January 6, 2000    
This Date's Issues: 4013 4014 4015

Johnson's Russia List
#4013
6 January 2000
davidjohnson@erols.com


[Note from David Johnson:
1. Reuters: Gore to ``engage'' Russia's new leadership.
2. New York Times: Boris Nemtsov and Ian Bremmer, Russia's Best Bet.
3. Jamestown Foundation Monitor: CHUBAIS SAYS HE AND PUTIN HOLD "SIMILAR" VIEWS ON DEMOCRACY. 
4. Bloomberg: Putin Will Put Reform on Hold to Focus on War.
5. Nicolai Petro: Putin's Russian Idea (a reply to Ira Straus) 
6. Andrei Liakhov: A Few comments on Putin.
7. Los Angeles Times: Martin Malia, Putin--Toward Democracy After Rehab. Russia: Paternalistic modernization will lead to a market economy, albeit slowly. 
8. Moscow Tribune: Fred Weir on Russian leaders.
9. BBC MONITORING: CHECHEN SUCCESS MORE IMPORTANT THAN PRESIDENCY TO PM.(Interview with Mikhail Kozhukhov, press secretary to Prime Minister Putin)] 


*******


#1
ANALYSIS-Gore to ``engage'' Russia's new leadership

WASHINGTON, Jan 4 (Reuters) - Vice President Al Gore aims to ``engage'' 
Russia's new leadership following Boris Yeltsin's departure, despite 
political heat over the major role Gore has played in the Clinton 
administration's Russia policy. 


However, there are no plans for Gore to meet acting Russian President 
Vladimir Putin, aides and campaign advisers to Gore said. Putin was elevated 
from his job as prime minister when Yeltsin stepped down in a surprise 
resignation New Year's Eve. 


``Clearly the transition to Putin represents new opportunities for us,'' said 
Marc Ginsberg, an outside foreign policy adviser to Gore. 


``The vice president, who is engaged in multifaceted efforts to build 
democratic institutions in Russia and to promote nuclear disarmament 
agreements, will want to engage acting President Putin in the days ahead,'' 
Ginsberg said. 


U.S. Russia policy and Gore's role have not been a major issue in his quest 
for the Democratic presidential nomination. 


But foreign policy advisers to Gore said Yeltsin's departure could underscore 
an uncertainty in Russia that calls for a U.S. leader with Gore's foreign 
policy experience. 


The Republican party said it would continue to hammer Gore for what it called 
the failures of Washington's Russia policy, including a dispute over U.S. 
plans to build a missile defence system and allegations of corruption under 
Yeltsin. 


``Al Gore fancied himself an architect of this policy. ... He is going to be 
held accountable for this administration's reckless, half-baked policies 
toward the Russian republic,'' said Mike Collins, spokesman for the 
Republican National Committee. 


The Clinton administration has relied too much on a personal relationship 
with Yeltsin, and failed to establish protections, such as verifiable 
treaties, that could outlast an individual leader, Collins said. 


Gore has assumed a lead role in Clinton's Russia policy, mostly through his 
chairmanship of a bi-national commission in which he has met with a 
succession of Russian prime ministers and overseen working groups on a number 
of bilateral issues. 


That role came under Republican attack following allegations of money 
laundering and corruption under Yeltsin's rule. Critics say Gore, who once 
complained about conditions attached to International Monetary Fund loans to 
Russia, should have known about the corruption and tried harder to stop it. 


Gore's defenders say he was aware of corruption and made extensive efforts to 
promote legal and economic reform. 


Gore did not meet Putin during the Russian's four-month term as prime 
minister under Yeltsin, although initial steps had been taken to arrange a 
meeting, aides said. 


Now, with a Russian presidential election looming on March 26 -- which Putin 
is expected to win -- and the U.S. presidential primary season entering full 
swing, an early Gore-Putin meeting is considered unlikely. 


Nevertheless, a foreign policy spokesman for Gore's vice presidential office 
said committees of the bi-national commission have continued to work. He said 
Gore is prepared to pursue an active role in Russia policy over the coming 
year. 


``If there are projects, there are things that can be accomplished, certainly 
the vice president is interested, and we have a very big agenda with 
Russia,'' the foreign policy spokesman said. 


U.S. goals include economic reforms, controls on arms exports, measures to 
prevent nuclear weapons proliferation and efforts to further U.S.-Russia arms 
control agreements, he said. 


Gore's Democratic opponent for the presidential nomination, Bill Bradley, has 
criticised the Clinton administration for focusing too heavily on Yeltsin. 


And Republican presidential candidates have called for the United States to 
take a harder line against Russia over its military offensive in Chechnya and 
other issues. 


But Gore has faced little public grilling over the administration's Russia 
policy at town meetings and other stops on the campaign trail. 


``I just don't think it matters that much in the large sweep of our 
presidential politics at this point,'' said Bruce Jentleson, director of the 
Terry Sanford Institute of Public Policy at Duke University and a Gore 
foreign policy adviser. 


He said foreign policy may assume a greater importance in the general 
election campaign. Yeltsin's abrupt departure, he said, ``reinforces the 
importance that the next president be someone with extensive foreign policy 
experience, and I think that that ... supports Vice President Gore.'' 


*******


#2
New York Times
January 5, 2000
[for personal use only]
Russia's Best Bet 
By BORIS NEMTSOV and IAN BREMMER
Boris Nemtsov is a member of the Russian parliament and a former first deputy 
prime minister. Ian Bremmer is president of Eurasia Group. 


Vladimir Putin has seamlessly replaced Boris Yeltsin as leader of Russia, 
moving quickly to take advantage of his high approval ratings and his party's 
bolstered support in parliament. 


This is quite an accomplishment for a government that lacked a popular 
mandate only a month ago. 


Yet many in the United States have expressed doubts about Russia's new acting 
president. 


For one, it has been widely noted that Mr. Putin, a former K.G.B. officer, 
was a virtual unknown until Mr. Yeltsin made him his prime minister in August 
and that his Unity Party did not even exist then. The truth is, being an 
unknown is not only a distinct political advantage in Russia, it was a 
necessity for Mr. Putin, who had to amass credible popular support in a 
political culture tarred by cynicism and disillusionment. He neither made nor 
carried out government policies in the last few years, so he wasn't 
responsible for any of the mistakes. 


Some critics have questioned Mr. Putin's commitment to democracy. True, he is 
no liberal democrat, domestically or internationally. Under his leadership 
Russia will not become France. The government will, however, reflect the 
Russian people's desire for a strong state, a functioning economy, and an end 
to tolerance for robber barons -- in short, a "ruble stops here" attitude. 


Russia could do considerably worse than have a leader with an unwavering 
commitment to the national interest. 


And it is difficult to see how to do better. 


Russia's neighbors grasp the importance of this point. The other former 
Soviet republics lauded Mr. Putin's appointment, mostly because of the 
pragmatism he demonstrated when serving as secretary of Russia's security 
council. His reaction to the formation of the "counter-Russia" alliance of 
Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova was to state that Russia 
should craft a regional policy palatable to its neighbors. 


In addition, Mr. Putin's vocal support for a free-market economy boosted the 
prospects of reform candidates in the parliamentary elections last month and 
provided a firm footing for meaningful economic reform to be passed this 
year. 


The reformers are back. 


Given that the Communists' support comes overwhelmingly from those over the 
age of 50, the party's clout will diminish with each passing year. 


December's elections were undoubtedly the last in which the Communists will 
receive a plurality. 


At the same time, a new middle class led by small- and medium-sized business 
owners is beginning to assert itself. And Russia is finally developing a 
political system that can begin to shape the direction of change instead of 
simply damming its tide. 


A framework for real market democracy -- property rights especially -- can 
now be put in place, making entrepreneurialism less expensive and therefore 
less beholden to the oligarchs who held far too much sway under Mr. Yeltsin. 


This maturation should gradually continue, eventually leading to stable 
parties with consistent platforms, a system of checks and balances and a real 
separation of powers.


******


#3
Jamestown Foundation Monitor
5 January 2000


CHUBAIS SAYS HE AND PUTIN HOLD "SIMILAR" VIEWS ON
DEMOCRACY. The question of Acting President Vladimir Putin's
democratic credentials or lack thereof continues to be discussed in
somewhat nervous tones. In an interview published today,
Yevgenia Albats, veteran journalist and author of a book on the
Soviet KGB, asked Anatoly Chubais, head of United Energy Systems
and Putin's one-time boss in the Kremlin administration, about
what guarantees there were that democracy, individual rights and
human rights would be respected if--as Chubais himself
predicted--Putin moves to "toughen" state power as a way to
fight corruption, insubordination within the state apparatus and
other problems within Russia. Chubais said that there cannot be
any such guarantees within the state itself, but that they do
exist within society--such as the mass media. Interestingly,
Chubais specifically mentioned NTV television, part of the
Media-Most empire founded by tycoon Vladimir Gusinsky, saying
that the channel "will play a very important role" in the new
political alignment (Izvestia, January 5).


During the weeks leading up to the December 19 State Duma
elections, Media-Most's Seven Days publishing house, which
includes the newspaper Segodnya, was raided by the federal tax
police--an act which its editors said amounted to politically
motivated harassment allegedly initiated by Kremlin
administration chief Aleksandr Voloshin, tycoon Boris
Berezovsky's main Kremlin ally. Neither Chubais nor any other
top members of the Union of Right-wing Forces at that time
criticized the raid or came out in defense of Most-Media, whose
outlets were then strongly critical of the Kremlin and friendly
toward Fatherland-All Russia, the political bloc headed by
Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov and former Prime Minister Yevgeny
Primakov. In addition, Chubais' concern with press freedom seems
to be newly acquired. Nezavisimaya gazeta editor Vitaly


Tretyakov once recounted an autumn 1996 meeting between top
newspaper editors and Chubais, then head of Yeltsin's
administration, during which one editor complained to Chubais
that the presidential administration was interfering in
editorial policy via Gazprom, which controlled the publication.
According to Tretyakov, Chubais responded: "You will do what the
owners tell you. And if you don't, bones will crack" (Moscow
Times, November 21, 1997).


In any case, Chubais said in his interview today that his and
Putin's views concerning democracy are "similar." However, he
also said he had never discussed the issue with Putin.


In a doctrinal document published just before Yeltsin's
resignation, Putin, who made his career in the Soviet KGB, said
that Russia cannot at its current stage of development be a
model Western-style democracy like Great Britain, and that the
state would have to continue to play a strong regulatory role.
He promised, however, that the state will protect the basic
democratic rights of Russian citizens.


Some Soviet-era dissidents and human rights campaigners,
however, have been less sanguine than Chubais about what Putin's
accession might mean for democracy. In an interview published
just before Yeltsin's resignation, Sergei Grigoryants, head of
the Glasnost Foundation, warned that Putin and Berezovsky were
"rushing to establish control over the mass media" and that
censorship had already been imposed on state media and those
belonging to Berezovsky--on reporting involving not only the war
in Chechnya, but also "the internal situation in Russia, Western
assessments of Russian politics and much else." Grigoryants
added: "It is still hard to say whether we are capable of
protecting that little for which we paid so dearly over the last
decade--above all, freedom of speech, freedom from ideological
diktat, Russia's openness. The most important thing to
understand is that we could lose all this very quickly"
(Segodnya, December 30).


For her part, Yelena Bonner, a veteran human rights activist and
widow of the late Andrei Sakharov, said of Yeltsin's resignation
and Putin's accession: "After eight years in the Kremlin, sadly,
what has Boris Nikolaevich achieved? Nothing. He left Russia
with a dangerous constitution which was written just for him,
and now Putin will exploit it" (Time, January 1).


*******


#4
Putin Will Put Reform on Hold to Focus on War

Moscow, Jan. 5 (Bloomberg)
-- Russia's acting President Vladimir Putin will put economic reform on 
the back burner as he tries to cement public support by winning the war in 
Chechnya ahead of the presidential election in March, analysts said. 


The 47-year-old former KGB agent is now the most popular politician in the 
country, largely thanks to public support for the military campaign against 
Islamic rebels in Chechnya. That means his economic policies will remain 
sketchy until after the election. 


``His main goal will be to ensure that TV screens show the story of a victory 
in Chechnya,'' said Andrei Piontkovsky, director of the Center for Strategic 
Studies. On the economy, Putin has merely said ``Russians must be healthy and 
wealthy. Those are his economic views.'' 


Putin not only must preserve public support but must avoid threatening the 
interests of Russia's financial and industrial groups that aided his meteoric 
rise through their control of newspapers, magazines and television channels. 
He's unlikely to make major changes in economic policy or in his cabinet of 
ministers to maintain the balance of power among the groups. 


Financial and industrial holdings such as Interros Holding and Alfa Group 
that bought up chunks of Russia's industry during the state asset sales 
program in the early 1990s will lobby Putin to direct economic policy as it 
suits them, and to retain influence by keeping ministers they support in 
government positions. 


Oligarchs Need Putin 


The groups were key to Boris Yeltsin's reelection in 1996 when they joined 
forces and resources to boost his support from less than 5 percent six months 
before the election. 


Now the groups, led by businessmen known as the oligarchs, are rallying 
behind Putin, a virtual unknown before his appointment as prime minister in 
August, and will jockey for influence on government policy, analysts said. 


``How beholden he is to the oligarchs we do not know,'' said Eric Kraus, 
chief strategist for Nikoil Capital Markets. ``Yes, he needs their money for 
the election, but who else can they back at this late date? They need him 
more than he needs them.'' 


Free-market reformers who've been steering the country's economic policy 
since the Soviet Union fell in 1991, are also lining up behind Putin. Anatoly 
Chubais, chief executive of the country's power monopoly, RAO Unified Energy 
Systems, and author of Russia's state asset sales program, praised Putin, 
saying he long ago learned the benefits of reform. Chubais is lobbying for 
support of Putin, analysts said. 


``For Putin . . . it's all clear -- he's not asking whether the government 
should interfere in the economy (or) if the country needs private property,'' 
said Chubais on NTV television. 


Economic Views 


Putin outlined his economic views in a statement this month published on the 
government's official web site. The country's economy has fallen far behind 
those of industrial countries in levels of gross domestic product and goods 
produced, he said. Russian goods aren't competing in the new and fast-growing 
market of high-technology goods and services, and oil, gas and metals are the 
main exports, he said. He attributed this to limp investment. Foreign direct 
investment totals $11.5 billion since the fall of communism, less than a 
third of Poland's. 


``He's looking forward and not back,'' said former First Deputy central bank 
Chairman Sergei Alexashenko. ``He's relatively young . . . and he will not be 
in favor of returning to the Soviet system.'' 


Since being appointed prime minister in August this year, Putin's government 
has taken steps to boost revenue to the budget including raising oil export 
duties, imposing export duties on natural gas, slashing tax breaks in 
formerly closed cities, and doubling export duties on some metals. 


No Rhetoric 


One of Putin's biggest tasks will be to mend relations with Europe and the 
U.S., which have deteriorated since March when the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization bombed Yugoslavia over Russia's objections, said former Finance 
Minister Mikhail Zadornov. The government is still waiting for a $640 million 
loan payment from the International Monetary Fund it was expecting in 
September, but the fund never released under pressure from the U.S. 


``For Putin, it will be very important to try not to lapse into anti-western 
rhetoric in the presidential campaign,'' said Zadornov, now envoy for the 
president of Sberbank. ``We can say that Russia can make it without foreign 
loans but we must understand that (it means) each citizen will have to pay 
inflation tax.'' 


Others said Putin will say what he thinks the public and his supporters want 
to hear. 


`Absolutely Zero' 


``He doesn't show any signs that he will take on the economy,'' said Mikhail 
Delyagin, director of the Institute of Globalization Issues. ``He's said 
he'll support small business, help exporters go to western markets and has 
done absolutely zero on all these fronts.'' 


Still, the war will take his attentions for now, at least until the election 
on March 26, a date approved by the upper house of parliament today, which 
he's favored to win. Russia began fighting in the breakaway republic in 
October, after losing a war there it fought between 1994 and 1996, which was 
unpopular at the time. Now more than half the population supports the war. 


``We won't resolve any problems, economic or social, in conditions of the 
break-up of the state,'' said Putin in an interview on ORT television last 
night. ``It's not unusual that we give so much attention and meaning to the 
issue of fighting terrorism. We must bring this to an end.'' 


According to Putin, a major reason for Yeltsin's resignation was to boost 
Putin's chances in the election. With the presidential election moved up 
three months to March from June when Yeltsin's term was due to expire, 
Putin's political rivals will have less time to regroup and campaign. 


There's also less of a chance the war will drag out and become unpopular by 
March. Yeltsin anointed Putin as his successor when he appointed the prime 
minister in August. 


Creating an Impression 


The economy doesn't need much tinkering with at present. The ruble's plunge 
against the dollar last year stoked growth by cutting out imports, and 
increasing demand for domestically made products. Also, oil prices -- at 
nine-year highs -- boosted exporters' earnings and allowed the government to 
keep to its budget last year for the first time since the fall of communism. 


``The best way for him to win the election would be for him to create the 
impression that he's working on rebuilding the economy,'' said Kraus. ``He is 
fairly action-oriented and appears to have a firm grasp on Western 
economics.'' 


It's unclear what Putin's policies will be if he's elected president. The 
constitution, approved in 1993, gave tremendous powers to the office, 
allowing the president to change economic policy by decree and hire and fire 
prime ministers. 


*******


#5
Date: Wed, 05 Jan 2000
From: "Nicolai N. Petro" <kolya@uri.edu> 
Subject: Putin's Russian Idea (a reply to Ira Straus)


I must disagree with my friend Ira Straus' critique of Vladimir Putin use 
of the Russian Idea.


To begin with, it is very important that Putin's discussion of the Russian 
Idea be read in the context of his entire presentation, for it is only in 
this context that its specific purpose can be understood. Putin's purpose 
in writing this memo is to stress the need for government to settle on an 
effective strategy of social consolidation and economic growth. The two 
are, he correctly notes, closely intertwined, hence the importance of 
addressing the "intellectual, spiritual, and moral" aspects of this agenda. 
For Russian readers these can be conveniently summed up in the phrase the 
"Russian Idea."


The Russian Idea is not something invented by Putin or Yeltsin. It is a 
metaphor for social consensus which, as Putin correctly observes, was 
disrupted by the communist coup d'etat of 1917. It was lost again in 1991 
because older generations were simply not intellectually and emotionally 
prepared for the transitions demanded by postcommunist modernization. As 
Putin uses the term it refers only to a set of values around which people 
would instinctively and voluntarily unite. It is precisely the loss of this 
instinctive moral compass that keeps bringing this issue back into the 
public eye, not the machinations of politicians. Moreover, and this point 
needs to be emphasized, Putin explicitly rejects any attempt to impose any 
set of values as a new state ideology.


If it is not a state ideology, then what purpose does the discussion of a 
set of values serve in the context of his "strategic vision?" By raising 
the issue, Putin is attempting to bring greater coherence to the 
formulation ( if not the execution) of government policy. He has served 
notice, first and foremost to the elite, that government policy will be 
constructed according to two guiding principles: 1/ do nothing that would 
worsen the condition of the populace; 2/ pursue policies that are 
evolutionary rather than revolutionary in character.


Putin's second guiding principle clearly demands a discussion of what 
features of current Russian society he intends to rely on to ease the 
transition into the future. The four facets or contemporary Russian society 
that he focuses on are not deemed comprehensive, but again have clearly 
functional characteristics. It is also clear from his discussion that he 
does not view them as immutable. On the contrary, he redefines each one in 
terms that make it more compatible with the agenda of modernization that he 
has set for Russia. Ultimately, he suggests, only this sort of redefinition 
of already widely accepted values will allow for Russia's integration into 
the global economy. His objective here is clearly to offer a bridge that 
would allow concepts familiar to all to be seen in a new light, and thereby 
to be made serviceable in the construction of a democratic and economically 
productive Russia.


One might quibble with his choice of characteristics, but I think he has 
addressed a real need in post-Soviet society, a need instinctively (not 
rationally) felt by anyone over the age of 40 for a set of values to 
replace those of Marxism-Leninism. Much to his credit, he does so without 
falling into the trap of transforming them into a state ideology.


I can see two serious objections to this attempt. One, it is not 
appropriate for the state to advocate any ideals. This view of a government 
that somehow remains "above the fray" and unsullied by the turmoils of 
society strikes me as quite unrealistic. Putin is quite right that (whether 
we like it or not) in post-Soviet Russia the state dominates social 
discourse. By addressing the issue of the state's role head on, and 
defining such clear limits on what constitute appropriate efforts by the 
state to set the tone of the national debate, he has done Russia democracy 
a favor.


Another objection is that there is really no such thing as a "national 
idea" and the any discussion of one is pernicious (as Ira puts it "there is 
no American Idea . . ."). I disagree. For some this idea is characterized 
by American exceptionalism, for others by American universalism. But while 
the debate over which represents the "true America" is waged in 
intellectual journals, the clearest manifestation of the "American Idea" 
has already been cogently distilled for us and is dutifully recited every 
school day by millions of American school children. In fact, three of the 
values cited by Putin are all quite transparent in the Pledge of 
Allegiance: patriotism (in the very act of public obeisance to the flag), 
derzhavnost ("one nation . . . indivisible"), gosudarstvennost ("I pledge 
allegiance . . to the Republic"), and social solidarity ( "with liberty and 
justice for all"). Indeed, the only thing missing from Putin's list is the 
presumption of God's blessing on this particular set of values.


With best wishes,
Prof. Nicolai N. Petro
Department of Political Science
Washburn Hall
University of Rhode Island
Kingston, RI 02881 (USA)


*******


#6
Date: Wed, 05 Jan 2000 
From: "Andrei Liakhov" <liakhova@nortonrose.com> 
Subject: Putin


A Few comments on Putin


Putin, as a career KGB officer was brought up with the spirit of a team
player. He proved this quality time and time again - in St.Petersburg, while
serving as Deputy Head of Yeltsin's Administration and when allegedly using
his service weapon to persuade Mr.Skuratov to resign in February 1999 (when,
according to well informed rumours Yeltsin took first close notice of
Putin). 


He always obeyed the rules of the game and finally received his reward for
this. Thus he is not a "new type leader" as Mike McFaul branded him, but
rather a skilful bureaucrat who, with the help of his team, used the System
to his full advantage. However it would be naive (at least) to think that
anyone can join a "team" like this without making substantial sacrifices
along the way. Putin's post '91 career suggests that the keys to his joining
the "team" could be found in his tenure as Deputy Mayor of St.Petersburg and
his work as Mr.Borodin's Deputy.


The decisive test of his team playing abilities undoubtedly came during his
tenure as Mr.Borodin's deputy at the time when Kremlin renovation works by
Mabetex were in full swing. After trying out his abilities (and possibly
establishing a more tight control over him), the "team" (which may or may
not be the Family in full) decided that he is capable of handling a more
sensitive job of heading the FSB. At that stage it would appear that his
St.Petersburg past was put to good use by the team - may I remind here that
Mr.Putin was Deputy to Mr.Sobchak who was (i) Mayor of a Criminal Capital of
Russia; and (ii) subject of various criminal investigations, including one
by the Agency, of which Mr.Putin became head in (if my memory serves me
correctly) 1998. It is a telling fact that Mr.Sobchak was able to quietly
return to Russia soon after Mr.Putin's move to Moscow - it was a sign that
Putin does not have to worry about his St.Petersburg past for the time
being. 


The above I think is a good indication that we are unlikely to whitens any
major anti-corruption measures soon after the March elections and that the
crony capitalism has survived for the time being and the Family has nothing
to worry about (for the time being too). However it remains to be seen if
Putin manages to break away from the team which brought him to power.
Economic situation in Russia may help him to do so (if he chooses to pursue
this course of action) - if the economy will continue to grow and people
will feel that quality of life is improving - it is conceivable that Putin
may feel secure enough in his job to break away from the support "team" and
play solo - but he will only be able to do so by promoting serious anti
corruption drive. However at this early stage it is a mere speculation as
Putin currently needs the team and the team needs Putin and only some time
after the March election is won (if it is won by the team for Putin) it
would be possible to make an educated guess as to the extent to which Putin
will need the "team" to rule Russia. 


******


#7
Los Angeles Times
January 5, 2000 
[for personal use only]
Putin--Toward Democracy After Rehab 
Russia: Paternalistic modernization will lead to a market economy, albeit 
slowly. 
By MARTIN MALIA
Martin Malia is a Professor of History at University of California Berkeley


The star of the millennium show was, unquestionably, Boris Yeltsin: His 
New Year's Eve valedictory alone marked a change of historical era. Riding 
the impetus of the centrist victory in Duma elections two weeks before, he 
resigned six months early to prepare for the likely election in March of his 
designated successor, acting President Vladimir V. Putin. 
What should we make of Yeltsin's latest return from the political grave? 
Given his present vile reputation in the West, inveterate Russophobes and 
sour Gorbophiles will doubtless call his resignation the ultimate maneuver of 
"The Family" and its oligarchs to keep power by passing it to a KGB 
spymaster, his ratings bolstered by a Chechen war fomented for the purpose. 
But what if Yeltsin's valedictory is read in the context of his entire 
career? In this case, it appears as an astute act of statesmanship to 
preserve his legacy for Russia. 
And despite his numerous flaws and mistakes, such a legacy does exist. 
For Yeltsin, unlike Mikhail Gorbachev, clearly understood that communism 
could not be reformed but had to be dismantled. Thus in 1990, he was the 
first Communist leader to quit the party, the next year forcing on Gorbachev 
Russia's first democratic election for the presidency. In 1996, when the 
Communists seemed set to make a comeback, he resisted the temptation of force 
and fended them off at the polls. Now, after holding on four more years 
against chronic illness, he has relinquished power voluntarily. What more can 
one ask by way of commitment to constitutional procedures? 
It is often forgotten that Yeltsin never had a parliamentary majority 
for reform. So in Russia, unlike in Poland, advocates of "shock therapy" 
conversion to the market had only six months of undivided power. Indeed, by 
December 1992, the old Soviet nomenklatura had forced Yeltsin to make their 
man, Viktor S. Chernomyrdin, prime minister, thereby inaugurating a decade of 
off-again on-again reform. 
Thus during the crucial transition of 1990-92, insiders were able to 
purchase raw materials at Soviet prices for resale at world prices and pocket 
the profits; they became the infamous oligarchs. Again unlike Poland, Russia 
had no Western credit to tide it over the transition; Western aid to Russia 
has not been significantly greater than the Mexican bailout of 1995. It was 
the same circumstances that in 1994 produced Anatoly B. Chubais' fire-sale 
privatization of obsolete state industries to force their modernization. It 
was these circumstances that produced the ultimate scandal of granting the 
oligarchs "shares for loans" to bankroll the crucial campaign of 1996. 
Then the crash of 1998 ended this speculation-driven economy. In the 
short run, this forced Yeltsin to take as prime minister Yevgeny M. Primakov, 
who immediately set Communists over the economy and began to eye the 
presidential succession. In the long run, the crash cleared the air since it 
cut off foreign credit and forced Russia to produce for itself. At the same 
time, it became apparent that Primakov and his "left" allies had no 
alternative program to offer. 
So last March, as the economy slowly improved, Yeltsin fired Primakov 
and began the search for a successor to his own legacy. In August, when 
Islamic militants attacked Russian territory adjoining Chechnya, the search 
settled on Putin. 
But the war was not started to launch Putin's career. There is a real 
Chechnya problem--of terrorism, of Russia's territorial integrity and of 
national credibility when attacked. Then NATO's Kosovo war, to the average 
Ivan a blatant display of American hegemonism camouflaged as globalized 
morality, brought home like nothing else the contempt in which the West now 
held Russia. Victory in Chechnya thus came to stand for reborn Russian pride. 
We must expect, therefore, that Chechnya will end up largely occupied, even 
if it cannot be wholly subdued. 
And what manner of man is Putin? He is not an opaque mystery, as some 
would have it, nor is victory in Chechnya his sole program. He has published 
an Internet document 
(http://www.pravitelstvo.gov.ru/english/statVP_engl_1.html) showing a keen 
understanding of the historical moment for Russia. This program amounts to a 
slower, more national version of the Yeltsin era's reform aspirations. Thus, 
per Putin: "We can count on a worthy future only if we manage to naturally 
combine the principles of a market economy and democracy with Russia's 
realities." For "Russia will not soon, if ever, become a copy of the U.S.A. 
or, say, Britain, where liberal values have deep historical roots." This 
decidedly does not mean return to "the Soviet regime, [which] failed to make 
the country flourishing, its society dynamic, its people free." But it does 
entail realistic acknowledgment that Russians are not yet ready "to abandon 
traditional dependence on the state . . . especially in social policy." 
This sense of Russia's distinctiveness does not mean withdrawal into 
confrontational isolation. Russia must remain part of the world economy, 
improving the climate for foreign investment and expanding participation in 
international economic organizations. The goal of this reform process is a 
renewed patriotism, a feeling of belonging to a great power that is based on 
economic and technological strength rather than military force. Is it 
necessarily chauvinist imperialism for Russia to aspire to a measure of 
national power and pride? All major nations do, including our own. 
In sum, Putin's program means paternalistic modernization through 
Westernization. But this is how our prize proteges, South Korea and Taiwan, 
made it to market democracy. Why expect that Russia, still in rehab from 74 
years of communism, should already display the democratic refinements of the 
world's luckiest and wealthiest nation? 


*******


#8
Date: Wed, 05 Jan 2000 
From: "Fred Weir" <fweir@glasnet.ru> 


Moscow Tribune
11 January 2000
Fred Weir


MOSCOW -- The most powerful predictive theory in Russian political
science holds that this country will be ruled alternately by bald and
hirsute leaders. It has been surprisingly accurate for well over a century,
and has attained something of the status of a folk belief.
Consider the facts. Alexander III was quite bald, but his feckless
son Nicholas II carried a handsome head of hair right up to his disastrous
final day. Vladimir Lenin started shedding in his twenties, and the process
was complete long before he took power. Joseph Stalin was thick as a brush
on top, but his successor Nikita Khrushchev was naked as a cue ball. Leonid
Brezhnev sported dense, swept-back dark locks. Next, the radically-thinning
Yury Andropov briefly ascended to the Kremlin, followed by the very hairy
Konstantin Chernenko and finally Mikhail Gorbachev, whose frontal lobes are
familiar to all. Boris Yeltsin proudly wears his silvery mane, which defines
his place in history quite nicely.
There is an extension of the theory which postulates that the
baldies tend to be progressive reformers while the hirsute are more
reactionary, if not downright horrific. This is more disputatious, of
course. Some Russians throw up their hands in outrage at the suggestion that
Lenin was progressive. But despite everything, Lenin remains to this day the
only Russian leader who ever distributed land to the peasantry. And before
he died he introduced a limited market, in the New Economic Policy. There is
no doubt that subsequent baldies Khrushchev, Andropov and Gorbachev were all
a breath of fresh air for their times.
The usual crowd will leap up to shout that Yeltsin falsifies the
theory, because he was a great reformer wasn't he? But that's confusing
ideological sympathies for solid achievements. Most of the truly momentous
changes of the past decade were not even vaguely Yeltsin's work. It was
Gorbachev who crushed the rule of the Communist Party, created functioning
legislatures, opened up society, encouraged press freedom and even permitted
the first small businesses to open. When he had no answer to the challenge
of ethnic nationalism, Gorbachev reluctantly permitted the Soviet Union to
break up peacefully rather than set the Soviet army into motion.
Yeltsin has been handed a lot of the credit for all that just
because he manouvered and connived, in his trademark fashion, to destroy the
USSR. Yeltsin curtailed the parliamentary experiment and recentralized power
in the Kremlin. Faced with ethnic separatism, he gave us two bloody wars in
Chechnya. Privatization? Say rather mass corruption and the birth of an
oligarchy that will probably prove more pernicious than the Soviet
nomenklatura. Personal freedoms? Well, it's true that Russians have been
freer under Yeltsin than at any time in history. But is that because they
have rights, underpinned by good laws and defended by democratic
institutions? Or is it because Yeltsin was a lackadaisical leader,
disinterested in the nuts-and-bolts of government, who only roused himself
when his own position was threatened? I would argue that Yeltsin's
indifference gave Russians space, not real freedom. It remains to be seen
what a younger, more vigorous and engaged president will do with all the
power Yeltsin accumulated in the Kremlin.
Now we are into this extraordinary interregnum, the only such moment
in Russian history that (hopefully) won't be remembered as a Time of
Troubles, it behooves us to consider who will lead Russia next? Obviously
what is wanted is a decisively bald and boldly reformist personage.
Here the picture becomes murky, even downright troubling. There are
some contenders. Buddha-like Yury Luzhkov is certainly qualified. Though his
taste in public art has been catastrophic for Moscow, he can claim to have
fixed the roads and kept the metro running on time. Also waiting in the
wings in grim-faced Gennady Zyuganov, whose only personal ray of light may
be that gleam on his scalp.
Then there is Candidate Number One. But what is that on Vladimir
Putin's forescalp? Peach fuzz? He should shave. Still, he's thinning nicely
and can be expected to come along in that department. The basic theory
holds. But the political dimension is harder to see from here.
Judging by his mission statement, published on the Internet just
days before Yeltsin handed him Russia as a New Year's gift, Putin has no
progressive ideas whatsoever. Though he claims to favour human rights, press
freedom, democracy and market economics, it's absolutely clear from context
that the future under Putin will see no advances, at best, in those areas.
Putin's one big concept for the economy and social policy is statism. To be
more precise, dirigiste and paternalistic capitalism of the type pioneered
by Count Sergei Witte and Pyotr Stolypin in Czarist Russia nearly a century
ago. Nothing boldly reformist about that. (By the way, Witte was seriously
thinning and Stolypin bald as an acorn. I'm certain there's a PhD thesis in
here somewhere).
Russia needs to look further afield for men who possess both the
appropriate coiffure and fresh, radical ideas. Who is that guy from the Spy
Who Shagged Me? Dr. Evil. He'd be perfect.


*******


#9
BBC MONITORING 
CHECHEN SUCCESS MORE IMPORTANT THAN PRESIDENCY TO PM - PRESS SECRETARY
Source: Ekho Moskvy radio, Moscow, in Russian 1317 gmt 5 Jan 00


Mikhail Kozhukhov, press secretary to Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, 
has pledged that Russian foreign policy will not change with Putin as acting 
president. Interviewed on Russian Ekho Moskvy radio on 5th January, he 
predicted personnel reshuffles in the presidential and government structures 
and praised Putin as a man of "very firm, definite moral principles" who 
would rather give up his presidential ambitions than the Chechen operation. 
He repeated that Putin values a cooperative relationship with the Duma and 
has a clear economic strategy. The following are excerpts from the interview. 
Subheadings have been inserted editorially.


[Interviewer] In the studio we have Mikhail Kozhukhov, press secretary to the 
Russian prime minister and acting president, Vladimir Putin.


[Kozhukhov] Hello. I should explain that I am actually press secretary to the 
prime minister.


[Q] Sorry.


[A] It's just that right now there is a press secretary to the acting 
president. They are different things...


Foreign policy won't change


Putin has stated his position repeatedly and with absolute clarity: Russia is 
part of the European community, Russia is part of the civilized world and the 
country's only serious claim is that Russia wants to be treated with respect 
as a great power. I think that this way of putting it encapsulates all the 
subtlety of our mutual relations. There will be no revolutions, there will be 
no north-south or any other realignment. Our previous foreign policy line 
will be continued and there is absolutely no doubt about that whatsoever.


Reshuffles


[Q] Another question arises. The current acting Russian president may seek to 
rectify some of the mistakes which Boris Yeltsin mentioned in his farewell 
speech. Will he change his team? Or will he carry on with the same team to 
accomplish new things and won't that indicate that it was Yeltsin 
specifically who was to blame for all our misfortunes?


[A] There are two parts to that question. I am not prepared right now to 
assume the role of people's judge and say who is specifically to blame for 
everything. I think that we are all to blame for everything that happens in 
our country. I have thought that for a long time now...


I think that of course there will be changes to the team but the question is 
when. Vladimir Putin has said on more than one occasion that in his opinion 
all presidential and government structures without exception need a radical 
personnel overhaul. That is clear. Russia awaits change. It awaits new 
people, new ideas and these expectations must not be let down. There will 
undoubtedly be changes. And in fact they are already quietly under way now. 
Primarily this concerns people who aren't in the very top echelons of the 
presidential administration. I think that the personnel changes in the 
administration aren't over yet. There are reasons to think so. If you look at 
what is happening in this context it is perfectly obvious that the people 
coming into the administration are those with whom Vladimir Putin has worked 
in recent years and that the people who are going are those who are linked 
with the past. That is obvious.


[Q] Might one say that these changes will come through reformist methods 
rather than by revolutionary ones?


[A] You know that Vladimir Putin is special and possess a strange combination 
of qualities. For all his decisiveness, which he has shown repeatedly, he is 
a very unbloodthirsty person. Generally speaking, he doesn't like big shifts 
and shake-ups. He is a person who, in my opinion, is inclined to make haste 
slowly, as the saying goes.


Chechnya


[Q] This unbloodthirsty Vladimir Putin is well known for what he said about 
what needs to be done with bandits. In 1996, in response to an Internet 
question, he said that bloodshed was beneficial. Whose blood will he be 
shedding in the near future?


[A] You know this can be interpreted in various ways... The point is that 
everything that is happening in the North Caucasus involves a very important 
sphere - the idea of the country's integrity. I am absolutely certain that if 
he [Putin] were offered a choice between stopping the Chechen campaign and 
becoming president on the one hand or completing the counterterrorist action 
and not becoming president on the other, he would go for the latter option. 
Because, apart from the specific aims which the army is pursuing - 
eliminating the fighter units and so forth - and he himself has talked about 
this many times - the point lies in preserving the country's territorial 
integrity in all senses of the word. This is something (?truly close to his 
heart) and when he talks about it he may perhaps use pretty colourful 
language.


[Q]... Would you agree that the successful completion of the Chechen war 
(?spells) a successful election campaign?


[A] You know I have been in this job for two months. I have spent two months 
observing Vladimir Putin... But so far he has given no reason to suspect him 
of duplicity or scheming. He is a man of very firm, definite moral principles 
and for him everything that is in accordance with these principles, 
everything that corresponds with his iron logic is good...


Yeltsin's future


[Q] Here is a question sent over the Internet. Is Yeltsin going to head the 
Union of Russia and Belarus?


[A] As far as I know, talks are going on with various people... Yeltsin would 
like to remain in public life and politics and he intends perhaps to set up 
his own fund. But there is nothing definite. He simply hasn't had the time, 
as far as I understand, to decide exactly what he is going to do...


[Q] Let's get back to political problems. Many people say that some thrashing 
about in Yeltsin's home and foreign policy ensued from a certain absence of a 
general policy. Has Vladimir Putin already set out his policy?


Putin's general strategy


[A] You know, I would reply in the following manner. There are two no less 
important things. Firstly, there is an understanding that a country has to 
have a general policy, because it is a fact that over the last 15 years we 
have been groping around as to what to do, and this was probably one of the 
first big political and economic tasks that Vladimir Vladimirovich posed the 
government back in the autumn. For the first time, a development centre has 
been set up to draw up a plan for the country's development over a period of 
at least 10-15 years. He thinks that this programme should be agreed with the 
whole of society. We can only make progress if the majority of people are in 
agreement as to which way we are going.


The centre is open. It has started operating. It is too early to talk about 
results. The task set is to place a programme on the table in the autumn...


Duma


[Q] Returning to the meeting of Vladimir Putin with the leaders of the 
parliamentary factions. Among the present and previous deputies there are 
people who traditionally support you, but would like to have some kind of 
portfolio. There are people who are not accustomed to give their support and 
state that they will be independent no matter what. What has the outcome of 
the current meeting been? Has anyone been promised anything?


[A] No, no-one has been promised anything. The only thing that has been 
promised, is that, despite the public holidays, the government will go on 
working and working intensively, counting on the cooperation of the Duma 
[lower house of Russian parliament]. Vladimir Putin thinks very highly of the 
fact that of late the government has managed to find a common language with 
the legislators and get the laws passed without great delays. Because it is 
quite obvious that very many years were just wasted. Extremely important laws 
were not passed for the most stupid reasons, owing to the stand taken by 
people who really did not have the right to be in the Duma.


I think that the main outcome of today's meeting was the government's desire 
to say it was hoping for cooperation. It said that work has on a package of 
laws has been going on in the government for some time now which will be put 
on the legislators' table as soon as the Duma starts operating. And the 
government thinks very highly of everything positive in the relations between 
the two branches of power...


Government meeting on 5th January


[Q] Well, tell us about it [government meeting with Putin on 5th January]


[A] Essentially, [First Deputy Prime Minister Viktor] Khristenko gave a 
report on his trip to Dagestan, what has been done since that trip regarding 
the Districts destroyed. He gave a report on the state of the budget, on the 
amount of taxes collected in the federal budget. Naturally, this is a matter 
of concern to the government. [Deputy Prime Minister] Valentina Matviyenko 
gave a report on the state of pension payments. That was one of the 
favourite, no that's the wrong word, [presenter interrupts with the word 
"painful"] subjects to which constant attention is paid. There were some 
problems there regarding the payment of pensions connected with the military 
recruitment offices. The defence minister [Igor Sergeyev] gave tough 
instructions for the pension arrears to be paid up. Deputy Prime Minister 
Ilya Klebanov reported on the state of affairs in state procurement orders. 
The instruction was issued to convene a sitting of the commission for 
technical cooperation on the 12th [presumably January]. The subject is a 
confidential one.


And [Deputy Prime Minister Nikolay] Koshman gave a report on how the 
restoration work is going in Chechnya. There are some serious problems in 
some Districts in particular. In Urus-Martanovskiy District, for example, 
where the militants destroyed everything that was not in ruins as they left. 
And he spoke about that. Those are all the surnames I have in my notebook.


[Q] Many of our listeners are contacting our pager via the Internet to ask 
about the economic programme. Is there one?


Economy, freedom of speech


[A] What I have said is that the strategy for the development of Russia is 
first and foremost about the economy in our situation. There is an 
understanding of what, from his [Putin's] point of view, needs to be done. He 
has repeatedly said that he will adhere to the policy of reform in our 
economy. That will naturally be a liberal type of reform, like the reforms 
that have been conducted over the last few years. To put it simply, Vladimir 
Vladimirovich Putin is indubitably a supporter of the market in furthering 
development, although he has repeatedly said that the state has disappeared 
without grounds from very many key places where its supervision would not 
only be desirable but necessary. The issue of the ups and downs of the market 
and state supervision are of interest to many people at the moment. I think 
we shall very soon get an answer from him.


[Q] One of the reasons why some people are afraid of the special services is 
that they are customarily secretive. There won't be any censorship will 
there? We don't have anything to fear?


[A] No. There are things, or to be more exact subjects, on which Vladimir 
Vladimirovich made his position quite clear. That is with regard to freedom 
of speech, which, I hope, will prevail, if you like, reign supreme in 
Russia...


*******

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