October 9, 1999    
This Date's Issues: 3551 3552

Johnson's Russia List
#3551
9 October 1999
davidjohnson@erols.com


[Note from David Johnson:
1. Journal of Commerce: John Helmer, FORTUNE COOKIES FOR PRIMAKOV.
2. Reuters: Yeltsin has no plan to curb Russian press - aide.
3. Itar-Tass: Decision on Otechestvo-All Russia Bloc Due on Oct 9.
4. Interfax: FEDERAL TROOPS ABOUT TO END FIRST STAGE OF CHECHEN OPERATION.
5. Igor Malashenko at CSIS in Washington.
6. Fred Weir: re: Tribunsky #3550.
7. Andrew Yorke: Edinstvo/Unity... past and present.
8. Interfax: Poll: Putin cabinet's performance approved by most Russians.
9. INTERFAX OPENS ELECTION WEB SITE.
10. Pavel Baev: Is the Second Chechen War Different?
11. Interfax: RUSSIAN SPECIAL SERVICES TO PUT KEY TERRORISTS OUT OF ACTION.
12. Interfax: YELTSIN CONFIRMS EFFORT TOWARD START II RATIFICATION.
13. Interfax: U.S., IMF AID TO RUSSIA POLITICALLY MOTIVATED - ACADEMIC.
14. Reuters: Caucasus problems almost unsolvable -- Russia.
15. RFE/RL: Andrew Tully, Russia: Expert Urges International Fight Against Money Laundering. (Louise Shelley)
16. Moscow Times: Simon Saraszhyan, 'Stingers' May Mean Carpet Bombing.
17. Moscow Times: Kevin O'Flynn, LDPR Calls For State of Emergency.
18. Reuters: Russia faces criticism over Chechnya campaign.] 


*******


#1
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 1999 
From: helmer@glasnet.ru (John Helmer)


FORTUNE COOKIES FOR PRIMAKOV
By John Helmer
Journal of Commerce, October 7


MOSCOW. Hidden away behind China's public celebrations this week of the
50th 
anniversary of the establishment of the People's Republic, it was decided
in Beijing to send a very important box of fortune-cookies to Moscow.
As is traditional with these things, inside each cookie there is a 
slip of paper which carries a message. 
The Chinese leadership long ago understood they were wasting their 
time communicating with President Boris Yeltsin and his circle. They
decided to be patient, and wait. The fortune-cookie decision marks a new
attitude in Beijing towards the developments in Moscow. It is the Chinese
way of acknowledging discreetly what the American government is doing
noisily -- that Yeltsin's regime is finished.
No less than the Americans, the administration of President Jiang Zemin and
Prime Minister Zhu Rongji is anxious to know if what follows Yeltsin
will be more or less agreeable to China's interests; and to influence
this outcome, if possible.
In dealing with Russians, the Chinese leadership has been nothing these
past eight years if not discreet. How to communicate was studied for
weeks. Mooncakes are seasonal delicacies in September, but were out
of date by the time the Chinese leadership had made up its mind on
the fresh overture to Moscow.
Besides, mooncakes have egg, cream and jelly centres, which Russians
often dislike; and which in any case don't permit hidden message-passing.
And so fortune-cookies were chosen, and six messages selected for
insertion. 
Not by coincidence, these are the six recommendations which the Politburo of 
the Chinese Communist Party has been considering as its recipe for 
continuing to stay in power.
A talented calligrapher was employed to miniaturize these messages, so that
the slip of paper would fit inside the cookie. In case the cookies fell into
the hands of American agents, each message starts with the formula, 
Confucius say... This is what is on the slips:
-- Confucius say the wise leader must maintain national 
sovereignty and territorial integrity.
-- Confucius say the wise leader must ensure economic stability and growth.
-- Confucius say the wise leader does not tolerate growing disparities 
between east and west, north and south.
-- Confucius say the wise leader cannot enjoy the mandate of heaven if the
cadres are corrupt.
-- Confucius say the wise leader must rule his own family and tolerate no
scandal.
-- Confucius say the wise leader should demonstrate continuity from one 
generation to another.
Actually, these started off as the recommendations which the Chinese
Politburo has been considering as their own blueprint to keep Jiang and
Zhu from being keeling over under domestic pressure of all sorts. 
The territorial issue for them is mostly Taiwan, and also Tibet. The rate
of economic growth in China has been in doubt ever since the collapse of
the southeast Asian currencies, and the pressure intensified to devalue 
the renminbi. The widening economic gulf between the rich coastland of 
Guangdong, Shanghai, and Beijing, compared to the poor heartland, has 
been exacerbated by natural disasters. 
But the wily Chinese also knew that the Russian recipient would crack
open his cookies, and understand the Russian meaning of the messages --
war in Chechnya; the Central Bank's rouble policy; the dominance of Moscow;
the Yeltsin family's bank accounts; and so on. 
But Jiang and Zhu wanted something more. They wanted to send their cookies
to the Russian most likely to decide these matters in a way that complements,
and reinforces, the policies the Chinese leaders are committed to.
The Politburo in Beijing decided the six cookies should comprise a code.
When cracked, this identifies the candidate the Chinese believe would
be the best man to rule Russia next. The candidate that fits most closely
the six Confucian descriptions is the one who not only gets the cookies,
he is the one who gets the power.
When it came to selecting that man, the Politburo called in all its
top spies and Russian advisors. Their deliberation was full of joke-telling
and unprintable anecdotes at the expense of a string of well-known Russian
figures. 
The calligrapher was called in finally, and told to inscribe the chosen
name. The diplomatic bag was then sealed, and despatched to the Chinese
Embassy with coded instructions for the method of its 
delivery. Noone but the Chinese Ambassador himself was to hand the cookies
over, and he was explicitly instructed to address the recipient's attention to
the wisdom of Confucius. 
The Ambassador was not told what was inside the cookies. The calligrapher
was awarded his pension, and he has disappeared.
Naturally, I am sworn to secrecy.


*******


#2
Yeltsin has no plan to curb Russian press - aide

MOSCOW, Oct 8 (Reuters) - President Boris Yeltsin is concerned about 
information wars raging in the Russian media ahead of a December 
parliamentary election but has no plans to curb press freedom, his spokesman 
said on Friday. 


``No one can suspect (Yeltsin) in any way of wanting to infringe on the 
freedom of the press,'' Dmitry Yakushkin told Russian reporters in comments 
confirmed by the Kremlin. 


Yakushkin was apparently commenting on speculation that Yeltsin, angered by a 
series of smear campaigns in the media, might move to restrict press freedom. 


Yakushkin said he did not know what Yeltsin's specific reaction was to the 
media reports but added that his general attitude to information wars was 
negative. 


As political tensions rise in Russia ahead of December's election and next 
summer's presidential poll, politicians and businessmen have begun hurling 
allegations of corruption and wrongdoing at one another. 


Yeltsin, often himself the target of bitter attacks in the media, has always 
supported press freedom but the surprise creation of an information ministry 
earlier this year revived fears that the authorities were planning a 
clampdown. 


The ministry, in charge of safeguarding media ethics, has already once 
briefly suspended a major regional TV station after it aired a programme the 
ministry had said was inappropriate. 


Yakushkin said Yeltsin might take a short holiday later this month to ease 
the strain of the last two months when he had to deal with a series of crises 
in Russia's North Caucasus. 


*******


#3
Decision on Otechestvo-All Russia Bloc Due on Oct 9


MOSCOW, October 8 (Itar-Tass) - An inspection has confirmed that a 
"considerable number" of candidates from the federal list of the 
Otechestvo-All Russia election bloc submitted incorrect information, Central 
Election Commission Chairman Alexander Veshnyakov said on Friday after 
meeting his colleagues. 


There is quite a number of such candidates, but less than 25 percent of the 
federal list, which would have predetermined a removal of the list from 
registration, he said. Veshnyakov did not say whether these included 
candidates from the list's top three. 


"The Central Electoral Commission will not take ungrounded decisions. All the 
doubts will be interpreted in favor of the candidate," he said. At the same 
time, a possibility of a deeper examination will be preserved as regards some 
candidates. 


The Central Electoral Commission will decide on registering the list on 
October 9 with due account of data given by the traffic police, the Interior 
Ministry, the Federal Security Service and the Ministry on Taxes and Dues. 
The ten-day period given for such collection of data is due to expire on 
Saturday. 


Veshnyakov refused to forecast a resolution of the Central Electoral 
Commission on the registration of the election bloc's candidate list. He said 
he did not know what decision would be taken on each candidate who had 
submitted the incorrect information about his property and revenues. "That is 
a separate question, which will be solved personally for every candidate," 
Veshnyakov said. 


In his words, the press will be given detailed materials. The documents 
related to the election bloc's candidates in single- mandate electoral 
districts were received by the Commission on Friday, and the examination 
began, Veshnyakov said. 


An analysis of the documents submitted with the Liberal Democratic Party's 
federal list of candidates is underway, too. That list also has candidates 
with incorrect data, he said. The Central Electoral Commission will discuss 
the registration of that candidate list on Monday after working all through 
the weekend to verify the information. Veshnyakov said they "will have to 
make additional inquiries for a deeper examination, because questions arise 
in the first reading of the information." 


*******


#4
FEDERAL TROOPS ABOUT TO END FIRST STAGE OF CHECHEN OPERATION
By Interfax observer Alexei Petukhov


MOSCOW. Oct 8 (Interfax) - The federal forces are likely to
complete the first stage of their operation for establishing a security
zone on Chechen territory in the near future.
Several facts point to this: the formation of ruling agencies in
the federal-controlled part of Chechnya, and the extension of
humanitarian assistance there.
Law-enforcement sources have said that Russian soldiers will not
advance deeper into Chechnya, but fortify their positions near the Terek
River. They continue to press forward, but avoid large-scale clashes.
An attack on Grozny is not on the cards. The Defense Ministry is
about to begin the erection of quarters for its troops in Chechnya.
"As soon as troops capture positions, their settlement begins,"
Deputy Defense Minister in charge of construction and housing Alexander
Kosovan said. Permanent buildings will not be erected and the servicemen
will quarter in warm tents, Kosovan said.
This statement is not disinformation. Russian soldiers are unlikely
to cross the Terek despite statements by Defense Ministry and General
Headquarters officials that terrorists would be neutralized "no matter
where or when," sources told Interfax.
It is easier to fight well-trained militants on flat ground than in
the mountains.
Control over the plains up to the Terek is beneficial from
political and economic points of view. The federal center will change
things for the better by establishing a enclave free of bandits. It will
have a full-fledged presidential representative, military chiefs and
law-enforcement structures. It is to the Shelkovsky and Naursky
districts that humanitarian assistance will be channeled, to be spent on
restoring the social infrastructure, paying pensions and wages.
These steps are aimed at creating a contrast between the living
standard in the federally-controlled area and the rest of Chechnya. By
this, the federal authorities expect to undermine popular support for
the militants.
Chief of the General Staff Gen. Anatoly Kvashnin is confident that
"the Chechen people will decide themselves whom to support. This choice
is currently made under at the point of the militant's assault rifles."
Kvashnin is a key architect of the so-called Chechen campaign.
However, the militants are unlikely to be given a break even if
troops stop short of fighting their way into the mountains in southern
Chechnya. Aviation, artillery and special anti-terrorist units will
pursue them.
Interior Minister Vladimir Rushailo said Friday that they will
"either capture or kill Basayev and Khattab." "There is no other way
out," he said.
Moreover, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin caused a sensation by
announcing that State Duma deputy Nadir Khachilayev had recently been
arrested. Khachilayev is alleged to have taken an active part in the
incursion into Dagestan led by Basayev and Khattab.
No details of the arrest have been revealed. "This is not like our
aw-enforcement agencies. They prefer transparency in their work. The
interests of the case call for secrecy in this instance," the sources
said, noting that the same methods might by applied to Basayev and
Khattab.


*******


#5
Date: Fri, 08 Oct 1999 
From: "Amanda Lahan" <ALahan@CSIS.ORG>
Subject: Malashenko in Washington


THE RUSSIAN POLITICAL SCENE


Speaker: Igor Malashenko, First Deputy Chairman of Most Media
Date and Time: October 13, 12:00-2:00 p.m. Lunch will be provided.
Location: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1800 K Street,
NW, Washington DC
To register, please call Jeffrey Thomas or Amanda Lahan at 202-775-3240.


******


#6
From: "Fred Weir" <fweir@glas.apc.org>
Subject: re: tribunsky #3550
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 1999


Alexander Tribunsky's rant on the hypocrisy of Western journalists
coverage of police persecution against Moscow's Caucasians will probably get
lots of deserved reaction. As one who's made a point of covering this issue,
and will continue to do so, here's mine.


First, it's absurd to say we're indifferent to the sufferings of
Russians. There may have been (primarily ideological) differences in the
ways Western journalists covered the socio-economic crisis in this country
over the years, but the recent wave of apartment bombings brought out
unanimous feelings of horror, revulsion against the (still unidentified)
criminals and empathy for the victims. That was reflected in the reportage.


Second, no one doubts the need for stepped-up security measures. I for
one made a point of stressing, in my piece about the revival of house
committees and babushki at the entrance, that it is not at all wrong in
principle for people to organize at the home level for self-defence. I have
a family -- a Russian family by the way -- and we live in Moscow too. Even
though the local security measures were mostly blundering excess, and there
were definitely some scary undertones, there were also positive stirrings of
community solidarity. It's really too bad that, now the crisis appears over,
all that is quickly falling by the wayside.


But beyond that, Mr. Tribunsky loses me. We're talking, for the most
part, about Russian citizens who are being routinely stripped of their
Constitutional and human rights. The propiska system in Moscow is illegal,
it has been struck down by the Constitutional Court. The fact it continues
to be enforced is in itself one of the most disturbing signs that there is
no rule of law in Russia. But the manner in which it's enforced on the
streets of Moscow is a special disgrace, and unspeakably dangerous for the
future of this country.


As I understand it, the Russian case to the peoples of the North
Caucasus is that they cannot secede and must remain part of the Russian
Federation. I actually sympathize with the Russian point of view on this.
But in recent days I've talked with numerous Chechens who fled to Moscow
friends and relatives to escape Russian bombardments in Chechnya, only to
find themselves arrested, beaten and robbed by Moscow police. So much for
the protections of Russian citizenship. And it's simply not true to say, as
Mr. Tribunsky does, that only "non-registered" visitors to the capital
receive such treatment. I have also interviewed people who held valid
temporary registrations -- and in most cases good and worthy jobs in
Moscow -- who were denied re-registration in the recent "anti-terrorist"
campaign, and ordered to leave the city. Where can they go? Back to the
killing fields in Chechnya? Moreover I also have interviews with Chechens
who've lived in Moscow for years, possess valid propiskas, who have
nevertheless been detained, strip-searched, fingerprinted, photographed and,
in some cases, robbed and roughed up by police.


Mr. Tribunsky implies that to draw attention to the plight of these
people proves one is careless toward the feelings of long-suffering
Russians. Bull. More seriously, he suggests we are interfering with
legitimate security measures and aiding the terrorists by raising the human
rights issue. "If any of the observers who are so eager to criticize the
police can suggest something really effective to prevent more tragedies,
they are most welcome," he writes.


I'd be happy to. Start by ordering the police to focus on fighting crime
rather than wasting their efforts by meting out collective punishment. Look,
I read in Tass the other week that more than 20,000 "suspects" had been
detained in connection with the bombings. Yet to this day not a single
person has been charged. Does anyone call that good police work? How has
Great Britain managed for decades under the constant threat of IRA bombings?
By rounding up all citizens of Irish descent, registering them, deporting
them? Not. In the short run, chasing terrorists is the work of special
services, who track specific persons, materials and activities. The cop on
the beat should keep his eyes peeled for suspicious packages, I suppose, but
what is the practical anti-terrorist impact of hounding every non-Slav he
sees?


In the long run it requires political solutions. Either Russia is going
to have to find a way to extend the blessings -- and legal guarantees -- of
Russian citizenship to the peoples of the Caucasus or it is going to have to
let them go. Subjecting Caucasians to systematic persecution in the streets
of the capital city is a sure way to undermine the social peace and cohesion
of this multi-ethnic country. Seen in this light, how on earth can anyone
describe the brute actions of Moscow police as "security measures"?
Collective punishment is not only inherently unjust, it is also reckless and
destructive policy.


*******


#7
Date: Fri, 08 Oct 1999 
From: Andrew Yorke <y@fremder.demon.co.uk>
Subject: Edinstvo/Unity... past and present


Today I found an old report from the RFE/RL Newsline for 29th July 1998,
entitled
"'IZVESTIYA' VIEWS PRO-LUZHKOV COALITION AS
THREAT TO COMMUNISTS ",
which mentioned that Kursk Governor Aleksandr Rutskoi was affiliated
with the Edinstvo (Unity) alliance established to secure Luzhkov's
election as president of the RF.


A year later, as we know, Rutskoi is affiliated with the Edinstvo
(Unity) alliance established to secure Putin's election and prevent the
Luzhkov/Primakov alliance from coming to power.


Does anyone know what happened in between?


*******


#8
Poll: Putin cabinet's performance approved by most Russians


MOSCOW. Oct 7 (Interfax) - Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's
Cabinet approval rating rose 3% last week to 51%, with as few as 11%
taking a negative view of the Cabinet's activities and 38% being
undecided. These figures were reported by the Independent Agency for
Regional Political Research (ARPR), which polled 3,000 Russian citizens in
over 220 towns and villages in all of Russia's regions from October 1 to
3. ARPR experts estimate the poll's margin of error at 2.2%. Since the
last poll, taken on August 20-22, the Cabinet's approval rate has climbed
39% and the percentage of undecided has dropped by 37%. Businessmen are
more likely than the average to be approving of the Cabinet's performance.


*******


#9
INTERFAX OPENS ELECTION WEB SITE


MOSCOW. Oct 8 (Interfax) - Interfax news agency is opening a web
site to cover Russian elections. The project is financially supported by
the Open Society Institute while the leading Russian Internet provider
Demos has assumed responsibility for the technical side.
The site on www.rusline.ru will carry up-to-date information about
events organized by candidates in the Duma, presidential and local
elections, reports from news conferences, statements by Russian
politicians, poll results, texts and diagrams.
The election news on the site will contain not just Interfax
reports but also information from the local media and analytical
services.
On each polling day visitors will have a chance to follow in real
time the constantly updated voting results.


******


#10
From: Pavel Baev <Pavel@PRIO.NO>
Subject: Short essay on the second chechen war
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 1999 


Hi David,


I have put together a couple of my recent presentations and media interviews
in the following short essay. Maybe,it could be of interest to your List. 


Pavel Baev (pavel@prio.no)
Senior Researcher, PRIO
Co-Editor, Security Dialogue



Is the Second Chechen War Different?


It feels so much like a recurrent nightmare. Russian bombs falling on
mountain hamlets and Grad missiles devastating entire villages, burning oil
refineries and long columns of refugees. Russia again resorts to a massive
use of force against the defiant Chechnya, however, it is hard to believe
that Moscow is determined to replay the disaster, which Yeltsin himself
called his 'gravest mistake'. What then is different now from the gloomy
days of December 1994?


Moscow insists that it has learnt its military lessons and is now conducting
a different operation with a winning combination of aims and means. Indeed,
the tanks have rolled slowly across the plains of Northern Chechnya and
consolidated the positions along the river Terek, relying more on firepower
and air superiority than on frontal assault. Still, it will not be possible
to avoid completely any direct contact with the enemy, and the experience
from the August battles in Daghestan is not very encouraging. Russian troops
were able to push the enemy back only with strong support of the population
and backing from local militia, and those are not happening in Chechnya. It
appears that Russian generals have indeed learnt some tactical lessons, but
have overlooked one strategic conclusion: to fight successfully in this
unwinnable war, they need a much stronger, better trained and motivated
army. No military reform has happened after the defeat, and teenage soldiers
are again thrown into the dirt and death of the trenches. 


They also face a much stronger and more experienced enemy than their
comrades did five years ago. One might say that Chechnya won the war but has
lost the peace due to internal turmoil and warlordism. But in 1994 it was
more violently divided, had a weaker and less legitimate leadership, and was
more impressed by the Russian power - and still showed the ability to get
its military act together. The uniting idea now is not that much the Islamic
holy war (gazavat) as resistance against the Russians, for whom all Chechens
are bandits and terrorists. While Islamic slogans are widely used by
propaganda on both sides, this war has very little to do with 'civilization'
and is driven entirely by political calculations. Several Chechen warlords,
led by Shamil Basaev, obviously miscalculated a few months back their
ability to keep control over some parts of Daghestan. They were defeated,
and Chechnya now - unlike the situation in 1994-1996 - is firmly blocked
from the East. But a wider regional context of the war is much the same:
long-term instability, manifesting itself in bitter tensions in
Karachaevo-Cherkessia, in unresolved dispute between North Ossetia and
Ingushetia, in 'frozen' Georgian secessions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 


One noticeable difference both in the region and in the wider neighbourhood
involves the oil factor. Autumn 1994 saw the beginning of the Great Caspian
Oil Game, with its expectations of enormous profits in the immediate
tomorrow. Five years after, the 'golden shower' has been postponed for at
least another five years. The sharp drop in the oil prices in 1997-1998
nearly killed the Great Game altogether, and the current price increase has
been achieved only through multilateral agreements on cuts in production. It
is pretty obvious that nobody in the world oil markets needs the Caspian oil
for at least several years. Moscow has concluded that it has plenty of time
to build a new pipeline through Daghestan and does not need the Chechen
'pipe', therefore the Grozny oil refineries has been targeted and destroyed.


Perhaps the most obvious differences are still in Moscow. The
decision-making process is as hidden and confusing now as it was in the
first Yeltsin's presidency, with the 'boss' disappearing from the stage for
long periods, leaving the war-making to his aids and confidants. But the
intrigue now is not about bureaucratic interests or personal fortunes, the
main game in town is elections. The war has created grounds for building in
a matter of days a pro-regime party called 'Unity', which indeed unites the
government bureaucracy with the regional barons. It has also provided for a
consolidation of power of Prime Minister Putin and sharp rise of his
approval ratings. But what are the near prospects in this quasi-democratic
intrigue?


The plan in the Kremlin quite possibly is to keep the momentum until
mid-December, to secure a good performance for the 'Unity' in the
parliamentary elections. They are widely perceived as the 'dress rehearsal'
for the presidential elections in June, but Putin definitely cannot expect
to continue 'winning' the war through the winter. The public opinion, which
is now very much in favour of 'punishing' the Chechens, most probably will
turn against the protracted war - so in early 2000 Putin might try to enter
into new 'peace' negotiations with President Maskhadov, abandoning current
backing for a puppet 'government-in-exile'. One important precondition for
starting such negotiations from a position of 'victory' is to eliminate
physically one of the warlords. For Moscow it is very useful now to have
such enemies as Shamil Basaev or 'Emir' Khattab, who symbolise respectively
Chechen bandits and international terrorists. But their usefulness might
expire soon, as President Dudaev's did in spring 1996, and one pinpoint
air-strike might give Moscow a symbolic victory and also make President
Maskhadov's position more solid. 


That may seem to be a very smart political game, but wars rarely go as
planned. The second Chechen War has already acquired its own dynamics,
pushing politicians and generals in Moscow further than what they consider
to be a safe position. What is particularly worrisome now is the complete
indifference of the Russian public to the humanitarian tragedy of this war.
The implicit denial of human rights problems was evident already in the
Kosovo crisis, which was interpreted in Russia nearly exclusively in the
Realpolitik categories. The whole concept of human right is increasingly
perceived in Russia as foreign, empty and essentially hypocritical, which
probably is an evidence of societal disillusionment in democratic reforms.
It is a scary coincidence that Dmitry Likhachev, the soul and the
consciousness of Russian intelligentsya, died at the start of the second
Chechen War - as Mikhail Gefter did at the beginning of the first one.
Russia wanted to put an end to that war - and now it wants victory; so more
bitter will be the taste of the defeat.


Every crisis inside Russia and next to its borders adds to the collective
trauma and alienates further the elite from the society. And the
bridge-building on the part of the elite appears to go in the direction of
playing on the public paranoia (such as the recent one related to urban
terrorism) and pushing Russia into self-isolation. Moscow has barely started
to sort out the damage it inflicted to its own links with Europe through the
anti-NATO campaign around Kosovo. Now every bomb dropped on Chechnya pushes
Russia further away from Europe. But that is not all the damage. Moscow's
elite - scared and infuriated by the corruption revelations in the West -
settles in a pattern of self-destructive infighting, in which the Chechen
War becomes just another theatre. In this sense, every military strike on
Chechnya marks another turn in the deepening spiral of Russia's crisis, in
which elections are not at all a part of the solution.


Pavel Baev (pavel@prio.no)
Senior Researcher, International peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) 


*******


#11
RUSSIAN SPECIAL SERVICES TO PUT KEY TERRORISTS OUT OF ACTION


MOSCOW. Oct 8 (Interfax) - Russian special services have come up
with and begun implementing a plan for arresting and bringing to justice
key participants in the terrorist attacks in the North Caucasus, Moscow
and Volgodonsk.
State Duma deputy Nadir Khachilayev has been arrested in Dagestan
and transferred to the Moscow prison of Lefortovo as part of this plan,
law-enforcement sources have told Interfax. The Prosecutor General's
Office has charged Khachilayev with fighting against federal troops.
"Other terrorists, notably Shamil Basayev and Khattab, will be
brought to Moscow in the near future," the sources said.
Basayev and Khattab could well be killed if their capture proves
impossible during operations to be carried out by special law
enforcement units including the Federal Security Service's (FSB) Alfa
Group, they said.
Asked why Basayev had not been arrested previously despite a
warrant from the Prosecutor General's Office, the sources said that
"such issues are resolved on the political level." "Political approval
was given for neutralizing and bringing the bandits to trial. It is up
to the special services now," they said.
The sources did not go into detail about the anti-terrorist plans.


******


#12
YELTSIN CONFIRMS EFFORT TOWARD START II RATIFICATION


MOSCOW. Oct 8 (Interfax) - The Russian leadership makes
"considerable effort" for prompt ratification of the START II Treaty and
is prepared to negotiate the START III Treaty if the ABM Treaty is
preserved and complied with, Russian President Boris Yeltsin said in a
message to Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi.
Moreover, documents have almost been prepared to submit the
comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty for parliamentary ratification,
the presidential press service quoted the message as saying.
Russia has urged other countries to join this treaty as early as
possible, the service reported.
Regarding preparation of a bilateral peace treaty, Yeltsin hailed
the implementation of bilateral agreements which ease travelling to
southern Kurils for Japanese citizens as well as plans for joint
economic activity.
Yeltsin expressed satisfaction over the bilateral relations'
dynamics. Yeltsin praised Japan's "active drive" for broader cooperation
in keeping with agreements of the November 1998 meeting.
Tangible results were attained on the path of creative partnership,
the message reads.
"It is also true in trade and economic cooperation. A meeting of
the inter-governmental trade and economic commission demonstrated [these
results] in early September in Tokyo. We promoted mutual understanding
and trust in military contacts and security issues," the service said.
Yeltsin thanked Obuchi for supporting Russian reforms and
condemming the international terrorist aggression against Russia, the
service said.


*******


#13
U.S., IMF AID TO RUSSIA POLITICALLY MOTIVATED - ACADEMIC


MOSCOW. Oct 7 (Interfax) - The International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and the United States have been politically motivated in providing aid
to Russia, and that aid has done much harm to the Russian economy,
Andrei Illarionov, director of the Institute of Economic Analysis, said
at a news conference at the Interfax main office Thursday.
Decisions on paying back IMF loan instalments to Russia were made
by the U.S. administration rather than by the IMF board of directors,
Illarionov said.
The IMF programs for pulling the Russian economy out of its crisis
have failed, Illarionov said. Efforts aimed at keeping the ruble steady
against the dollar and the Russian Cabinet's commitments to increasing
its collection of taxes have done irreparable harm to the Russian
economy, he said.
Statements made by the Cabinet and a range of experts that Russia
cannot pay back more than $10 billion to $12 billion of foreign debt in
2000 have mislead the Russian public, Illarionov said.
The Russian business community will not trust the ruble until
Russia pays its foreign debts in accordance with the original schedule,
Illarionov said, adding that rising world fuel and commodity prices will
help facilitate this.


*******


#14
Caucasus problems almost unsolvable -- Russia
By David Ljunggren

MONT-TREMBLANT, Quebec, Oct 8 (Reuters) - The problems in Russia's explosive 
southern Caucasus region are so complex that Moscow may not be able to solve 
them in the foreseeable future, the country's nationalities minister said on 
Friday. 


Ramazan Abdulatipov also told Reuters in an interview that he feared Islamic 
guerrillas in Chechnya would try to spark ethnic conflicts elsewhere in the 
impoverished region, home to hundreds of different groups and often mutually 
hostile groups. 


Russian forces have seized a third of Chechnya and are pounding positions 
which they say are occupied by guerrillas blamed for a series of bomb attacks 
in Russia. 


Abdulatipov said nothing could be done to start fundamentally improving the 
situation in the Caucasus until after parliamentary elections set for this 
December and a presidential poll set for mid-2000, he said. 


"I do not think we will have the time (before then) to solve this problem and 
to deal with Caucasus region properly. It's also possible we won't end up 
with the right people," he said, referring to the post-election period. 


"Therefore it is very difficult to expect a fundamental change in the 
situation...The state does not have enough economic, spiritual or management 
potential to do this," he said, speaking in Russian. 


Moscow has had problems with the Caucasus since the 19th century, when its 
troops had to battle for decades to crush local Moslem fighters before 
conquering the region. 


During the long rule of Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin several ethnic groups 
in the Caucasus were deported, ensuring many in the region still harbor 
strong anti-Russian feelings. 


"This has been a very long process. A lot of things were done which didn't 
need to be done, under the tsars and the Soviet Union. People should have 
paid attention to the social and economic problems of the region," 
Abdulatipov said. 


"Even in Soviet times, Chechnya was the least developed region in the 
country. About 30 percent of the population were unemployed," he added, 
saying the Caucasus region had deep- rooted social, economic and criminal 
problems. 


The guerrillas from Chechnya last month launched major raids into neighboring 
Dagestan and Abdulatipov said he feared they might now try to stir up trouble 
in the small ethnic republics of Ossetia and Ingushetia to the west. 


"In Ingushetia and Ossetia the situation is exceptionally tense and could 
deteriorate into conflict at any time, a conflict between Ingush and 
Ossetians," Abdulatipov said. 


"I think the Chechen side, I mean terrorists and the like, will try to incite 
inter-ethnic tensions between Ingusetia and Ossetia," he said. Several 
hundred people died in clashes between the two republics in 1992. 


Abdulatipov said he supported the tough line taken by Prime Minister Vladimir 
Putin against the Chechen guerrillas. 


"The first question is the elimination of the terrorists," he declared, 
saying the government was also looking for partners among different forces 
inside Chechnya with which it could start a talks process to restore peace. 


Possible interlocutors included Ruslan Khasbulatov -- a Chechen and former 
speaker of the Russian parliament who was jailed after the legislature 
revolted in 1993 against President Boris Yeltsin -- and commanders of Chechen 
forces who were not involved in attacks on Russia. 


But Abdulatipov said there was no question Moscow would pull out its forces 
entirely, as it did in 1996 at the end of the bloody two-year Chechen war. 


"We've already been convinced that the withdrawal of federal forces does not 
mean the situation returns to normal but instead means a full dictatorship of 
bandits, terrorists and criminal structures in the region," he said. 


********


#15
Russia: Expert Urges International Fight Against Money Laundering
By Andrew F. Tully


Washington, 8 October 1999 (RFE/RL) -- An expert in international organized 
crime says the West has been just as unprepared for Russia's move from 
communism to capitalism as Russia was itself.


Louise Shelley, a professor of criminology at the American University in 
Washington, cites the Bank of New York, where billions of dollars in Russian 
currency is suspected to have been laundered.


Shelley told a briefing Thursday at the Washington office of Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty that this questionable activity was able to persist for 
months without the knowledge of the bank's top executives.


"We're just as unprepared for what is now happening in the global financial 
markets as Russia was unprepared for this transition."


Shelley says the Russian money-laundering scandal is "long overdue," because 
it finally brings attention to money laundering. Until now, she said, law 
enforcement officials around the world focused their attention on drug 
trafficking.


The important thing, she says, is that investigators realize that Russian 
mobsters and corrupt officials cannot launder their money without "Western 
complicity." Shelley says there are plenty of lawyers and accountants who are 
willing to help launder the money, and bankers who ignore suspicious 
transactions at their banks.


And she predicts that such large-scale money laundering will grow unless 
governments learn to trust one another and work together. And this, Shelley 
says, means that organized crime will be one of the major problems of the 
21st century.


The Russian money-laundering scandal broke in August with reports that 
billions of dollars in Russian funds -- perhaps as much as $15 billion -- may 
have been laundered through accounts at the Bank of New York. Some reports 
said IMF assistance to Russia may have been involved, and that senior Russian 
government officials may be involved. No evidence has surfaced to support 
this.


Money laundering is transferring illegally acquired income through a series 
of bank accounts to obscure the source of the funds and make it appear legal.


The corruption scandal has broadened to include Russian President Boris 
Yeltsin. Swiss prosecutors are investigating whether he and his daughters 
received about $1 million from a Swiss construction company that won a 
lucrative contract to renovate Russian government buildings, including the 
Kremlin.


Yeltsin's supporters say the president's political opponents are the source 
of the accusations. But one senior member of the U.S. Congress indicates that 
such denials are suspect. Congressman Benjamin Gilman (R-NY) says he believes 
corruption in the Yeltsin government goes to "the top," as he put it. He made 
the comments Thursday in his opening statement at a hearing of the 
International Relations Committee of the House of Representatives. Gilman is 
chairman of the committee.


In her briefing, Shelley said it is time for governments around to the world 
to recognize how central the issue of money laundering is to international 
development, and how it hurts everyone from corporate executives to ordinary 
citizens. She notes that an economist with the International Monetary Fund 
says money laundering involving drug profits, capital flight and tax evasion 
accounts for between 6 percent and 8 percent of the world economy.


She also says that when banks are caught laundering money, the penalties -- 
usually fines -- are so lenient that they leave the banks with little or no 
loss. Shelley calls this "the cost of business."


Shelley offers one option that she says would be among the most valuable 
tools in keeping banks from being attracted to the business money laundering 
can provide.


"Part of it is to get at banks through shaming them by having corporations 
feel uncomfortable using a tainted bank so that they get hit in the pocket 
not through a $25 or $100,000 fine or even a million-dollar fine, but that 
there are corporations that feel that it's not appropriate to deal with a 
tainted bank." 


******


#16
Moscow Times
October 9, 1999 
NEWS ANALYSIS: 'Stingers' May Mean Carpet Bombing 
By Simon Saradzhyan
Staff Writer


It seems likely that Chechen fighters are telling the truth when they say 
they are armed with U.S. Stinger missiles - shoulder-fired heat-seeking 
rockets that can bring down military aircraft. And if it is true, than 
paradoxically it could lead to even greater civilian casualties, as Russian 
pilots fly higher to say out of range - and bomb with less accuracy. 


Russia has already lost two jets this week, a two-seater Su-24 bomber and an 
Su-25 fighter, and the Russian air force says it is still looking for the 
three pilots. The Chechens have claimed they downed both with Stingers, and a 
wing of the Su-25 has been mounted triumphantly on a pedestal in downtown 
Grozny. The Russian military has grudgingly agreed that at least one of the 
planes was brought down by a shoulder-fired missile. 


Military analysts and Russian espionage agencies say the Chechens are 
probably armed not just with Stingers, but also with Russian-made Iglas and 
Strelas, which are roughly as effective. 


The American-made Stingers could have been provided by arms dealers or 
sympathetic Islamic militants in Afghanistan and the Middle East. The 
Chechens talked publicly during the 1994-1996 war of their ardent desire to 
obtain Stingers, partly the rockets would be militarily useful against 
Russian aviation, but also because of the pleasing associations Stingers have 
with the Soviet-Afghan war of the 1970s and 1980s. 


During that war, the CIA not-so-covertly assisted the Afghan resistance, 
known as the mujahedin, by arming them with hundreds of Stinger missiles. 


When the mujahedin began downing Soviet planes, the Soviet military modified 
them. The cockpit and other key components of the Su-25 fighter, for example, 
are protected by titanium plating, and a steel plate shields its rear fuel 
tank. The additions made the planes far heavier, but also safer: In nine 
years of war, the Su-25 flew more sorties than other Soviet planes, yet only 
23 were lost. 


When the army eventually pulled out of Afghanistan in defeat, the Stingers 
remained behind - apparently they are now either for sale or in the hands of 
radical groups like the Taliban. 


They are also making their way into the hands of Chechens - who, during the 
earlier war, were also dubbed "mujahedin" by the Russians. The Federal 
Security Service, or FSB, announced last year that it had intercepted eight 
Stingers being smuggled from Azerbaijan into Dagestan, apparently to be 
shipped on to neighboring Chechnya. 


One FSB official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said emissaries of 
Chechen warlord Shamil Basayev met again with the Taliban earlier this year 
to try to purchase dozens of Stingers. The FSB official said the negotiations 
ultimately fell through, but not before the Taliban handed over some of the 
Stingers as a gift. 


Getting ahold of Russian Strelas and the more advanced Iglas would be even 
easier, and the FSB official and others agreed such homegrown weaponry was 
probably mostly what the Chechens had. 


"There are as many Soviet-made portable missiles on black markets all over 
the world as there is dirt," said Konstantin Makienko, deputy head of the 
Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies. 


Both Makienko and Thomas Valesek, an expert on European security at the 
U.S.-based Center for Defense Information, agreed that whether the Chechens 
have Stingers or Iglas, they seem to be shooting down planes - a fact that 
will probably drive Russian warplanes into altitudes from which it will be 
much harder to hit small mobile units of Chechen rebels - and much harder to 
avoid civilian casualties. 


*******


#17
Moscow Times
October 9, 1999 
LDPR Calls For State of Emergency 
By Kevin O'Flynn
Staff Writer


Vladimir Zhirinovsky's far right Liberal Democratic Party of Russia has put 
forward a bill in the State Duma for the introduction of a state of emergency 
for a period of six months. 


After the bomb attacks and the resumption of fighting in the North Caucasus, 
a state of emergency is the only way "to bring order," said Vladimir Antonov, 
assistant to Duma deputy Vladimir Lisichkin, who is co-sponsoring the bill in 
the lower house of parliament with party leader Zhirinovsky. The bill was 
introduced in late September. 


The legislation, though, is unlikely to pass. It does not have the support of 
the Duma's powerful Security Committee. The committee said the fighting in 
the North Caucasus was of a local, not national, character and the bill was 
unconstitutional because only the president can introduce a state of 
emergency. 


The committee, led by hard-line Communist Victor Ilyukhin, also said it 
couldn't be ruled out that the recent terrorist acts were organized with the 
hope of provoking a state of emergency and the cancellation of parliamentary 
and presidential elections. 


Analysts say that the LDPR is fully aware that the bill has no chance, but is 
simply being used by the Kremlin to see how the political world reacts to the 
idea. 


"It's a trial balloon," Nikolai Petrov of the Moscow Carnegie Center said 
Thursday, "to understand the reaction, to make any political calculations and 
see how parties will react." 


"[Prime Minister] Vladimir Putin can't openly support the state of emergency, 
but Zhirinovsky can," said Vladimir Pribylovsky of Panorama research center. 


*******


#18
Russia faces criticism over Chechnya campaign
By Peter Graff

MOSCOW, Oct 9 (Reuters) - Russia faced growing criticism of its campaign 
against rebels in Chechnya, with the United States accusing it of violating a 
key arms control accord by deploying too much military hardware. 


Moscow has denied that it is inflicting substantial civilian casualties 
despite detailed reports of villages being hit. 


Russian troops seized the northern parts of the breakaway region this week in 
their first campaign to recapture Chechen territory since withdrawing after a 
humiliating defeat in a 1996-94 war that killed tens of thousands. 


Russian warplanes and artillery have struck what Moscow says are Chechen 
rebel targets for two and a half weeks, saying they are taking action against 
guerrillas who launched raids into other Russian regions in August and 
September. 


They also blame Chechen rebels for a series of bomb attacks on apartment 
blocks Russian cities which killed nearly 300 people. The rebels deny 
responsibility for the blasts. 


The Russian air strikes have sent about 150,000 Chechens fleeing to 
neighbouring regions, raising concern about a possible humanitarian crisis. 


Washington said on Friday Russia's campaign had violated the 1990 
Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty, which limits the deployment of 
tanks, artillery, aircraft and other non-nuclear arms by NATO and Russia in 
sensitive areas. 


``We're talking about many, many hundreds of pieces of equipment over the 
limits in the armour/combat vehicle category,'' State Department spokesman 
James Rubin said. 


Russia has so far defended its right to deploy troops in Chechnya, saying it 
can put its forces anywhere within its territory, but has not addressed the 
issue of the CFE treaty. 


Moscow says 20-30 Russian troops have died in the fighting so far. Reuters 
and other international news organisations have documented incidents of at 
least several dozen civilian deaths in what Chechen villagers have described 
as Russian attacks. 


A Reuters reporter saw shattered homes, fresh graves and wounded victims in 
the village of Elistanzhi on Friday, 35 km (22 miles) southeast of the 
Chechen capital Grozny, after what villagers described as an air raid. 


But Russian armed forces Deputy Chief-of-Staff Valery Manilov late on Friday 
dismissed reports about extensive civilian casualties as a result of Russian 
strikes, saying the troops targeted only the rebels. 


``There are virtually no such (civilian) losses,'' he said. 


Manilov said the military's current aim was to build a security zone in 
northern Chechnya, and troops would not advance further unless it was 
absolutely necessary. 


``There are no plans to move ahead unless we must... We have to complete the 
current stage first,'' he said. 


Russian officials say they intend to bring food and medicine to the parts of 
Chechnya they occupy, reopen schools and hospitals and restore law and order. 


*******

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