November 29, 2000   

This Date's Issues:   4658 • 4659 • 4660

Johnson's Russia List
#4659
29 November 2000
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Bloomberg: Russia Has 7 Million Internet Users, Interfax Agency Reports.
2. RFE/RL: Sophie Lambroschini, Russia: AIDS Epidemic Threatens Hundreds Of Thousands.
3. The Times Literary Supplement (UK): Abe Brumberg, When Beezness Is Booming. (Review of Paul Klebnikov's Godfather of the Kremlin: Boris Berezovksy and the Looting of Russia.)
4. Nezavisimaya Gazeta - Stsenarii: RUSSIA ON EDGE OR UNDERSTANDING PUTIN. Intellectuals and Politicians Contemplate Whether the President Is Capable of Turning Russia Around.]

******

#1
Russia Has 7 Million Internet Users, Interfax Agency Reports
 
Moscow, Nov. 29 (Bloomberg) -- Russia has 7 million Internet users, who
account for the $700,000 a day of transactions carried out online, said
Deputy Communications Minister Alexander Volokitin, Interfax reported.

About 3 million of those 7 million are frequent users, with the rest being
occasional users, Volokitin said, the agency reported. Russians have 10
million personal computers, he said.

Russia is attempting to increase the use of computers and the Internet,
with President Vladimir Putin answering e-mails during presidential
elections. OAO Svyazinvest, the holding company for Russia's 86 regional
phone companies, expects 10 percent of the country's 145 million population
to use the Internet within three years, still well below the proportion of
Internet users in the U.S. and western Europe.

An e-mail address in St. Petersburg, Russia's second-biggest city, received
passwords sent by hackers who broke into Microsoft Corp.'s computer network
earlier this year.

******

#2
Russia: AIDS Epidemic Threatens Hundreds Of Thousands
By Sophie Lambroschini

In the past year, the number of registered cases of HIV -- the virus that
causes AIDS -- has doubled in Russia, a sudden surge in an epidemic that hit
the country later than elsewhere in Europe. This week, in advance of the
annual World AIDS Day (1 December), the country's top health officials are
calling for more financial aid and more prevention-oriented efforts. Moscow
correspondent Sophie Lambroschini reports.

Moscow, 28 November 2000 (RFE/RL) -- Russia today has only 418 registered
cases of AIDS, with some 700 people known to have died from the usually fatal
disease in the past. But the country's health authorities are warning that
hundreds of thousands may already be infected with HIV -- the virus that
triggers AIDS -- and that more people will be infected in the next few years
when the epidemic shifts from intravenous drug users to the general
population.

Russia' Health Ministry classified HIV as an "epidemic" earlier this year.
Two months ago, a United Nations representative in Moscow, Philippe
Elghouayel, said that Russia now has the highest HIV infection rate in the
world.

Russia currently has about 70,000 registered HIV cases -- a number that has
doubled over the past year -- of which almost all are intravenous drug users.
The UN's World Health Organization estimates Russia's non-diagnosed HIV cases
at about 130,000. But Vadim Pokrovsky, Russia's top AIDS specialist, says
that the real number of HIV cases could be between 300,000 and 400,000. A
similar figure was cited by the director of the UN's UNAIDS department, Peter
Piot, during a trip to Moscow earlier this month.

At a Moscow press conference today, Aleksandr Goliusov, who is charge of
combating AIDS at Russia's Health Ministry, acknowledged that the
government's earlier efforts had to be overhauled because authorities had not
expected an epidemic.

"At the moment, we are finishing work on a new program for the period from
2002 to 2007. The problem is that the old program was adopted in 1996, when
the epidemiological situation was different. At the time, we had not yet seen
the spread of HIV among drug users that make up 90 percent of all new cases
now."

Drug addiction is a widespread problem among Russian youth, who consume
anything from heroin to cheap pharmacy mixes costing about one dollar. Heroin
addiction is relatively common, with some cases even having turned up in some
of Moscow's elite scientific institutes.

Pokrovsky and Goliusov agree that future AIDS prevention should target the
population at large in order to hold back the spread of the disease from
intravenous drug users to transmission through heterosexual relations. The
rate of sexually transmitted diseases in Russia has increased dramatically
over the past 10 years, indicating that a similar evolution of HIV could
occur.

Pokrovsky told today's press conference that Russia, like many African
countries, cannot afford the $1,000 monthly cost of HIV therapies available
to the fortunate few in the West. He says it must therefore concentrate on
prevention policies, taking advantage of an educated population that watches
television and reads the newspapers to get its message across.

But Pokrovsky notes that, as in some other countries, a battle is going on in
Russia between a conservative lobby and what he calls a "democratic" one. He
says the conservatives -- influenced by religious or communist values -- are
against full sex education in the schools. The "democrats," he says, believe
children should be taught to take into account that many people have several
sexual partners in the course of their lives -- and are therefore more at
risk of contracting the disease.

"We can clearly see this battle inside the Education Ministry, where there is
still no state policy on sex education in schools. One proposed program
earlier was criticized and rejected for allegedly pressing open and free
sexual behavior on children."

But Russia's Health Ministry insists that the main problem is simply lack of
money. Officials note that the anti-AIDS program set up four years ago only
began receiving financing last year. And this year, less that $1.5 million,
or 20 percent of the sum allocated, was actually paid out to the ministry.
Most of it has gone to buying and distributing prevention kits.

The government points out that it helps through other forms of support.
Non-governmental organizations, or NGOs, combating AIDS receive free time on
state television. And Moscow's city council allows free advertisement space
for prevention ads.

In addition, Russia also receives financial aid from abroad. In addition to
help from international NGOs, the UN's anti-AIDS program has contributed
about $750,000 this year, and the World Bank recently offered Russia a
$150-million loan to help fight the disease.

******

#3
Date: Tue, 28 Nov 2000
From: abe brumberg <ABrumberg@compuserve.com>
Subject: When Beezness Is Booming

I submitted the review below to TLS more than two months ago, and the
editors have assured me it is as timely now as it was then.  I don't quite
agree, but in any event the review is finally appearing, and readers of the
JRF are welcome to read it.

THE TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT, DEC. 8, 2000
When Beezness Is Booming
By Abe Brumberg

Paul Klebnikov
Godfather of the Kremlin
Boris Berezovksy and the Looting of Russia
400 pp., Harcourt, Inc.
ISBN    0-15-100621-0

    One spring day some years ago  I was driving with a few friends,
including an Irish correspondent from Dublin, through the leafy streets of
Peredelkino, the renowned litrerary dacha colony near Moscow, when we noted
a  shabby-looking structure, with a sign identifying it (if memory serves)
as a restaurant-cum-nightclub.  All the doors and windows were shut,
nowhere was there a sign of life, but when we rang the bell, the door
opened slightly and a gruff voice asked who we were.  We produced our
identity cards, whereupon the door swung open and we stepped inside. 
     We found ourselves in a small  cultivated garden flanked by   a
modest  18th century palace,. obviously once  the property of a noble
family, and  were   ushered  into its spacious vestibule, furnished with
comfortably upholstered red chairs and polished ebony coffee tables.  A
small leprechaun of a man, nattily dressed, entered  the room.  He turned
out to be the manager of the establishment and indeed--to the utter delight
of the Irish correspondent-- a fellow Irishman.
     Mr. O'Reilly, as I may as well  call him, spoke not a word of
Russian, but after his staff  provided us with ice-cold champagne and
zakuski, and having made sure that they we were alone,  he proceeded to
give us a  spirited if sotto voce account of what it was like for a
restauranteur  in post-Communist Russia to cater to a gang of mafiosi--his
only customers, he told us. They would appear, he said, in the evening or
at night, sometimes  phoning in advance, but more often without any prior
notice,   fully expecting him   to welcome them with  an  profusion  of
bottles--vodka, beer, champagne and cognac. "They don't eat," he noted
gravely, "they only drink."  And make a fearsome racket.  Accompanied by a
dozen or so tough  looking bodyguards, they  would drape themselves over
sofas and chairs, the bodyguards occasionally swinging  their weapons
menacingly,  giving their host,  he confessed,  a proper case of the
willies.   The local police knew them well, he told us, and was aware of
"the extortions and shootings   these chaps engage in"--but, no doubt
complicit, would leave  them be.
      "And you?," we asked, "why not quit this dangerous game.?"  He
smiled: "They stay an hour," referring to his visitors, " may be two., and
then depart leaving behind them  a mountain of banknotes,  20,000, or
30,000 dollars.".  Even after purchasing fresh booze, paying his staff (all
Mafia associates) and turning over a share of the profits to  his employers
(a Swedish firm, of all things) there was still plenty left "to deposit in
my Dublin bank account.  Can you b lame me for  hanging on?"
     In retrospect, our visit with the Irish restauranteur now seems
like a halcyon moment in the already relentless  rise of the Russian
criminal universe.  Mr. Klebnikov, an American journalist of Russian
parentage  stationed in Moscow,  offers a vivid description   of the
explosion of mayhem and violence in the early l990s: offices firebombed,
Chechen gangsters ( deft heirs to a long and proud tradition) battling it
out with Russian gangs, Daghestanis with Georgians,"bankers" (with ties to
one or another group of mafiosi) shot down in full daylight,  cars blasted
by remote-control devices or hand-thrown grenades (Klebnikov's main
protagonist, Boris Berezovsky, once saw his chauffeur decapitated before
his  eyes as they were driving through Moscow--an experience which sent him
to Switzerland for  two months of recovalescence).  The victims (including
the chauffeur's head) were often buried in  Chicago gangstyle  funerals,
and the police made no arrests.   
     The outburst of criminal activity in the early l990s was not
exactly a novel event. Tsarist Russia boasted  a large criminal population,
which in the USSR, with its massive violence against peasants, "wreckers"
and sundry "enemies of the people", its hordes of bezpryzornye (homeless
waifs) roaming the countryside, its prisons and gulags, not only increased
exponentially, but created  a distinctive  criminal culture, with strict
rules of behavior, a rich blatnoy yazyk (thieves' cant),  and a large
number of  songs, some dating back to the l9th century.
     But however strong the  historic roots of the post--Communist
criminal world, it nevertheless represents something discrete --a
consequence , as Klebnikov demonstrates, of the catastrophic   "economic
reforms" conceived and implemented by eager young "democrats" like Agar
Gaidar and Anatole Chubais, with the blessings of Boris Yeltsin and of the
United States (as trumpeted  regularly by the State Department's top
Russian expert,   Strobe Talbot)..
     While the criminalization of Russia was taking place anyway, what
with Gorbachev's reluctance to pursue vigorous economic policies and the
drastic decline of Russia's productivity and of its standard of living,
the "reformers''' radical initiatives were the force that pushed   the
country to the brink of disaster, and to the emergence of  new social layer
of wheeler -dealers , former party apparatchikki and enterprise managers
dizzy with   wealth and power.  The sweeping price liberalization of l992
and its resultant  hyperinflation that wiped out the savings of millions of
Russian citizens,  followed by the generous treatment of unscrupulous
traders, and the 1993-94 voucher privatization (or prikhvatizatsiia--
"grabitization"--as it soon became known) enriched  the few and caused
hundreds of thousands of ordinary  Russians to pursue illusory get-rich
stratagems, such as the disastrous "pyramid schemes" that nearly brought
the country to a standstill..   .
     Yet nothing proved more onerous  than the so-called "loans for
share" scheme, by which the state offered controlling shares to some of the
country's biggest companies in return for  munificent loans tendered by the
latter to the Yeltsin apparat.  In addition, the companies undertook to
assure (by means fair and foul--particularly the latter) Yeltsin's victory
in the presidential elections of l996.  Klebnikov's book provides stunning
examples off skull-duggery engaged in both by the government and by he
company owners, the new Russian "oligarchs" whose rape of the country was
facilitated by the Yeltsin machine, including his  energetic   daughter
Tatyana Dyatchenko..  
     The two major television networks, ORT and NTV, controlled by Boris
Berezovsky and Vladimir Gusinsky respectively, kept  Yeltsin's rivals (in
particular the large and well organized Communist Party and its leader and
presidential candidate Genady Zyuganov). at arm's length from the TV
studios.  They  ran   defamatory  ads about Yeltsin's opponents, doctored
documentaries and staged "spontaneous" meetings of Yeltsin's adoring
supporters.   In doing so, the media moguls and Yeltsin apparatchiki could
draw on their own country's venerable tradition of manufactured spontaneity
as well as on the advice of a number of American public relations
hucksters --reliable friends of democracy, all-- also adept in the art of
"improving" reality.     In a more traditional vein, as Klebnikov reports,
"Yeltsin's team was bribing cash-strapped journalists and their bosses to
run flattering pieces about the president.  Payments ranged from $l00 paid
to as provincial reporter for a single positive article to millions of
dollars paid to the owners of the largest Russian newspapers."
     Since the onset  of perestroika in the late l980s little has been
done to erect a stable and functioning legal order in Russia.  The civil
code has been improved, and some positive reforms in ther relations between
tghe center and the pereipheries instituted, but criminal justice is in a
parflous state.  Thus  bribery, extortionism, arbitrariness, corruption
have all continued to thrive.  In addition, Putin periodically launches
censorship forays at the media, all his mealy-mouthed praise of a "civil
society", and "rule of law" notwithstandinge.  Where there is little
legality, where the police is partnered with gangsters, where confession is
still regarded as a prima facie evidence of guilt (see Confessions at any
Cost, Human Rights Watch, l999), and where the government, too, is steeped
in corruption,   a criminal society is bound to take root and resist any
attempts to dislodge it.  Especially when Russia's most sympathetic friend,
the  United States,  applauds    acts  which communists themselves would
be proud of,  such as defaming and destroying  poilitical opponents.   (See
pp. 115-ll6 of the book under review, and  Janine R.E.. Wedel, Collision
and Collusion--the Strange Case of Western Aid to Eastern Europe,
l989-1998, St. Martin's Press, l998, pp.121-163.)
     The criminalization of Russia has been the subject of several books
in recent years, but Klebnikov's  is one of the  best of the lot.  It is at
one and the same time an astute   analysis of the  forces that have spawned
the criminalization,   and of the    individual tycoons who spurred the
process and benefitted from it.    In his effort  to leave no stone
unturned in depicting the machinations of  Boris Berezovsky, Klebnikov
gives relatively short shrift to  other members of this unholy alliance,
such as Vladimir Gusinskiy, Roman Abramovich, Vladimir Potanin, Oleg Boiko,
and especially the odious  General Alexander Korzhakov, for many years
Yeltsin 's personal bodyguard, bosom chum and tennis partner, then chief of
the Presidential Security Service, who has been deeply implicated in some
of the most sordid  operations in recent years.   There are not a few
smarmy operators in Russia, but Berezovsky has been  patently  the most
flourishing one of the lot.. 
     Berezovsky's success among those  too innocent to see through his
duplicities also comes at a time when public opinion in the West is turning
against the Chechens and in support of Putin's new war,  with its once
again  increasing toll of Russian and Chechen lives.  That since the end of
the First Chechen war in l996 Chechen terrorists have embarked on massive
kidnaping rackets, replete with mutilations, rape and murder , and that the
fires of Muslim fundamentalism have spread through the region is
indisputable.  Yet that these appalling developments (in manyu respects,
incidentally, paralleled by the Russian military forces in Chechnya) are
to a large extent a result of the Russian refusal to negotiate  with the
relatively moderate president of Chechnya,     Aslan Maskhadov--still
prepared, all rumors to the contrary notwithstanding, to work out a
political compromise with the Russians-- is equally certain.   
     More to the point is Berezovsky's squalid exploitation of the
Chechen-Russian quagmire for his own financial and political gains., He has
frequently traveled to Chechnya with suitcases filled with of money--ransom
paid for the release of hostages, an act of sheer selfless  generosity, as
he has solemnly avowed. .  He negotiated the deals while a member of the
Russian  Security Council, that is, as a government official, while in
fact, as it turned out, serving as a banker for the Chechen kidnappers,
among them members of some of the most fanatical fundamentalist gangs, such
as the Wahhabis.  At one time he donated $l million in cash to Shamil
Basayev, a notorious Chechen warlord, admitting to it but claiming the
money was purely the  "reconstruction of a cement factory" (!).  
     The story of how a once distinguished Soviet scientist acquired the
greatest private fortune in Russia with the aid of  inspired operators  and
mobsters, and how a country once thought to be in the vise of an
ideological dictatorship turned into monumental kleptocracy is one of the.
most fascinating stories of the late 20th century.  One partricular piece
of received wisdom which Klebnikov, rightly, will have none of is that the
present oligarchs are direct descendants of the American robber barons of
the late l9th century, and are thus bound, eventually, to become
transmogrified intro ordinary businessmen.  Humbug.  The American robber
barons, however insalubrious their methods, contributed heftily to the rise
of the United States as an industrial power and eventually as a consumers'
haven.  The Russian oligarchs merely followed the maxim  enrichez vous,
grabbing the country's wealth, shipping most of their gains  abroad ( a
capital-flight orgy unknown in any other country in the world), causing
Russia's gross domestic product to fall by 50 percent in four years, and
plunging the country into abject poverty (on a per capita basis, Klebnikov
notes, Russia became poorer than Peru). .                  
     Klebnikov provides an enlightening tour of the stations in
Soviet/Russian history each of which contributed to the country's eventual
downfall.  But ultimately the  the explosion of organized crime in Russia,
he writes, may well "go back to the earliest days of communism.," when
gangster methods were used "to intimidate or eliminate political
opponents."   He could have added that those "gangster methods" became the
hallmark of Soviet/Russian history before, during, and after Stalin.  That
with them went contempt for the average citizen, contempt for the law,
indifference to living standards,  mendacity, cynicism.  However
significant the changes of the past decade, despite the  Putin's current
contretemps with Berezovksy and Gusinsky (but not with any other tycoons!),
and despite Putoin's recognition of the parlous nature of the realities he
is faced with, Russia's political culture remains largely the same.  It is
a grim discomfitting thought. But books such as Klebnikov's make it hard to
dismiss.

******

#4
Nezavisimaya Gazeta - Stsenarii
No. 10
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
RUSSIA ON EDGE OR UNDERSTANDING PUTIN
     Intellectuals and Politicians Contemplate Whether  the
President Is Capable of Turning Russia Around
     The Free Word Club organized a roundtable discussion
entitled "Russian President Vladimir Putin's one hundred and
forty days (Where is Russia heading?)" at the Philosophy
Institute of Russian Academy of Sciences on September 27, 2000.
The list of the participants was as follows: Doctor of
Philosophy, Professor Free Word Club President Valentin
TOLSTYKH;
philosopher and writer Alexander ZINOVYEV; State Duma deputy
Vladimir RYZHKOV; Doctor of History, Professor (Gorbachev Fund)
Vladlen LOGINOV; Doctor of Philosophy, Professor Vladimir
SHEVCHENKO; Professor Vadim TSAREV; Doctor of Philosophy Vadim
MEZHUYEV; Doctor of Political Science, Professor of the Russian
State Service Academy affiliated to the President of the
Russian Federation Oksana GAMAN-GOLUTVINA; writer, Doctor of
Philology, leading researcher of the Arts Institute of the
Russian Academy of Sciences Lyudmila SARASKINA and others.
     Nezavisimaya Gazeta - Stsenarii is publishing materials of
the discussion. The discussion is available in full in the next
issue of an almanac published by the Free Word Club.
    
     "There Are Two Putins: One Wishes, the Other Acts..."
     Valentin TOLSTYKH. I thought of the title for the
discussion. Let me explain how it came up. I had an idea about
a discussion of this topic on the inauguration day of our new
president. It would have been proper to hold this discussion
after the first 100 days, but everyone was on vacation in
mid-August. Exactly have 140 days passed, it's that simple.
However, some things are not simple. When the question "What is
Putin like?" was asked across Russia and worldwide, we kept
silent although we usually react promptly to the latest events.
We did not want to make guesses, digest rumours and express our
expectations for a prognosis to be made.
     However, the question is different today. In the past 140
days our young and energetic president has taken a lot of
decisions and numerous actions, all of them goal-oriented and
systematic. Now it's time to stop guessing and understand
clearly "what Putin is like" and "where Russia is heading." He
has remained something of an enigma. My impression is that
there are two Putins: one wishes something; he wants it very
much. Next to him, is the other one, who keeps doing things.
The two do not always co-incide, leaving the door open for more
guesswork and assumptions. Putin might have inherited a
notorious "unpredictability" from his predecessor. Maybe he
does not want to reveal his true intentions in advance. This
needs clarification and this is why we have met today...
     I have invited two prominent but very different people,
Alexander Zinovyev and Vladimir Ryzhkov, to co-host the
discussion. They will moderate the tone and positions. Both of
them are known for their precise and uncompromising assessments.
This is extremely important in such discussions. Let them have
the floor.
    
           "To Expect Radical Changes Is Pointless..."
     Alexander ZINOVYEV. The people, who implemented the
operation resulting in Putin's coming to power, did it at the
top level. Putin was a very convenient and passable figure for
this purpose. However, he is a narrow apparatchik who has never
sat in a presidium. A person in power should be more versatile,
a leader. How should the person act in this post? I've never
attached importance to personal qualities in such situations.
No matter who was in power in the current circumstances he
would take roughly the same steps that Putin is taking. Given
the situation in Russia, 90% of the behavior of the person in
power is determined by factors out of his control.
     What are these factors? The social system put together
after the Soviet system collapsed in our country. The human
factor that did not get better after the Soviet Union fell
apart. The condition of the country in general and its current
circle, primarily the West and Washington. If these factors are
combined, it's pointless to expect the new president to act
differently.
     Our wish, the wish of Russians, the wish of different
circles of Russian society and probably the recently-elected
president's subjective intentions differ from what can be done
in these conditions. Some things can be done no matter what.
The new president is faced by the task of boosting and
legalizing the results of the Gorbachev-Yeltsin social coup.
The task of turning these results into a foundation for the
future will be imposed on him by the overall situation. They
must not be annulled; Russia should not be turned backwards (we
all understand that it is impossible), but the results of this
post-Soviet period must be reinforced. The outrageous defects
of the Yeltsin period must be eliminated. Society is not going
to change radically. The most drastic historic changes have
already happened. New changes on such a scale are out of the
question. Russia's social system is a hybrid of Western
principles, the remains of Communism and recollections of an
idealized Russian society. This social hybrid will determine
Russia's fate.
     I would like to draw your attention to the peculiarities
of this social system. It was not created by amateurs on the
spur of the moment. It was in Russia that amateurs handled the
process.
Qualified people manipulated the organization. These people
waged the Cold War and destroyed the Soviet Union and the
Communist structure. This system was designed to prevent
Russia's revival and its rise to the level of a strong power
that will be able to compete with the West led by the United
States. This was done on purpose! I dubbed it a conflict
democracy. A study of its components shows that conflicts are
unavoidable. Take a look at the power bodies: the Kremlin and
the parliament, the Kremlin and the government, the federal and
regional authorities. Conflicts are unavoidable within these
pairs. One conflict breaks out after another. How did Putin
start? He came into conflict with the oligarchs, parliament,
regions and the ideological sphere (I mean the mass media that
has become "a new Vatican.") Putin is not to blame for these
conflicts. He does not have either the desire or inclination
for them. Conflicts are unavoidable in one form or another.
     Russia has moved toward a super-society that combines
Soviet (Communist) and Western elements. It's hard to say which
of the tendencies will prevail. Given Russia's traditions,
political concerns are likely to dominate over economic issues
in the power structure, although attempts might be made to make
economic aspects dominant. The Kremlin in effect carries out
the same function in Russia that the CPSU Central Committee did
during the Soviet era.
     Will a new social order save Russia from a further
degradation? It might slow down this degradation, but I doubt
it will halt the process. Headed by the United States (a global
super-society located in the USA), the West has deliberately
put into practice a program for destroying Russia. The Russian
Armed Forces are the next target. Attempts will subsequently be
made to strip Russia of its nuclear potential. From my
perspective, the role of an anti-Communist bastion will be
imposed on Russia in a future war with China.  It will become
clear later whether the war is going to be warm, cold or hot.
The West will try to accomplish the same things in China in the
21st century that it did in Russia. However, this is not a
final verdict. The historic process involves creativity.
    
       "I Do Not Understand Putin At All..."
    
     Vladimir RYZHKOV. I must admit that my view of the
President, of the situation in Russia and worldwide differs
considerably from Alexander Zinovyev's opinion. Regarding
attempts to oppose the West and Russia's Westernization, our
history is abundant with examples for such a debate.
     In the past five hundred years, from the late 15th to
early 16th centuries, Russian tsars, regimes, even religions
(at some point our people rejected religion and atheism was
officially proclaimed) were replaced, but the role of the
Kremlin changed very little. Russia's society and state
retained some permanent features through all these centuries.
They can still be distinguished through the light cover of the
last decade's reforms as visible, rough and vast forms.
     The first feature is the dominance of state interests over
the interests of society and its citizens especially in
security and border protection issues. Everything was
sacrificed for these interests. We've never counted sacrifices
and losses. Secondly, self-sufficient classes have never
emerged in Russia. There is no class of owners who can pursue a
political and social independence from the throne, from the
Kremlin. The third feature is lack of personal freedom among
the majority of the population, for instance, serfdom, gentry
with service obligations and other limitations of personal
freedom.
     We can discern a few archetypes of the Russian leader.
They took shape while attempts were made to resolve cardinal
problems of society and the state over the past five hundred
years. The first archetype is the tyrant-reformer. Such a
leader implements a super-idea via terror and violence. The
second archetype is autocrat and counter-reformer who slows
down the country. He prevents the undermining of power and a
destabilization of the regime. Thirdly, there were undecided
leaders who failed to make a strategic choice during their many
years in power.
     Let's talk in terms of our historic archetypes and the
typical features of our state and society over these centuries.
What is Vladimir Putin like? I do not know, although Alexander
Zinovyev does. As of today, Putin has been in power for over a
year (starting in August 1999 when he was appointed Prime
Minister) but I cannot understand him at all. However, some of
his steps indicate that the Kremlin's centuries-long instincts
are prevailing.
     A search is probably underway. No strategic solution or
vision has been defined. The questions of what needs to be done
in Russia and how to progress further have not been answered.
The power instinct continues to function. I agree with Valentin
Tolstykh that some presidents search, other presidents act. A
president who acts is an equivalent of the classic Russian
Kremlin that stifled, squeezed, raked up and re-pressed so that
everyone stayed in line. A searching president meets everyone
from ultra patriots to Yuri Levada, a full-fledged liberal.
This means that a research process is underway.
     I cannot answer the question of what Putin is like. If
Putin continues to reveal the power instinct without a
strategy, he will turn into a classic Russian Tsar. He will
"suppress and bar" trying to retain the post for four or eight
years, preferably for fifteen years, but a life tenure would be
even better. But it's a waste of time. Should a strategy be
determined, we will learn about it a bit later. It is very
vague at the moment.
     As for the West, what is meant by the West? The West is
torn by contradictions. Look at what is going on in Europe. All
the countries have quarrelled there. I think that the West is
just another myth. The image of a West out to destroy us is a
chimera.
Nobody is repressing and ruining us except for our own state
and ourselves. Nobody has hurts us worse than we have hurt
ourselves in the course of history. If all of us including
Putin learn the lessons of history correctly, we will have
hope. If the Kremlin recaptures its role of the past few
centuries, we will have to pin our hope on the next leader. We
will hope that the next leader will learn the right lessons
from shameful defeats.
    
     "Stability Spells Death for Us"
    
     Vladlen LOGINOV. Putin is facing two problems. To begin
with, reforms cannot be implemented in the atmosphere of
obstruction on the part of mass media. This problem must be
solved.
     The second problem is that the Soviet Union existed at the
expense of its natural resources. Russia is the richest country
in the world in this respect. As long as the state had control
over oil, gas and non-ferrous metals, opportunities existed.
The entire defense complex, education and science were built up
on oil and gas revenues.
     At present Russia has no other resources to carry out the
revival of its economic potential. The issue involves billions
of dollars. Why is Yuri Luzhkov under attack? He was the only
politician to put down in his program the following: "review of
illegal privatization results." He said it openly. It's hard to
settle the matter peacefully. This clarifies the issue of
possible reforms.
     One more thing should be born in mind. The state and
"private" armies have become equal in numbers. Over a million
people work as security staff in banks and as bodyguards. These
are well armed and trained fighters who have combat experience.
The Russian armed forces are a hungry and ragged army of 1.2
million people. They will be reduced to 800,000 soldiers. The
"oligarchs' army" will become larger than the "state army." Is
it possible to settle all these matters peacefully?
     Professor Fedotova made a very good point recently at a
roundtable discussion. "The Western countries' Club" is a
restricted arrangement and new membership is barred
particularly for us. Even if we learn to manufacture modern
Japanese-style computers and cars like Opel and Ford, we will
not be admitted anyway. Everything has already been divided. We
should be able to offer something that no one else can. Then we
would have a chance to play a distinguished role in the global
community.
     Does Russia have anything to offer?
     Academician Nikita MOISEYEV put forward his project. He
said that the only thing we can offer to the world is our
geopolitical position. The shortest path lies across our
country between two civilization centers: Europe that will play
an increasingly important role in the 21st century and the
Asia-Oceanic civilization. If we were able to streamline
transportation - the Northern Sea route, railways and aviation
- we would receive huge investment. The London-Tokyo route via
Russia is 66.7% cheaper than around Africa. It means there is a
way out.
     We should not expect things to settle down in due course.
When it is said that Putin "restores stability," the important
thing to remember is that "stability" means death for us.
Stability would conserve Russia's current tragic situation. A
breakthrough is our only hope.
    
         "Storm Is About to Break Out..."
    
      Vladimir SHEVCHENKO. Putin has not distanced himself from
the Yeltsin era, it is being wrapped up at the current stage of
Putin's presidency. The contradictions of the Yeltsin epoch
have clearly taken shape and Putin will have to resolve them
before a direction for Russia's development can be determined.
     Russia and Putin are faced by at least four acute
contradictions. We are in the midsts of the lull before the
storm. I am sure that a storm will break out soon, we will
watch it and probably participate in it. I agree with Loginov
that the existing contradictions are unlikely to be resolved
democratically and peacefully. Society will be shaken by one or
another form of social upheaval, a revolution.
     The first conflict involves patriotism in its form and
content. Patriotism means love for the Fatherland, a readiness
to protect it against enemies. Do we have a probable enemy? If
we do, who is it? The situation with the Kursk nuclear
submarine can serve as an example in this respect. If the
United States and NATO are our potential enemies, it is clear
why the Kursk nuclear submarine was carrying out a strategic
military mission and why US submarines are cruising the Barents
Sea at all times. The existence of potential enemies in the
West, East or South accounts for Putin's attempts to boost the
military-patriotic spirit in Russia. However, if the United
States and NATO have become our friends and partners, if their
representatives visit us, negotiate and finance the
dismantlement of obsolete nuclear submarines and recycling of
chemical weapons, we probably do not have potential enemies.
Then why do we need a powerful military-patriotic rhetoric? It
might lack content and cover up other processes underway in
society. We cannot speak about patriotism and refuse to
allocate enough money for the army at the same time. Priorities
must be determined. If the army protects a country from likely
and specific enemies, it should receive sufficient financing at
any cost, even through resorting to food rations. The mass
media has reported that the combined annual incomes of the ten
top Russian oligarchs exceed the annual state budget. But we
are told that there is not enough money.
This cannot continue forever.
     The second contradiction is linked to the first one. If
Russia is a great power, it should have its own development
path similar to China, India or Iran. Russia should promote
this path in the international arena and adhere to it
regardless of threats or temptations. Russia does not need to
be a great power if it emerges as a raw materials attachment to
the "golden billion." In that case, Putin's patriotic rhetoric
about a great country and the power axis strengthening are
aimed at consolidating the ruling elite that controls all the
nation's treasure. It becomes a bargaining chip in
behind-the-scenes negotiations that will pave the way for a
liberal and capitalist Russia to join the global civilization.
     This is the reason why real political parties have failed
to emerge in the ten years of reforms and democracy is
deteriorating both at the upper and lower levels. Russia does
not have a government of parliamentary majority and is unlikely
to have it in the future. Local self-rule authorities work
ineffectively.
The political elite's objectives hinder the emergence of a
genuinely democratic Russia.
     The third conflict entails a choice between the secular
state and a theocracy. Attempts to turn the Orthodox
Christianity into the state ideology have become more frequent.
     The fourth and last contradiction involves corruption.
Over 3,000 articles about corruption in Russia were published
abroad from August 1998 to late 1999. If these materials amount
to libel, it must be said that someone made up the names of
people who stole billions of dollars as well as numbers of
their bank accounts. No denunciation has been issued. Not a
single embezzler has been found. What are we offered instead?
We are showered with calls for moral self-improvement and for
the moral revival of society. Are the fraudsters real or
imagined? Society is permeated by moral degradation from top to
bottom and vice versa.
Who is responsible for this? We must make a choice between
retaining the status quo in a doomed society with blurred
boundaries between good and evil and taking a firm moral
position. Putin and his "technical" government have not been
helpful in this respect. The question is how rapidly can we
resolve these contradictions and with which means and in which
areas.
    
       Planning Could Jeopardize the Presidency
     Vadim TSAREV. Putin's enigma does not worry me. It's good
that he has remained inscrutable.
     Putin has not laid his cards on the table and he keeps
dodging. He is not doing what others thought he would be doing.
It is probably improper on his part, but it is the right thing
to do. A real commander in Russia is able to overcome his
team's pressure. He is able, if necessary, to play
hide-and-seek or hunt the thimble with the inner circle and
outsiders.
     Spy school is just what the doctor ordered for a president
in Russia. A spy is taught to conspire against everyone. Early
in his career, a spy has to give up the habit of sharing his
concerns with his family, co-workers and friends. Thus a threat
from confidents is eliminated. Does a decent spy have true
friends or people he trusts completely?
    
         "Political Deals Are Instrumental in Restoring  the
Country's Normal Federative System"
    
     Oksana GAMAN-GOLUTVINA. To understand what Putin is like
today, we should recall how it all started six months ago. To
tell you frankly, I thought then that Putin's victory in the
election would mean the country's defeat and I wrote as much. I
think differently now. Putin has become a reformer against his
will, similar to Alexander II. The Tsar's acclaimed reforms ran
counter to the political opinions of his youth, psychological
traits and early political moves. Russia's collapse after the
Crimean War did not leave him another option.
     Putin is facing the same situation. A collapse after ten
years of full-scale retreat has forced Putin to define
priorities in all spheres of life from software to nuclear
submarines. The restoration of Russia's normal federative
system presented an initial and overwhelming objective. That,
in turn, required a revival of the state's federative system
and efficiency. The logic is straightforward. It is neither a
despotic, nor an autocratic instinct but an elementary
inversion. Therefore, simple and understandable steps have been
taken to curb those members of the Federation, which seemed to
have privatized the state. It is common knowledge that the
privatization of state institutions and funds resulted in the
state's collapse and inefficiency. The interests of regional
barons and mass media who tried to assume the role of the state
have been curbed.
     Views on the position of the state differ across the world.
The "state vs. individual" dilemma is not so much superficial
as it is obsolete. There is a prejudice that the state is bound
to stifle the individual. It is maintained in modern Western
political science that an efficient state is indispensable for
an individual and instrumental in the protection of an
individual.
The West tends to minimize the state. The state is less
powerful and less important in Russian society than it is in
the democratic United States and Britain. Our state has in
effect distanced itself from social regulation. Moreover, a
tendency for minimizing the state is typical for the so-called
first world, but Russia, unfortunately, is not part of it.
Russia moves farther away from this world every year. And in
the Third World the state continues to initiate development and
implement corresponding objectives.
     The earlier privatization of Russia's key state
instruments  hinders the restoration of its normal federative
system.
Therefore, political bargaining has become instrumental in
reviving the state federative system. A direct offensive cannot
be expected in this epoch and this situation.
    
         "Putin's Strategy Is Search"
    
     Lyudmila SARASKINA. Putin won the hearts and minds of not
only those who voted for him without thinking, but of the
people who analyze and argue. The cautious and implicit
criticism we have heard today shows that there is nothing
serious to reproach Putin with.
     Vladimir Ryzhkov's analysis disappointed me very much.
Ryzhkov blamed Putin for searching instead of acting. However,
Putin's strategy seems to focus on this search. He is
absolutely unlike Yeltsin in this respect.
     Putin explores in the periphery rather than in the Kremlin.
Putin turned to Solzhenitsin who is not his type of person.
Putin talked to Levada and Gorbachev who are not his type of
people either. You may wonder why Putin even met Prokhanov. I
think he is trying to find the difficult middle line, a path
which has never existed in Russia. Putin's search is his
strategy. As Alexander Zinovyev remarked, Putin might halt
Russia's degradation. Putin is able to convince people that
some things can be achieved in Russia. The middle line of
today's discussion can probably be narrowed down to this
formula.
    
     "Current Russian Authorities Merely Imitate Authorities"
     Alexander ZINOVYEV. The guest-speakers today have
considered Russia's post-Soviet history in isolation. I view
Russia as part of the worldwide process. Moreover, Russia's
history has been discussed in terms that do not make sense any
longer and have become ideological dummies: "capitalism,
democracy, freedom, self-rule." The speakers' arguments belong
to the past too. I am sure that Russian and world history have
been falsified. Historic references cannot be backed
scientifically. This is particularly true about Soviet history
and current Western history. The West is depicted to us in such
a form that I have not seen in reality, although I lived in the
West and studied it for 21 years. Such a West does not exist.
There is something different.
     What is happening in Russia? Russia is deteriorating.
Russia is being destroyed. A war is underway. The Cold War is
over. A warm war has begun, i.e., a war on the verge of fire
when firing mechanisms are used. Hundreds of books about this
have been published in Russia. Brzezinski said that thirty
million Russians would be enough. Thatcher remarked why thirty,
fifteen million would do. It is being put into practice! That's
the point. This is the truth rather than arguments about
autocracy. That kind of discussion is meaningless. Analogies
make no sense. The fact that history has been falsified is of
lesser importance than the fact that such phenomena never
occurred previously. Never!
     The historic fate of Russia and the Russian people is at
stake. Will we remain a considerable historic phenomenon?
Owners of the global Western super-society took a negative
decision long ago. The plan is not limited to eliminating
Communism, this was just a pretext. There was a plan to wipe
Russia from the Earth so that no recollection of it remained.
We must accept it as an axiom if we want to form an opposition.
Do we have resistance leaders? No, we do not! I have been in
favor of Putin because out of the possible scenarios, the best
one has occurred. However, the best scenario is not offering a
solution to the problem.
     I said at the very beginning that (it was ignored for some
reason) Putin's historic function involves the protection and
legalization of the Gorbachev-Yeltsin acts rather than radical
changes. The objective is to legalize and strengthen the
anti-Communist coup results instead of scrapping them. However,
more decent means will be used than in Yeltsin's years. He will
not go beyond that.
     Remarks have been made that we are facing a threat of
autocracy or dictatorship triggered by a strong authority. What
does a strong authority mean? Are the impoverished Russian
authorities strong if they cannot ensure a decent legal income
for their officials? Reshuffles in the power mechanism do not
strengthen authorities. They imitate a strong authority but
fail to boost its control functions. A Stalin or Hitler
dictatorship cannot emerge from strong authority in today's
conditions. The social organization of the post-Soviet Russia
was specifically designed to prevent such a turn of events. A
super-society is being formed in post-Soviet Russia with the
elements of a super-state (the Kremlin) and a super-economy,
i.e., financial totalitarianism. The upper state echelon in the
West (presidents, chancellors, prime ministers, kings, etc.)
are involved in the mechanism of financial super-authority and
carry out its will.
Russia has been heading in the same direction since it embarked
on the path of Westernization and globalization.
     Are there forces in Russia that can attempt a breakthrough
i.e., a radical confrontation with the globalization and
Westernization? Is President Putin capable of leading those who
would attempt a breakthrough?
    
        "We Do Not Have Society Per Se"
    
     Valentin TOLSTYKH. It's premature to draw results and
finalize conclusions. Putin inherited problems that are
difficult to overcome. A lot was destroyed and almost nothing
accomplished in the past ten years. Reforms flopped and the
society did not perceive them as such. An ephemeral stability
rests on the people's eternal patience and a habit for silence.
Those in power abuse these traits mercilessly and rely on the
Russian saying:
"perhaps we'll get by." Measures touching only the tip of the
iceberg are not going to change anything. Does Putin realize
that he inherited a Gordian knot?
     The idea of a strong state has been floated. The word
"strong" is stressed more than "state" although the other way
around would be more preferable. Can a state be strong after it
has turned its back on its citizens, after it organized two
massive robberies of its population and abandoned most of its
people? The problem is that this state is anti-popular. The
weaker it is the better for the inhabitants. Even those who
created this state have admitted that its nature is "criminal"
and "racketeering," putting it simply, "bandit" (it is not
strong but "impudent," should Chubais' favorite word be used.)
The state will remain weak unless it is turned into an
instrument of society, a means of real (instead of currently
false) popular governance.
     Our president seems to have been carried away by the
reconstruction of the executive branch vertical. He shows no
concern at all for the horizontal of society. A society per se
almost seized its existence, it became anomic and disintegrated
(except for hard cash ties). Basic social instincts were
suppressed including most respected Russian traits: communal
living, sobornost (unity) and sensitivity. Does the president
realize that the efficiency of a deftly constructed vertical
will be undermined by a weak and unreliable horizontal. This is
true if the possibility and intention to return to a unitary
model of state and a totalitarian society is ruled out.
     Morality is another important element. We have lived
outside and without morality for ten years. We got used to it
and morality seems redundant in politics, the economy and
everyday life. Our president prioritized "Russia's moral
revival" in his program speeches. No serious efforts or signs
of "improvement" can be detected.
     I am sure that we have exercised enough caution and wisdom
in our arguments and assessments. We would be glad if our
esteemed president finds time in his extremely busy schedule to
take a look at our remarks.
    

******


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