December 19, 2000   

This Date's Issues:  4696 • 4697 • 4698

Johnson's Russia List
#4697
19 December 2000
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Bloomberg: Russian Tycoon Berezovsky Creating Group to Promote Rule of Law.
2. BBC Monitoring: Russian Communist chief defends NTV.
3. strana.ru: Communists take revenge on Unity for December 3 election loss.
4. Reuters: Chechen spokesman denies top rebel's brother killed.
5. Business Wire: New Study Concludes Dramatic Improvements in the State of Business in Russia: Expert Available for Interview.
6. Joseph Dresen: Nick Govosdev will be speaking at the Kennan Institute.
7. Oskars Ceris: CNN Should be Nationalised.
8. BBC Monitoring: Former Russian security chief urges cooperation with USA on Iran. (Andrey Kokoshin)
9. Bernard Sucher: responding to Ekman's 17 Dec letter.
10. Paul Fiondella: Re: Contributions and abusive criticism.
11. Thomas Graham: The State of U.S.-Russian Relations and the New Bush Administration.]

*******

#1
Russian Tycoon Berezovsky Creating Group to Promote Rule of Law

Washington, Dec. 18 (Bloomberg)
-- Russian tycoon Boris Berezovsky, in exile out of fear of 
persecution from the Putin government, said he would create a $25 million 
foundation to nurture democratic freedoms and the rule of law in Russia. 

The International Foundation for Civil Liberties will support public 
education campaigns and fund the creation of a Russian version of the 
American Civil Liberties Union, Berezovsky said. 

``It's an institute to help people understand the problems of democracy, what 
it means, and how to help Russia become a real liberal democratic country,'' 
Berezovsky told reporters in Washington. 

Berezovsky supported the election of Russian President Vladimir Putin, then 
grew critical as Putin cracked down on leading businessmen who garnered 
wealth and power by buying state enterprises following the 1991 collapse of 
the Soviet Union. 

A friendship with then-President Boris Yeltsin helped Berezovsky build his 
fortune in the oil and automobile industries. His holdings include a 49 
percent stake in Russia's largest television station, ORT, which he has 
agreed to sell under pressure from Putin's government. 

Berezovsky said he is negotiating to sell the ORT shares to Roman Abramovich, 
his partner in oil and aluminum companies. 

The foundation will spend $25 million over five years, including $3 million 
to support a museum and community center in Moscow honoring the late Russian 
dissident Andrei Sakharov. 

Sakharov Money 

Sakharov's widow, Yelena Bonner, agreed to accept the money, although only 
after making clear she remained skeptical of Berezovsky's motives and was 
distancing herself from his name. 

``You are giving money to the U.S. Sakharov Foundation, and I am grateful to 
you,'' Bonner reported telling Berezovsky, according to the Moscow News. 
``But this cannot influence our stance.'' 

Berezovsky, among a group of Russian oligarchs facing criminal inquiries over 
business dealings, has moved to align himself with Russians facing a broader 
attempt by the Putin government to crack down on political dissent. 

A leading member of both groups is Vladimir Gusinsky, chairman of Media 
Most, Russia's largest private media company. Gusinsky is imprisoned in Spain 
fighting Russian attempts to have him extradited on fraud charges. 

The company's newspapers and television and radio stations are among the few 
media outlets in Russia that have criticized Putin over such matters as the 
war in Chechnya, corruption and human rights abuses. 

Berezovsky, meanwhile, has said he would remain abroad rather than return to 
Russia to face questions from prosecutors investigating alleged embezzlement 
of foreign currency earnings at the state-controlled airline OAO Aeroflot. 

He describes the probe as part of Putin's efforts to stifle his criticism of 
the federal government. 

******

#2
BBC Monitoring
Russian Communist chief defends NTV 
Text of report by Russian Ekho Moskvy radio on 18 December 

[Presenter] Political figures today commented on the situation around NTV. It 
is noteworthy that two senior Communists, CPRF [Communist Party of the 
Russian Federation] leader Gennadiy Zyuganov and State Duma Chairman Gennadiy 
Seleznev, were divided in their views on the subject. 

Zyuganov said that it was NTV that he turned to for information of 
importance. 

[Zyuganov] This morning, I woke up at six, switched on the channel and 
watched the news. They reported in detail both on all major international 
events and on the events inside Russia. In particular, I watched that channel 
to learn about the results of the elections, which coincided fully with those 
that I obtained from our HQ within an hour. 

My advice, in particular to TV companies, is: If you think that the actions 
of this or that body are unlawful, go to court. There, vigorously defend your 
rights. 

[Presenter] Gennadiy Seleznev, on the other hand, said that he had not 
watched NTV lately. 

[Seleznev] To be honest, I can no longer watch NTV, as all I hear are 
panic-stricken statements and reports. Yesterday's prediction by [anchor] 
Yevgeniy Kiselev, who alleged plans to axe the show on the night of the New 
Year, is nothing but an absolutely unnecessary attempt to incite passions. 

I think that everything will calm down. NTV will continue to exist as a 
channel. It is another matter who its shareholders will be. Few doubt, 
however, that the viewers need NTV today. 

******

#3
strana.ru
December 18, 2000
Communists take revenge on Unity for December 3 election loss
Nikolai Ulyanov, Strana.Ru observer

The December 17 gubernatorial elections in a number of Russia's regions 
brought formidable gains to the Communists adhering to leftist views. It 
should be noted that the results of the first round of these elections on 
December 3 did not show any signs that would guarantee the leftists such 
advances. Elections were held in 11 of Russia's regions on December 3. The 
heads of administration in four subjects of the Russian Federation were 
elected in the first round. Three of them were supported by the 
pro-presidential party Unity.

The balance of forces in seven regions that did not produce a winner in the 
first round was approximately even between Unity and the Russian Communist 
Party. For example, Unity candidates led the vote in Arkhangelsk and 
Kamchatka regions, as well as in the Komi-Perm autonomous district. Communist 
candidates were in the lead in Ivanovo, Ryazan regions and in Stavropol 
territory.

But the runoff on December 17 in these regions demonstrated a substantial 
weakening of Unity's positions. For instance, the Unity-backed leaders in the 
first round Boris Sinchenko (Kamchatka region) and Nikolai Poluyanov 
(Komi-Perm autonomous district) lost the elections. Moreover, Communist 
candidates won not only in Ivanovo, Ryazan regions and Stavropol territory 
where their positions were always strong, but also won in Kamchatka region. 

Only one Unity-backed candidate, the incumbent governor of Arkhangelsk 
region, Anatoly Yefremov, won a convincing victory on the December 17 runoff.

The runoff demonstrated two other peculiarities. Just like in the December 3 
first round of voting, the incumbent governors were elected to office. 
Doubtlessly, their victories were ensured by often tapping their 
administrative resources unlawfully. Second, despite forecasts to the 
contrary, representatives from different power structures failed to win the 
ballot. Among them there were such prominent figures as the Interior Minister 
of Mariy El Republic, the former commander of the Caucasian special border 
district and the former commander of the army group in Northeastern Russia.

******

#4
Chechen spokesman denies top rebel's brother killed
December 18, 2000

MOSCOW (Reuters) - A Chechen spokesman denied on Monday that Russian troops 
had killed Chechen rebel field commander Shirvani Basayev, the brother of one 
of the main guerrilla leaders in the breakaway province. 

"It has been announced (several) times that Shirvani Basayev has been killed. 
... This is not true," said a spokesman at the rebel Chechen information 
center in London. 

Earlier Monday the office of the Kremlin's Chechnya spokesman Sergei 
Yastrzhembsky said Basayev, brother of top field commander Shamil Basayev and 
a major figure in his own right, had been "annihilated" in a special 
operation and had already been buried. 

An aide to Yastrzhembsky declined to give any further details on the 
operation. A spokeswoman for Russia's FSB security police also said that 
Shirvani Basayev had been killed. 

Russia has said several times in the past that top rebel commanders, 
including both Basayev brothers, have been killed or injured. These reports 
have rarely proven true, although Shamil Basayev did lose a foot this year in 
a minefield. 

Shamil Basayev has been Russia's most wanted man since leading a 
hostage-taking raid on the southern Russian town of Budennovsk in 1995. He 
emerged last year at the helm of Chechen guerrilla groups that invaded other 
nearby Russian regions. 

His brother Shirvani is also a substantial figure in the pro-independence 
rebel movement and took part in peace talks with Russia in 1996-1997. 

His killing would be a major success for Moscow, which has previously failed 
to kill or capture any of the most senior rebels since starting a campaign to 
crush them last September. 

Russian troops have nominal control of virtually all Chechen territory, but 
have failed to bring peace to the region and still come under daily attack by 
the rebels. They have vowed to deal the rebels a crushing blow this winter. 

Russia's armed forces chief of staff, Anatoly Kvashnin, was quoted last week 
as saying the military intended to take its troops out of the safety of army 
bases and deploy them in small contingents across the rebel region. 

Kvashnin said a task force would hunt down leading Chechen commanders who 
form the backbone of rebel resistance. 

******

#5
New Study Concludes Dramatic Improvements in the State of Business in Russia: 
Expert Available for Interview
(www.ecountries.com) 

NEW YORK and LONDON--(BUSINESS WIRE)--Dec. 18, 2000--While the financial 
crisis of 1998/99 is commonly seen as a disaster for Russia, for business, it 
was a godsend. 

In a comprehensive survey, to be published by eCountries today, James Arnold 
reports that Russian business is now truly coming of age. 

Devaluation of the ruble, coupled with high oil prices, has provided the 
country with a tremendous financial windfall. Now, an elite group of Russian 
companies have taught themselves the arts of branding, marketing, advertising 
and distribution, and are giving the multinationals a run for their money. 

This doesn't mean that Russia's troubles are over. The Putin government, 
despite its talk of reform, has done little to facilitate business. Corporate 
success stories are found among the newer firms; much of Russia's traditional 
business remains old-fashioned, politicized and corrupt. And for foreign 
companies, Russia is still one of the trickiest business environments in the 
world. 

In this series, eCountries talks to a huge cross-section of Russia's business 
community: bankers, lawyers, consultants - and, of course, Russian 
businesspeople themselves. Topics in this survey include: 

- The Russian legal system 

- Analysis of the resurgence of the middle class, 

- In-depth examination of the technology business - an industry 

Russia hopes to dominate. 

James Arnold, eCountries Senior Writer Eastern Europe / the former Soviet 
Union. 

James has a degree from Oxford University. Before joining eCountries he spent 
four years as an East European specialist with The Economist Group, including 
stints at the Economist Intelligence Unit in Vienna and, most recently, as a 
Moscow correspondent. Previous jobs including writing about East European 
energy markets for Petroleum Argus, and covering the derivatives business for 
Risk Publications. 

******

#6
Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2000
From: "JOSEPH DRESEN" <DRESENJO@WWIC.SI.EDU> 
Subject: Re: 4691- Book on Orthodoxy and Democracy,

David - 
I would just like to note that Nick Govosdev will be speaking at the Kennan
Institute on January 18, 2001. (3:30 to 5:30 pm) For information on this
and other Kennan Institute events at the Woodrow Wilson Center, please
visit our homepage at:
www.wilsoncenter.org

Joe Dresen
Program Associate

******

#7
From: "Oskars Ceris" <oskars@sjcb.lv>
Subject: CNN Should be Nationalised
Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2000 

Let's take a look at such a such an innocent resolution, which is no
different from the planned takeover of Russia's leading independent
television broadcast company.
NTV remains, for now at least, the leading Russian TV company, which has
been playing a dangerous, important but most important their own role in
Russian politics. Highlighting the shocking reality of the Chechen wars, of
corruption, the government's incompetent failure to rescue it's sub crew.
And no wonder only the Russian national TV channel was let in on the Kursk
tragedy. Of course the less the public knows, the less a burden it is for
the economic and political revival of the country.
But let's take the CNN, as the leading US and world TV company. How often
has CNN played an essential and crucial role of determining the outcome of
world events, negotiations and multi billion dollar take-overs? Not to speak
of the renown CNN effect. But undoubtedly, wouldn't it be so much more
wonderful to have a nagging, annoying and snooping CNN off the shoulders of
the Whitehouse? Wouldn't it be easier for Bush or Gore to achieve their
presidency goals without time, money and nerve consuming legal battles?
Russia is a far cry away from a decent comparison with the USA on every
scale, but it's essential that people understand the magnitude of the games
that are being played in Moscow and the immense repercussion that the
results could have. For a moment try to imagine the absurdity but at the
same time effects of nationalising CNN.

******

#8
BBC Monitoring
Former Russian security chief urges cooperation with USA on Iran 
Source: Ekho Moskvy radio, Moscow, in Russian 1208 gmt 18 Dec 00 

Former Russian Security Council Secretary Andrey Kokoshin has said that 
Russia should cooperate with the USA and the EU on preventing the Iranian 
nuclear threat. Interviewed by Ekho Moskvy radio, Kokoshin, currently a State 
Duma deputy, said that Iranian missiles posed a greater threat to Russia than 
to the West. He said that Russia's key priority in the foreign policy was 
gaining access to the world market of hi tech products, and that Russia 
should profit from participation in the peace settlement in the Middle East 
and the Balkans. Following is an excerpt from the interview broadcast at 1208 
gmt on 18 December: 

[Presenter] Our guest in studio is former Russian Security Council Secretary 
[State Duma Deputy] Andrey Kokoshin. Hello. 

[Kokoshin] Hello. 

[Presenter] We are going to talk about the first - and probably the most 
important - appointments in the new US administration headed by the newly 
elected president, George Bush Jr. Condoleezza Rice has been appointed 
national security advisor. Colin Powell has been appointed US secretary of 
state, which is an equivalent of our foreign minister. 

[Omitted: listeners asked to phone in] 

So what do these two appointments spell for us? 

[Kokoshin] I think that these appointments were expected, along with the 
appointment of the US finance minister. This figure will mean as much for us 
as, say, the secretary of state or the national security advisor. Of course 
these appointments spell dramatic changes in the US foreign policy - the 
foreign trade policy as well as the security policy. 

For us it is the situation when we should not wait until they formulate their 
foreign policy. It might differ substantially, despite the common opinion, 
from that of the [US President Bill] Clinton's administration or of 
[Vice-President Al] Gore. We should not wait. We should actively push forward 
our own agenda of relations between Russia and the USA, certainly taking into 
account the fact that the USA's influence and might, unfortunately, by far 
exceeds that of Russia. We will need much more skill and thought to maintain 
equal partnership than during the times of the two superpowers, the USSR and 
the USA. 

[Omitted: praise of Rice's knowledge of Russian] 

I think that this new administration will stick to a more accentuated, even 
tough, position on a number of issues. This may concern Russian interests, 
for instance relations with Iran. On the one hand Bush several times 
expressed his desire to improve relations with Iran. I think everything will 
be done in order to draw Iran into the world economic context and into the 
global political system the USA is trying to build, and to open the Iranian 
market for the American business. On the other hand the policy in the field 
of the transfer of technology to Iran will become tougher. 

Although, as our Security Council has once discovered, there have been quite 
a few instances of technology leaking to Iran from the West, we are still 
being accused. This is a usual practice. We haven't managed to prove yet that 
this situation has largely been induced by the world media dominated by the 
USA. It is hard for them to admit that technology is leaking from the USA and 
its allies on a much grander scale than, as it used to happen, from Russia. 

This is a serious problem for us. There is a law in the USA adopted last 
year. In 1998 we managed to prevent such a law from being adopted. I 
personally worked with the Americans on the issue. This is a law on 
sanctions. Many of our companies, including those dealing with launches of US 
satellites, may be subject to these sanctions. This is an extremely important 
market for us. About 2,000 people in Russia are involved in this cooperation 
in the most hi tech industry. This is just an example. 

The USA's position on the ABM treaty may change substantially. 

[Omitted: known facts and speculations] 

The Republicans are proposing a national anti-missile system clearly designed 
not only to neutralize the North Korean or the Iranian threat, but also to 
neutralize the Chinese nuclear potential. This is a system which would make 
us think a lot, if it comes to striking back in some conditions. 

[Omitted: known facts] 

I also think that we should reconsider our position on the Balkans radically. 
The fact that we have been sticking to the Serbian position is pretty 
unfavourable for us. 

[Omitted: repetition; interview interrupted for a news bulletin; presenter's 
intro for the second part of the interview] 

[Presenter] Sorry, before the news I interrupted you when you started talking 
about Russia's key priorities in th elight of the changing situation. 

[Kokoshin] The key priority for us is to gain access to the American market 
for our hi tech and medium tech products. The American market is the most 
important, the most capacious, the toughest and the most attractive. 

[Presenter] Do we have anything to offer? 

[Kokoshin] We have something to offer. I have already mentioned launches of 
commercial satellites. We could expand a lot on this market. We have products 
in the field of microwave electronics. We have high-quality software. We have 
a lot of know-how in the field of chemistry, metal processing, different 
equipment for the energy sector, new materials and in many other fields. And 
we have not had a consistent policy in these fields, although it is largely 
in the lines of the need for an economic emphasize in our foreign policy and 
for making it more pragmatic, which has been proclaimed by our new president, 
Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin. 

[Omitted: on the Chinese experience] 

It is very important for us to propose ourselves as equal partners in 
enabling stability on fuel markets. I am afraid it is a bit too late now, but 
there is still a chance for us to show that we could enable supplies of fuel 
to Europe and to other regions, where the USA has its interests. In return 
for supplying fuel at mutually acceptable prices we could receive 
investments, which would allow us to upgrade our energy sector substantially 
and to explore new reserves. The latter is a critical issue in Russia. 

Now, we should unequivocally tell the USA that Central Asia and the Caspian 
region is the zone of Russia's vital interests. This is the basis for our 
relations with the USA and other Western countries in this area. Again, this 
should be linked to our long-term partnership in the field of energy 
supplies. 

We should have a new approach to the situation in the Balkans. I have already 
talked about this. No matter whether US troops stay or go, it is clear for us 
that the West needs our presence there more than we do ourselves. They enjoy 
talking about this at the NATO headquarters, in Western Europe and in the 
West European Union, whose headquarters I have just visited. We don't receive 
anything for this. We don't have a skill for profiting from politics. 

The next issue concerns our position on Middle East. Now it is evident that 
everyone wants us to take part in the Middle East settlement - both the Arab 
side and Israel. It seems that the USA is not against that, since they have 
not had much success there. Now they have a new administration. We can 
certainly play a great role. We have always played it. Now we have more 
opportunities since we have good relations with Israel, thanks God. But we 
never think of how we want to profit on this. Peace settlement is a great and 
noble target, but nobody plays these games any longer. We have not learnt how 
to make profit. Our main task, if we are to take part in this settlement - I 
have talked about this with some Israeli politicians in particular - is to 
gain access to markets of hi tech products. This is a very difficult task. 
Nobody is eager to invite us to these markets even with our best technology. 

The next thing is Iran. This is a very complicated subject. I think that we 
should closely cooperate with the USA and the EU on the subject of Iranian 
weapons. Only acting together we could stop unpleasant developments. We will 
be the first victim in case strategic stability is disrupted. The missile 
tested by Iran, Shikhab-3 - despite our very good and friendly relations with 
Iran - can only reach the southern edge of Russia, and not the EU or the USA. 
I think that neither Russia nor anybody else needs Iran as a nuclear power. 
And again, Iran's nuclear potential is an important argument for the creation 
of the US anti-missile system. I am sure that we can resolve this problem 
using political methods. There is still no mechanism which would unite forces 
of the USA, Europe and Russia. I think we should propose such a mechanism. We 
are extremely interested in resolving this problem. 

The situation is similar in relation to the People's Democratic Republic of 
Korea. I think that Putin made an important step when he visited this country 
and showed that our window to North Korea is open. We can cooperate and work 
with them. But then his initiative was largely seized by the Americans. They 
started to work with them. But the Americans will not resolve the problem of 
North Korea's nuclear potential. There should be cooperation between Russia, 
the USA, China and maybe Japan, which is gravely concerned about developments 
in North Korea. If we resolve the problem of North Korea, one more official 
argument for the US anti-missile system will vanish. Officially, nobody, 
except very conservative Republicans, mentions China among possible threats. 

These seven issues is the minimum programme of our relations with the USA and 
Bush's administration that we need to formulate. Bargaining will be tough. 

[Omitted: known facts; repetition; questions from listeners] 

******

#9
From: "Bernard Sucher" <imgalt@primebroker.com>
Subject: responding to Ekman's 17 Dec letter
Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2000 

Anyone who reads the eXile (as I am sure you do), knows perfectly well that
it is neither fascist nor racist, and indeed uses humor and exaggeration to
wake people up to the dangers of the very same. The eXile has often been
well ahead of nearly every other Western publication in calling attention to
the hard realities of life, business and politics--Ames and Taibbi have
contributed here, far more than many others paid to do so on someone else's
coin.

The eXile does something else that cannot readily be done in a more
litigious environment. It names names. Whether in seriousness or jest,
real people are put into the (admittedly limited) public's crosshairs. Mr.
Ekman has been named. Understandably, he doesn't like it. The eXile may be
wrong in singling him out, it may be personal, it may be a joke gone wrong,
it may even be true--everyone who reads the paper knows how wide the score
might be. But the fact that Mr. Ekman doesn't think the eXile is funny
doesn't make a fascist of Taibbi or a racist of Ames.

And I for one wouldn't take kindly to anyone or any "community" taking away
one of next week's grins.

******

#10
Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2000
From: Paul Fiondella <softelny@ix.netcom.com> 
Subject: Re: Contributions and abusive criticism

David,

I'd like to respond to your comment about people who do not contribute
their views because of concern that they will be subject to unwarranted
or abusive criticism.

To begin with the field of Russian studies is very polemical. One only
has to look at Stephen F. Cohen's recent work to get some idea of the
animosities that put everyone on edge in this field. There are
considerable differences in historical point of view and there are
policy differences. The subject matter doesn't favor openness. Handling
these differences while attempting to analyze them even in an academic
setting takes a diplomatic touch. An editor of an email based thread
would have to be very careful in setting ground rules for posting to
protect the integrity of the participants and make everyone feel
comfortable.

The nature of the email must also be taken into account. It is
transient, condensed, and somewhat spontaneous, more like a telephone
call than an essay. Reading all the posts takes an enormous amount of
time. A specialized magazine would divide up the content into categories
and have a regular form but an email format puts the topics all
together. This also makes in depth discussions on certain topics
somewhat difficult. Finding what someone has said about something is
often hit or miss. Also, is it worth condensing information in order to
reduce the length of the posts? Some people find it isn't. The medium is
closer to the Letter to the Editor or Op-Ed page in written length than
it is to the essay but without the fixed format of a newspaper where you
expect to find letters near the editorial page and not interspersed with
news stories. Email lists are free form, and this in itself limits the
types of expression and thus the participants.

The nature of the Internet contributes it's own level of problems.
Unlike a written work for publication, contributing ones views on the
internet brings out in people a lack of self-discipline. One must have
enough self-discipline to contribute thoughtfully. A good editor can
screen out those responses that do not deal deeply enough with the
content of the subject matter being discussed or the post being
responded to. And a good editor can screen out posts that are empty of
content themselves, but the flare for controversy tends to get control
over the subject matter without very careful attention on the internet.
Since the subject matter is highly controversial to begin with, all of
the participants would have to carefully understand and agree to a
certain standard of posting to enable the discussions to be meaningful
and to encourage the reluctant to post.

*****

#11
Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2000 
From: Tom Graham <tgraham@ceip.org> 
Subject: The State of U.S.-Russian Relations and the New Bush
Administration

The State of U.S.-Russian Relations and the New Bush Administration
Finnish Institute for Foreign Affairs
Helsinki, Finland
December 13, 2000

Thomas E. Graham, Jr.
Senior Associate
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Washington, DC

Troubled Relations

One of the primary primary foreign policy challenges President-elect Bush
will face when he takes office January 20 will be repairing U.S. relations
with Russia. Despite - or perhaps because of - its deep socio-economic
malaise and strategic weakness, Russia will remain critical to our security
and prosperity well into the future. Its nuclear arsenal, location in the
heart of Eurasia, veto on the UN Security Council, and vast natural
resources and human potential guarantee that. Repairing relations is not
going to be easy, for today they are at one of their lowest ebbs since the
breakup of the Soviet Union. 

Over the past two years, senior Russian government officials have talked
about the United States using rhetoric that has not been heard since the
end of the Cold War. Russian national security documents now clearly
portray the United States as a threat, as seeking to build a unipolar world
where force, not law, would be the preferred instrument for resolving
international disputes. U.S. Department of State polling has tracked a
steady decline in the percentage of Russians with a favorable attitude
toward the United States from nearly 75% in 1993 to under 50% at the moment.

Meanwhile, in the United States, the image of Russia as an aspiring
democracy has given way to an image of a hapless land mired in deep,
pervasive corruption, where organized crime operates unrestrained. The
American political establishment is suffering from a severe case of Russia
fatigue, and the "Forget Russia" school is gaining adherents in the
Congress. This school would not gratuitously harm Russia, but it is not
prepared to spend much time, energy, or money to nurture good relations
with Russia. It simply believes that Russia does not matter much any
longer in the world. Even the Clinton Administration, which entered office
with Russia as its top foreign-policy issue and spoke enthusiastically of
building a "strategic alliance with Russian reform," has disengaged and
degraded Russia within its overall priorities. Decisions on Nato
enlargement, Iraq, and Kosovo, for example, demonstrate that the
Administration is prepared to give precedence to many other issues over
Russia. 

Over the past two and a half years, three events, in particular, soured
relations: The Russian financial crisis of August 1998, Kosovo, and Chechnya. 

The financial crisis marked the failure of the grand project of quickly
building a vibrant democracy and robust market economy in Russia along
Western lines and with substantial Western assistance. For many Russians,
it confirmed suspicions that the West was not trying to help their country
rebuild but rather to turn it into a third-rate power. In the United
States, we began to take a more sinister view of Russia. Because we tend
to think there is something natural about the emergence of democracies and
market economies, many Americans see the problems in Russia as a sign of
some profound moral flaw in Russia's national character. This moralistic
streak is also the reason many Americans seized upon the Bank of New York
scandal last year as evidence of the endemic corruption in Russia that,
they thought, doomed our effort to help them rebuild.

The Kosovo conflict, at a time when NATO was adopting a new strategic
doctrine and adding new members, confirmed Russians' worst fears about the
Alliance. Moreover, Kosovo underscored just how little Russia's voice
mattered in the world, even in Europe, a region of vital significance to
Russia. At the same time, Russia's failure to condemn Milosevic and to
admit what Americans saw as clear evidence of massive, inhumane ethnic
cleansing in Kosovo reinforced their convictions that Russians were indeed
morally deficient. 

Finally, Chechnya dramatically underscored the gap between Russians and
Americans. While Americans were appalled by the brutality of Moscow's
military operation, Russians cheered it as necessary to putting an end to
the alleged terrorist threat emanating from Chechnya, restoring order to a
Russian territory, and safeguarding the country's territorial integrity.
Against the background of what Russians saw as an illegal and inhumane NATO
air campaign in Kosovo, they took Western criticism of their Chechnya
operation as evidence of a double standard, of a refusal to treat Russia as
an equal, and of an unwillingness to appreciate the depths of the problems
Russia confronts, problems, moreover, that many Russians believe arose out
of their following Western advice. 

Earlier this year, there was a hope - certainly in Washington and, perhaps
to a lesser extent, in Moscow - that Putin's assumption of power would halt
the deterioration and begin to put the relationship back on track. And
indeed there was a certain thaw, as President Clinton declared Putin a man
we could do business with. But the hopes quickly faded as it become clear
that the two countries were deeply divided over the issue of national
missile defense and concern grew in Washington about Putin's commitment to
democratic principles, especially press freedoms. Moreover, Washington was
disturbed by Putin's efforts to sow discord between the United States and
our European allies on the issue of national missile defense, as well as by
Putin's reaching out to countries we once called "rogue states," such as
Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, and the former Yugoslavia. 

In fairness, we should admit that U.S.-Russian relations have not been in
great shape for many years, despite official rhetoric on both sides to the
contrary. The past two and a half years only mark an acceleration in a
basic trend that dates back to the mid-nineties. Ironically, the high
point of the relationship was probably the late Gorbachev and early Yeltsin
period, when the barriers that had divided the two countries since the end
of the Second World War came down with astonishing rapidity. That was a
time of great expectations, when it seemed possible that Russia could be
swiftly integrated into the West and that the United States and Russia
could together take the lead in building a new world order around
democratic values and market principles. In 1992 President Yeltsin
addressed an enthusiastic joint session of the American Congress, declaring
that Russia "was extending its hand in friendship to the people of America"
and inviting the United States to join Russia "in partnership in the quest
for freedom and justice in the twenty-first century." 

By 1994, however, after the ultranationalist Zhirinovskiy's shocking
victory in the Duma elections, doubts emerged about the short-term
possibilities for U.S.-Russian relations. In Washington, Russia was
increasingly seen as a country intent on destabilizing Moldova and
Transcaucasia, suspicions grew concerning the nature of its contacts with
Iran on nuclear matters, and differences over how to deal with the former
Yugoslavia deepened. At the same time, the Russian political elite was
disturbed that the West was tardy in delivering the assistance it had
promised to Russia's transition and niggardly in the amounts it was
prepared to offer. It viewed with concern an increasingly activist U.S
policy toward the states of the former Soviet Union, an area it saw as one
of vital interest and where some Russians thought Russia still had
exclusive rights. 

The Clinton Administration did not address this change in mood directly.
Instead, it largely ignored it, because it decided that it could work with
Yeltsin and a small group of so-called "radical reformers" around him to
get what it wanted on security matters (no matter what the Russian
political elite thought). In crude terms, it assuaged Yeltsin's ego,
trading symbolism for substance, to persuade him to agree to U.S.
initiatives. So Yeltsin was hailed as a major world leader - despite his
at times clownish behavior and Russia's diminishing clout - in exchange for
his acquiesence to NATO expansion, the United States' Balkan policy, or its
demands on nonproliferation issues. 

But this approach fueled resentment within the Russian elites, which
increasingly saw U.S. policies as efforts to take advantage of Russia's
weakness. The elites also resented the disrespect for Russia that was
implicit in our increasingly overt manipulation of a mentally and
physically challenged Yeltsin. 

No Agenda

So relations have been on a downward trajectory for some time, and the
question I would raise now is whether there is any real substance left to
them. What is striking is how little the United States and Russia have to
talk about. This year, President Clinton and President Putin have met face
to face four times and talked frequently by phone, but they have
accomplished little. The agenda has been thin. Part of the reason, of
course, lies in the fact that Clinton is the lamest of lame ducks, and the
Russian side rightly judges that there is little to be accomplished with
this outgoing president. But neither is the American side particularly
eager to engage. 

One does not have to look far for the reason. The Administration has lost
confidence in its earlier Russia policy. From the time it entered office
until the Russian financial crisis of 1998, the Clinton Administration had
devoted great energy to transforming Russia into a democracy and a market
economy. To be sure, considerable time was also spent on traditional
security concerns, and not without some success - for example, the
withdrawal of Russian troops from Central Europe and the Baltics on
schedule and the withdrawal of Soviet weapons from Ukraine, Belarus, and
Kazakhstan to Russia for dismantling. 

But the Administration's real enthusiasm, and particularly that of Deputy
Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, the chief architect of the
Administration's Russia policy, was for transforming Russia domestically in
the belief that a prosperous, democratic Russia would be a key support for
U.S. security and a key partner in maintaining global peace and stability
over the long term. The Administration talked boldly of forming a
"strategic alliance with Russian reform." The goal was - to use one of
Talbott's favorite locutions - to help Russia become "a normal, modern
state - democratic in its governance, abiding by its own constitution and
by its own laws, market-oriented and prosperous in its economic
development, at peace with itself and with the rest of the world." For
several years, the Administration spoke as if Russia - with substantial
Western assistance - was making rapid progress toward that goal.

In August 1998, the Administration's policy failed. It watched in anguish
as the officials it had staked its hopes on, Anatoliy Chubays and other
so-called "radical reformers," were dismissed from key positions and
distanced from the halls of power. The Administration made a lame effort
to defend its policy in the fall of 1998, pointing largely to the successes
on the traditional security agenda. It also pointed to some limited
progress on democratization and marketization, while expressing concern
that much of it could be undone by the more conservative government that
had replaced the radical reformers. Most tellingly, it rediscovered the
truism it had so long ignored while it appeared its policy was succeeding,
namely, that Russians themselves will ultimately decide what type of Russia
is to be built. In other words, it laid blame for the failure of the
Administration's policy squarely on the Russians themselves. 

Surely, the Administration shares the blame, but just as surely it is
right that our ability to influence domestic outcomes in Russia was always
on the margins. That has been the great lesson of the 1990's, which should
have been obvious at the very beginning. Russia is simply too large and
too complex and our understanding of the processes underway there too
limited for it to be otherwise. Now, in sharp contrast to the situation
just a decade ago, the Russians are not particularly eager for our
assistance in their domestic transformation. As a result, many of the
items that had animated U.S.-Russian relations during the better part of
the Clinton Administration disappeared from the agenda some two years ago. 

Asymmetry

Beefing up the agenda today is not going to be easy, for we have followed
radically different paths over the past decade, something that has lead to
a gaping and growing asymmetry in power, attitudes, and fortunes. 

The United States is enjoying the longest period of economic expansion in
its history. Russia has suffered a socio-economic collapse unprecedented
for a great power not defeated in a major war. The U.S. economy grew by
over 30 percent in the 90's, while Russia's plunged by over 40. Today,
Russia's economy is a tenth the size of United States', and Russia lags
years behind the United States in mastering the possibilities of the
information-technological revolution.

The United States exudes self-confidence and optimism about our future;
Russia is mired in self-doubt and an identity crisis. The United States
talks of itself proudly as the indispensable nation. It is indeed the
paramount power in the world with no threat to its security looming on the
horizon. Russia, meanwhile, uses the rhetoric of a great power and demands
to be treated like one, but such behavior masks profound disquiet about
Russia's standing in the world. As national security documents released
earlier this year indicate, Russia sees multiple threats to its security
both at home and abroad. 

The United States welcomes globalization; Russia sees it as a threat. The
United States wants to ride the wave of globalization to build an
international order that will perpetuate its preeminent position and
prosperity well into the future. Russia wants to postpone the
consolidation of any new world order to a time when it will hopefully have
regained its power and therefore be in a better position to shape that
order. 

The United States enjoys a surfeit of power and possibilities; the
challenge before it is to use that power wisely. Russia's power is eroding
and its choices narrowing; the challenge before it is to stop the rot,
begin to rebuild, and eventually close the gap with the world's leading
powers. 

In short, Americans and the Russians live in radically different worlds,
and their leaders are intent on taking radically different paths, at least
in the short run. 

The Post-Cold War World

Moreover, not only have the United States and Russia changed dramatically,
but so has the rest of the world. Although the Cold War ended a decade
ago, we are now only beginning to break out of the frameworks inherited
from it. During the Cold War, U.S. relations with Russia (in the guise of
the Soviet Union) determined the very nature of the international system.
In the early years of the Clinton Administration, Russia was given a
priority that indicated that the Administration was having difficulty
breaking out of the bipolar framework of the Cold War. Likewise, Yeltsin's
Russia saw the United States as its chief international partner and point
of reference. 

Much has changed. Today, the United States no longer views the world
through the prism of its relations with Russia. On the contrary, Russia is
viewed through the prism of other problems, be they European security,
nonproliferation, Caspian energy resources, or China. For this reason, the
United States no longer has an integrated Russia policy. Rather, it has a
Russian section to its policies on other matters, and often these sections
are not smoothly related one to another.

And, indeed, the solutions to many of the problems that bedevil
U.S.-Russian relations are to be found elsewhere than in Moscow, or better,
we cannot solve these problems by talking only or even primarily to Moscow.
Normalizing relations with Iran is the key to easing the United States'
concerns about Russia's nuclear relationship with that country. Getting
its China policy right is the key to easing U.S. concerns about growing
Russian-Chinese military cooperation. The solution to the former
Yugoslavia lies with America's European allies and the Balkan states
themselves, not with Russia. Moreover, I would stress, even the one
relationship that looks bipolar at this point - the strategic nuclear
balance - will become increasingly less so as Russia builds down its
forces, China builds up, and other countries gain the capacity to build
nuclear weapons.

Russia too is slowly realizing that we can no longer be its primary
interlocutor in international affairs. We are simply in different weight
categories. And so the task for Russia in dealing with us is to build
coalitions on specific matters to influence our behavior. Hence, Russia's
growing focus on Europe and China, not simply as counterweights to the
United States, but as countries in a league to which Russia can reasonably
aspire. 

The Future of the Relationship

So where do all these considerations leave U.S.-Russian relations as a new
administration prepares to take office in Washington? Let me begin by
stressing that Russia will remain a key country for the United States, even
if it no longer occupies central stage in our concerns and competes for
attention with other countries and regions, notably Europe, Japan, China,
and India. This is not going to change with the new Bush administration.
Its strategic goal will remain the one that has animated our Russia policy
from the late Gorbachev period - Russia's democratization, marketization,
and integration into the West - although obviously the way in which, and
the intensity with which, President Bush pursues that goal will differ from
President Clinton's.

The watchword for the Bush administration will be pragmatism. Gone will
be the romanticism of the early Clinton years and the pretense of the later
years. Russia will not be considered a strategic partner, but neither will
it be deemed a strategic adversary or threat. Rather, the Bush
administration will seek relations with Russia that are a combination of
cooperation, competition, and indifference, that is, similar to relations
the United States enjoys with most countries around the world. Russia will
be treated with respect, and it will be expected to vigorously defend its
national interests, just as the United States will, both in cooperation and
in competition with Russia.

The respect will be evident in Bush's approach to Russia's domestic
affairs. No longer will the United States be intimately involved, seeking
specific kinds of political arrangements or pressuring the Russian
president to retain or dismiss certain government ministers, as the Clinton
administration in fact did on a few occasions. Like earlier
administrations, the Bush administration will pay close attention to the
state of the basic human rights in Russia - and it will criticize sharply
any egregious violations and consider sanctions, as demonstrated during the
campaign by Mr. Bush's call to stop lending to the Russian government as
long as it was engaged in the brutal military operation in Chechnya. It
will also be concerned about corruption and organized crime in Russia, in
part because both pose threats to the United States, and it will be
prepared to work with the Russian government in combating both. But the
Bush administration will be less concerned about the details of Russia's
domestic political arrangements, including executive-legislative relations,
federal structures, and the party system, than the Clinton administration was.

Similarly, on economic matters, the Bush administration will continue to
facilitate Russia's entry into the World Trade Organization, assuming that
Russia indeed wants to join, but it will interfere less in Russia's
domestic economic policies. The assumption will be that the Russian
government knows what needs to be done to rebuild Russia and that it must
show the political will to take the tough, unpopular measures necessary to
turning the country around. Moreover, for the Bush administration,
investors, both foreign and domestic, will be the best judges of whether
Russia has gotten its economic policies right. 

As for foreign and security matters, there are a range of issues on which
the Bush administration will engage Russia, along with other countries.
Let me focus on two that are perhsps the gravest causes of concern in
Moscow: Nato expansion and national missile defense. 

On Nato, the Bush administration will be committed to further expansion
eastward, as President-elect Bush made clear during the election campaign.
But the Bush administration will not rush into a second round. It will
want to assure itself first that the new members from Central Europe -
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic - have been sufficiently integrated
and that further enlargement poses no serious threat to Nato's cohesion and
integrity of the Alliance or its ability to carry out its core security
functions. Even then, a second round is likely to be limited to Slovenia
and Slovakia, while the sensitive question of the Baltic States is
postponed until the middle of the decade. Consequently, there will be
considerable time to work out he modalities of Baltic membership in ways
that do minimal damage to U.S.-Russian relations. 

On national missile defense, widespread fears in Russia to the contrary
notwithstanding, the Bush administration's approach will open up
opportunities for improved relations with Russia for three reasons. First,
its commitment to a more robust system means that the administration's
first year - and perhaps more - will be devoted to determining exactly what
type of system to build and what series of test to undertake to prove the
technology. An early withdrawal from the ABM Treaty is unlikely, although
that option will of course be held open. Second, the system the Bush
administration is likely to opt for - boost-phase - could also conceivably
be used to defend Europe, including Russia. That would create
opportunities for cooperation with Europe and Russia in developing and
deploying such a system. Third, the Bush administration will review the
United States' nuclear posture, with the goal of bringing down unilaterally
the number of warheads to the minimal level required to meet our security
needs. That number will be well below current levels, as well as START-2
levels. As President, Bush will challenge the Russians to make parallel,
unilateral cuts. That approach promises to accelerate the building down of
forces worldwide, something that should improve the atmosphere for the hard
negotiations over national missile defense and the ABM Treaty.

If I am right about the Bush administration's policies, then we are on the
eve of a new departure in U.S.-Russian relations, one that will offer the
opportunity for significant improvement. Much, of course, will depend on
whether Putin's Russia is prepared to seize the opportunity. It takes two
to tango, after all. Will Putin's Russia have sufficient confidence in its
own strength to engage the United States constructively? Or will doubts
about its capabilities and wounded pride lead it to seek to work at
crosspurposes to the United States, as it has in the recent past? That is
an open question. 

If Russia is prepared to engage, then the next few years could witness
small, but significant, steps toward reparing U.S.-Russian relations. To
be sure, there will be little of the drama that transfixed us in the
immediate post-Cold War period. There are no historic missions to be
accomplished. Rather, we will find ourselves engaged in the less glamorous
work of repairing relations step by step. That is ultimately for the
good, for only by lowering our expectations and avoiding grandiose talk of
partnership, only by looking more realistically at the state of
U.S.-Russian relations and their possibilities, can we begin to restore the
trust between the two countries that has suffered so greatly over the past
decade and begin to rebuild a relationship that promises great benefits to
both countries if only we can get it right. 

******

CDI Russia Weekly:  http://www.cdi.org/russia

Johnson's Russia List Archive (under construction):  http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson