November 9, 1999    
This Date's Issues: 3612 • 3613 

Johnson's Russia List
#3613
9 November 1999
davidjohnson@erols.com


[Note from David Johnson:
1. Bloomberg: Russia's Yabloko Party Urges Halt to Chechen War, Interfax Says.
2. Bloomberg: Russia's Putin on His Political Future, Chechnya, IMF.
3. Moscow Times: Yelena Bonner, Generals Take Revenge.
4. The Globe and Mail (Canada): Geoffrey York, Russian conscripts suffer in line of fire. Chechen duty means numbing fatigue, constant fear of being shot.
5. Rossiyskaya Gazeta: Kuzbass Workers Air Grievances in Moscow.
6. World Socialist Web Site: Steve James, Europe and the US challenge Russian domination of the Baltic states.
7. Moscow Times EDITORIAL: Firing Putin Will Bring Little Good.
8. Christian Science Monitor: Fred Weir, Russia's Caucasus quagmire. In its current war, Russia is following a familiar pattern in the fractious region. 
9. AFP: Dangerous encounters with Saint Petersburg cops.
10. New York Times letter: Feeding Russian Fears.
11. Paul Backer: millenial boondoggle.
12. St. Petersburg Times: Boris Pustyntsev, The Erosion of Our Rights.]


******


#1
Russia's Yabloko Party Urges Halt to Chechen War, Interfax Says

Moscow, Nov. 9 (Bloomberg) -- Russia's opposition Yabloko party leader
Grigory Yavlinsky called on the government to stop bombing the southern
republic of Chechnya, to halt ground operations in the republic and to
begin talks with Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov, Russian news agency
Interfax reported. Yavlinsky said talks should be held on the following
terms: the liberation of all hostages, an end to kidnapping and the slave
trade, the handing over of all international terrorists to the Russian
authorities for trial, and steps towards disarming all armed groups. If
Maskhadov refuses to negotiate under these conditions, a 30-day grace
period for refugees to leave Chechnya should be given, after which ``the
above-mentioned tasks will be carried out independently by Russian
forces,'' Yavlinsky said, the agency reported. 


An estimated 200,000 Chechen refugees have fled the Russian military
assault in Chechnya; Moscow says it is fighting Islamic militants who wish
to create an Islamic state independent from Russia. 


*******


#2
Russia's Putin on His Political Future, Chechnya, IMF: Comment


Moscow, Nov. 9 (Bloomberg) -- Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin spoke
about rumors he will be fired, the military operation in Chechnya and the
delay in loan payments from the International Monetary Fund in an interview
with Russian daily Kommersant. Below is a translation of parts of the
interview. 


On how long he thinks he will be prime minister: 


``If one thinks whether or not he or she will be fired, it doesn't leave
time for work. There are specific economic problems that should be solved.
There are problems that Russia will face in the next century. A base should
be formed now for solving them. This is what I think about, not about how
to keep my seat. I am Russia's 29th prime minister. This means, that after
me, whatever time I am given to serve in the office, there will be the 30th
prime minister and so on. Because Russia won't disappear. It will always
have a government. . .And concerning firings, we'll all be fired one day.'' 


On military operations in the southern republic of Chechnya: 


``Some of our politicians still don't understand that if the so-called
Chechen problem isn't solved to the full, if the source of crime and
terrorism in a problem territory isn't destroyed, the Caucasus will be lost
and we will have to set up a security zone next to Moscow. 


``Solving this problem requires considerable funds. Though the sums are far
less than what was said on television.'' 


On the government's economic policies: 


``Private ownership should be protected. From bureaucracy, from the mafia.
. . 


``Our situation, realistically, is that we are at the crossroads. It is not
about going back. Even if someone wants to, it won't be possible to take
Russia back to what it was in the past. The country is totally different
today. 


``But we lack a clear vision of our future, understandable to the people
and corresponding to the people's interests. We have been in a transition
period for 10 years. There are institutes that specialize in the problems
of transition (from a command to a market economy.) But we can't be in that
state forever. We should have a clear idea about how economic and political
reforms will affect Russia's future. 


On delay of loan payments from the International Monetary Fund and the
World Bank: 


``In the matter of receiving IMF and World Bank loans the government
expresses cautious optimism. We take a similar position where talks with
the London Club of private creditors are concerned. . .Of course, we regret
the delay of the IMF loan payment. I think there is no significant basis
for it. It has to be understood there is an information war against Russia,
its business. Russian business came out to world markets. Not everyone in
the West likes that. 


``Concerning sovereign default -- the government will not allow it.'' 


*******


#3
Moscow Times
November 9, 1999 
Generals Take Revenge 
By Yelena Bonner 


The main cause of the second Chechen war must be sought in particular 
features of the current Russian political scene. The first war was needed in 
order to re-elect President Boris Yeltsin. This war is needed to raise the 
standing in the polls of the current prime minister, Vladimir Putin, whom 
Yeltsin has publicly endorsed as his chosen successor. 


For the Russian army, the war is attractive because it gives the generals an 
opportunity to take revenge for their defeats in the Afghan war and in the 
first f 1994-1996 f Chechen war. They believe that perestroika and Soviet 
leader Mikhail Gorbachev prevented their victory in Afghanistan, and that in 
Chechnya, Alexander Lebed, Russia's free press and public opinion were to 
blame. For the military-industrial complex f which has been in a degraded 
state since the Soviet Union fell f war means money and new orders. For the 
presidential administration, government ministers and State Duma politicians, 
the war is needed to resuscitate patriotic slogans and divert the public's 
attention from corruption and financial scandals. 


The regime hasn't found any way other than war to rally the public, of which 
one third, or 51 million, lives below the poverty level. The frequent 
replacement of prime ministers this past year f it is noteworthy that the 
last three have all had KGB connections f has possibly been the result of a 
conscious or subconscious search for someone capable of deciding for war. 


Putin took former Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin's place, most likely 
because he recognized the Kremlin's wish for war, not peace. It's worth 
recalling thatin August, in one of his first interviews as prime minister, he 
answered a question about his attitude toward his appointment by stating: 
"I'm a soldier." Later, Putin f not the president f was the first to declare 
that the Khasavyurt agreement and the peace treaty signed by Yeltsin and 
Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov were meaningless scraps of paper. Putin 
falsely claimed that Maskhadov is not a legitimate president, so there is no 
sense entering into negotiations with him. 


Russian public opinion has accepted the notion that the apartment building 
explosions in Moscow were the responsibility of Chechen terrorists, even 
though a Chechen connection to these explosions remains unproved. 


An unprecedented anti-Chechen campaign has been launched in the mass media, 
especially on television. Chechens have been banished from Russian cities, 
with Moscow leading the way. 


Between 100,000 and 130,000 people perished during the first Chechen war. 
Every city in Chechnya, its infrastructure, its institutions of education, 
medicine, culture and its factories were destroyed. And yet, with incredible 
effort, after the war ended, people somehow repaired their homes, farmers 
gathered the harvest and Chechens managed to survive the winter. All this was 
accomplished without financial help from Russia. 


Russia couldn't find any money to ensure peace. But Russia can find the money 
to make war. 


In the current budget, military expenditures have been increased by a billion 
dollars. Where will this extra money be found? One way is by simply printing 
more rubles f the resulting inflation will make the poor still more 
impoverished. Taxes will be raised, which will ruin many small- and 
medium-sized businesses. And then there will be Western loans and money from 
the International Monetary Fund and other international agencies, or at least 
whatever may be left after payment of interest on outstanding loans. The 
second Chechen war, just like the first war, is being indirectly financed by 
"the big seven" and other economically advanced countries. 


When they began their military action, the Russian generals stated their goal 
was to create a cordon sanitaire along the border with Chechnya, but since 
mid-October and after the offensive against Grozny and Gudermes, it has 
become clear that this announcement was made only to appease public opinion. 
The rocket attack on the Grozny market, when more than 150 people were 
killed, including 13 babies in a nearby maternity hospital, signaled the 
second, even more savage, phase of the war. 


It is typical that Russian officials, including Putin, have lied and denied 
that the incidents took place. Maskhadov, in his Oct. 29 appeal to Pope John 
Paul II on behalf of Chechnya's civilian population, wrote that 3,600 people, 
mostly women and children, have been killed and more than 5,500 wounded by 
Russian bombing and shelling. 


That same day, a refugee convoy that included five clearly marked Red Cross 
vehicles, was attacked by Russian planes, and eyewitnesses said more than 25 
people were killed and more than 70 wounded. The number of refugees from 
Chechnya in neighboring regions has passed the 250,000 mark. 


Every day, dozens of people f primarily infants and the elderly f die from 
cold, disease and wounds. Aid from the United Nations and other humanitarian 
organizations that has reached the refugees so far is insufficient. 


Moreover, part of the assistance has reportedly fallen into the hands of the 
military. If the flow of assistance is not promptly and substantially 
increased, countless deaths from epidemics, malnutrition and extremely cold 
weather can be expected. A humanitarian catastrophe already exists, and only 
major international aid can prevent its further advance. 


The means used to conduct this war demonstrate plainly that this is not a 
fight against terrorists; the Russian generals are trying to annihilate a 
large part of the Chechen nation and drive out those who survive from their 
native land. Their aim is to keepChechnya as part of the Russian Federation f 
but without the Chechens. This is genocide. And this can no longer be 
exclusively the internal affair of Russia, no matter how often Yeltsin and 
Putin try to assert this point of view. 


The above is a transcript of Bonner's comments before a Nov. 4 hearing of the 
U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee . 


*******


#4
The Globe and Mail (Canada)
November 8, 1999
Russian conscripts suffer in line of fire
Chechen duty means numbing fatigue, constant fear of being shot
By Geoffrey York


Galashke, Russia -- Fear and misery are etched on the grimy faces of the 
18-year-old Russian soldiers as they sit on an armoured vehicle in the 
foothills of the Caucasus Mountains.


Barely six months ago, they were conscripted into the Russian army. Now the 
teenagers have been thrown into a war zone, running a gauntlet of rebel 
snipers as they ferry supplies into Chechnya from the neighbouring region of 
Ingushetia.


"They're shooting, but thank God they haven't shot at us," one of the 
conscripts says, numb with fatigue.


Even here, more than 10 kilometres inside Ingushetia, the soldiers know 
they're not safe. Chechen guerrillas are roaming the hills and forests, 
ambushing Russian patrols.


"They seized one soldier and cut off his head," a conscript says.


The conversation is interrupted by a Russian colonel, who hurries over to the 
armoured vehicle to yell at the soldiers and tell the visitors to leave.


On Oct. 25, just up the road from where the Russian conscripts are now, a 
military camp at Verkhni Alkum was attacked by Chechen fighters.


The Russians suffered heavy casualties, but they refuse to disclose their 
losses. The Chechens claim that they killed 38 soldiers and wounded another 
100 in the midday assault.


The tension at these isolated Russian military camps, far from the official 
war zone, makes it abundantly clear that the Kremlin cannot confine the 
conflict in Chechnya to a small area or a short duration.


Russia is doomed to be haunted by this war for months or even years to come. 
If the Chechen guerrillas can move freely into Ingushetia and launch brazen 
daylight attacks, far from the official war zone, they are unlikely to be 
defeated any time soon.


Russia's military commanders insist they can crush the separatist rebels. In 
the hills of Ingushetia, however, lower-ranking Russian officers are much 
less confident of an early victory.


"We can solve everything, but we need time," a Russian major said at the 
Verkhni Alkum base, where hundreds of interior ministry troops have dug 
fortified positions in the rugged landscape.


"We can't deny that the Chechens are pretty regularly attacking . . . on the 
Ingushetia side of the border," he said. "The fighters have broken up into 
small groups. A military action against bandits can last for 100 years."


The major, who refused to give his name, compared the Chechens to the 
Ukrainian nationalists who fought against Soviet occupation in the hills of 
Western Ukraine for almost a decade after the Second World War.


"We're fighting in the same kinds of forests, the same kinds of hills, with 
the same type of fighters," he said.


His troops, peering from behind walls of sandbags, gaze warily east toward 
the hills of Chechnya. A few kilometres away, across the border, is the rebel 
stronghold of Bamut, a near-legendary symbol of Chechen resistance.


In the last Chechnya war, from 1994 to 1996, the people of Bamut defended 
their village for 15 months, despite a massive Russian onslaught of artillery 
and missiles.


The Russian major at Verkhni Alkum insisted that his troops have enough food 
and supplies. He acknowledged, however, that there might be "temporary 
shortages" when military units move to new locations.


The food shortages are probably more than temporary, though. At a checkpoint 
a few kilometres down the road, at Galashke, an Ingush police officer says 
the Russian soldiers often beg for bread and canned meat as they pass by.


"Look at them," the police officer says, pointing to soldiers in shabby, 
filthy uniforms. "They're miserable. They ask us for food almost every day."


(In the last Chechen offensive, Russian soldiers in the war zone were so 
badly equipped and hungry that many were reduced to selling their weapons in 
order to buy food and other necessities. Several of them were reported to 
have starved to death.)


Officially, only about 135 Russian soldiers have been killed in the current 
campaign. But many analysts say the death toll is much higher. A committee 
representing the mothers of Russian military conscripts recently sent a group 
of women to visit hospitals and morgues near the offensive. They estimated 
that 600 soldiers have been killed so far, including many whose bodies were 
too badly damaged to be identified.


Regardless of the exact number, the death toll on both sides is much higher 
than it was at a similar stage of the previous war.


While the Chechens continue to stage their hit-and-run attacks in small 
mobile groups, the Russians are pushing forward with massive barrages of 
artillery, tank shells, tactical missiles, and waves of rockets from 
warplanes and helicopters, at a huge cost to the civilian population.


Chechen officials say the war has killed 3,600 civilians so far. Some 
analysts say the Russians are killing as many as 20 civilians for every rebel 
they kill.


"To win this war, one has to destroy the entire male population of Chechnya," 
former Russian prime minister Sergei Stepashin said recently.


At the beginning of the last Chechen war, Russia assembled about 20,000 
troops for its first failed assault on Grozny. Russian commanders later said 
they should have had at least 70,000 troops. This time, they have built up a 
force of 100,000 soldiers. They appear to be relying heavily on the weight of 
numbers and the superior firepower of their artillery, tanks, missiles and 
warplanes.


To assemble this force, however, Moscow has relied heavily on conscripts, 
despite the Kremlin's promise that it would not send raw recruits into 
battle. More than 90 per cent of the rank-and-file soldiers and sergeants in 
Chechnya are conscripts, analysts say.


"Sending such teenaged infantry and tank crews into street battles would be 
murderous, so today Russian generals besiege Chechen settlements instead of 
attacking them," independent Moscow military analyst Pavel Felgenhauer wrote 
in a recent commentary.


"But such classical sieges that involve a hunger blockade and constant 
bombardment of residential areas kill more civilians than fighters. The slow, 
methodical advance of Russian forces into Chechnya, when bombers and heavy 
guns demolish all obstacles before the infantry moves forward, is equally 
murderous."


The Russian bombings of civilian neighbourhoods and the recent attack on a 
Red Cross refugee convoy are "flagrant violations" of the Geneva Convention 
and its protocols, he said. "Present tactics in Chechnya imply that war 
crimes are committed on a daily basis."


Meanwhile, Russia's military commanders are insisting they could have won the 
first Chechen war if their political leaders had not "betrayed" them by 
ordering ceasefires for truce negotiations.


"The most terrible thing is that a bitter taste remains from the last war, 
that the soldiers and officers of Russia gave everything they had, but were 
betrayed," General Vladimir Shamanov told Russian television last week. "I 
will tell you directly and openly: For me, this war is above all to restore 
the trampled-upon honour of my motherland."


There is growing evidence that the Russian military has broken loose from 
political control. General Shamanov, who commands the western group of 
Russian forces in Chechnya, has warned the Kremlin that the military will be 
unhappy if "politicians" interfere and prevent a military victory. If that 
happens, Russia could be driven "to the brink of civil war," he suggested.


The military has already begun to usurp some traditional civil powers. In 
Ingushetia, for example, it is the Russian military that controls the border 
crossings out of Chechnya.


"The military is solving problems that were previously always under civilian 
authority," the daily newspaper Izvestia said last week. "A military regime 
has been introduced on a part of Russia's territory that is not a military 
zone."


*******


#5
Kuzbass Workers Air Grievances in Moscow 


Rossiyskaya Gazeta
5 November 1999
[translation for personal use only]
Report by Vladimir Romanovskiy from the Politika agency: "Kuzbass Is 
Getting Irritable Again"


A news conference given by workers from Kemerovo 
Oblast was held in the Central House of Journalists 3 November. It was 
opened by Vitaliy Malanin, chairman of the Council of Labor Collectives 
of Kuzbass. He stated that the socioeconomic situation in Kemerovo Oblast had 
deteriorated once again and criticized the activities of its governor, 
Aman Tuleyev. "A frank conversation with journalists," the speaker noted, 
"and particularly the subsequent honest coverage of events in the press 
is impossible here because of the pressure on the local mass media. That 
is why we have come to Moscow: Our aim is to bring the opinion of the 
oblast's working people to the attention of the Russian Federation 
leadership." 


Malanin spoke about the All-Kuzbass Congress of Labor Collectives which took 
place in the city of Novokuznetsk 23 October. Some 422 representatives 
from more than 90 of the region's enterprises participated in its work. 
The congress called on the workers to prepare protest actions against the 
decline in living standards, unemployment, and the forcible 
redistribution of property in the oblast. The delegates adopted a 
decision on creating the Kemerovo Oblast Working People's Council 
(Workers' Parliament) and also an appeal to the State Duma, the 
Federation Council, and the Russian Federation Government. 


"The workers, however," the speaker emphasized, "do not want a fight; 
they are demanding social justice and openness as far as the activities 
of the governor and his entourage are concerned. The oblast is capable of 
living without subsidies from on high, nevertheless the existing social 
tension is becoming a pretext for asking the government for money." 


"After the congress," Malinin went on to say, "I was summoned to the 
prosecutor's office to provide the most detailed information about the 
organizers and work of the congress. But is this legal?!" 


Trade union committee chairman Andrey Denyakin spoke at the same news 
conference about the situation at the region's largest enterprise -- the 
Kuznetsk Metallurgical Combine (KMK): 


"Just a year ago the KMK was 'in poor shape.' We had not been paid for 
nine months. I am a big, strong man, but I did not know how to feed my 
child. And then the workers' collective took the matter under its 
control. It organized a tender for managing the combine which was won by 
the MIKOM [Metallurgical Investment Company] firm. It was actually MIKOM 
that managed to restore production. But when the combine got back on its 
feet, it naturally caught the eye of the governor. Pressure from on high 
began to be applied to remove our team of managers. Production was in 
turmoil once more. We invited Tuleyev many times to come and see us and 
have a talk with the labor collective but he did not come. Yet, after 
all, there are 32,000 people working a the enterprise. 


Viktor Kozlov, member of the trade union committee of the Anzhero-Sudzhensk 
open cut mine: 


"Of the 30,000 able-bodied people in the city, 11,000 are unemployed. 
However, many of those who are working are not being paid anyway. 
Furthermore, we have 15,000 deceived investors. People have been pushed 
over the edge...." 


Igor Ustyuzhanin, a blaster at the Chernigovets Closed Joint-Stock 
Company open cut mine: 


"Two years ago we were hardly making ends meet. And then the labor 
collective hired a team of professional managers. Production gradually 
picked up, but a new misfortune arose: The oblast bosses became aware of 
the enterprise's success. Our managers really began to be hounded. There 
are all the signs of an economic blockade: We are not being provided with 
rail cars to ship the coal, on which we are losing vast sums of money. 
Correspondingly we are not paying taxes to the city budget. Everyone is 
suffering, including workers in the budget-funded sector -- teachers and 
doctors. We support the decisions of the All-Kuzbass Congress of Labor 
Collectives." 


*******


#6
World Socialist Web Site
www.wsws.org
Europe and the US challenge Russian domination of the Baltic states
By Steve James 
6 November 1999


The collapse of the Soviet Union has transformed a number of Cold War 
frontiers into crossroads for an expanding flow of trade and capital. Both 
Europe and the United States are seeking to make one critical area, the 
Baltic region, a stable access point to exploit Russia's considerable natural 
assets.


On November 12 in Helsinki, Finland the foreign ministers of 22 countries, 
along with representatives of the European Commission and other 
inter-regional groupings in the Baltic Sea area, will assemble to discuss 
what has become known as the European Union's "Northern Dimension." Present 
will be all fifteen EU countries, along with Norway, Russia, Poland, Iceland 
and the Baltic states of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania.


The conference is being held under the auspices of the Finnish presidency of 
the European Union. It represents an attempt to propel European business 
interests into Russia's north and northwest and develop valuable resources 
such as natural gas and oil, without threatening the political stability of 
the region.


The initiative for the “Northern Dimension” has come from Finland, and to a 
lesser extent Sweden. The entry of both countries into the European Union in 
1995 placed Finland in the strategically critical position as the only EU 
state with a direct border with Russia, at least until Poland or some of the 
Baltic states join the EU.


The Finnish government is attempting to use its longstanding connections with 
the ex-Stalinist leaders of Russia to broker agreements between all the 
regional players and establish a dominant position for Finnish and other 
European oil and forestry interests. In recent speeches, Finnish President 
Marti Ahtisaari has promoted Karelia—the former Finnish province occupied by 
the Soviet Union for most of this century—as a possible site for business 
training centres and "company hatcheries".


One of the main points of discussion will be the progress of plans to extract 
and sell billions of cubic metres of Russian gas reserves—one third of the 
known world reserves. Since 1997 the Russian power company Gazprom and the 
Finnish Fortum Group have been working on piping the massive Russian gas 
reserves into the industrial regions of central Europe. The intention is to 
have a $5-6 billion pipeline ready by 2005.


The Fortum Group estimates that Russian natural gas could supply as much as 
40 percent of Europe's energy needs. Together with the Finnish government, 
they are promoting the “Northern Dimension” in general, and the gas pipeline 
in particular, as a more stable source of Russian energy than southern 
supplies from the highly volatile Caucasus region.


The US has not been invited to the “Northern Dimension” conference, although 
the EU's plans and those of America have ostensibly complementary aims. Both 
promote Western trade and commercial penetration into Russia, stress the need 
for stable political conditions, and incorporate assurances on the need to 
work with their respective transatlantic partners.


In an address last May in the US, the Finnish director general of political 
affairs at the EU, Pertti Torstila, spoke of a “new dimension to the 
transatlantic relationship conducted between the United States and the 
European Community/Union. During the Finnish Presidency, it will be our task 
to promote the dialogue on political and security issues between the two 
leading actors in world politics."


The US Council for Foreign Relations Task Force on “US Policy Towards North 
Eastern Europe”, chaired by ex-National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, 
underscored the same concerns in April. "In particular, the United States 
should work closely with Finland to promote closer EU-Russian-US cooperation 
in north eastern Europe in areas such as drug traffic control, energy 
development, and building civil society," the task force declared.


The US already has $18 billion worth of investments in the Baltic region, 
including $7.6 billion in Sweden—the largest source of foreign investment in 
the country. The US Task Force made clear that they regard the Baltic region 
as crucial to American interests in Europe.


The Clinton administration's concentration on the region was viewed as 
something of an experiment in European integration, drawing Russia closer to 
Europe, "defusing the potential for conflict in the region, and promoting its 
stable economic and political development." The Baltic area was described as 
“the one region in Europe where a US-Russian confrontation is still 
conceivable."


The task force proposed that the US work with regional allies in the Baltic 
and the EU to ensure that the Baltic states join both NATO and the EU, 
without provoking a dangerous response from the Russians. It urged the US to 
pay particular attention to the Russian minorities in the region, because the 
most nationalist elements within Russia could exploit the minorities question 
to impose an anti-American political line. The task force warned of potential 
trouble amongst ethnic Russians in Latvia, Estonia and Kaliningrad.


It declared: "To the extent possible, US economic assistance should be 
channelled directly to the regions in north western Russia rather than going 
through Moscow. This would ensure that the assistance actually goes to local 
entities and NGOs [non-governmental organisations] rather than into the 
pockets of the central authorities... Together with St. Petersburg, 
Kaliningrad could become Russia's gateway and window to the West, helping to 
link it more closely to Europe."


At present, the Russian response appears benign. Welcoming the EU's “Northern 
Dimension” earlier this year, Gennadi Seleznyov, the speaker of the Duma 
(parliament), noted that Russian hopes for the Finnish EU presidency were 
that "the ‘Northern Dimension' will take on material content, and that Russia 
will have a worthy place in the programme." But this situation could rapidly 
change, given that US and EU policy appears to be veering away from 
connections with Russia towards establishing direct relations and control of 
former Soviet republics.


For the present, Europe and America are working in parallel, but the 
projection of US wealth and influence into what is increasingly regarded by 
the EU as its own backyard raises the inevitability of future conflicts. The 
US task force was forced to note that Germany, for one, was "far less 
enthusiastic about the inclusion of the Baltic states in NATO".


*******


#7
Moscow Times
November 9, 1999 
EDITORIAL: Firing Putin Will Bring Little Good 


We at The Moscow Times are not fans of Vladimir Putin. We have been wary of 
the war in Chechnya, which is the only policy we know of that Putin is 
pursuing. 


But even so, Putin's sacking f which is apparently imminent f will bring 
Russia nothing particularly good. 


When President Boris Yeltsin appointed Sergei Stepashin as prime minister, he 
said Stepashin would drive economic reforms forward. After 82 days, he sacked 
Stepashin and put in Putin; Stepashin later claimed he was sacked because he 
would not perform unspecified dark services for the collective Yeltsin 
presidency known as "the family." 


With Putin's appointment, Yeltsin had nothing to say about the economy f 
instead he offered the unsolicited pledge that there would be presidential 
elections on schedule, and named Putin his successor. 


Like other Yeltsin promises about his prime ministers f remember the one 
about how Yevgeny Primakov would be in office through 2000? f the bit about 
Putin being the successor has since been retracted. Will the elections pledge 
be next to go? 


Most likely. The logic of the political situation today is leading inexorably 
toward some sort of a deal between the various clans. They can't afford 
elections f if only because that would mean one clan would win entirely and 
the other be destroyed. 


Anti-Boris Berezovsky forces have now accused Berezovsky of killing 
journalist Vladislav Listiev in 1995, of paying Chechen terrorists to attack 
Russia, and of trying to contract the murders of Moscow Mayor Yury Luzhkov, 
NTV founder Vladimir Gusinsky and crooner and friend-of-Yury Iosif Kobzon. 
Anti-Luzhkov forces, in turn, have accused the mayor of orchestrating the 
murder of Paul Tatum and embezzling money from a hospital in Budyonnovsk and 
the Christ the Savior Cathedral. 


In all the years of kompromat wars, never have the allegations been so 
dangerous. For a comparable scenario of Moscow political clan warfare, one 
has to think back to the days before the October 1993 conflict. 


October 1993 is not a reassuring analogy. But it is an apt one: As then, we 
are now in a fight to the finish. Berezovsky cannot afford to see Luzhkov and 
his Fatherland crowd triumph and take up power, while Luzhkov cannot afford 
to see Berezovsky and "the family" in power. 


There are two possible resolutions. One is violence; the other is a deal. 
Enter the State Council f an idea floated during the 1996 elections, and now 
given new currency with the Belarus union. Seats at the table will be 
negotiated between elites, outside of the elections process; no one wins and 
no one loses, except the people. 


*******


#8
Christian Science Monitor
9 November 1999
Russia's Caucasus quagmire
In its current war, Russia is following a familiar pattern in the
fractious region. 
By Fred Weir , Special to The Christian Science Monitor


The hills above this military staging post in southeastern Ingushetia are a
riot of fall colors. The high, snow-capped Caucasus Mountains seem to float
on the mist beyond, like a living postcard. But in the immediate
foreground, tanks and armored personnel carriers churn up a muddy field.
Groups of young conscripts in filthy uniforms, assault rifles slung over
their shoulders, stand idly about. 


A few days ago a band of Chechen rebel fighters crossed the border into
Ingushetia and ambushed a Russian patrol in broad daylight, killing some 50
soldiers from this base, according to the Moscow media. A Russian major,
standing on the camp's perimeter, says the attack occurred but refuses to
give his name or any details of the action. 


"We're fighting here so that these boys won't have to fight one day in
their own hometowns," he says, gesturing toward a group of conscripts. The
rugged but confident-looking major's uniform is freshly starched, and he
wears a peaked cap with a silver double-headed eagle badge. "If we don't
take strong measures now, all this instability will spread." 


Then he offers an analogy that speaks volumes about the mind-set of the
Russian military, as they commit more and more resources in pursuit of
victory against the Chechen irregulars who own those forested hills beyond
the base. After World War II, the USSR fought a little-known
counterinsurgency struggle to destroy CIA-backed anti-Soviet guerrillas in
the Carpathian Mountains of western Ukraine. "Those Ukrainians were the
same kind of bandits, fighting us in similar terrain," he says. "It took 10
years, but we ground them down and eventually wiped them out. We'll do the
same here." 


The irony of that comparison seems completely lost on him: Ukraine is today
an independent country, and those long-buried guerrillas are being
transformed into national folk heroes. The USSR may have won the war, but
it failed in the long run to create a society that any of its diverse
peoples wanted to belong to. 


Post-Soviet Russia appears headed down the same road. Its Achilles' heel is
here, in the North Caucasus. Six impoverished and restive ethnic republics
nestle up against the high wall of the mountains, which separate Europe
from Asia in this part of the world: Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, North
Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, and Karachayevo-Cherkess. Of these, all but
one are traditionally Muslim. All are rent with internal discord, and it is
growing worse under the impact of the deepening cataclysm in Chechnya. 


"This is a colonial war, and it will end ... with the republics of the
North Caucasus breaking free from Russia," says Franz Sheregi, an analyst
with the Institute of Social and National Issues in Moscow. "They cannot be
integrated into Russia, except under a colonial system. And that means
endless war and dissension." 


It's hard to escape that conclusion here on Ingushetia's rugged frontier
with Chechnya. Russian artillery batteries dug into hillsides hammer the
nearby Chechen towns of Bamut and Sernovodsk around the clock. Gunships and
fighter planes sweep in over the safety of Ingush territory, firing rockets
at rebels. 


The Ingush are closely related to the Chechens, and until 1991 were united
in a republic with them. When Chechnya opted to secede from the Russian
most of that goodwill. A two-year war to crush Chechnya's independence in
1994-96 killed some 80,000 people. 


In September, Russia launched an "antiterrorist" campaign that its army has
turned into a full-fledged effort to refight the previous war - only
"smarter" this time. Some 200,000 Chechen civilians fleeing into Ingushetia
carry horror stories of savage and indiscriminate Russian bombardment of
their homes, public places, and refugee columns. 


At a checkpoint just down the road from Verkhni Alkum, an Ingush police
sergeant, who asked not to be named, is contemptuous of the Russian
soldiers. "They come out to the road to beg for food and cigarettes from
passing cars," he says. "But if we try to approach them, they crouch down
and raise their guns. They're scared to death of us." 


Russia conquered the North Caucasus in the 19th century after decades of
guerrilla warfare. The Chechens were the last to surrender. In World War
II, Stalin deported tens of thousands of Chechens to Siberia as punishment
for their supposed collaboration with the Germans. But in later Soviet
times, things settled down, and the Communist social contract took hold. 


"The elite from every ethnic group could gain advantage by joining the
Communist party, and even found it possible to call themselves Soviet
citizens," says Sergei Kazyenov, a Caucasus specialist with the independent
Institute for National Security and Strategic Research in Moscow. "For all
of its flaws, the USSR had a unifying ideology and force." 


But the Soviet Union is dead, and Boris Yeltsin's Russia has failed to
appeal to its non-Russian citizens - particularly the Muslim Caucasians -
with any new integrating principle. And rising nationalist forces are
pressing a definition of Russianness that hinges on Slavic ethnicity,
Russian culture, and Orthodox Christianity. Those forces are fueling the
war to subjugate Chechnya, and warning against any peace talks or political
compromises. 


"The search for a long-term political solution has been totally disrupted
by the military action," says Mr. Kazyenov. "If we fail to create a Russian
civilization that embraces the Caucasian people, we will surely lose them." 


"We are a small people, but we want our freedom" says Liza Nagalayeva, a
Chechen schoolteacher who fled her burning hometown three weeks ago. "The
Russians say we must be part of Russia. But they talk only with guns
and rockets, and they will never win the argument that way." 


*******


#9
Dangerous encounters with Saint Petersburg cops


SAINT PETERSBURG, Nov 9 (AFP) - 
In Saint Petersburg, never ask a policemen: you could have your cash and
papers stolen, be beaten and tortured and end up in hospital.


Konstantin Zhuravlev, a 31-year-old medical doctor, ended up in hospital in
a serious condition after spending a few hours at the police station where
officers said they wanted to check his identity papers.


"I was on my way home when two policemen asked to see my papers. As soon as
they saw I had 3,500 roubles (about 140 dollars) on me they took me to the
police station.


"There, one of them put the money in his pocket. I asked for it back, then
they began to hit me.


"After beating me for several hours, they made me sign a paper saying I had
no complaints against the police and then threw me out, pennyless and
without identity papers," said Zhuravlev.


Boris Gaidar, a surgeon and teacher at the Military Medical Academy, said
this sort of case was frequent in Saint Petersburg.


"Cases of head injuries inflicted in police stations are frequent in our
clinic, especially during the night shift," he said.


"If people try to defend themselves against the police, they end up in
hospital," said Maxim, a 37-year-old journalist who also was molested
during a short stay in one of the city's police stations.


Some 360 cases of law-breaking by the police have been registered here so
far this year, official figures say, but there have been only 83 prosecutions.


Rapes are regularly reported, usually of prostitutes taken to the police
stations, later to be released.


Police misbehaviour is also frequent in the rest of Russia. Deputy Interior
Minister Valery Fiodorov at the end of October quoted an opinion poll of
80,000 people as saying that only 42 percent of Russians trusted the
police, notably because of their brutal methods.


Alexander Kulikov, who heads a police internal disciplinary body, says it
is very difficult to provide proof of offences by police. "There are no
witnesses to thefts or beatings," he said.


But the newspapers frequently report excesses. The daily Petersburg Express
recently said that two policemen had been arrested on suspicion of killing
a homeless person.


The same newspaper said one of the city's municipal councillors, Vladimir
Belozerskikh, was recently beaten up after being arrested for "insolence".


"If you have been drinking, even moderately, the police are free to do what
they like," said Alexander Rezunov, a 39-year-old shopkeeper.


The most frequent motive for police misbehaviour is venality in a
profession where the average pay is around 1,000 rubles (40 dollars) a month.


Natasha, a young woman from Saint Petersburg, recently lost a boy-friend
after he was beaten to death during a night in a police station. "I am more
frightened of the police than the criminals," she said.


******


#10
New York Times
November 9, 1999
Letter
Feeding Russian Fears


To the Editor: 
You overlook one aspect of the foolish and wasteful decision to withdraw
members of our diplomatic staff in Russia and three other former Soviet
republics in anticipation of Russia's Year 2000 computer problem (front
page, Nov. 8). 


Has anyone at the State Department considered the symbolic effect of this
decision? To many on Russia's nationalist fringe, this could be seen as
evidence of American preparation for war under the cloak of the supposed
computer problem. Why else, they will say, of all the countries in the
world, would the United States withdraw diplomats only from Russia and the
three former Soviet states? 


Such musings can resonate in a society rife with paranoid suspicions about
Western plots. With this bureaucratic fumble, the State Department runs the
risk of serving up propaganda for extremists, and for no real benefit.


PETER KRACHT
Sandy Hook, Conn., Nov. 8, 1999 


*******


#11
Date: Mon, 08 Nov 1999 
From: "Paul Backer, Esq." <pmcllc@email.msn.com> 
Subject: millenial boondoggle


If you work for a U.S. Embassy in the former Soviet states and want a free
one month trip to U.S. with the family, you get to go, providing you leave
to avoid the Y2K bug.


Scenes resembling the evacuation of our embassy in S.Vietnam can be
anticipated in the four post-Soviet sites offering Y2K related travel
opp'ties. Apparently the particular danger of FSU sites must be from these
site nations' reliance on super computers to manage their economies as NO
other sites plan to offer their personnel evacuation. Heck, Moldova is no
place to be when your EDT/EFT protocols glitch up on you.


Oddly, no posts outside the FSU are expecting to have to flee their sites,
while up to $7.5 million dollars ($15,000 per month/person taxpayer expense)
worth of FSU embassy officials and families are set to flee FSU's Y2K
terrors. Appears that the post-Soviet work ethic is contagious.


To borrow a line, "Senator, have you no shame? Have you finally, no
shame?".


******


#12
St. Petersburg Times
November 9, 1999
The Erosion of Our Rights
By Boris Pustyntsev
Boris Pustyntsev is the chairman of the St. Petersburg-based human rights
organization Citizens' Watch. He contributed this comment to The St.
Petersburg Times.


OVER the last turbulent decade, two social institutions have crystallized
which, up until now, have stubbornly resisted the intentions of the
authorities to usurp citizens' rights and forced those in power to glance,
at least from time to time, at the law. These institutions are the free
mass media and the so-called "third sector," the independent
non-governmental organizations.


Undoubtedly, the most substantial achievements of our fragile democracy are
in no small part due to journalists. Beginning with perestroika, the media
conquered the airwaves at a second's notice, dashing ahead and forcing
society to catch up with the level of freedom they had achieved. Because
civil society was underdeveloped and public opinion eroded, the media
weren't able to directly influence government decisions - but it was
nevertheless too late for the authorities to ignore them. The government
unleashed a concentrated attack on journalists at the beginning of the
first Chechen war, aiming to turn the media into an official megaphone -
and it failed. The "fourth estate," on the whole, stood up for its
independence. Journalists continued to report on Russia's barbaric means of
waging war and about the authorities' massive violations of the rights of
both Chechen civilians and Russian soldiers.


How quickly things have changed. One need only try a brief experiment to
see how much: For three days, read only newspapers, and over the following
three days watch only television and listen to the radio. It will seem as
if you have spent three days in different countries - or under different
regimes. Many central publishers - and even some regional ones - still
print news and commentary that gives readers a more or less objective
opinion on critical events, including the war in the Caucasus. At the same
time, radio and television openly ignore people's constitutional rights to
information about the actions of their state agencies, offering only
heavily pro-government coverage of the war.


We have long ago come to terms with the fact that regional TV and radio are
fully controlled by local political elites and that the central stations
exist mainly as tools in the battles of the oligarchs. Nevertheless, a few
years ago, NTV had a deserved reputation as the most objective and detailed
news source (at least in matters not concerning Yury Luzhkov) in Russia.
Today, when it comes to human rights, the three leading stations are united
- in their intention to help the authorities beat off accusations that they
are violating these rights.


Yevgeny Kiselyov pretends to be surprised when the Western media reports
the bombing of a refugee convoy first. The one-time accurate commentator
Nikolai Svanidze dishes out pure disinformation, and carps on Western
criticisms of Russia's "stern actions ... relative to terrorists" -
although he knows himself that the criticism is directed at the shelling
and bombardment of civilians.


Pavel Sheremet, that recent martyr for the right to information, looks
especially vile now: What is the West fuming about? After all, what we are
doing in Chechnya is the same thing it did in Kosovo.


A brief survey: Around 20,000 bombs were dropped during the entire conflict
in Kosovo. Of those, only 80 - or 0.4 percent - missed their targets to hit
civilian homes, the Chinese Embassy, and so on. This information, which
NATO put out three months ago, has been disputed by no one. If we were sure
the Russian army could strike at terrorist bases with such precision, there
would be no protest.


Television has also failed to mention the authorities' growing encroachment
on human rights groups via the re-registration law, passed by the State
Duma in June, now being applied to non-governmental organizations. The
legal department of Moscow's City Hall did much to initiate this law and to
grab on to it when passed.


The renowned academician and ecologist Alexei Yablokov was turned down
several times in 1998 and 1999 while trying to register his inter-regional
rights coalition "Ecology and Human Rights." City Hall bureaucrats finally
informed him he should take the words "human rights" out of the
organization's title and charter. Then they would register it.


Protests to the Justice Ministry led to no action: The ministry said that
City Hall's legal department is "autonomous in its decisions," which gave
City Hall the green light for further despotism. Yablokov filed suit
against City Hall's legal department in April. In court, the legal
department explained its position thus: The constitution stipulates that
the defense of human rights lies with the state. Therefore, the only real
defense for human rights can be exercised by the state or lawyers.
Everything else, including social organizations, can only assist the
defense of rights - i.e., help the government.


Government agencies are the primary violators of human rights. States are
constantly trying to broaden their authority at the expense of our rights,
if only on instinct. In this sense, there are no good or bad governments.
But there are societies that allow authorities to violate civil rights and
those that don't - at least not without going unpunished.


The position of Moscow's legal department can be expressed as "I violate
human rights, I defend human rights." Despite the idiocy of such an
argument, the court found in favor of the legal department. Yablokov
appealed to the Moscow City Court in August, which - in violation of
several statutes of the constitution and a whole series of international
obligations Russia has as a member of the Council of Europe - also found in
City Hall's favor.


The case is now pending with the Moscow City Court, which may be just as
precious a relative to Luzhkov's agencies. The case of these human rights
abuses is also going to be heard in January by the Human Rights and Legal
Committee in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. The
Council's High Commissioner on Human Rights for the Baltic countries has
filed an inquiry with Moscow's city government and also intends to file one
with federal authorities. The International Commission of Jurists is
prepared to represent Yablokov at the European Court of Human Rights, if it
comes to that. It is also true that this Moscow initiative has been seized
on in the regions: The infamous Krasnodar governor, Nikolai Kondratenko,
has already closed all the truly independent non-government organizations
in his area, allowing only organizations he controls to register.


The desire of Luzhkov and the Kremlin to declare all defenders of
fundamental rights and political freedoms outlaws is easily explained. The
administration is brushing off everybody it can't control. Having crushed
radio and television and weakened the media, authorities are declaring war
on the next bastion of freedom - human rights organizations.


*******