since the country will not
make the leap which the first two years of Putin's rule
promised. Everyone will treat Putin with equal respect while
newspapers will guess in what direction he will direct his
energies after the end of his second term because, as distinct
from other leaders, he will leave the presidential post when he
is still very young and energetic.
    
     Andranik MIGRANYAN:
     "It is impossible to solve anything without an adequate
power mechanism"
     1. In the first place, this is the problem of power
consolidation both vertically and horizontally and, in this
connection, the restoration of the subjecthood of the state,
which was lost during the years of chaotic reforms and
confusion. Beginning with the period of Gorbachev's rule, it
was believed in Russia that the only problem was to prepare a
good programme of economic or social development. However,
there had been actually no talks about what power mechanism was
necessary to realise even the best programme. It is impossible
to solve anything without an adequate power mechanism.
     There were many programmes but, as a result, we've got the
disintegration of the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and the
privatisation of the state by oligarchic clans, on the other.
That is why, the main problem today is the problem of power
itself, its consolidation and restoration of the subjecthood of
the state.
     Now about the second problem. Of course, power can be
consolidated but it is necessary to know for which purpose it
is consolidated. Definite tasks and goals must be set before
the state. It is necessary to have a specific programme of
extricating the economy from crisis, solving social problems
and determining the basic vector of the development of the
Russian state, the Russian economy and Russian societal life.
     It seems to me that no such programme exists today.
Perhaps, a detailed and comprehensive programme cannot be
elaborated in the near future. However, we are not seeing even
any movement in that direction. This is because the economic
growth which we are witnessing today, unfortunately, largely
depends on the prices of energy products.
     In my opinion, so far the problem is not that a programme
by Gref or someone else must be elaborated and implemented - we
are not seeing even a number of steps, which the authorities
could take by trial and error to achieve a definite result. In
the period of the Great Depression the Roosevelt administration
also did not have any programme prepared in advance and acted
by trial and error. In the final analysis, this resulted in the
emergence of a sort of orderly system which proved to be able
to wrest the US economy and society out of the severe crisis.
     Now about the third problem. For the past ten years and
perhaps longer, Russia, unfortunately, has failed to be
organically integrated into the emerging new system of
international, economic, political and military relations and
structures. Russia has failed, or the Soviet Union has failed,
to "exchange" its military might, presence in Europe and the
division of Germany for Western investments and gradual
integration into the international system of labour division,
organically modernise its economy and political system, and
become a part of the civilised world. As a result, we found
ourselves in a much worse situation than at the beginning of
perestroika. At that time the country at least had something to
convert, whereas today we have accumulated enormous debts and
found ourselves on the margins of the civilised world as we
have only mineral resources and a rather backward economy.
Today we are no longer trying to exchange our might, influence
and presence in the world, worthy and equitable with other
nations, from the position of strength, instead as we are a
sort of a money-seeking country. We have to accept all the
terms set before us, to gain entrance to the civilised
community.
     So far, Russia has limited subjecthood both inside the
country (as I said, it is only restoring its subjecthood,
consolidating power horizontally and vertically) and in
international relations where it is an object rather than a
subject. The territory of the former Soviet Union and Russia
itself are today an object of influence both from the West, and
the East and the South. So far, it is difficult to answer
unambiguously whether the incumbent authorities will be able to
adapt Russia to the world in these conditions of dependence and
limited resources.
     The authorities have already achieved certain results as
regards the consolidation of power: the Federation Council has
been scrapped as an institution which was compared by some with
the Boyar Duma; work is underway to bring local laws into
compliance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation and
the threat of the country's disintegration has been removed
from the agenda, at least for today. Other measures to this
effect involve the appointment of governor-generals and an
attempt to break the regional Fronde. There are also some
achievements as regards the efforts to consolidate power
horizontally: the state is trying to set limits on those
natural monopolies which have actually slipped out of state
control and dictated its terms to it - Gazprom, the Railways
Ministry, RAO UES Rossii and ORT public television. Struggling
with oligarchs in all areas, the authorities are succeeding in
de-privatising the state and the institutions of power. But so
far, all these efforts are in their initial stage. It is still
early to say how successful further movement will be. However,
at least in the last 15 years since the beginning of
perestroika, for the first time, we have seen an attempt to
reverse the situation and witnessed a process opposite to the
weakening of federal power and disintegration of the state.
     From the economic point of view, there have been few real
achievements, unfortunately. The Gref programme, or the new
economic programme, has not been put into operation. The
government is making some attempts at tax reform and taking
some other measures to stimulate economic growth but all of
them are very approximate and have not yielded any practical
results yet.
     2. In the coming years Russia will have to deal with the
problems, which were enumerated above and I have serious doubts
about the fact that they will be resolved in ten years.
While the first ten years following the disintegration of the
Soviet Union were the period of pulling the country apart,
plundering its resources and turning Russia into the periphery
of the world economic, political, and social life, in the
coming ten years we shall try to reverse the negative trends.
By returning subjecthood to the state, we shall have to find
ways to create economic, social, cultural and scientific
pre-requisites for embarking upon a road that will lead us
somewhere.
     If in ten years we see at least the first signs of
progress in the economy and politics, and Russia's accession to
international structures, we shall be able to say that the
decade has not been wasted.
     3. I believe that if in the coming eight years Putin
manages to solve the problems indicated above, or at least
restore the subjecthood of the state, create new points of
growth in the economy, begin Russia's organic integration into
the world economy and resolve the problem of Russia's
adaptation to the world, if he manages to cope with all this,
then the first two presidential terms will not be the limit for
such a politician.
     Only mad people and Russian radical liberals (which
amounts to the same thing) can call Russia a democratic
country. This is a typical transitional country, while
transformations pass successfully only under a certain
continuity of power. This is evidenced by the experience of
China with its Deng Xiaoping, Chile, South Korea and even
France after 1958 - de Gaulle ruled for ten years and, in
principle, could stay in power longer but simply the May 1968
revolution forced him to resign. He stepped down but Gaullism
remained and his successors ensured power continuity.
     Strictly speaking, our experience confirms the same
things. Perhaps, it is not a proper thing to recall this but
Stalin's long period in power was a certain guarantee of the
quick and radical modernisation of the Russian economy and the
country's victory in World War Two. If there had been
continuous power reshuffles during the initial stages, it is
difficult to imagine what the results would have been - both in
terms of the war and the process of modernisation. Even the USA
made an unprecedented step during the crisis by letting
Franklin Roosevelt rule for 16 years (although he did not serve
out the fourth term), as he was the man who successfully coped
with the challenges, which the country had been confronted
with.
     Let me repeat that it is not important whether Putin or
someone else will be in power. Perhaps, Putin will not be even
re-elected, if he fails to cope with the problems. But power is
the instrument, which can be used to implement certain goals.
For this purpose, it is necessary to have a certain vision and
set the goals that can indeed elevate the country to quite a
different level.
     If Putin has positive achievements and certain success, I
do not rule out that, as in the case with Roosevelt when the
USA broke the tradition of two terms, Russia, which is not a
country with long-standing democracy, may easily make changes
to its Constitution to remove these obstacles. Incidentally, it
could have done this with respect to Yeltsin as well. If
Yeltsin had been healthy enough, nothing would have stopped him
from becoming President for a third time. At least, in our
conditions, even under non-consolidated power, this could have
been organised and ensured.
    
     Vyacheslav NIKONOV:
     "Anything may happen in Russia in ten years"  1. The
problems which the authorities face are well-known. It is
necessary to revive the economy and, as a result, raise living
standards, create effective state structures functioning in the
democratic and legal space, ensure security and national
interests, including through integration into the globalising
world, and form a Russian identity.
     In principle, the incumbent authorities should be able to
resolve all these problems. For long-term economic recovery it
is necessary to establish private ownership of land, low taxes
and a normal investment climate. Steps in these directions are
at least being considered.
     In the political sphere, after the de-privatisation of the
state and revolutionary changes in federative relations, it is
actually not necessary to do anything else. It is especially
undesirable today to change the Constitution and write down
into it seven federal districts (their institutionalisation is
the way to the country's disintegration in the future) or make
attacks on the press. I am afraid that the authorities may be
too active in this field.
     The prospects of our integration into the world community
depend not only on Russia. However, the nation should be able
to traverse its part of the road. Security can be achieved only
through economic recovery which would enable us, among other
things, to carry out military reforms at last.
     The formation of society's self-identity is impossible
without state symbols and Putin has correctly begun to deal
with this issue.
     2. As experience shows, anything may happen in Russia in
ten years. Proceeding from the current trends and Putin's
remarks to the effect that he is not an advocate of carrying
out experiments on people, the situation may develop in the
following way. Russia will exist within its current borders,
possibly, with the exception of Chechnya. The economy will grow
by 50-100 percent, which will bring us to the level of the
advanced states of Eastern Europe and even weak countries of
the European Union. This means that people in St.
Petersburg will live like people now living in Moscow, people
in regional centres will live like current residents of St.
Petersburg and villagers will live like those now living in
regional centres. Russia will be a member of the WTO and the
OECD. The G-8 group (with our participation) will transform
into the G-10 or the club of 12 nations. Russia will not join
either NATO or the European Union. Electronics will develop in
Russia. Good quality domestic TV-sets, household appliances and
modern cars of joint make will appear in this country. Up to
30% of the population will use the Internet.
     The situation in politics will be determined by whether
Putin will attempt to revise the Constitution. If he does, we
shall more than likely see a tougher regime than we currently
have. If he does not, the regime will be softer. There will
never be authoritarianism in the country, even if the
authorities want it badly: both the country and the world are
quite different today. There won't be a full-fledged democracy
either - in any case, decades rather than years will be
required for its establishment. There will be 4-5 parties in
the State Duma, even if the rules of the game are changed.
People will continue to read Nezavisimaya Gazeta and Vitaly
Tretyakov will be respected by the journalists' corps.
     Instability will increasingly come from the south - from
the Islamic "arc of instability." The problem of Kaliningrad
encircled from all the sides by the countries of the European
Union and, probably, NATO will become an acute one. By 2010
NATO expansion will clearly spread to the Baltic states. There
will be ever more active attempts to draw Belarus into the
western orbit. Ukraine will try to get rid of our Black Sea
Fleet. In the East we shall continue the dispute with Japan
over the Kuril islands and deal with the problems of Chinese
immigration and be apprehensive of instability coming from the
united Korea.
     3. It is quite possible that Putin will be the President
in ten years as well, especially if the situation in the
country becomes worse than I predict. In this case, it will be
hardly possible to avoid "screw tightening" and one of the
components of this process will undoubtfully be the extension
of the presidential term. If Russia develops rapidly, in 2008
Putin will, with a light heart and the feeling of his duty
performed, hint at his successor, if not name him directly. We
do not know his name yet or we do not know it well enough. I am
almost sure that by this time the real party of power will have
been established and it will have all the chances to retain the
post of the head of state. Given this good scenario, the people
will not swap horses in mid-stream and given a bad scenario the
people's opinion may not be asked.
    
     Mark URNOV:
     "We are at a crossroads today"
     1. The scope of problems which the incumbent authorities
face is directly proportional to the scope of the tasks it has
to deal with today.
     These tasks are very difficult. They involve the creation
of an effective system of state governance, the reform and
strengthening of the judicial system, the creation of
conditions for the development of normal parties, the
suppression of organised crime and normalisation of the
situation in the North Caucasus. It is also necessary to ensure
political stability and a favourable investment climate, carry
out painful reforms of the social and budget spheres, reform
the army, achieve's Russia's optimal positioning in the world,
etc.
     A mere enumeration of these problems indicates that all
these tasks do not have short-term solutions. Apart from that,
it is perfectly obvious that the efforts to resolve each of the
said tasks will to a certain degree complicate the solution of
all the other issues, thus affecting the interests of quite
influential forces and numerous groups of the population.
     The answer to the question about the extent of the ability
of authorities to resolve all these tasks largely depends on
how realistic expectations are. It is understandable that four
or eight years are not enough to turn post-Communist society
into a well-structured and well-tuned system. That is why, to
assess the situation realistically, the incumbent authorities
could at best create the fundamentals for such a crystalisation
and foster the process, which society has begun to extricate
itself from the organisational and psychological stagnation, in
which it had found itself in the last two-three years of
Yeltsin's presidency.
     Are the incumbent authorities able to do this? Today there
are objective pre-requisites for that. Moreover, it is possible
to assert boldly that since the collapse of the Soviet system
the situation has never been so favourable for large-scale
political and economic initiatives of the state.
The President is young, healthy and energetic; the economic
situation is improving (thanks to devaluation and the high oil
prices); the confidence in the authorities and public optimism
have been at a record 15-year high; regional elites are so far
afraid of opposing openly the initiatives of the federal
centre; the Communists have lost control of the State Duma.
     It is the unity of the presidential team, coordination and
flexibility of its actions that will largely determine the
degree, to which the authorities will be able to use these
advantages and move forward in resolving the tasks they face.
     However, serious problems exist today in this field.
Frequently, there is no unity of actions and sometimes the
presidential team lacks flexibility as well. As a result,
mistakes and blunders are covered and smoothed over at the
expense of one resource only - the high degree of the public's
confidence in the President. However, this resource is not
boundless and inexhaustible. The preferences of any society
change and Russians are no exception.
     It is not surprising that the President does not yet have
a united and strong team. The rise of Vladimir Putin was too
rapid for his team to be formed and, all the more so, gain the
experience of jointly carrying out complex multi-step
strategies. However, the fact that the power's weak points are
explainable and natural does not in any way remove these
weaknesses. The dramatic nature or the tenseness of the
situation consists in the fact that the President has little
time to form his team.
     2. Therefore, today we are at a crossroads.
Unfortunately, we face two equally probable scenarios.
     If the presidential team manages to complete its formation
and begins active actions before the public's confidence in
Putin and oil prices begin to drop, Russia will have a chance
to get out of the systems crisis and begin its real renewal. In
this case, in ten years our country will look more or less
okay. Of course, we shall not be able to reach the living
standards of post-industrialised nations of Western Europe or
North America. Also, we should not expect that there will be a
well-tuned state mechanism and developed civil society, typical
of these countries, in Russia. At the same time, the advance in
the desired direction will be quite noticeable, although not
everywhere. In the first place this will be observed in the
"points of growth" - in megalopolises and some sectors of the
economy.
     If the presidential team is not formed in time, the
impulse will be lost, the advantages will not be realised,
while the state and society will again find themselves in the
condition of the Brownian movement. I don't want to describe
what Russia will be under this scenario, especially on New
Year's eve.
     3. I have no doubts about the fact that Putin will be
re-elected. The answer to the question about whether he will
still run the country in ten years depends on how the Russian
Constitution will look like in 5-7 years, i.e. whether the
presidential term will be increased in it. The possibility of
such changes in the Constitution directly depends on the
President's popularity among the population and his authority
among the country's elite. This, in its turn, depends not only
on whether he manages to form a strong and united team quickly,
but also on a great number of other factors that are difficult
to predict. That is why, I do not have an answer to this
question.
     I also don't have an answer to the question of who will
succeed Putin. The experience of the latest presidential
elections has shown that it is senseless in our country to make
a forecast for a period of more than 6 months in this field.
     It is hardly possible to say who will be the country's
leader in 7 years.
    
     Alexander TSIPKO:
     "In ten years Russia will grow tired of the "iron fist
hand"
     1. The solution of moral and political problems comes more
easily to Putin (like to many of his predecessors) than the
solution of economic and social issues. He is active in
everything that concerns the ideology, the set-up of the state
and the struggle of political forces. However, he is still
passive and has not yet finally determined his position on
everything that relates to the economy. The gap between the
current profound reforms in everything that concerns the state
and ideology and cosmetic changes in the economy is becoming
the Achilles heel of the Putin regime. In the superstructure
and politics we see the resolve and decisiveness to go to the
end. In the economy, on the contrary, we are witnessing
contemplation and hopes for automatic self-development. It is
also difficult to explain the contemplation and passiveness in
everything that concerns the problems of crime. Putin has
placed the investigation of high-profile contract murders under
his control. However, there hasn't been any progress in this
field.
     Threats to Putin's power and the current political
stability will quickly increase, as the current extensive
development factors are exhausted and the fixed assets
inherited by Russia from the Soviet Union wear out completely.
Besides, in the conditions of the current market economy, when
there is an acute thirst for prosperity and a beautiful life,
it is difficult to maintain stability and consensus exclusively
at the expense of ideology and political freedoms.
     Putin has rehabilitated Russian patriotism, national
dignity and state values. He has reached consensus with the
overwhelming part of society as regards the programme of
preserving the integrity and strengthening Russian statehood.
     Putin has not only done away with the syndrome of national
humiliation and freed national consciousness from the previous
depressed state, but has also ensured the basic political
conditions for preserving Russian statehood. The second Chechen
war has put an end to the disintegration of the USSR and the
nascent disintegration of the Russian Federation.
The federal centre has regained control over regions and
regional elites, restored the single legal space, the country's
political and economic unity. The prestige of the army as the
guarantor of national security has also been restored.
     However, the quicker the advance on the ideological and
political fronts, the more acute the problems of the economic
and social rear. Given its current lean budget of $20-30
billion, Russia is still capable of preserving its integrity,
but is devoid of chances for its development. So far, there are
no funds to restore the power vertical, maintain the army, the
state apparatus and law-enforcement bodies. In his time, Stalin
ensured the might of the USSR as a power and the rapid
industrial development at the expense of collectivisation and
mobilisation of the rural economic and labour resources. What
are the resources, at the expense of which Putin will ensure
the might of Russia as a power? So far, there is no answer to
this question.
     If Putin continues to believe in the possibility of a
breakthrough on the way of economic liberalisation, then what
has to be done to bring half of our economy out of the shadow,
terminate the practice of tax evasion and create a competitive
environment?
     Does he really believe that the reduction of the tax rate
will make our economy transparent?
     2. To ensure economic and social conditions for the
survival of the state, Putin will most likely follow the path
of returning to the state apparatus commanding heights in the
economy and public life. The current rehabilitation of state
interests in foreign policy also suggests that the state will
safeguard its interests in the economy in a more tough and
direct manner. Putin will not have time to wait for the results
of a new liberal revolution. In the coming ten years we shall
be solving the problem of economic resources, first of all, by
way of new nationalisation and the placement of natural rent
into the hands of the state again. It will be possible to save
contemporary Russia from self-disintegration and
self-degradation only with the help of extraordinary measures
in combatting crime.
     3. If Putin does not venture to seize commanding heights
in the economy and carry out tough measures in the struggle
against crime, the new political elite, which mainly consists
of representatives of power structures, will replace him by a
tougher and more authoritative leader. That is why, it is
difficult to guess how long Putin will stay in power. Much
depends on what methods he will use to strengthen economic and
social pre-requisites of Russian statehood. It is only clear
that in the coming ten years the role of power ministries and
power methods in our political life will increase. The
liberalisation of the currently emerging regime can hardly be
expected.
     However, this cycle of power tightening will be much
shorter than in the Soviet times. Putin does not have and
cannot have at his disposal the CPSU with its Messianic
ideology or the extraordinary committee. The rightist
authoritarianism, which we are heading for, is in the majority
of cases softer than leftist authoritarianism.
     That is why, already in ten years, on the threshold of the
second decade of the 21st century, Russia will grow tired of
its new "iron fist" and will impatiently wait for a new "thaw,"
a new Khrushchev. Most likely, the transition of power from the
saviour of Russian statehood, Putin, to a new liberal reformer
will be very painful.
    
*******

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