November 19, 1999    
This Date's Issues: 3634 •3635  •

Johnson's Russia List
#3634
20 November 1999
davidjohnson@erols.com


[Note from David Johnson:
1. AFP: Russian election season kicks off amid allegations of censorship.
2. Governor George W. Bush on Russia.
3. Moscow Times EDITORIAL: Chechnya's News Is in Its Numbers.
4. Intefax: YELTSIN TELLS CLINTON HE SEES PM AS SUCCESSOR.
5. Interfax: GORBACHEV COMES OUT FOR PRIMAKOV-LUZHKOV BLOC.
6. Interfax: Igor Denisov, RUSSIA'S NATIONAL BEAR? - PUTIN.
7. The Daily Yomiuri (Japan): Alexander Tsypko, Kremlin winning propaganda 
war.
8. Gordon Hahn: on Chechnya.
9. David Hughes: Re: 3628-Lozansky/Jewish Community and Chechnya.
10. Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies: Propaganda War Over Chechnya 
Goes Awry.
11. Moscow Times: Jonas Bernstein, New Job in Cards for Yeltsin.
12. Itar-Tass: Russian Political Scientist Accused of State Treason.
13. AP: Russia's Military Gets Image Boost.] 


*******


#1
Russian election season kicks off amid allegations of censorship


MOSCOW, Nov 19 (AFP) - 
The Russian political season officially kicked off Friday amid bitter
complaints from leading journalists that the election committee was
muzzling free speech.


The first two of 28 registered factions used up their freely alloted
television spots to sell themselves to skeptical Russian voters exactly one
month before the December 19 elections to the State Duma lower house of
parliament.


Interest in modern Russia's third democratic elections to parliament at the
moment appears to be meek at best. A recent Regional Sociology Monitor
study found that less than half of those questioned said they intended to
vote.


The study said Russians are currently much more pre-occupied with the war
in Chechnya and in general, distrust most of the parties currently in
contention as either ineffective or corrupt.


Just four parties are forecast to dominate the election vote. Centrist
new-comers Fatherland-All Russia (OVR) and Unity are expected to join the
Communist Party and the liberal opposition Yabloko faction on the Duma
floor next year.


The Communist Party on Friday was reported to have the largest campaign
war-chest of the four -- 31.32 million rubles (about 1.2 million dollars).


Russia's heavily pro-Kremlin constitution has relegated the Duma to the
role of a spirited anti-Western debating club.


Yet the election is significant because it is widely expected to determine
the field and potential alliances that can form ahead of next summer's
crucial vote to pick a successor to Boris Yeltsin as president.


But what the vote now lacks in suspense is currently being made up in angry
jostling between Russian media outlets and election watchdog Alexander
Veshnyakov.


"We are increasing the amount of free television time alloted to the
faction compared to the last elections ... so that this can turn into a
real debate," Veshnyakov said in a television interview Friday.


Yet several journalists are taking Veshnyakov to court over what they say
are draconian new election laws that prevent the media from reporting any
information about candidates that might be considered demeaning.


"This election law even forbids you from walking out on the street and
holding up a banner calling on people to come out and vote," said Alexander
Minkin, a journalist with the Novaya Gazeta weekly.


Other journalists besides Minkin are making the same point.


One is Alexander Dorenko, a popular commentator with the nation's largest
television network ORT. He has been taken to court for mentioning a western
media report in which a former US intelligence officer questioned the
background of OVR party leader and ex-premier Yevgeny Primakov.


Dorenko argues that Veshnyakov's efforts to clean up the election from
mud-slinging between media interest that have links to the leading
candidates are anti-constitutional.


In his defense, Veshnyakov said Friday: "We are speaking of only limited
curbs to electioneering in the mass media."


Nearly every political party list has seen dozens of its members scratched
off the ballots for mis-reporting their income and assets.


The ultra-nationalist faction of Vladimir Zhirinovsky was wiped off the
slate completely, forcing the flamboyant Russian politician to create a new
group only hours before the registration booths closed.


Amid squabbles over election laws, the Russian political scene appears to
be steadily moving towards the center -- seen as the preferred choice of an
electorate disenchanted with both Communist and liberal reforms.


Nezavisimaya Gazeta on Friday reported efforts by the Communists to link
forces with Primakov's OVR.


Unity and OVR meanwhile were both reported by Kommersant to be impressed
with the leadership skills of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.


*******


#2
Excerpt
Governor George W. Bush - 'A Distinctly American Internationalism' 
Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Simi Valley, California
November 19, 1999


Russia stands as another reminder that a world increasingly at peace is
also a world in transition. Here, too, patience is needed ­ patience,
consistency, and a principled reliance on democratic forces.


In the breadth of its land, the talent and courage of its people, the
wealth of its resources, and the reach of its weapons, Russia is a great
power, and must always be treated as such. Few people have suffered more in
this century. And though we trust the worst is behind them, their troubles
are not over. This past decade, for Russia, has been an epic of deliverance
and disappointment.


Our first order of business is the national security of our nation ­ and
here both Russia and the United States face a changed world. Instead of
confronting each other, we confront the legacy of a dead ideological
rivalry -- thousands of nuclear weapons, which, in the case of Russia, may
not be secure. And together we also face an emerging threat ­ from rogue
nations, nuclear theft and accidental launch. All this requires nothing
short of a new strategic relationship to protect the peace of the world.


We can hope that the new Russian Duma will ratify START II, as we have
done. But this is not our most pressing challenge. The greater problem was
first addressed in 1991 by Senator Lugar and Senator Sam Nunn. In an act of
foresight and statesmanship, they realized that existing Russian nuclear
facilities were in danger of being compromised. Under the Nunn-Lugar
program, security at many Russian nuclear facilities has been improved and
warheads have been destroyed. 


Even so, the Energy Department warns us that our estimates of Russian
nuclear stockpiles could be off by as much as 30 percent. In other words, a
great deal of Russian nuclear material cannot be accounted for. The next
president must press for an accurate inventory of all this material. And we
must do more. I’ll ask the Congress to increase substantially our
assistance to dismantle as many of Russia’s weapons as possible, as quickly
as possible. 


We will still, however, need missile defense systems ­ both theater and
national. If I am commander-in-chief, we will develop and deploy them.


Under the mutual threat of rogue nations, there is a real possibility the
Russians could join with us and our friends and allies to cooperate on
missile defense systems. But there is a condition. Russia must break its
dangerous habit of proliferation.


In the hard work of halting proliferation, the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty is not the answer. I’ve said that our nation should continue its
moratorium on testing. Yet far more important is to constrict the supply of
nuclear materials and the means to deliver them ­ by making this a priority
with Russia and China. Our nation must cut off the demand for nuclear
weapons ­ by addressing the security concerns of those who renounce these
weapons. And our nation must diminish the evil attraction of these weapons
for rogue states ­ by rendering them useless with missile defense. The
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty does nothing to gain these goals. It does not
stop proliferation, especially to renegade regimes. It is not verifiable.
It is not enforceable. And it would stop us from ensuring the safety and
reliability of our nation’s deterrent, should the need arise. On these
crucial matters, it offers only words and false hopes and high intentions ­
with no guarantees whatever. We can fight the spread of nuclear weapons,
but we cannot wish them away with unwise treaties.


Dealing with Russia on essential issues will be far easier if we are
dealing with a democratic and free Russia. Our goal is to promote, not only
the appearance of democracy in Russia, but the structures, spirit, and
reality of democracy. This is clearly not done by focusing our aid and
attention on a corrupt and favored elite. Real change in Russia ­ as in
China ­ will come not from above, but from below. From a rising class of
entrepreneurs and business people. From new leaders in Russia’s regions who
will build a new Russian state, where power is shared, not controlled. Our
assistance, investments and loans should go directly to the Russian people,
not to enrich the bank accounts of corrupt officials. 


America should reach out to a new generation of Russians through
educational exchanges and programs to support the rule of law and a civil
society. And the Russian people, next month, must be given a free and fair
choice in their election. We cannot buy reform for Russia, but we can be
Russia’s ally in self-reform.


Even as we support Russian reform, we cannot excuse Russian brutality. When
the Russian government attacks civilians ­ killing women and children,
leaving orphans and refugees ­ it can no longer expect aid from
international lending institutions. The Russian government will discover
that it cannot build a stable and unified nation on the ruins of human
rights. That it cannot learn the lessons of democracy from the textbook of
tyranny. We want to cooperate with Russia on its concern with terrorism,
but that is impossible unless Moscow operates with civilized self-restraint.


Just as we do not want Russia to descend into cruelty, we do not want it to
return to imperialism. Russia does have interests with its newly
independent neighbors. But those interests must be expressed in commerce
and diplomacy ­ not coercion and domination. A return to Russian
imperialism would endanger both Russian democracy and the states on
Russia’s borders. The United States should actively support the nations of
the Baltics, the Caucasus and Central Asia, along with Ukraine, by
promoting regional peace and economic development, and opening links to the
wider world. 


*******


#3
Moscow Times
November 20, 1999 
EDITORIAL: Chechnya's News Is in Its Numbers 


What does it take to galvanize a nation? Official statistics coming out of 
the Defense and Interior ministries regarding Russian casualties in the 
ongoing Chechen conflict are beginning to look alarming, and Russia is not 
yet cynical enough to let the death of its young conscripts pass unnoticed. 
Still, public opinion on the conflict is surprisingly sanguine. The latest 
polls put approval ratings for the campaign at 62 percent. 


Polls, of course, can be easily manipulated or misconstrued. So, for that 
matter, can the media, policy and general assumptions of cause and effect. 
Analysts suggest that this time around, Russians have a real, ground-level 
sensation of fear that past and distant conflicts failed to provide. The 
quick succession of apartment block bombings, which left nearly 300 dead in 
Moscow, Bunaiksk and Volgodonsk, were apparently potent enough gestures to 
keep public support humming for some time. 


The Moscow bombings, which claimed the greatest number of lives and quickly 
rippled out into an ugly local campaign of document checks, neighborhood 
snitches and vicious discrimination against Caucasian minorities, were neatly 
packaged for public consumption within weeks. Sites were plowed over, 
survivors were relocated to new apartments, and a tidy theory of Chechen 
conspiracy was put forth for instant acceptance. 


The conflict's billing as an "anti-terrorist operation" was an easy sell 
after that. There has been virtually no objection movement in the public 
sector, and Russian media vehicles - at least some of which spread their 
wings during the first Chechen campaign - have returned to a nest of relative 
docility. 


The most acid news content has concentrated on grotesque footage of 
kidnappers and enslaved Russian soldiers - stories that are part of, but not 
central to, the conflict at hand. The refugee crisis has been covered, but 
can hardly be expected to evoke the sympathies of traditionally racist 
Russia, especially when Sadako Ogata, the UN high commissioner for refugees, 
is escorted to a suspiciously empty border crossing-point and is quoted the 
next day - by the Russian Interfax news agency in a report short on context - 
as saying the situation "can by no means be described as a humanitarian 
catastrophe." 


The press has been so busy skirting the issue, in fact, that the one story 
that is likely to interest the Russian public - the casualty figures coming 
out of the Russian Information Center, which are all the more astounding for 
being issued by the body least interested to exaggeration or alarmism - is 
unlikely to cause a stir. Russian soldiers are dying at an Afghanistan-level 
rate of 132 men a month. And this is just the official story. When does the 
watershed begin? 


*******


#4
YELTSIN TELLS CLINTON HE SEES PM AS SUCCESSOR


ISTANBUL. Nov 19 (Interfax) - Russian President Boris Yeltsin does
not see any "other realistic candidate except Prime Minister Vladimir
Putin for the presidential post."
Yeltsin laid out this position in response to U.S. President Bill
Clinton's questions during their meeting in Istanbul on Thursday,
sources told Interfax.
"Putin adheres to democracy and market reforms in Russia," Yeltsin
said, according to the source.
Asked about Putin's attitude toward the United States, Yeltsin
reassured Clinton that it was "constructive and respectful."
Moreover, Yeltsin and Clinton discussed peace and stability in
Europe, bilateral ties and the upcoming presidential polls in both
countries.


*******


#5
GORBACHEV COMES OUT FOR PRIMAKOV-LUZHKOV BLOC


MOSCOW. Nov 19 (Interfax) - The former President of the USSR,
Mikhail Gorbachev called on the citizens of Russia to vote for the bloc
Fatherland-All Russia at the upcoming parliamentary elections. Our
correspondent reports that he made that statement at a political salon
run by the newspaper Obschaya Gazeta.
"I think that the country's best choice now is the Fatherland-All
Russia bloc. I can't vouch for tomorrow, but today this is so," he said.
He forecast that the bloc may win 25% of votes and the Communists - 20%.


*******


#6
RUSSIA'S NATIONAL BEAR? - PUTIN
By Interfax Political Observer Igor Denisov


MOSCOW. Nov 19 (Interfax) - Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, rising
in the popularity ratings, seems to be claiming the role of a single
candidate for Russian president from the party of power, both on the
federal, which is hardly surprising for "Yeltsin's heir," and regional
front, which, it seemed not too long ago had consolidated more around
the Fatherland - All-Russia bloc.
For the time being, little gives credence to such a turn of events.
Indeed, it is hard to imagine that the leader of the Fatherland - All-
Russia bloc, Yevgeny Primakov will make up with tycoon Boris Berezovsky,
or that Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov will shake hands with his arch-enemy
Anatoly Chubais, who, as Interfax sources predict, may take over Putin's
election camp right after the December elections.
And nonetheless, a number of factors indicate that in some
situations, the Kremlin and the White House can touch upon common ground
with that part of the Russian political elite which has broken off with
the party of power.
Putin and Luzhkov met in Izhevsk somewhat accidentally at the
festivities for the jubilee of renowned Russian gun designer
Kalashnikov. The discussion continued aboard the Prime Minister's plane.
The following day, at the White House, the premier and city mayor met
again to complete their conversation. The protracted meeting ended with
Putin's statement that Luzhkov's economic proposals had quite a few
useful points.
In turn, Luzhkov also made a statement, which can only be viewed as
a thinly veiled support of the government's policy.
A somewhat similar statement came from Primakov. He remarked that
Putin was a good premier, and Fatherland - All-Russia supports his
policy in Chechnya. Indicatively, it was accompanied by a remark that
Primakov himself has not made up his mind yet whether he will run for
president.
As for Luzhkov, he has renounced his own personal presidential
ambitions repeatedly. This did not look very credible until the mayor
changed his tune by pledging that he would try to persuade Primakov to
run for president.
However, lately Luzhkov has chosen to keep a low profile. There are
several explanations for that. Here is one. Sources at the Fatherland
leadership claim that there are no glaring differences of attitude
toward the Duma elections among the bloc members. This is not the case
with regard to the presidential race.
It seems that some members of the Moscow political team are not
sure that Primakov, after riding to an electoral victory on the back of
Luzhkov's organizational structures, would not then fill key posts with
his own tried cadres. He has no shortage of such: "Primakov's people"
who are in the foreign intelligence service, which he led in Soviet
times, in the Foreign Office which he headed prior to his premiership,
in the government house, and in various research institutes of the
Academy of Sciences. Some possible candidates are already being named.
But whoever they may be, the point is that the pie is not big enough for
all. The question then is - why serve under his banner?
And this question bothers not only the Moscow crowd - doubts also
plague regional leaders who placed much stake on the Fatherland-All
Russia bloc. Evidence of that is seen in the sensational proposition by
Yaroslavl Governor Anatoly Lisitsin that a single presidential candidate
may be announced by that bloc together with the so-called Medved
movement (Russian abbreviation of Inter-Regional Unity Movement which
when abbreviated rather comically becomes the Russian word for "bear")
led by the Minister for Emergencies Sergei Shoigu.
Medved since its inception has figured as a pro-government bloc
favoring Putin as a presidential candidate. Another curious point is
that Lisitsin criticized Primakov for passivity (criticism of leaders is
not welcomed in the Fatherland-All Russia bloc). The next day a
prominent member of the bloc - the well-known political observer
Vyacheslav Nikonov hastened to disown "Lisitsin's private view".
No matter: as Putin's positions gain strength, regional governors
who joined Primakov-Luzhkov when they looked to them as the only choice
for consolidating power, now are beginning to re-appraise the situation
and search for other props to lean on. The search is likely to go on
until the returns of the parliamentary election are announced. If the
Fatherland-All Russia bloc and the Communists both gain a strong
majority, the conflict between the federal government and the Primakov-
Luzhkov alliance will intensify, with hesitant governors bowing to the
stronger rival. If not, Putin may be put forth as a presidential
candidate by a bloc that could be called "Fatherland's Bear of All
Russia".


*******


#7
The Daily Yomiuri (Japan)
Kremlin winning propaganda war
By Alexander Tsypko
(Tsypko is director of the Political Research Center in Moscow.)


Speculation about a pending collapse of the current Kremlin regime is not 
based on reality.


Criticism of the government from the communist and democratic opposition 
press in Russia
has continued for the last two years. After launching a war against 
separatists in Dagestan, the
government has unexpectedly demonstrated the will and ability to act. The 
high popularity of
Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, who has taken credit for the results 
of the war, also has boosted the Kremlin's prestige.


The attempt to discredit the the centrist coalition of former Russian Prime 
Minister Yevgeny
Primakov and Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov has failed to weaken the Kremlin's 
power. A
scandal over the Swiss construction company Mabetex and Russian money 
laundering through
the Bank of New York has proved the existence of corruption inside Russian 
President Boris
Yeltsin's entourage. However the Yeltsin "family" is still the major 
political force in Russia.


The president has as firm control of key political positions as ever through 
Putin's popularity.
The military has turned its sympathies from Primakov to Putin. The "family" 
is increasing its
power by attracting popular politicians and analysts. Foreign Minister Igor 
Ivanov has become
very close to Yeltsin, and to Yeltsin's daughter and wife, and pro-Yeltsin 
analysts have completely overcome criticisms from the the Fatherland bloc.


Many experts think that the Kremlin has beaten the centrists in the 
mud-slinging match over
accusations of corruption. The result is clearly demonstrated by public 
opinion polls.


Two months ago, Fatherland could claim the support of 25-28 percent of 
voters. Now the
figure is about 13-18 percent. Support for Primakov's presidential bid has 
fallen from 29
percent to 13 percent over the past two months. Luzhkov's support rate fell 
from 14 percent to 3 percent.


Luzhkov's attempt to raise his national support rate through sharp criticism 
of the president
and his team has resulted in complete failure. Luzhkov has almost no chance 
of winning a
presidential election if one were called for the summer of 2000. Luzhkov's 
popularity is rapidly
decreasing even in Moscow, where in 1996 he received 90 percent of the vote.


Most of the damage to Luzhkov's image was caused by the Kremlin-inspired 
publication of
facts about the participation of the mayor's office in dubious financial 
transactions with the
Bank of New York. Luzhkov's image as a centrist opposition leader has also 
been damaged by
the commercial activity of his wife, Elena Baturina. Russians traditionally 
do not like the rich, a
sentiment that the Kremlin cunningly used in depicting the Luzhkovs' life as 
luxurious.


It seems that Primakov and Luzhkov underestimated the Kremlin's ability to 
counter
accusations of corruption. Like the communist leaders in 1996, the centrists 
are under the
delusion that the Kremlin has lost the capacity to rule the country.


Contrary to their hopes, the Yeltsin regime has demonstrated miracles of 
vitality. One of those
miracles is another Yeltsin resurrection. It looks like Primakov and Luzhkov 
were waiting for
Yeltsin's physical collapse followed by the transfer of power from the 
"family" to centrists this autumn.


Perhaps Primakov and Luzhkov were misled by the illusion that they live in a 
truly democratic
country where the proven involvement of the president's daughters in illegal 
activity would
compel Yeltsin to resign. However, the country is not democratic. Public 
opinion means
nothing in this case--Yeltsin's approval rate is next to zero, but there is 
no force able to make him retire.


There is no sense in fighting the president with compromising facts because 
he is as autocratic
as a Russian czar. Even if Primakov and Luzhkov held majority support in the 
Duma, it would
not give them the opportunity to seize the presidency.


Primakov and Luzhkov have an advantage in their fight with Kremlin in 
comparison with
communists--they enjoy the support of the United States, but this hardly 
affects the results of
power struggle in Russia. Russians dislike politicians who are seen as 
friends of the United
States. That is why U.S. gestures of support might weaken Fatherland's 
position. If Primakov
moves toward the West, whose skeptical attitude to the Chechen War is well 
known, it could
easily be seen in Russia as a betrayal of Russian national interests.


The Kremlin's huge advantage is that it is the acting power. It is not so 
important now who
instigated the campaign against Dagestan. The will of the regime to protect 
the territorial unity
of Russia is crucial. Unlike the opposition, which can only make promises, 
the Kremlin can act.
If the Kremlin is successful in controlling Chechnya, it will have an easier 
time defeating the
centrist opposition and passing the presidency to a pro-Yeltsin candidate.


It is easier for the Kremlin to fight the centrists than the communists. 
Everybody knows that
Primakov and Luzhkov as well as their close aids were active members of 
Yeltsin's team for
many years. They were on Yeltsin's side when the Soviet Union was dissolved 
in 1991, when
the Duma was attacked in 1993, and later when privatization led to mass 
poverty, so the
Kremlin can easily argue that the centrists have no right to criticize the 
government now.


In addition, the Kremlin has a strong opportunity to counter the opposition 
over economic
policy. Putin's government is doing everything possible to pay social 
security debts and support health and education services.


Yeltsin will use all available means to control the Duma. One of them is to 
provoke a struggle
between communists and centrists, a tactic the Kremlin has already embarked 
on.


Yeltsin understands that the major danger for him would be a coalition of 
the leftist and centrist
opposition. Yeltsin has not given up the idea of playing Primakov and 
Luzhkov off against each other.


Another Kremlin strategy is to splinter the Duma into competing factions, 
thereby weakening
its ability to gather enough votes to impeach the president. The Kremlin 
hopes that the Fatherland bloc will split after a presidential election.


The Kremlin also intends to push its own candidates into Duma seats. 
Vladimir Zhirinovsky's
supporters in the Duma who were originally pro-Yeltsin cannot be discounted. 
Also, the
Yedinstvo (Unity) bloc, also known as Medved (Bear), could provide fertile 
ground for the
Kremlin. The bloc is led by Sergei Shoigu, the popular emergency situations 
minister, and was formed apparently to draw votes from Fatherland.


If Yeltsin is diligent and makes no fantastically foolish moves, the Kremlin 
will have all the
necessary administrative, financial, propagandist resources to maintain its 
grasp of power by the summer of 2000.


*******


#8
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 1999 
From: Gordon Hahn <hahn@hoover.stanford.edu> 
Subject: on Chechnya


It is clear now that the sequence of events including the expansion of
NATO, the West failed diplomacy and NATO war in Kosovo, and Western
overreaction to Chechnya has brought Russian-American relations to its
lowest ebb since the end of the Cold War. While these are not the only
reasons for the deterioration in relations (the geopolitics of energy
resources, Western and particularly America's high profile association with
failed economic transition in Russia, and Russian cultural and structural
difficulties in adapting to the post-Cold War world being among some of the
others), I would like to focus on the most recent of Western overreactions.


Several important observers of the Russian scene and international
politics have loosely thrown around the word 'genocide'. (Paul Goble,
Zgibniew Brzezinski, and Paul Henze -- Goble and henze on Voice of America
no less) I agree with Ira Straus's assessment here that the use of this
word is wholly inappropriate and reflects an ignorance of the what the term
means or a propaganda ploy. (In the three cases mentioned it is the latter.
In Brzezinski's case, I believe we are dealing clearly with the latter;
this should not be unexpected from a Polish nationalist with a historical
vendetta as his agenda). Last night on PBS's Charlie Rose, US rep to the
UN Holbrooke said that "tens of thousands" of Chechens had been killed in
reference to the most recent and on-going Chechen war. This overstatement
reminds one of US Defense Secretary Cohen's claim in May that a hundred
thousand Kosova Albanians had been killed by Milosevic's forces. We now
know that thus far UN human rights investigators and the FBI have been able
to uncover less than 3 thousand corpses. While I expect there will be many
more found, it is unlikely that the figure will approach a figure even
generally approximating Cohen's figure.


Holbrooke's statement is even more curious since the day before the
Chechnya's authorized representative to the US, Usmanov, said that 4,000
plus had been killed. Chechnya's "foreign minister" Akhmanov has cited a
similar figure. Russians will have a difficult time perceiving emotional
and incompetent overstatements by American officials as anything other than
"russophobic propaganda." This is why American officials should be very
careful in their statements; rather than solving problems, they are
exacerbating them. The United States would be in a better position to
criticize Russian brutalities, if they had condemned the Chechen incursion
into Dagestan as forcefully. Chechen terrorism has also been undrplayed in
the West, even though westerners have been targetted for kidnapping.
Chechnya is much less a model of democracy than Russia; threats by Chechen
officials to sabotage nuclear power plants in the West if western leaders
did not condemn Russia's first war in Chechnya reveal what kind of
barbarism the Chechen leadership is infiltrated by.


While it is clear that the Russian tactics are heavy-handed, this is in
part a result of political and technological constraints. Since their
precision weapons are few and since Chechen guerillas are intermingling
with the peaceful population, the strategy to engage a general offensive
has meant carrying out attacks that are bound to kill civilians. The need
to avoid Russian military casualties is the obvious political constraint,
and the decision to engage a stand-off, long distance battle tactic is
logical and perhaps a bit of learning modelled on NATO's Kosovo success.
Nevertheless, I believe Russia would have been better off lopping off
Chechen territory north of the Terek, as a buffer zone between Chechnya and
Dagestan.


Another misstatement prevalent in the wstern press is that Russia's
liberals have been silent from the beginning and that only a few days ago,
with Yabloko's call for negotiations, was their a break in the unanimous
Russian support for the war. In fact as early as 24 October, Yavlisnkii
called for a political settlement and negotiations, even as he supported a
drive against Chechen terrorism. Both Luzhkov and Primakov also questioned
the wisdom of reigniting a full scale war. Russia's human rights activists
have been aggressive in their opposition to the war as well, even oif theyn
have discredited themselves internally by applying the harshest terms to
the Russian leadership while remaining silent when Chechens engage in
terrorism or make incursions into Dagestan.


Unfortunately, the roots of this crisis and its emergence as an issue in
Russian-American relations go back the West's failure to invite Russia to
join NATO (I gain call on JRL readers to clarify for me if Holbrooke has
ever denied Vornotsov's claim that he told him Russia could never join NATO
as cited in Mandelbaum's book). There was a much better chance of avoiding
both Chechen wars and the Kosovo conflict, if Russia had been clearly won
over to our side. Only Russia can hurt Amercan interests, not Poland, not
the Czeck Republic, not Hungary, not the Baltic republics. Bringing the
latter into NATO will do little for American and European security, if
Russia goes authoritarian or worse again. Bringing Russia in would have
solved everything and provided strength for any possible challenge from
China. But it appears too late for this. The question now is: what to do
when Russia is lost? Answer: renew the arms race, play the China card in a
much more dangerous context, and ratchet up the defense budget. This will
be good for Lockheed Martin and others. Was not this one of the main forces
behind NATO expansion anyway? But is it good for international security?


*******


#9
From: "david hughes" <govnyuk@hotmail.com>
Subject: Re: 3628-Lozansky/Jewish Community and Chechnya 
Date: Fri, 19 Nov 1999 


I am neither Russian, Jewish or Muslim, so forgive me if my opinion is 
uninformed, but it seems to me that Ed Lozansky's letter to the JRL (Tue, 16 
Nov 99) had a rather alarmist tone to it. By blaming the war in Chechnya on 
fundamentalist terrorists, I think Ed makes the same mistake the United 
States made in assessing the Viet Cong as a Communist movement, when in 
reality it was a national liberation movement. The strife in Chechnya is a 
result of two hundred years Russian colonization, imperialism and poverty. 
It seems as if Putin is trying to finish the job that Peter the Great 
started, and rid the Caucuses of Chechens completely. From what I have 
seen, there is no indication that the Chechens are any more "Fundamentalist" 
than the KLA. Of course NATO shouldn't bomb Moscow, any more than they 
should have bombed Belgrade, and they won't, because Russia can bomb back. 
Western leaders will continue to complain about civilian casualties, while 
doing nothing to stop it, and Russian politicians will continue to refuse 
all discussion, declaring it an "internal matter." As for his statement that 
the Jewish community "took a stand" in supporting the NATO action in Kosovo, 
I heard many Jews wondering if it was such a good idea, considering the ties 
the KLA had with fundamentalist Islamic terrorists...


*******


#10
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 1999 
Subject: News from CRES
From: esokova@miis.edu (Elena Sokova)


The Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies at Monterey Institute of
International Studies has initiated a series of essays written by Russian
journalists, politicians, and scientists on contemporary Russian politics
and society. The first essay "Propaganda War Over Chechnya Goes Awry" was
written by a Russian government official who prefers to remain anonymous. 


The essay and other CRES publication can be viewed at
http://cns.miis.edu/cres.htm
You may also find our collection of web links and periodicals very useful.


Propaganda War Over Chechnya Goes Awry


In late October 1999, well-known journalist Yevgenii Kiselev hosted a TV
show discussing Russian media coverage of the war in Chechnya. The results
were rather unpleasant for the authorities: nearly two thirds of the
participants said the current Russian media coverage was inadequate and
biased.


This may have been a surprise for the government, but not for most outside
it. Unlike the 1994-1996 war, local military authorities strictly limit and
control access by journalists and cameramen to the "other side" of Chechen
territory. Therefore, live coverage is next to impossible. The Russian
military has done its best to impose a near-total information blackout on
events in this small Caucasian republic, claiming this is necessary to
ensure that combat plans remain secret. From this point view, the
information campaign has been successful. Simultaneously, the point of view
has appeared, out of nowhere, that showing and especially interviewing
terrorists is unpatriotic, on the one hand, and contributes to terrorist
and extremist propaganda, on the other.


The drawbacks of such an approach became visible rather quickly. Moscow
started to lose the propaganda war when Western mass media reports and the
Internet campaign by Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov overwhelmed Russian
coverage from Chechnya. While pictures of victorious Russian troops sitting
on armored vehicles dominate TV screens in Moscow, European and American
news reports were dominated by pictures of Chechen women and children
wounded and killed during Russian air strikes.


This suggests that the Western approach to the ongoing war is quite
different from the one four or five years ago. At that time, Russian
military actions in Chechnya, which were undertaken without direct
provocation, resulted in thousands of civilian deaths, hundreds of
thousands of refugees, and hostility on the part of the Chechen population.
However, the Western reaction against Moscow's actions in Chechnya was
rather mild, even as the Russian media was awash with criticism of its own
troops and government, ultimately helping to end the war.


Now the situation is the opposite. The Russian media constantly maintains
that the explosions in Moscow and other cities were sponsored by Chechen
terrorists (the investigation still continues, but few in Russia doubt who
the perpetrators were), cites the invasion of Dagestan by Chechen warlords,
and the kidnapping of thousands of civilians--some of them from Western
countries. There is very little sympathy for Chechen "freedom fighters" in
Moscow these days. Last year's kidnapping of several NTV journalists, who
were noted for their comparatively greater sympathy toward the Chechen
cause in the previous war, seems to have turned the tide. It is not even
the public that supports the war these days: journalists who suffered much
in 1996-99 (some were actually murdered) have little sympathy for Chechnya
today and form public opinion accordingly.


This is why many Russians simply fail to understand the negative Western
attitude to the war. Does the West not consider Chechnya a stronghold of
terrorism? Or has the general attitude towards Russia changed?


Of course, many in Russia understand that the West does not deny the need
to fight terrorism and does not support Grozny. During the aforementioned
TV show, reporters from Germany, the United States, and the 
Czech Republic honestly tried to explain this. It is the refugees from
Chechnya, the humanitarian catastrophe, and civilian casualties resulting
from bombings and artillery strikes that are the West's major concern.
Indeed, it was difficult to justify why huge crowds of refugees,
predominantly women and children, eager to leave Chechnya had to line up
near the border at check points that are unable to handle more than several
dozen a day. The inability of Russian authorities to control the situation
causes criticism from international organizations including the UN and the
International Red Cross.


It may be that the lack of widespread criticism in the Russian media is
causing the Western media to "compensate." It was easy to remain aloof in
1994-96, reprinting articles from Russian newspapers and claiming that the
war, strange as it may seem, was helping to promote democracy in Russia.
The new attitude apparently took the West by surprise.


Now, instead of waging just a domestic propaganda war (as in 1994-96), the
government finds that it has to wage another, international, propaganda
war. This has necessitated some policy adjustment. As of mid-November,
Russia is trying to be more flexible, inviting OSCE observers to Chechnya
and portraying the situation in this region in a more balanced way. At the
same time, it tries to counterattack the West by putting it on the
defensive. Nearly all Russian TV channels broadcast reports from London,
where a radical Islamic organization in Lee Valley is openly hiring
mercenaries to fight alongside Chechen extremists. Moscow's Obshchaya
gazeta has also reported that the International Relief Association and
Islamic Relief Worldwide, both based in the United States, have collected
and sent millions of dollars to the Chechen rebels. While admitting that
such organizations may not be violating domestic laws directly, the reports
highlight the fact that the terrorists are receiving support from parties
in the United Kingdom and the United States.


As the information campaign unfolds, both sides are coming a little bit
closer in their coverage of the events in Chechnya. Maybe as a result the
world, including Russia, will enjoy more balanced media coverage and
Chechen refugees will enjoy international assistance. The ongoing conflict
might still yield benefits to everyone, including Chechnya itself: it
desperately needs to get rid of the warlords and build a normal society.


But maybe this will not happen. The Istanbul summit is starting too soon
and positive results will not have enough time to ripen. Instead,
confrontation might only become more acute.


********


#11
Moscow Times
November 20, 1999 
PARTY LINES: New Job in Cards for Yeltsin 
By Jonas Bernstein 


Last week, according to just about everybody, Vladimir Putin was about to be 
fired. Then, literally over one weekend, he was suddenly endorsed by 
politicians across the spectrum and re-embraced by President Boris Yeltsin. 
What happened? 


The conventional wisdom is that Putin has simply become too popular to snub. 
But is there something else driving the elite to close ranks behind him? 


On Wednesday, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, one of the newspapers in Boris 
Berezovsky's media empire, ran the latest commentary by Vitaly Tretyakov, its 
editor in chief. The main theme of the front-page article was that Yeltsin's 
actions over the last 18 months have been aimed not "at prolonging his 
authority, but at [his] departure from power or life (which for him is one 
and the same)." To this end, Tretyakov wrote, Yeltsin has set to work on 
three tasks aimed at correcting "failures" of his rule. The first is to "make 
up for" the disintegration of the Soviet Union; the second, to prevent the 
disintegration of Russia; the third, to prevent the Communists from returning 
to power. To succeed in these tasks, Yeltsin's has set himself the additional 
one of bringing to power a successor who can finish this work, and to 
"provide this person with the maximum reserve of time to do so." 


If you sense at this point that a caveat to Yeltsin's departure plans is 
waiting in the wings, you are not mistaken. Almost at the end of his essay, 
Tretyakov adds that one of the sub-tasks Yeltsin has set for himself is a 
reunion with Belarus. 


"I can roughly guess how Putin will solve the problem of reuniting with 
Belarus," Tretyakov wrote. "With Yeltsin's help and under his guidance, of 
course, because the laurels as the unifier must go to the current president. 
That Putin has a plan in this regard, I know precisely. One time, in a small 
group of people, he made a retort which, in essence, revealed this plan. A 
good plan. Yeltsin does not see his role as heading the Union with Belarus 
for another 100 years and thereby remaining in the Kremlin endlessly long. 
Along with creating the Union as such, Yeltsin sees his role only as keeping 
pressure on [Belarus President Alexander] Lukashenko until Putin is finally 
up on his feet and Lukashenko's popularity ceases to represent a political 
threat to the presidential successor both in the Union and within Russia. 
Yeltsin sees this, and only this, as his role." 


Is Tretyakov simply making this up? I can't see a single useful propaganda 
purpose for this information - unless, of course, it is true. And if 
Tretyakov is giving us genuine inside information, then it would appear that 
the "Belarus option" is alive and well. 


This week the Kremlin quietly announced that Yeltsin and Lukashenko will sign 
a Russia-Belarus union treaty Nov. 26. Earlier this year, various observers - 
including Yabloko leader Grigory Yavlinsky, ultra-nationalist leader Vladimir 
Zhirinovsky and former Yeltsin press secretary (and long-time critic) Pavel 
Voshchanov - predicted that Yeltsin might skirt the constitutional niceties 
about surrendering power by assuming the leadership of such a Russia-Belarus 
Union. It is reassuring to learn from Tretyakov that Yeltsin does not want to 
head such a union for "another 100 years" or remain in the Kremlin "endlessly 
long." But is that another way of saying Yeltsin may have to stay on for, 
say, two more years? 


Which gets back to the sudden emergence of harmony within Russia's fractured 
political elite, with Putin as the rallying point. Pro-Kremlin politicos like 
Sergei Kiriyenko and Viktor Chernomyrdin rushed to praise Putin, as did Yury 
Luzhkov and Yevgeny Primakov, the leaders of the competing "party of power." 
Meanwhile, the Communists' perpetual anti-Kremlin drone went silent. 


Support for the Chechen campaign, of course, is part of this. But perhaps 
there is something else: Maybe Putin let it drop that everyone who plays ball 
will get a seat on the Russia-Belarus Supreme State Council. 


Given Russia's anti-Western drift, it is difficult to argue with Zhirinovsky, 
who predicted last February that Russian and Belarussian citizens alike would 
approve both a union and "the right for Yeltsin to rule for another four 
years." 


Zhirinovsky - who, like Nezavisimaya Gazeta, can be seen as a launching pad 
for Kremlin trial balloons - predicted that would happen in a referendum to 
be held in January 2000. A new millennium, a new state - and for Yeltsin, a 
new job. 


*******


#12
Russian Political Scientist Accused of State Treason.


MOSCOW, November 20 (Itar-Tass) -- The Federal Security Service (FSB), the 
main successor to the Soviet-era KGB, on Friday confirmed that it had brought 
charges of state treason against an offical of the Russian Institute for the 
United States and Canada. 


Igor Sutyagin, head of the institute's military cooperation sector, was 
arrested in the central Russian Kaluga region on Thursday, FSB chief 
spokesman Alexander Zdanovich told Itar-Tass. He declined to elaborate, 
saying only that the case would be investigated by the regional FSB 
department. 


Sutyagin is residing in the town of Obninsk, the home of the Russian Nuclear 
Centre. 


******


#13
Russia's Military Gets Image Boost
By ANGELA CHARLTON
November 18, 1999
MOSCOW (AP) - Something strange is happening to the Russian military. 


Young men going off for obligatory military service are being showered with 
flowers by well-wishers as military bands belt out old army tunes. TV 
networks broadcast variety shows featuring soldiers and veterans singing and 
talking about good times in the ranks. 


After years of decline, the military's image has perked up, largely thanks to 
Moscow's war against Chechnya. Strong popular support for the war reflects 
rising nationalism that is helping lift the stigma of incompetence, brutality 
and aimlessness that has stained the military for years. 


This fall's draftees are being treated with respect, instead of the pity 
normally given those consigned to two years under the cruel conditions that 
have long dominated military life. 


In a typical, pomp-filled ceremony of speeches and orchestral crescendos, 70 
conscripts were inducted recently in a Moscow movie theater. Girlfriends and 
mothers sprinkled them with kisses. Passers-by nodded approvingly as the 
young men filed out to head off for the army. 


``I'm not ashamed to serve my country,'' said conscript Alyosha Davydov, 17, 
his arm around his grinning younger brother. ``If I have to go to Chechnya, 
then I have to.'' 


Russia's generals, shamed by the disastrous 1994-96 Chechnya war and the 
Soviet pullout from Eastern Europe in the early 1990s and from Afghanistan in 
1989, are exercising a political confidence not seen in years. 


Russian newspaper and television coverage daily shows hardy commanders 
claiming sweeping victories and minimal casualties. It's a far cry from the 
dying conscripts and broken-down tanks that filled newspaper front pages and 
television screens during the last Chechnya war. 


The military is also working to assure conscripts and their families that 
life is getting better in the armed forces. Some units have held open days, 
at which teen-age boys get to handle Kalashnikov rifles and other weapons 
while listening to soldiers' stories of being in action. 


Even prominent liberals are whistling a military tune. Anatoly Chubais, one 
of the country's most pro-Western politicians, said recently: ``The Russian 
army is reviving in Chechnya, faith in the army is growing and a politician 
who does not think so cannot be regarded a Russian politician. In this case 
there is only one definition - a traitor.'' 


No one is pretending that the military's problems have vanished. Soldiers are 
still underfed, underpaid and barely trained. Russia's economic woes mean the 
army hasn't received new weapons in years. Hazing is fierce and endemic. 
Desertion, suicide, alcoholism and corruption are rampant in the ranks. 


And the military's new status may not last long. While the first weeks of the 
Chechnya campaign have gone smoothly for Russia, the fighting is likely to 
get bloodier and drag on for many months. 


Unless casualties among troops are kept low - or kept quiet - Russia could 
soon be back to army-bashing. It was the high casualties among young, 
ill-trained conscripts that angered so many Russians during the 1994-96 war. 


Although they opposed the last war, many Russians now see Chechnya as a 
lawless threat to the rest of the country. Chechnya-based militants twice 
invaded Russian regions in August, and are blamed for bombings that killed 
300 people in Russian cities. 


Russian commanders are desperate for things to go well and say they won't let 
bureaucrats, or Western criticism of the campaign, hold them back. 


Maj. Gen. Vladimir Shamanov, head of the Russian western command in Chechnya, 
recently said to the newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta: If the government ``tries 
to stop the army, there will be a powerful exodus of officers of various 
ranks. The officers' corps may not survive another slap in the face.'' 


Not everyone has fallen in love with the army. The respected Soldiers' 
Mothers' Committee says the government is underreporting casualties and that 
conditions on Chechnya's front are dismal: little but bread and water to eat, 
tattered uniforms left over from World War II, delayed paychecks. 


Elmira, a bookkeeper who did not give her last name, frowned throughout the 
ceremony in which her son Sergei was inducted. 


``These conscripts are too young to have been betrayed by their government. 
They see the tough guys on TV (fighting in Chechnya) and that's attractive to 
them,'' she said. 


*******