December 29, 2000   

This Date's Issues:   4712 • 4713

Johnson's Russia List
#4712
29 December 2000
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. The Times (UK): Gile Whittell, Old age blinds Russia's spies in the sky.
2. AP: Russia Political Parties Law Backed.
3. Financial Times (UK): Andrew Jack, World's Russia-watchers start to prepare for Putin's surprise: December often brings political shocks and, with a government reshuffle on the cards, many feel this year will be no different.
4. Izvestia: GERMAN GREF: "WE ARE ALL WAITING FOR A MIRACLE." (interview)
5. Nezavisimaya Gazeta - Politekomiya: SERGEI GLAZIYEV: FAVOURABLE TENDENCIES ON THE WANE. (interview)
6. www.interfax.ru: The Year 2000 was not used to greater advantage in implementing structural reforms. (Interview with Martin Gilman, IMF representative in Moscow)
  7. Los Angeles Times: Maura Reynolds, Drawing Out Life in Russia. Boris Yefimov, 100, saw the last czar, the birth and death of the Soviet Union, and voted for Putin. The political cartoonist, who survived civil war and Stalin, watched many others perish.    
8. BBC Monitoring: Russian paper claims "little new" in president's Chechnya remarks. (Nezavisimaya Gazeta)]

******

#1
The Times (UK)
29 December 2000
Old age blinds Russia's spies in the sky
BY GILES WHITTELL
 
RUSSIA'S network of military and civilian satellites has long been a pale
shadow of its former self, even before yesterday's crash.

Only 111 of the 190 satellites put into orbit by the Soviet Union are still
there, and nearly 80 per cent are all but obsolete, space officials say.
The result is an early warning system that was designed to alert the
Kremlin to US missile launches but suffers huge blind spots and is
operational at best for 17 hours a day.

The Soviets put in place two sets of satellites to monitor American
missiles - eight in low orbits over a fixed point on the Earth's surface,
and nine in higher orbits. Of the lower satellites only one is still
operational and even that has strayed, according to a report this summer by
the US Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers. Of the nine
higher satellites, only four are still working, the report said.

It is thought that seven military satellites built to plug gaps in the
early warning system have not been launched owing to a lack of funds. It
was unclear yesterday if any of these were among the six lost satellites,
but it is evident that Russia cannot afford more failed launches. The
former superpower once boasted a satellite-based navigation system to rival
America's Global Positioning System, or GPS.

Now only 11 of its 24 navigation satellites are fully functioning.
Officials say that 34 of the 44 civilian Russian satellites still flying
could break down "at any time".
 
*******

#2
Russia Political Parties Law Backed
December 28, 2000
 
MOSCOW (AP) - President Vladimir Putin has submitted to parliament a proposed
law setting new requirements for political parties, a parliamentary spokesman
said Thursday.

Putin has said the law would promote the creation of effective political
parties in Russia, but the proposal is likely to squeeze many small parties
out of existence.

Viktor Cheremukhin, spokesman for the lower house of the Russian parliament,
the Duma, said he had received the text of Putin's proposal, which will be
debated next year.

Critics of the proposed bill have said that it would result in the larger
parties carving up seats in parliament and concentrate political power in the
hands of just a few major groups.

According to the draft law, a party must have at least 10,000 members and
have branches of no less than 100 members in more than half of Russia's
regions and territories.

The law would forbid a whole range of activities, including parties that
sought to change the constitutional system, undermine Russia's current
borders and security, create paramilitary units and spark racial hatred,
among others.

Parties that receive more than 3 percent of the vote would be eligible for
federal funding.

Boris Nemtsov, the head of the liberal Union of Right Forces parliamentary
faction, strongly assailed the proposal to finance parties from the federal
budget, saying it would subdue political parties to the government.

``The authorities want to finance parties, because the one who pays would
have control,'' Nemtsov said at a news conference Thursday. ``We already have
problems with our parties' independence, and funding them would simply end it
altogether.''

*******

#3
Financial Times (UK)
28 December 2000
World's Russia-watchers start to prepare for Putin's surprise:
December often brings political shocks and, with a government reshuffle on
the cards, many feel this year will be no different
By ANDREW JACK

As the end-of-year holidays approach, Russia-watchers are trembling not only
from the cold but in anticipation of what has become a national habit -
political surprise.

In Soviet days officials loved to hold briefings for foreign journalists on
Christmas day, and over the last decade December often brought political
shocks; former President Boris Yeltsin maintained the tradition a year ago
with his resignation on New Year's eve.

Twelve months on, there is considerable speculation about a government
reshuffle and changes at the top of the Kremlin administration as President
Vladimir Putin attempts to reinforce his imprint on power.

Admittedly, many analysts are expecting things to be calmer during the
holiday period this year. "I don't see any logical reason for a change," says
Lilia Shevtsova, a political scientist from the Carnegie Moscow Centre.

"There again," she adds, "the current system does not depend on logic. It is
a strange sort of solianka (a Russian sausage and vegetable soup)".

The national media have been rife with rumours of a reshuffle, and a change
in personnel would make some sense.

A year after he was nominated as acting president, Mr Putin is still largely
operating with a government and senior Kremlin officials inherited from Mr
Yeltsin.

There are also clear signs of tension within his administration. Mikhail
Kasyanov, the prime minister, Alexei Kudrin, the finance minister, and German
Gref, the economic development and trade minister, have all made
contradictory remarks on debt restructuring, for example.

Andrei Illarionov, Mr Putin's special economic adviser, has openly criticised
Mr Kudrin and Anatoly Chubais, head of the electricity utility UES, over the
company's restructuring plan. And Mr Putin himself has attacked both the
Finance Ministry and other top officials, notably within the Ministry of
Defence.

These trends reflect a deeper struggle for influence between three groups
close to Mr Putin: his former colleagues from the security services; the
liberal reformers with whom he worked in his native St Petersburg in the
1990s; and the residual members of Mr Yeltsin's "family" who helped bring Mr
Putin to power.

Andrei Ryabov, a political analyst, argues that pressure has also been
growing on Mr Putin from several large and influential Russian companies,
including the oil group Lukoil and the Alfa conglomerate.

Nevertheless, observers suggest it is no coincidence that reshuffle rumours
have been launched by - or given greatest prominence in - the media
controlled by the influential "oligarchs" Vladimir Gusinsky and Boris
Berezovsky, both of whom are in exile and firmly oppose Mr Putin's regime.

The president's style is certainly more calm than that of his mercurial
predecessor, and he may well want to avoid any gesture that smacks of the
previous era, especially on the anniversary of his own surprise propulsion
into power.

In any case, he is still weighing up the merits of those from the circles
around him.

Equally, as someone who takes a more active role in government decisions than
Mr Yeltsin did, it may well serve Mr Putin's interests to keep relatively
malleable officials formally in charge. Beneath them he is discreetly testing
his own team of deputy ministers and senior advisers.

While talks over renegotiating Soviet-era debt and attracting new investment
are under way, there is also sense in keeping in place those who have been
accepted in the west. One such official is the English- speaking Mr Kasyanov.

Alexander Voloshin, head of the Kremlin administration inherited from Mr
Yeltsin, has said that he is himself a transitional figure. While his
departure may be accelerated, some have tipped him as the new chairman of
Gazprom, the gas monopoly, when the existing incumbent retires in the spring.

Sergei Markov, head of the Institute of Political Studies, echoes the view of
a number of analysts in arguing that important changes in the Russian
administration are more likely to take place in the spring, or at the point
when oil prices drop and progress on economic reform begins to stall in the
face of vested interests.

That is when Mr Putin will really need to show firm leadership.

It will be a test of whether Russia's new president can break with the maxim
that the only predictable thing in his country is the unpredictable.

*******

#4
Izvestia
December 29, 2000
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
GERMAN GREF: "WE ARE ALL WAITING FOR A MIRACLE"
German GREF, Minister of Economic Development and Trade
and the coordinator of the government's programme, interviewed
by Andrei KOLESNIKOV of Izvestia
    
     Question: Do you know that your name has become as
notorious as the names of Gaidar and Chubais of late? Gaidar is
blamed for ruining the economy, Chubais is accused of selling
out Russia, and now it is your turn.
     Answer: You know, I have a deep respect for Gaidar, whom I
regard as one of our strongest economists. So, such comparison
is an honour to me. Seriously speaking, I think that this is a
political label. Maybe somebody already thinks that I ruined
the country. But believe me, it would take at least several
decades to ruin a country.
     We have been "ruining" Russia so persistently this year
that it registered 7.6% of economic growth, a record figure for
the past 30 years, although oil prices had been higher than
today.
Pensioners had their pensions increased four times; the wages
of the public sector staff were raised and were paid regularly.
Of course, these figures are way below the parameters of a
normal civilised economy, but the reforms are being carried out
for the express purpose of reaching these parameters. We will
change the country and it will become different.
    
     Question: Our achievements are apparent, and not all of
them are due to the high oil prices. But maybe this "raw
materials respite," which is ending, was not used to the full?
Maybe 2000 was a year of lost possibilities?
     Answer: This is a matter of evaluations. Of course, we
would have liked to do more. It is clear that while collecting
the oil rent, we failed to create a fund that would protect us
against potential risks.
     But I remember how hard we have been working this year. We
could not imagine in our most daring plans that the president,
the government, the Duma and the Federation Council would do so
much! As a result, we have a completely different country at
the end of the year.
     Everyone is waiting for an instant miracle. But this is
impossible. When asked at the Brunei forum to evaluate the
results of the bourgeois revolution in France in the 18th
century, a question that was a complete surprise to him and all
others, the Chinese leader replied: "It is too early to sum up
the results yet." So, let's not hurry to summarise results;
this is impossible in economics.
    
     Question: On the one hand, the president clearly
proclaimed the principles of a liberal economy. On the other
hand, the government's programme was unexpectedly married to
Ishayev's programme; your programme is still being discussed,
although it has long been approved. The same goes for the
reform of power engineering. For how much longer can we keep
discussing things?
     Answer: Such documents as the strategic development plan
for ten years should be discussed for years. There is no
deadline beyond which their discussion should be prohibited. As
for RAO UES, the outlines of the reform suggested in spring
were extremely loose. The government was formed in late May and
we started working on the concept on July and August. The
initial plan of reforms in power engineering was seriously
overhauled. We have elaborated specific attitudes, which
engendered the questions of shareholders, representatives of
different branches of power and society. This is a perfectly
normal situation, when time is set aside for harmonising
positions. Given the situation in our economy, we may not make
wrong decisions.
    
     Question: How will you reform the natural monopolies next
year? How quickly can this be done?
     Answer: Reforms will develop according to plan. And
deadlines will be different for each branch. Take Gazprom. The
liberalisation of access to the pipeline is an emergency task.
In power engineering we must immediately modernise fixed
assets. The longer we delay this task, the more will the
industry fall apart.
     Given the current system of tariffs, the Ministry of
Railways will be able to exist for a long time yet. Yet the
reform is needed there, too, because it is not right that one
ministry should dispose of vast investment resources in the
industry. We do not have a mechanism there that would be a
guarantee against mistakes.
    
     Question: Is Problem 2003 a chimera?
     Answer: It is, from the viewpoint of the date. But it is
not a chimera from the viewpoint of the task. The year 2003
will be critical in terms of debt repayment. But I don't think
we can predict dates for technogenic catastrophes. On the other
hand, we must prepare for such eventuality. Next year we will
approve laws that will alleviate this problem.
    
******

#5
Nezavisimaya Gazeta - Politekomiya
No. 18
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
SERGEI GLAZIYEV: FAVOURABLE TENDENCIES ON THE WANE
Below is an interview with Sergei GLAZIYEV, chairman of
the State Duma committee for economic policy

     Question: What is your opinion of the results of the
country's economic development in the year 2000?
     Answer: The results are not so bad in general. Over the
first ten months of this year, industrial output grew by 9.8
percent, as against the respective period of last year, and the
annual GDP (gross domestic product) growth is estimated at 7
percent. Such economic indicators are due, above all, to market
factors, i.e., a relative increase in competitiveness of the
Russian economy caused by the rouble devaluation in 1998, the
decisions adopted at that time to contain the growth of
domestic prices for fossil fuel and natural monopolies'
services, and a rise in world oil prices.
     However, there is no reason to delude oneself. The effect
of these favourable factors is waning. Regrettably, the
government, which received an additional 300 billion roubles in
budget revenues, failed to make use of the existing
possibilities in order to achieve stable economic growth; it
pursued a passive policy and did not manage to organise the
financing of investment projects in the sectors capable of
ensuring the acceleration of economic growth. The state failed
to fulfil its commitments to science, the defence industry and
the social sphere, half of the budget revenues went to repay
and service the state debt. The state of the scientific and
technical and industrial potential has deteriorated still
further. Despite the outwardly favourable economic indicators,
the outgoing year turned out to be a year of unrealised
opportunities as far as the long-term goals of economic policy
are concerned.
    
     Question: Can a fall in world oil prices tell on the state
of the Russian economy?
     Answer: It can affect, primarily, the condition of Russian
oil exporters and oil companies' profits which disappear
somewhere in offshore zones. As to the economy as a whole, it
will hardly be affected.
    
     Question: What economic growth may be expected next year,
in your opinion?
     Answer: If the government fails to pursue active
industrial, scientific and technical and investment policies,
if it fails to  launch economic restructuring on the basis of
new technologies, the economic growth rates will not exceed 3
percent next year.
The 2001 budget does not provide for funds that would make it
possible to pursue a policy of economic growth. The Central
Bank has already endorsed "Guidelines for a Uniform State
Monetary Policy," which do not provide for such measures. With
the continued passive economic policy, the growth potential,
which we project at 10 percent, will be used by no more than
one-third of the target. The country's economic development
will be determined by an increase in demand for Russian raw
materials on the world market.
     Thus, the forecast for next year, from the point of view
of economic development, is another year of missed
opportunities, which become fewer and fewer with every passing
day. There will be a further degradation of the
scientific-industrial and intellectual potential. The
government and the Central Bank prefer not to notice obvious
threats to our future development connected with the continued
decommissioning of outdated production capacities.
    
     Question: Will the Paris Club's refusal to restructure
Russia's foreign debt affect the country's economy and how?
     Answer: The thing is that the payment of Russian debts in
2001 in full volume will be a signal to the West that we are
capable of repaying the entire debt, which amounts to nearly 40
billion dollars. Thus, we shall lose the opportunity for
manouevre in servicing and repaying this debt. If the Russian
government will continue acting only in Western creditors'
interests, it will lose the sources of the country's economic
development. Note that next year 40 percent of all budget
revenues will be used to repay and service the state debt -
these payments have become the priority in the government's
financial policy.
     True, we could repay debts, but in that case we could also
lose the main thing - scientific-industrial and human potential.
Then we shall have no other way out but to make debts again. I
am convinced that today's priorities must be investments in
economic restructuring based on novel technologies, as well as
investments aimed at preserving and developing the national
industrial potential.
     Only one country in the world - Romania - opted for
repaying the external debt at any price. We remember the end of
that story. The people's living standards fell drastically, and
the country lost opportunities for further development.
     I think we must properly realise the magnitude of the
threats we are facing now. There is a threat of default on
Russia's debts to the Paris Club. However, this is a technical
problem which must be resolved through negotiations. There is
also a real threat of the decommissioning of a greater portion
of the scientific and technical potential and the destruction
of competitive zones in science-intensive sectors of industry.
For instance, if within the next year we do not organise the
leasing of new Russian airplanes, then the development of the
aircraft-building industry - one of the "locomotives" of
economic growth - may be given up as lost. Thus, by making a
choice in favour of payments on the state debt and refusing to
finance priority economic restructuring programmes, we are
running the risk of undermining the main sources of future
economic growth.
Our further progress depends not so much on foreign investments
as on the preservation and activisation of the national
scientific and technical potential. All our efforts and
resources should be pooled for this purpose, i.e., for
realising our competitive advantages in the sphere of
science-intensive technologies, for starting up "locomotives"
of economic growth, including the aerospace  and
aircraft-building industries, nuclear power engineering,
gas-processing industry, etc. And only then can we repay our
debts.
     The fact that Germany and France agree to start
negotiations on debt repayment through the joint financing of
investment projects in Russia raises hopes for the future. This
is the  correct road to follow. Concrete agreements achieved
along this line are the best way to resolve our debt problem.
                  
*******

#6
www.interfax.ru
December 27, 2000
The Year 2000 was not used to greater advantage in implementing structural
reforms

Martin G.Gilman, head of the International Monetary Fund Moscow
representative office since 15 February 1997, in his exclusive interview
with Financial Information Agency observer Victoria Lavrentieva shared his
opinion of the Year 2000 and gave outlook for the Year 2001.

- How can you characterize the Year 2000 in terms of Russian economy?
- I am tempted to use the well-worn analogy concerning whether you see the
glass as half empty or half full. By that, I mean to say that the year 2000
has witnessed strong economic performance, indeed, by far the best
performance since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. However, given the
exceptional macroeconomic performance, it is unfortunate that this window
of opportunity-which is unlikely to last-was not used to greater advantage
in implementing structural reforms that will become critical when Russia's
external economic circumstances are no longer so favorable.

- Can you compare it with other post-crises years? What has changed for the
better and for the worse from your point of view?
- There were clearly good news on the policy front in the year 2000: the
government collected significantly higher tax revenue than foreseen under
the budget and, until the latter days of the year, displayed admirable
restraint on the spending side, thus conducting a fiscal policy which
played a key role in sterilizing the liquidity impact of the desirable
build-up in external reserves; the authorities placed considerable early
emphasis on reforms of the Tax Code which were enacted; and, finally, the
authorities designed, based upon the initial work of Mr. Grefs Center, a
comprehensive program to transform the Russian economy, including a
priority program through 2001 which was approved on July 26,2000.
    But I would have to add that there were disappointments as well;
despite the admirable fiscal policy stance for much of the year, the
government decided to spend a significant amount of this additional revenue
as the year ended. Thus the President has just signed into law a
supplementary budget for 2000 which foresees additional non-interest
spending of about Rub 190 billion. This spending will significantly
contribute to liquidity in the economy and will no doubt complicate
economic management as we go into 2001.
    Another point, which is not so much a criticism as an observation, is
that the favorable external circumstances that Russia has enjoyed in 2000
have inevitably led to a sense of complacency in the pace of actually
implementing important structural reforms. As someone who has worked for a
number of years with the Russian authorities, I can of course appreciate
how difficult it is to pursue comprehensive and meaningful reforms in a
number of areas at the siame time. Indeed, I recognize what a managerial
challenge the reform agenda represents. Nevertheless, as we watch oil
prices drop in recent days, I cannot help but regret that more ambitious
reforms were not implemented in practice.

- What were the most successful and most negative actions of the Russian
government in terms of investment climate in Russia?
- Looking back on the year 2000, it seems to me that Russia was the object
of a great deal of skepticism both domestically and externally. After all,
the effects of the August 1998 crisis, caused by the failure to bring the
fiscal situation under control combined with a loss of market confidence,
were still fresh. It was not surprising that the initial prospects for 2000
looked dim. And externally, the revelations concerning misreporting of
information to the IMF, which were revealed in 1999, were also in the minds
of many observers; not to mention the allegations concerning
money-laundering through the Bank of New York which led to further
constsmation in the investment community, even if the initial reporting was
exaggerated,
   From these difficult beginnings, the Russian authorities took a number
of well-known steps to addrsss both domestic and international concerns. In
this context, I might just mention the isfforts to ensure the enforcement
of federal laws, to improve government transparency and corporate
governance, as well as the Tax Code and the well-designed government
economic program that I mentioned already.
   On the negative side it is not so much policy actions as policy
omissions which I regret. I mean, for example, that the government's
failure to implement its policy for allocating oil products to agriculture
and the northern territories led to a hasty reimposition of quantitative
export restrictions. The lack of progress in banking reforms leaves the
sector vulnerable. There were also well-known cases where poor corporate
governance and abuse of minority share-holders' rights became important
concerns.

- What are your personal feelings towards Russia at the end of this year?
Are you satisfied with the achieved results?
- From the vantage point of a year ago, I feel encouraged by the
developments in the Russian economy in the year 2000. Much has been
achieved and at least the basis for important stmctural reforms is starting
to be laid. I am especially encouraged by the fact that the economic
program pursued by the authorities is one which was not imposed from abroad
or above, but was formulated carefully over many months in consultation
with many different interests in Russian society, as well as international
experts.

- What are your hopes and desires for Russia in the year 2001?
- What gives me hope looking ahead is the dedication and hard work of many
Russian officials who, despite unenviable work conditions, are striving to
improve the future for their country. I am concerned, however, whether
their efforts will be enough and can be sustained over the years that it
will take to really transform the Russian economy. Particularly, if
Russia's external circumstances should deteriorate in the period ahead, the
challenges that they face could be daunting. In this regard, I am confident
mat the international community will continue to show its support for an
appropriate Russian response to such circumstances.

******

#7
Los Angeles Times
December 29, 2000
Drawing Out Life in Russia
Boris Yefimov, 100, saw the last czar, the birth and death of the Soviet
Union, and voted for Putin. The political cartoonist, who survived civil war
and Stalin, watched many others perish.
By MAURA REYNOLDS, Times Staff Writer

    MOSCOW--He was born in the waning days of one century, endured a second
and, with a little luck, will soon greet a third.
    "True, I lived only 95 days in the 19th century," Boris Yefimov says with
sly modesty. "And then together with the rest of the planet I entered the
20th century. We could not have suspected that it would be so awful, so
troubled, so unprecedented in human history."
    Yefimov is no ordinary centenarian--and not just because he is an eminent
political cartoonist. This elfin man with outsize glasses also attended the
birth of the Soviet Union and survived to witness its death throes. He
remembers the last czar, Nicholas II, and met Lenin, the man who succeeded
him in power. He was friends with Trotsky and took orders from Stalin. He
stood face to face with Nazi leaders at the Nuremberg trials. He watched from
the window of his Moscow apartment as Boris N. Yeltsin fired on the Russian
parliament with tanks. And last spring, he cast his vote for Russia's latest
leader, Vladimir V. Putin.
    Indeed, it would be hard to find many people alive with more right to
call the last 100 years "my century."
    "What is it about my humble person that interests you?" Yefimov croons,
his diction slightly old-fashioned, his eyebrows working overtime. "Is it
that I've turned 100? If so, you must understand that it's no credit to me--I
did nothing to achieve it. . . . I just lived and then lived some more.
What's so special about that?"
    Everything, in fact. In Russia's 20th century--in which tens of millions
perished in successive wars, famines, death camps and political purges--just
living, and then living some more, was no small feat.
    Moreover, for a Jew, a Trotskyist and an "enemy of the people" who
practiced the dangerous art of political cartooning, it was a sheer miracle.
    It seemed like the movies. The phone rang, and Yefimov picked it up:
"Comrade Yefimov? Please hold for Comrade Stalin."
    At the name "Stalin," Yefimov leaps to his feet, just as he did more than
half a century ago, no stiffness apparent in his 100-year-old knees. He sways
slightly, holding an old-fashioned receiver to his ear, one hand steadying
himself on his writing table. His expression is grim, as if he still hears
the dictator's voice on the other end of the line.
    "I heard a throat clear. . . . He didn't waste time on hellos. I remember
it word for word: 'Yesterday Comrade Zhdanov spoke to you about a satirical
cartoon. Do you understand what I'm talking about?'
    "Yes, Comrade Stalin," Yefimov replies, now as then.
    It was 1947, just two years after World War II ended and just as a new
war, the Cold War, was beginning. A day before, one of Stalin's top aides,
Andrei Zhdanov, had sent guards to haul Yefimov out of a public lecture,
carrying him from the hall by his elbows. Backstage, Zhdanov announced that
Stalin had chosen the artist for a special job: to draw a cartoon ridiculing
a U.S. military buildup in the Arctic.
    Yefimov broke out in a cold sweat. It was less than a decade since Stalin
had given the cartoonist's older brother a similar "special assignment," only
to order the sibling killed soon after. It was no honor to be singled out by
Josef Stalin.
     "Comrade Stalin sees the cartoon something like this," Zhdanov told him.
"Gen. Eisenhower arrives at the North Pole with a large army, spoiling for a
fight. And an ordinary American stands next to him and asks, What's going on,
General? Why so much military activity in such a peaceful place? And
Eisenhower answers: Can't you see that the Russians are threatening us?"
     Yefimov spent the night sketching. He pondered long and hard over how to
represent the Soviet side--he'd received no instruction on that score--and
finally decided to draw a family of Eskimos, natives of the Russian far
north. He depicted them as poor and primitive, living in an igloo, surrounded
by reindeer, polar bears and a befuddled-looking penguin. A fur-clad child
holds an Eskimo ice cream bar. As a cartoonist, stereotypes were Yefimov's
stock in trade.
     "Someone will pick it up at 6 p.m.," Stalin said over the phone. The
conversation was over.
     Yefimov panicked. It was already 3:30 p.m., and he was only half done.
Normally, it would take an entire day to finish.
     "I was like a chess player when his time has run out--there's no time to
think, only to act," he says. "And you know, sometimes miracles happen." He
finished just as the messenger rang his bell.

     Stalin Marks Up Cartoon in Red Crayon
     Two days later, he was summoned to Zhdanov's Kremlin office and picked
up the sketch. In his crude hand, Stalin had added the labels "North Pole"
and "Alaska" and the title "Eisenhower to the Defense" in red crayon and
pencil.
     That version now hangs in Yefimov's hallway, under glass, the paper
yellowed but the red crayon still bright.
     Yefimov chuckles as he points to the one mistake Stalin didn't catch:
"He didn't notice the penguin. When it was published, many people called or
sent me letters asking where in the Arctic I had seen a penguin. But when
they were told that Stalin had approved the drawing, they bit their tongues."
     What did he think about Americans when he drew this kind of cartoon? Did
he believe they were a real threat?
     "I'll tell you frankly--in those times you didn't think too much. You
did what you were told if you wanted to save your neck," he says. "So if they
said Americans were our enemies, imperialists who wanted to start a new war
and smash the Soviet Union--well, so that's what they were."

     His Brother Has Been Most Important to Him
     Yefimov's brother Mikhail died 61 years ago, but he is still the most
important person in the cartoonist's life. His portrait dominates the wall in
Yefimov's bedroom, and his legacy still shadows the younger brother.
     Yefimov was born Boris Fridland on Sept. 28, 1900, in Kiev, the second
son of a Jewish shoemaker. Mikhail was already 2. The family soon moved to
Belostok, now the Polish city of Bialystok, where the boys grew up.
     His earliest memory is of standing for a photograph at age 2--a pouting
cherub in knickers with long hair, clutching a ball in his right hand. He is
sulking because the photographer gave Mikhail, who is gripping his other
hand, the more desirable prop: a toy rifle.
     "Misha was more lively, talented, smarter," Yefimov says, "while I was
quiet and obedient." And when his brother decided to support the new
Bolshevik government, young Boris followed.
     It was not a straightforward decision. He revered the czar and remembers
standing with his father in a crowded Kiev street in 1911 to see the royal
family drive by in a coach. But even then his illusions of the monarchy were
fading.

     Czar Was Just 'an Ordinary Man'
     "In my mind I had pictured the czar in his crown and mantle. But what I
saw was an ordinary man in a military jacket with epaulets, a good-looking
officer. The czarina was in an enormous hat and the daughters. . . ." His
voice trails off. "They were gone in a moment."
     During World War I, his family fled Belostok as the Germans approached.
Yefimov recalls a Zeppelin hovering over the city, harbinger of the advancing
army.
     In the fall of 1917, when the Bolsheviks seized power, Boris was
studying in Kiev. But Mikhail was in the thick of things in St. Petersburg,
slowly abandoning his studies to work as a journalist. He had supported the
overthrow of the czar and the leader of the provisional government, Alexander
Kerensky. He didn't particularly like the Bolsheviks and their leader, V.I.
Lenin, considering them a half-step above criminals.
     But slowly a sense of order returned to the capital, and by the fall of
1918, Mikhail had made his peace with the new regime and applied to join the
Communist Party.
     Meanwhile, in Kiev, revolution decayed into civil war. Boris tried to
keep out of sight as half a dozen armies--various combinations of
nationalists, Bolsheviks, monarchists, Germans and Poles--swept back and
forth through Ukraine. Power changed hands in the Ukrainian capital a dozen
times.
     The Bolsheviks first occupied Kiev in early 1918, slaughtering hundreds
of "bourgeois" before fleeing a few weeks later. But when they recaptured the
city two years later, many residents, including Boris, were ready to forgive
their earlier excesses. Some of the other occupying armies had been equally
bloodthirsty, and the monarchist White Guards had killed tens of thousands of
Jews.
     With the arrival of the new Soviet world order, the brothers abandoned
the Jewish-sounding family name. Mikhail took the surname Koltsov, and Boris
became Yefimov--from their father's first name, Yefim.
     Yefimov took work as a secretary in the military publishing department,
printing posters and brochures for the regime. At some point, Mikhail
suggested that he start drawing--Yefimov had always loved to doodle. And this
way the brothers could work together.
     "So I taught myself as I went along," Yefimov recalls. "My first drawing
was a success--they published it. Then they published a second. And before I
knew it, I was drawn into this work. And in my old age, they even gave me a
degree for it!"

     Trotsky Enthralls the Young Yefimov
     Yefimov was 18 the first time he heard Leon Trotsky. The teen was
standing in a crowd in Kiev's central square, which was packed so tightly he
could barely move.
     "His voice was electric; it rang out across the entire square, even
without a microphone," Yefimov recalls. "I could never have imagined then
that he would become friendly with me."
     At the time, Trotsky was more popular than Lenin, his fame bolstered by
his strategic abilities in fighting the civil war and his oratorical skills
in drawing people to the Bolshevik cause. One of them was Yefimov.
     "He was overflowing with talent," Yefimov gushes like a smitten youth.
"I've never heard a better speaker in my entire life--beautiful words,
beautiful ideas, powerful locution. A brilliant man."
     Five years later, having followed his brother into journalism, Yefimov
nervously knocked on the door of Trotsky's office carrying his first
collection of cartoons, which was soon to be published.
     "He rose graciously, walked toward me and said in his famous voice, 'My,
how young you are!' But I had an answer ready: 'Lev Davidovich,' " Yefimov
says, using the formal Russian manner of address, " 'at my age, you'd already
twice escaped from exile.' That pleased him."
     Trotsky paged through the portfolio, liked what he saw, and agreed to
write a foreword.
     Yefimov reaches behind his table and grabs the volume from the shelf. It
falls open to the introduction: "L. Trotsky. 20 July 1924."
     It was not a propitious time to ally oneself to Trotsky, who was already
in a power struggle with Stalin, the heavy-handed Communist Party leader and
future dictator. The editor of the newspaper Izvestia, Yuri Steklov, agreed
only reluctantly to print the introduction.
     "And the following paradox resulted," Yefimov recounts. "Steklov paid
with his life for his decision to publish this article, dying somewhere in
exile. And I, about whom Trotsky wrote such praise, I should have been jailed
10 times over. But I wasn't touched."
     History repeated itself a few years later. Yefimov's brother, who had
founded the illustrated journal Ogonyok, ignored a warning from Stalin in
1923 not to publish a photo spread on Trotsky.
     "Stalin followed the Eastern principle: Revenge is a dish that should be
eaten cold," Yefimov explains. "He would wait years and decades."
     In Mikhail's case it was 15 years. In 1938, he had just returned to the
Soviet Union after covering the Spanish Civil War for the Communist Party
newspaper Pravda. Mikhail had begun to cut a well-known figure at home and
abroad, even becoming acquainted with Ernest Hemingway, who used him as the
basis for Karkov, the Russian journalist in the novel "For Whom the Bell
Tolls."
     Stalin asked--that is, ordered--Mikhail to deliver a lecture in Moscow's
Central House of Writers on the "Short Course in the History of the Communist
Party." On Dec. 12, 1938, Mikhail did as he was told to a packed audience.
Then Yefimov invited him home for tea and cookies.
     "He said, 'Tea and cookies sounds nice, but there's work waiting for me
over at Pravda,' " Yefimov says. "And so we parted forever. What was waiting
for him at Pravda was an order for his arrest."
     The next day, Yefimov packed a suitcase and waited for the secret
police. It was a rule of Stalin's terror that when somebody was arrested as
an "enemy of the people," his close family and associates were rounded up in
short order. But the knock on the door never came.
     "An order for my arrest was already prepared. All it needed was Stalin's
permission. But instead he said, 'Don't touch him.' So I wasn't touched, and
now here I am, sitting in front of you."
     Mikhail was executed 13 months later, seven months before Trotsky was
assassinated in Mexico.
     Why was Yefimov spared?
     "It seems Stalin needed a good, experienced cartoonist," he posits. "He
loved cartoons as much as Trotsky. It was one thing they had in common."

     'What Are You Going to Do, Hang Yourself?'
     Russians have a saying: History doesn't ask what might have been.
     Yefimov doesn't ask either. He doesn't ask why he survived and his
brother did not. He doesn't ask whether compromise was too high a price to
pay for survival.
     "We were afraid all the time," he recalls. "But human beings--we're
creatures who can get used to anything. What are you going to do, hang
yourself? No, you live and then you go on living. They haven't touched you;
they took your neighbor. But that's your neighbor, not you."
     More often than not, survival is precisely the art of compromise.
Yefimov made many. He considered Trotsky a friend but drew unflattering
caricatures of him when so ordered. He admired Marshal Tito but depicted him
as a servile turncoat when the Yugoslav Communist leader fell out of favor.
     But Yefimov expresses no regrets--just sorrow. In many ways, survival is
its own reward.
     "As for Stalin's relationship to me, I can't complain. I received two
Stalin prizes. In those days, that was no trifle. . . . Yes, he destroyed my
brother. He was a villain. He murdered many innocent people. A dreadful man!
But still, a certain human logic wins out. He is also the person who granted
me my life, my freedom, my work."
     The more his brother's death receded into the past, the more Yefimov's
fortunes improved. He was fired from his job at Izvestia, but 18 months later
he was hired by the newspaper Trud.

     Drawing Defendants at Nuremberg Trials
     By World War II, he was working for an army newspaper and was entrusted
with some of the nation's most important propaganda. His style was not
subtle: Nazis with hawkish noses and elongated fingers, nearly dripping with
avarice. Plump and self-satisfied Western leaders, twiddling thumbs while the
Soviet Union fought valiantly and alone. It was what the leadership wanted.
And in time, Yefimov became trusted enough to travel abroad. He was sent to
the Nuremberg trials, where he sat beside the defendants' box to draw some of
the most hated men in history.
     When Stalin died in 1953, the country was seized with a fearsome
uncertainty, followed by a slow descent into political and economic
stagnation. Under leaders such as the plodding Leonid Brezhnev, Yefimov's
life--like those of his countrymen--became far more predictable and
comfortable. He spent more time at conferences and less time drawing.
Besides, his eyesight was fading.
     By the time the Bolshevik-founded state had failed, so had Yefimov's
eyesight. But it was just as well, he says, because the death of the Soviet
Union dealt a fatal blow to political satire--the new Russia just isn't as
funny. "For all intents and purposes," Yefimov laments, "political cartooning
doesn't exist anymore."
     Last year a cataract operation partially restored the sight in his right
eye. So now, as the new century approaches, Yefimov is drawing again. He sits
in his sunlit study overlooking the Moscow River, scratching out in ink and
paint his memories of Bolsheviks and White Guards, Hitler and Stalin, and the
mismatched pair of Mikhail S. Gorbachev and Yeltsin, yoked to an overloaded
cart labeled "problems."
     This is where Yefimov expects to be on New Year's Eve, under the
portrait of his dead brother, surrounded by memories of his parents and his
two late wives, toasted by his children and grandchildren--now grandparents
themselves. He will raise a glass to the new year, and the last century, and
those whose histories won't carry into the new one.
     "Fate granted my brother a much shorter life--a mere 40 years. Perhaps
it was his years that were added to mine."
     Yefimov looks small and frail. But he has already proved more stubborn
than an evil empire, more durable than a century.
     "History doesn't ask what might have been," he concludes. "What
happened, happened. And what will come next--well, we'll see, won't we?"

*******

#8
BBC Monitoring
Russian paper claims "little new" in president's Chechnya remarks
Source: Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Moscow, in Russian 27 Dec 00

The 27-December edition of the Russian newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta has
looked at the possible ways of settling the Chechen issue .The paper based
its conclusions on recent statements made by the Russian leadership and the
military on Chechnya. The paper quoted President Putin as saying that "it
would be an unforgivable mistake to withdraw and abandon the republic again"
and that the "main" emphasis should now be on the social and economic revival
of Chechnya. The paper also dwelt on ideas by some Russian circles that the
current Chechen administration could be reformed. The idea of a
Moscow-appointed governor was also examined by the paper. The other points
raised by the article were amongst other things the issue of whether the
federal centre should establish contact with the side opposed to the federal
centre, whether a federal military presence capable of ensuring the security
of the local residents against the renegade armed Chechen groups would be
needed and whether attempts should be made to capture the ringleaders of
criminal groups and separatist formations as a further step towards
establishing a stable administration in Chechnya. The following is the text
of the article published in Nezavisimaya Gazeta. The subheadings have been
inserted editorially.

Social rehabilitation, economic restoration

In fact there is little new in the "Chechen" part of head of state Vladimir
Putin's interview with ORT [Russian Public Television], RTR [Russian
Television and Radio], and Nezavisimaya Gazeta. The president again declared
that during the years of Chechnya's "independence" it became a territory
"occupied by bandit formations and religious extremists" which "began to be
used as a bridgehead for attacking our country and destabilizing it from
outside".

Nor was this the first time that Putin had said "it would be an unforgivable
mistake to withdraw and abandon the republic again" and we must "finish the
job from the military point of view". In confirmation of Moscow's recent
actions, including the appointment of a minister for Chechnya's social and
economic problems, the president said that "the main emphasis will now be
placed on social rehabilitation and economic restoration". However, when
summing up the results of the year, especially the most important year of his
life, the head of state could afford to repeat things he has repeatedly said.

Need to reform administration of Chechnya

The remark that Chechnya "will have only one centre of power - Akhmad
Kadyrov" can be regarded as a new element in his comments. The head of state
must be aware that under his own edict the post of head of administration in
Chechnya makes its occupant not the centre but the periphery of power.
Kadyrov himself has always said this at every opportunity, pressing for the
expansion of his powers. He realizes that there can be no question of any
centre of power when he lacks control over "security" structures. However,
Kadyrov is not even hinting that the functions of running the army and police
should be transferred to him and is merely seeking economic and political
autonomy.

It was clearly not for nothing that the head of state mentioned a "centre of
power". He must be aware of the plans which exist both among his entourage
and among leading political forces for the reform of the administration of
Chechnya - plans which, incidentally, are already being expressed in the form
of draft Russian Federation presidential edicts.

Some of them envisage introducing the post of "governor general" - a deputy
prime minister or plenipotentiary representative of the head of state with
the broadest powers - while others envisage expanding the potential of the
existing administration and creating a Government of Chechnya. It is clear
that the latter would not be a centralization of power. However, Vladimir
Putin left some hope to advocates of both options by stating that Kadyrov
"will perform his duties until we move on to other methods of resolving
political issues of this kind".

It so happened that the president was talking with journalists the day after
the meeting in Ingushetia between a group of Russian Federation State Duma
deputies headed by Boris Nemtsov and representatives of [renegade Chechen
leader] Aslan Maskhadov. It has to be noted that the assessments of these
contacts offered by the head of state were by no means as categorical as
those of his aide Sergey Yastrzhembskiy. The latter stated yesterday that
contacts with the opposing side must not take place behind the back of the
command of the Joint Troop Grouping and behind the back of Akhmad Kadyrov's
administration.

But Putin noted that political contacts are not harmful and this does not
cause substantial damage to troops' morale because "the final decision is the
president's". He also said that if somebody wants to hold talks with
Maskhadov, "we will not prevent this, but I do not think that this is a
productive path to a solution". But, in order to ensure that there is no
ambiguity, the head of state recalled that "everyone who is under arms must
be placed on trial".

Support for talks with side opposing federal centre

Thus Vladimir Putin's statements left the impression that serious political
changes are imminent. If this is not so, it means the head of state has not
heeded the recommendations of his own entourage and is ignoring the mounting
dissatisfaction within society at the way the Chechen conflict is dragging
on. Putin's words can also be assessed as meaning that any power in Chechnya
will be able to resolve many political issues autonomously, but will also
bear responsibility for its own decisions. It is no accident that even Shamil
Beno, Kadyrov's spokesman, has advocated the appointment of a special
representative of the federal authorities for Chechnya partly to oversee the
work of the security structures - this is the first time such a suggestion
has been made by the republic's current administration. Moreover, Beno
supports the idea of talks with representatives of the side opposing the
federal authorities, but with those who have some say in decisions - Ruslan
Gelayev, for instance. [Khodarenok ends]

In his interview Putin stated the need to protect the population of Chechnya
that has embarked on the path of cooperation with the federal authorities.
Chief of General Staff Anatoliy Kvashnin said the same thing in mid-December
when he announced the completion of another stage in the counterterrorist
operation in Chechnya. The military leader also announced the end of
"large-scale combat operations" in the republic. It has to be said that there
have been practically none of these throughout the entire second Chechen
campaign.

Historical experience of guerrilla warfare, which is well known to the
Chechens, confirms that the greatest success is achieved when actions are
carried out by small groups of no more than 60-80 fighters. Larger formations
are less mobile, are easily detected by the federal forces' means of
reconnaissance, and are generally routed. Thus the lack of "large-scale
combat operations" on the Chechen side is entirely explicable and certainly
does not signify the completion of any "stage" or "phase". The rebel
leadership is not using the tactic of open confrontation with the federal
troops, which would be suicidal for the Chechen separatists. Active defence
of "strongholds" (like the settlement of Komsomolskoye) usually ends in
disaster for the gunmen.

As for the potential for organized resistance on the part of the separatists,
despite the optimistic official assessment of the situation, this is by no
means exhausted for the Chechen rebels. This was also indirectly confirmed by
the chief of the General Staff, who stated the need for a military presence
in over 200 of the republic's 357 population centres in order to protect the
population from the bandits. This is the best demonstration that the
information concerning the final rout of the gunmen's forces is somewhat
exaggerated.

Military presence to counteract rebels

According to the federal leadership's plans, the proposed garrisons are to
include local law-enforcement agencies, subunits of the Russian Federation
MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] Internal Troops, and police officers from
other Regions and territories of Russia. The question arises: How many
servicemen and internal affairs staffers must be stationed in each Chechen
village in order to keep the situation in a population centre swarming with
rebels (that is no exaggeration) under control? Anatoliy Kvashnin thinks that
the garrison can be small in size, but many specialists do not share his
opinion. They are convinced that, quite obviously, a platoon would be
slaughtered before many nights had passed. A company would not last long
either, experts believe. Thus a garrison capable of holding out in a large
Chechen village must be equivalent in size at least to a battalion with
reinforcements.

There are also many doubts about the proposed scheme for command and control
of the troops (forces). The chief of the General Staff thinks that rayon
commandants will head operational staffs including the chiefs of temporary
and permanent Rayon Internal Affairs Departments, rayon FSB [Federal Security
Service] departments, and the commanders of Army units stationed on the
territory of the districts. "And they will be intended for collegial decision
making about ensuring the population's security," Anatoliy Kvashnin stressed.
"Under these staffs we will set up special formations for search operations
and targeted work to destroy the gunmen," the general added. Anatoliy
Kvashnin also disclosed that it has been decided to create at republic level,
under the leadership of the commander of the Joint Troop Grouping (North),
special forces and resources for the speediest capture of the ringleaders of
the bandit formations. An entirely natural question arises: Just who was
preventing this from being done before?

On top of everything else there are at least several worrying points about
the latest initiative. The temporary nature of the new structures and their
poor suitability for search and reconnaissance operations in mountainous and
wooded terrain are very obvious. The nature of subordination has not been
clearly delineated - who is subordinate to whom and regarding what matters;
how collaboration will be organized among the various federal security
structures; how relations with the local Chechen administration are to be
built. Finally, there are sufficient grounds for believing that the method of
"collegial decision making" planned from the outset cannot introduce anything
but unnecessary discussion, leaks of information, and additional confusion
into the conduct of combat operations. In addition, when they are in
population centres under the close observation of numerous voluntary helpers
of the separatists, the troops will be unable to take so much as a step
without the rebels immediately knowing. There are also questions about where
the troops (forces) will be housed in Chechen villages. It cannot be said
that the republic's population centres are excessively well endowed with
general-purpose buildings and installations.

Routing, capturing separatists, ringleaders of criminal groupings

The statement by the chief of the General Staff does not say a word about the
possible tasks that the so-called garrisons will resolve. Ensuring the
security of local residents from the gunmen? That function seems more than
farfetched. Conducting search and reconnaissance operations? Bearing in mind
the proposed combat makeup and strength of the garrisons, they will hardly be
capable of this. Finally, world experience of counterinsurgency shows that
"dissipating" a grouping in this way among population centres in a territory
involved in an armed rebellion is practically useless. It leads to the
fragmentation of forces and is effectively a switch to "strategic" defence.

Vladimir Putin stressed that the decision on stationing army and MVD subunits
in population centres "has still to be studied within a practical scenario".
The best way to protect ordinary citizens from the bandits, many experts
believe, would be not to dissipate Russian troops among numerous Chechen
villages but to conduct vigorous strong-arm operations under a united
leadership to catch the ringleaders of the criminal groupings and finally
rout and capture the separatist formations. It is the resolution of this main
task that will make it possible to ensure the security of peaceful residents.

As for the main reasons for the failures in the final pacification of
Ichkeria (and they have often been mentioned), they are rather simple and in
general traditional for this type of conflict: The Russian army and, even
more, the security structures of other departments proved not entirely ready
to conduct counterinsurgency operations; most of the federal forces'
armaments and military equipment are not adapted to conditions in the region
where the combat operations have unfolded; and the separatist formations have
the support and sympathy of a significant proportion (if not the majority) of
the local population.

*******

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