February 19, 1998   
This Date's Issues: 2069  •2070

Johnson's Russia List
#2070
19 February 1998
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Jerry Hough: Re: 2069-Goble/Regionalization, Land Reform.
2. Fred Weir in Moscow on spies.
3. Sovetskaya Rossiya: Communist Leader Sees Russia Faced With 
New 'Versailles.'
4. NTV: Zyuganov Hails CPRF Anniversary, Avoidance of Extremism.
5. Itar-Tass: Shokhin Sees Communists Moving Toward Social Democracy.
6. Komsomolskaya Pravda: Interview with Professor Valentin Zorin of the 
United States and Canada Institute, "The Lovely Ms Lewinsky Was Aimed at
Clinton but Has Hit Albert Gore."
7. Interfax: Rybkin Views Role of Russian Political Elite in New Book.
8. Obshchaya Gazeta: Alleged Potanin-Soros Spat May Change 'Alignment 
of Forces.'
9. Gordon Hahn: Re Hahn/D'Agostino.
10. RIA Novosti: YAKOVLEV: RELIABILITY INDEX OF RUSSIAN MISSILE 
COMPLEXES AND CONTROL MEANS IS NOT DIMINISHING.
11. RIA Novosti: INSTITUTE OF ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF TRANSITION PERIOD
INSTITUTES ADAM SMITH AND ALEXANDER II AWARDS.
12. Obshchaya Gazeta: Oleg Vladykin, BAGHDAD HARDLY HAS WEAPONS 
OF RETALIATION. Russian military experts see no chemical or 
bacteriological threat from Iraq.
13. Reuters: How Will the Iraq Crisis Affect U.S.-Russia Ties?
14. Interfax: Gov't Puts 10 Major Co's on '98 Privatization 
List.] 

*******

#1
Date: Thu, 19 Feb 1998 
From: "Jerry F. Hough" <jhough@acpub.duke.edu>
Subject: Re: 2069-Goble/Regionalization, Land Reform

It was good that you ran together in no. 2069 Goble's piece on 
regionalization and the Reuter dispatch on the Council of the 
Federation's refusal to override Yeltsin's veto. It is true that the 
regions sometimes engage in activities that should not occur in a 
well-ordered state, but the Federation Council shows the basic reality 
of the political situation. The regions have no independent tax 
authority, and hence they are dependent on Moscow for funds. Yeltsin 
doesn't care much about policies followed in the regions, but he demands 
that the Federation Council, like the old plenum of the Central 
Committee, support him in Moscow politics. Russia needs the reverse: 
taxation power and some autonomy to the regions and the Federation 
Council, and a central government that is concerned about central 
policies. Without that, democracy is impossible.
These are matters to which Westerners should be giving greater 
thought. The current regime has been reluctant to complete the 
incorporation of Belarus for fear that it would vote the "wrong" way in 
Duma and presidential elections. A new leadership may think that those 
votes would be cast in the "right" direction and it might be much less 
restrained with respect to other parts of the Soviet Union for similar 
reasons. The Soviet Union was less a Russian Empire than a Moscow 
empire. Russia remains that today. Our youth survey last year showed 
that Moscow and St. Peterburg young men serve far less in the military than
those in the countryside and small and medium-sized towns. Wage 
arrears are not a big problem in these two big cities but a big problems in
the rural areas and smaller cities. Wages when they are paid are much 
lower there. The danger of the current inequity and failure to have
agricultural reform (which is not the same as free sale of land) is that the
peoples of the regions will rise up. And if they do, the regional problem
may well expand geographically. The fact that American states can tax and
have some limited autonomy does not mean that the United States is near 
disintegration.

*******

#2
From: fweir.ncade@rex.iasnet.ru
Date: Thu, 19 Feb 1998 10:02:41 (MSK)
Subject: Spies

>From Fred Weir

MOSCOW (CP) Russian traitors feeling in over their
heads have relieved their guilt by confessing over a hotline set
up by the Federal Security Service, successor to the dreaded KGB
secret police of the Soviet era.<
''We have been swamped with calls from citizens who were
deceived by foreign intelligence agencies,'' says Vladimir
Murashkin, official spokesman for the agency known by the acronym
FSB.<
''We've had more than 900 calls, and 46 of these are of
operational interest to the counter-intelligence forces.''<
The telephone hotline was conceived last June by the FSB,
which claims to be battling a post-Soviet epidemic of foreign
spying on Russia's diplomatic, industrial and scientific
secrets.<
According to the scheme, any Russian who has betrayed his
country and repents may phone a Moscow number, agree to
co-operate and give full details, and be rewarded with immunity
from prosecution.<
''This is in their interest because we will inevitably
catch them in any case,'' says Murashkin.<
Russian law prescribes a minimum 20-year term at hard
labor for those convicted of spying.<
To show the advantages of turning oneself in as quickly
as possible, the FSB recently published the story of one unhappy
defence researcher who was allegedly tricked into working for
British intelligence.<
The scientist, named as ''Sasha'', told the daily
Segondnya newspaper that the British MI-6 agency promised him
$100,000 and evacuation from Russia in return for sensitive
military information.<
Sasha said he worked for 4 years and turned over many
secrets, but when the Brits refused to pay he dialled the FSB
hotline.<
The officers who took his call arranged for him to work
as a double agent for a while, then gave him a new identity and
whisked him out of his personal nightmare.<
''They helped me escape disaster,'' Sasha was quoted as
saying. ''It was as if my life had started anew. The feeling of
fear and duplicity has gone now... It is a heavenly feeling.''<
Critics say the hotline is a publicity gimmick to improve
the FSB's dismal image in the eyes of Russians, who still equate
it with the feared KGB.<
''This hotline can never be an effective method to combat
foreign espionage,'' says Andrei Piontkovsky, director of the
independent Centre for Strategic Studies.<
''Basically it's just a self-promotion tool for an
organization that people think should disappear.''<
Despite the name change, and some serious downsizing
since 1991, the FSB remains largely unchanged in its mission to
root out foreign spies and domestic saboteurs and, some say, in
its methods as well.<
''There have been several reforms, but the basic
structure and purpose of the KGB has not been touched,'' says
Konstantin Preobrazhensky, a former KGB lieutenant-colonel turned
critic of the organization.<
''This hotline is a ruse to persuade people that the KGB
is still needed in its old-fashioned form. There are many in the
agency who would dearly like to return to dictatorship.'' <
The KGB used to deploy as many as half a million agents
throughout Soviet society, while today's FSB has declined to
80,000 members.<
But it remains the largest national security police force
in the democratic world. By comparison, the U.S. Federal Bureau
of Investigation employs 26,000 people, and Britain's MI-5 about
2,000. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service has about 2,000
employees.<
''Of course Russia needs to protect its national
security, just like any country,'' says Irina Kobrinskaya, an
independent security expert.<
''But I'm not sure that playing on Soviet-era paranoia
and encouraging people to report on their neighbors which is
what the telephone hotline idea does is the best way to go.''<
Russia's bankrupt government routinely leaves the
nation's secrets in the hands of people who are paid very little
by global standards. A senior Russian diplomat earns about $300
per month, while top-flight scientists and military officers
often make even less.<
''All of this public bombast with hotlines and horror
stories contributes nothing to national security,'' says
Kobrinskaya.<
''Decent pay scales and a little respect for some of this
nation's best minds would ensure their loyalty, and that is the
best shield against foreign penetration.'' 

********

#3
Communist Leader Sees Russia Faced With New 'Versailles' 

Sovetskaya Rossiya
29 January 1998
[translation for personal use only]
Article by Gennadiy Zyuganov, leader of the Communist Party of
the Russian Federation: "Changing Epochs"

[Passage omitted]

The Belovezhskaya Epoch

There is absolutely no doubt that the breakup of the Soviet Union
marked the beginning of a new era in world politics. As one would expect,
this kind of global change in geopolitical epochs was preceded by wars and
revolutionary upheavals. The third world war, the Cold War, which the
Soviet Union lost, gave rise to a whole wave of bourgeois
"counterrevolutions," which radically changed the political and ideological
world map. We are now witnessing the formation of the latest "new world
order" by the "victorious countries," the main contours of which are
already beginning to take shape.
It looks very much as if it is replicating all the fatal shortcomings
of the Versailles system, under which it was proposed to isolate and divide
Russia as a country that was "superfluous" to world politics. Moreover, as
the main architect of this system, the West is also endeavoring to direct
its action against the growing influence of China, the Islamic world, and
other civilizations which are founded on distinctive religious and cultural
values.
It is perfectly obvious that, if the Western model of a unipolar world
with the United States at its head and NATO in the role of world gendarme
is translated into practice (and this scenario has already been approved
with regard to Iraq and Bosnia), Russia will be assigned the unenviable
role of a semicolony. The "developed countries" will pick away a little at
a time, gradually consuming the vast geopolitical heritage of our
fatherland.
However, movement in this direction is encountering increasingly
strong, organized resistance in our country. Standing its ground against
the fairly small cosmopolitan group that has taken the Kremlin by means of
deception is the traditional, historical Russia, which does not want to
lose its centuries-old culture or be reconciled to the national catastrophe
that has befallen us.
In any case, when making predictions, we must take into account a
number of important factors whose influence on the course of events could
prove decisive.
First, for all its present weakness, Russia is still not a formally
defeated country. Very significant moral, psychological, and material
consequences stem from this. Moscow has retained formally unlimited
freedom of action in the international arena, the strategic component of
its armed forces, the infrastructure of its national economy, and, to a
considerable extent, the undissipated potential of the nation.
Second, "World War III" is gathering momentum in our country behind
slogans about defending our historical distinctiveness. It is made no less
bitter by the absence of exchanges of fire, because, without exaggeration,
the future of the country is at stake. A new national elite capable of
heading "Russia's breakthrough" in the 21st century could well form and
harden in the crucible of this war.
Finally, third, the West's lack of ceremony in its pursuit of
exclusive global diktat could lead to a situation expressed by the formula
"the West versus the rest." This would cause the world to revert to a
bipolar geopolitical model on a qualitatively new level. But this time the
outcome of the confrontation could be different.
Obviously, the best scenario (and the one involving the least
conflict) for the development of the situation in the present conditions
would be a multipolar world with several centers of power which would
legislate to underpin the existing balance of forces and accept general
"rules of the game" compulsory for all. A renewed Russia could easily find
a worthy place for itself in this kind of world. Unfortunately, however,
the question of whether we will be able to build such a secure world is
still unanswered at present....

*******

#4
Zyuganov Hails CPRF Anniversary, Avoidance of Extremism 

NTV 
13 February 1998
[translation for personal use only]
>From the "Segodnya" newscast

[Announcer Grigoriy Krichevskiy] Today is the fifth anniversary of the
founding of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation [CPRF], the
refounded party whose candidate nearly won the presidential election in
1996. Our correspondent Yevgeniy Revenko decided to congratulate [CPRF
leader] Gennadiy Zyuganov and his colleagues.
[Revenko] The time has come for all the country's communists to give
an account of themselves, and there is a reason: The CPRF was founded five
years ago, and its constant leader since then, Gennadiy Zyuganov, today
remembered the time when he and some comrades gathered in a guest house
near Moscow and founded the party. Now, his child has grown up and taken
root. There is a CPRF branch in every region of the country now. Summing
up his party's five-year history, Zyuganov also remembered the turning
point when the People's Patriotic Union was set up and the the women's
movement organized, involving the forming of ties with representatives of
left-wing organizations from abroad.
[Begin Gennadiy Zyuganov recording -- identified by caption as CPRF
leader] We have managed to avoid extreme radicalism, toward which some
members of our party and some of our allies were pushing us. [end
recording]
[Revenko] However, not all the radicalism has been eliminated yet. 
Remaining on the side of what Zyuganov called the deceived population, his
party continues the struggle against the ruling regime. The first task
will be to deal with distortions during elections of all levels.
[Begin Zyuganov recording] We must fully disclose this Rostov mafia
that held elections and show once again the entire biased picture for
Russian President Boris Yeltsin's team, which has exceeded all norms and
morals, and in essence has violated half the country during past elections.
[end recording]
[Revenko] There are also concerns over future elections. The CPRF
leader is ready to fight to the last to obstruct his opponents' plans to
change legislation on elections to the State Duma.
[Begin Zyuganov recording] If there is another redistribution of
forces, then the settling of accounts that you see on the streets today
will also take place in the State Duma, and then the country will be torn
this way and that. [end recording]
[Revenko] Even while involved with its everyday concerns, the party's
ruling organs do not forget about theoretical preparation. It seems
Gennadiy Zyuganov's experience should be taken as an example for all
communists. Not stopping in the fight against the dictatorship of, as he
put it, criminals and ignorance, the CPRF leader a few days ago finished
reading the third volume by [ex Chinese communist leader] Deng Xiao Ping. 
The classic scholar of contemporary communism found much that was useful in
the works of his Chinese comrade. [video shows Zyuganov's news conference]

********

#5
Shokhin Sees Communists Moving Toward Social Democracy 

Moscow, February 11 (Itar-Tass) -- The Russian Communist Party has
undergone a very serious and considerable transformation over the five
years since its founding congress, Aleksandr Shokhin, head of the Our Home
Is Russia faction in the Duma, said.
Shokhin said at a press conference on Wednesday that the party "has
given up extremist forms of work".
"The fact that the Communist Party is not associated with Working
Russia, SKP-CPSU or other left-wing radical movements shows that the CPRF
is slowly but surely growing more social-democratic," Shokhin said.
The Communist Party is a complex organisation which involves both
people who are inclined towards European social democracy and people who
advocate radical Bolshevik ideology, he said.
Shokhin believes that "in five years or so the CPRF will transform
into a social democratic party and people will not have to fear its coming
to power."
He did not rule out the possibility that a two-party system may evolve
in Russia if the left-wing opposition begins to move towards the centre.
At the same time, he pointed out that this is unlikely to happen at
the next presidential elections in 2000 and they will go by the 1996
scenario when a left-wing candidate was viewed as a person advocating a
return to the past.

*******

#6
Scandal 'Campaign' Intended To Block Gore 

Komsomolskaya Pravda
12 February 1998
[translation for personal use only]
Interview with Professor Valentin Zorin of the United States and
Canada Institute by Vasiliy Ustyuzhanin; date, place not given:
"The Lovely Ms Lewinsky Was Aimed at Clinton but Has Hit Albert
Gore"

In an interview with Komsomolskaya Pravda, Professor Valentin Zorin,
the famous Americanist from the United States and Canada Institute and
observer at the "Golos Rossii" state television and radio company, says why
he thinks a personal scandal has broken out in the White House.
[Ustyuzhanin] Valentin Sergeyevich, do you have a rational
explanation for the phenomenon that America, which cares so much about its
image as a well-bred, puritanical nation, has suddenly descended to delving
into the president's private affairs in such a distasteful fashion?
[Zorin] For newspapers, television, and radio, a scandal means a good
rating. And a good rating represents money, publicity, fame, and other
joys of life.
Second, I like that country, but an element of sanctimoniousness
nevertheless characterizes Americans. A kind of masochism flatters their
national pride; it is a way of saying: This is what we are like.... There
is a kind of self-admiration, a desire to show the omnipotence of American
democracy, which does not balk at [criticizing] any figure.
[Ustyuzhanin] So what is the secret force behind the scandal that has
broken out?
[Zorin] The forcible, or shall we say involuntary removal of the head
of state from the White House is by no means unheard of in U.S. history. 
There is no need to go back to the last century and recall Lincoln. Many
people have a poor recollection of the name of Warren Harding, the U.S.
president at the beginning of the 1920's. He was involved in a major oil
scandal. A young man who was the picture of health died suddenly, and it
is still unclear why. This happened in 1923. Nor have historians looked
into the pretty strange story of the death of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. 
As a professor of American studies, I would venture to maintain that he
died in unexplained circumstances. And everyone knows the story of the
assassination of John Kennedy....
[Ustyuzhanin] But those are nevertheless not cases of impeachment....
[Zorin] In practice this has never been put into effect in the United
States. The only case in U.S. history of the legal removal of the
president occurred in 1972. But even that case did not get as far as
impeachment. Richard Nixon resigned of his own accord.
[Ustyuzhanin] At that time the scandal was caused by bugs at an
election headquarters, this time it is a secretary [as published]. These
would not seem to be the most terrible reasons for impeachment....
[Zorin] In Nixon's era I was concerned over the same question -- the
disparity between the case and the consequences. I asked an influential
senator for an explanation. In response, he told me an anecdote. "A
sitting of the board of an exclusive club is going on. The chairman of the
board says: 'Gentlemen, we have to carry out the unpleasant procedure of
excluding Mr. Smith from the club.' The respected members of the club are
shocked. What is going on? Mr. Smith is a decent man. How can he be
treated like this? The chairman of the board says: 'Mr. Smith is breaking
the rules of sanitation in our club's swimming pool.' The gentlemen are
still confused. 'Of course that is bad, but after all a lot of people do
it.' The chairman of the board specifies: 'A lot of people do it, but Mr.
Smith does it from a height of 10 meters.'"
It seems to me that this comparison is not only witty but also fairly
accurate from the political viewpoint.
[Ustyuzhanin] So what has Clinton done from a height of 10 meters?
[Zorin] It is perfectly obvious that all that is going on at present
is a huge political campaign. And a very expensive one. These two girls
have no money to launch it. We are talking about tens of millions of
dollars. Obviously influential and rich people are investing big money in
the scandal.
[Ustyuzhanin] What do they stand to gain from it?
[Zorin] There is a favorable economic situation, minimal
unemployment, and no current racial conflict in America. Under the
Constitution, the Democrat Clinton does not have the right to be elected
for a third term. However, the Republican Party does not have a single
significant national figure who could rally the electorate. The Democrats
do have such a figure: incumbent Vice President Albert Gore. This is a
man who has a very major political reputation and is well-known throughout
the nation. There is no doubt that he will be the Democrats' candidate in
2000.
The Republicans have no figure to set against him. They have no
figure, and they have no problems on which to focus their campaign by
contrast. So a problem had to be thought up. A commonplace piece of
scandal was taken -- indeed, one that is by no means proven at the moment
-- and enormous material and political resources were put into it, and the
world-wide scandal which we are witnessing was whipped up.
[Ustyuzhanin] What do you think about the theory that Clinton will
bomb Iraq to deflect attention from the Washington scandal?
[Zorin] It seems to me that this is a very superficial judgment. Such
decisions are based on far more serious factors and are not adopted by one
person. It is hard for me to say what action will be taken regarding Iraq.
But the current Washington scandal will not have any serious effect on
actions regarding Iraq. Personally, I am convinced of this.

********

#7
Rybkin Views Role of Russian Political Elite in New Book 

Moscow, Feb 13 (Interfax)--Accord and stability in Russian society are
unthinkable without these qualities among the political elite, says an
article by security council secretary, chairman of the Socialist Party of
Russia, Ivan Rybkin, in the book The Future of European Social-Democracy.
"If this is achieved, public prosperity and the continuation of reform
for the benefit of every member of society are assured," he writes.
"Various right of center and left of center movements could become the
core of a stable political elite in Russia. Flexible tactics aimed at
involving various representatives of the political center into the orbit of
centrism are needed for this," Rybkin writes.
He presented the book which is a collection of articles written by 32
political figures from 20 countries at a news conference in Moscow Friday.

********

#8
Alleged Potanin-Soros Spat May Change 'Alignment of Forces' 

Obshchaya Gazeta, No. 6
12-18 February 1998
[translation for personal use only]
Report by I.V.: "Potanin Did Not Find a Patriot in Soros. Will
They Remain Partners?"

A source close to the leadership of the Unexim group maintains that a
very acrimonious conversation took place in Davos between Unexim head
Vladimir Potanin and major U.S. financier George Soros. The subject of the
conversation was supposedly the collapse of the Russian corporate
securities market, which happened on 26 January. As the source maintains,
Potanin, who suspected the well-known destroyer of national financial
systems, Soros, of planning to speculate on Russian securities, warned him
not to try to "move the market" -- otherwise "this will have very
unpleasant consequences for him." In response, Soros noted that Unexim is
itself actively playing the stock market, and not without profit either. 
Vladimir Potanin agreed with the comment, but declared that the emergency
situation in Russia's economy forces him to take into account general state
interests. "I am still a patriot," Mr. Potanin said. Soros, however, did
not find his arguments convincing and irritably suggested that his
interlocutor go see the environs of Davos.
The bickering of the two "moneybags," if, of course, one is to believe
the source, sounds very unusual. When Boris Berezovskiy attacks George
Soros, the reason for their squabbles is absolutely obvious: They are
business rivals. But Potanin and Soros are two people who are in the same
boat. As is known, the $980 million attracted by Mr. Soros helped Potanin
win the Svyazinvest auction. Both businessmen were notable for their active
support of the team of young reformers in the Russian Government. And if
something has come between them now, this could significantly change the
alignment of forces among Russia's leaders, since Anatoliy Chubays and
Boris Nemtsov will lose an influential overseas ally.
Official sources at Unexim are not confirming the report about the
"Davos spat." Larisa Zelkova, head of Uneximbank's information
administration, told Obshchaya Gazeta's columnist that Mr. Potanin and Mr.
Soros were indeed in close contact in Davos and that they discussed the
situation on the stock market. "But I do not know anything about a
quarrel. It is not likely that it happened, after all, this was the first
time Potanin and Soros had met face to face," Zelkova said. Although it is
doubtful that information services are well informed about the nature of
their bosses' discussions.

********

#9
Date: Wed, 18 Feb 1998 
From: Gordon Hahn <hahn@hoover.stanford.edu>
Subject: Hahn/D'Agostino

Responding to Anthony D'Agostino's comments on my remarks
regarding the Gorbachev period from JRL/2051:
(I) My statement about "Gorbachev's road to what I perceive as
his preparedness to negotiate" a pacted transition to democracy has nothing
to do with the "Gorbachev intentionalism" D'Agostino questions. I was
referring to the late spring and summer of 1991 when under the political
circumstances than extant, Gorbachev had come to the realization that the
only way to get around a return to the pre-perestroika order or a revolution
was to negotiate a transition to a new regime, if necessary, and the
salvation of some rump of the Union, if possible. My view has nothing to do
with some early realization or 1985 plan on Gorbachev's part to dismantle
communist rule and unite Germany. I view Gorbachev as a practical politician
who in an environment of competing demands tried to fashion compromises he
could stomach given his worldview. As far as the socio-economic system, I
believe he was prepared for dismantling of much of the Soviet system through
partial privatization, price reform perhaps liberalization in some sectors
when politically feasible and the like by 1989, but political circumstances
led him to postpone this.
Though many of his compromises paved the way for the dismantling
of the ancien regime and weakening of the state, most of this was an
unintended consequence of reforms intended to liberalize, not dismantle. His
role as a negative or passive gatekeeper in refusing to crackdown in a way
sufficient enough to put the genie back in the bottle allowed the limited
revolution from below and Yeltsin's Russian creeping (until August 1991)
revolution from above to further the process of dismantlement, revolution
and collapse, but this was not his preference. 
(II) One can not argue that Gorbachev's tenure was threatened
from 1985-91 by reference to threats to his general secretaryship, for
example, at the April 1991 CC Plenum, as he held state executive power
through the Soviet presidency. Focusing on the general secretaryship -
though not unimportant - is old sovietology that fails to take into account
the changes in the political system from 1989 forward. I wrote extensively
about the plenum both in my doctroal dissertation and in my forthcoming
article and book. One aspect of that plenum that has ben overlooked is
Gorbachev's characterization of the political struggle in a way that
assumes, for the first time, the validity of what political scientists
studing comparative transition and democratization call the "uncertainty" of
rule: briefly, the free and fair elections that permit a turnover of power
to other groups and the contingent nature of their right to continue to rule
on the outcome of the next election, and so on.
Gorbachev warned the party that it would lose power at the July
1991 plenum as well, if it did not reform. Indeed he had put it in a corner.
On the background of (1) the Novo Ogarevo negotiations which would have
likely established 'uncertainty' for the elections to the new all-union
parliament, removing the CPSU's 750 set aside seats, for example: (2) the
'uncertainty' already established in the USSR constitution for universal,
secret ballot election of the Soviet president scheduled for 1995; (3) the
dismantling of the party's nomenklatura powers even to formally confirm many
state posts' appointments and elections pushed through the Secretariat in
August 1991 (after almost a year's delay); (4) Yeltsin's 23 July 1991 ukaz;
(5) and the 20 August 1991 deadline established by the Russian Justice
Ministry for party secretaries simultaneously chairing soviets to choose
between their party and soviet seats; (6) and Gorbachev's statization of the
party's political organs in the armed forces and power ministries (except
for party organizations) the end of the CPSU's 'certainty' in power was
imminent. It was all over, and Gorbachev was facing up to it. Like he told
the Politburo about beginning perestroika in September 1990; he ostensibly
would have preferred the 'good old times', but continuing in the old way was
impossible. That was his view, and he took practical steps in response.
(III) Regarding glasnost' and de-Stalinization. I said (or meant
to say) that glasnost' began with uskorenie. As my remarks about glasnost
gradually reaching back through Soviet history in 1986-7 until Gorbachev
kicked off the real destalinization campaign with his November 1987 speech
show, I viewed the process as a gradual move toward destalinization,
countenanced by Gorbachev through most of 1987 and then endorsed by him.
D'Agostino is correct in a way that the November speech was a comporomise,
as Gorbachev had to constantly 'compromise' with the apparat as he moved
things forward and changed his own mind, tactics and strategy as a result of
'learning', political realities and pressures. However, I can not find the
quid quo pro. Gorbachev was simply feeling his way and understood the
dangers of him taking the most 'radical' view on stalinism. Ligachev spent
most of 1987 following around the stalinists making speeches condemning the
blackening of Soviet history. Something Gorbachev never did, even in 1991.
Gorbachev's support for Yeltsin's removal after his badly-timed demarche at
the October 87 plenum when Gorbachev was trying to push through his
anti-Stlin speech, was balanced in January 1988 by his attack on the powers
of the Secretart and Ligachev. At a 7 January Secretariat meeting Gorbachev
ended its right to set the Politburo meetings' agendas and reduced it to
fortnightly, rather than weekly meetings. This was the first attack by
Gorbachev on the party apparat's powers and was part of supporting the
destalinization campaign. The reorganization of the party apparat and new
soviet electoral system were being planned then. It was not necessary for
Gorbachev to attack Stalin on TV or radio weekly for him to engage the
campaign. He simply endorsed such a campaign in his November 1987 speech and
then protected those members of the intelligentsia who wanted to expose
Stalin's crimes, and many views more radical than his were permitted to be
published and aired. D'Agostino's reference to a 1985 Gorbachev speech is
thus irrelevant. Everyone knows what Gorbachev was saying then, and everyone
knows that his views and/or strategy gradually progressed. He would have
been crazy to talk about destalnization in 1985. It would have ben his and
reform's death knell for several more decades. 
Mr. D'Agostino misunderstands me, if he thinks I'm taking a
telelogical approach. I'm talking about Gorbachev's 'learning', changes in
his tactics and strategy 'forced' on him by historical and political forces
domestic and external.

*******

#10
YAKOVLEV: RELIABILITY INDEX OF RUSSIAN MISSILE COMPLEXES
AND CONTROL MEANS IS NOT DIMINISHING

MOSCOW, FEBRUARY 19, RIA NOVOSTI'S ALEXEY MESHKOV - Today,
62 percent of missile complexes and 71 percent of control
devices are exploited beyond their warranty-covered period, but
the reliability index is not diminishing down from the level of
10 or 15 years ago. This statement was made today at a
press-conference in the RIA Novosti by Vladimir Yakovlev, the
commander-in-chief of the strategic missile troops.
Dealing with the military space group, the
commander-in-chief noted that 68 percent of the vehicles and 80
percent of servicing devices are exploited beyond the
guarantee-covered period.
According to Yakovlev, the situation is not hopeless. Of
major importance is the decision to integrate the military space
forces and the anti-missile defence group of the strategic
missile troops. Optimisation of structures and spending within
this arm will yield a substantial economic effect and enhance
the military capacity and manageability of the troops.

*******

#11
INSTITUTE OF ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF TRANSITION PERIOD
INSTITUTES ADAM SMITH AND ALEXANDER II AWARDS

MOSCOW, FEBRUARY 19. Report by RIA Novosti's correspondent
Alexandra Utkina/ -- The board of directors of the Institute of
Economic Problems of the Transition Period headed by Yegor
Gaidar has instituted annual awards named after Adam Smith and
Alexander II. The latter award will be given for the
contribution to the accomplishment of economic reforms in
Russian provinces, while the Adam Smith award is intended for
the contribution to solution of general economic problems and
creation of a liberal economic policy in Russia, Alexei Alexeev,
the Institute's learned secretary told Novosti. The awards will
be given to Russian statesmen and public figures as well as
journalists. The founders of the awards believe that the
upholding of the principles of economic freedom, liberal
economic policy and accomplishment of economic reforms are the
major precondition of the prosperity of Russia and its people. 
Today, Yegor Gaidar is to hand in the awards for 1997. The
journalist Mikhail Leontyev will receive the Adam Smith award
with a diploma, the Institute's certificate a monetary premium
in the amount of 5,000 denominated roubles. Mikhail Dmitriyev,
deputy labour minister of the Russian Federation, will also be
given the Adam Smith award with a commemorative medal a diploma.
The Alexander II award, a diploma and a premium of 5,000 roubles
will be awarded to the actress Yulia Latynina and Novgorod's
governor Mikhail Prusak. -0- (sam.lnv) 
*******

#12
>From RIA Novosti
Obshchaya Gazeta, No. 7
February 1998
BAGHDAD HARDLY HAS WEAPONS OF RETALIATION
Russian military experts see no chemical or bacteriological
threat from Iraq
By Oleg VLADYKIN

The more obvious the US intention to deliver a strike at
Iraq, the more poignant becomes the question of the existence
of chemical and bacteriological weapons in that Middle Eastern
country. The world has been divided by contradictory views on
the existence, or absence, of toxic agents in Iraq and threat
emanating from it. 
Russia is involved in these disputes, too. The US
Washington Post and Time, the British Times and several other
publications virtually accused Russia of handing over dangerous
technologies to Saddam Hussein and preventing the destruction
of mass destruction weapons in Iraq. Russian politicians,
diplomats, scientists and industrial managers refuted that
information. Regrettably, those in this country who are
supposed to have the fullest information about the origin and
stockpiles of weapons, which encouraged the USA to plan the
Desert Thunder operation and provoked accusations of Russia,
keep mum. 
This newspaper's correspondent met with experts of the
Defence Ministry, who preferred to remain anonymous but
expressed their views about Iraq's chemical and bacteriological
arsenals.
They began by pointing to the fact that equipment which
can be used for mass production of toxic agents and
bacteriological weapons were provided to Baghdad at the turn of
the 1990s by Germany, France, the USA, Switzerland and Austria.
Saddam Hussein used that equipment and personnel trained by
Western specialists to launch a programme for the creation of
mass destruction weapons. Eventually, it had to admit the
existence of that programme. However, Iraq hardly has mass
destruction weapons and their production means now, after the
Desert Storm operation carried out by multinational forces and
the subsequent many-year-long work by the UN special
commission. 
The Russian military experts admit that Iraq has possibly
hidden small amounts of toxic agents in some difficult of
access regions. But they are too insignificant to present a
large-scale threat.
As for bacteriological weapons, they cannot be stored for
a long time. In fact, they should be produced shortly before
intended use. Moreover, pathogenic substances can be easily
produced in the kitchen, in an ordinary pan. One can cook a
thick broth and add a drop of killer viruses. In a few days the
pan will turn into a bacteriological bomb.
And if you have the simplest bacteriological reactor
growing yeast and protection means such as a gas mask and an
anti-plague suit, they can be described as the technology for
mass production of pathogenic substances. In fact, The
Washington Post used this reasoning when it accused Russia,
whose representatives had negotiated the delivery of
protein-producing equipment to Baghdad, say the documents found
by the UN special commission. Given the will, any country which
has such equipment can be described as the flagrant violator of
the 1972 convention banning bacteriological weapons. And if we
remember the "pan bombs," accusations will be endless. 
The ballyhoo around the alleged Iraqi stocks of chemical 
and bacteriological weapons was raised for the sole purpose of
presenting it as a monster threatening the international
community, say specialists who have enough information and a
clear notion of what Saddam Hussein can have in his arsenals.
When asked to comment on the reports about the potential
poisoning of the Transcaucasus and Central Asia in case of the
destruction of reservoirs with mass destruction weapons in
Iraq, the military experts shrugged: "Only amateurs could have
said this."
They have elaborated a mathematical model of possible
variants of the development of the chemical-bacteriological
situation and concluded that the small amounts of such weapons,
which Iraq might have, do not present a serious threat to
neighbouring countries. It would take a unique combination of
exceptional circumstances for this potential toxic cloud or
disease to be raised to a considerable altitude and moved at a
high speed to a large distance. 
On the one hand, this makes the US planned strikes at Iraq
harmless to its neighbours. But on the other hand, this puts in
question the expediency of such strikes. Or rather, we see the
true essence of the US plans, which contradicts that proclaimed
by American officials. 
"Of course, we should destroy chemical and bacteriological
weapons wherever we find them," said a leading expert on such
weapons. "But the UN special commission has fulfilled its task
in Iraq. Whether the commission members want it or not, but
they are being turned into an instrument of US pressure on
Iraq. The Americans are trying to resolve their own economic
and political problems by establishing control over that
oil-rich region. I can also understand the policy of
pressurising Russia, which had had friendly relations with Iraq
and still has a chance to maintain a considerable presence on
the Middle Eastern market."

******* 

#13
How Will the Iraq Crisis Affect U.S.-Russia Ties? 
Reuters
18 February 1998

WASHINGTON -- One of the critical unknown elements of the Iraq crisis is
its long-term effect on U.S.-Russia relations, which are under new assault
because of differences over dealing with President Saddam Hussein. 
Washington long ago realized the nearly lock-step -- and fleeting --
partnership with Moscow that seemed so promising after the fall of the
Soviet Union in the early '90s was unrealistic and could not be sustained. 
But the crisis with Iraq this year has brought into stark relief just
how far the two powers are from convergence on a fundamental issue of
international security. 
As U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan prepared to visit Baghdad in what
may be a last-ditch diplomatic mission to prevent a U.S.-led attack on
Iraq, two of the most important U.N. Security Council permanent members
offered radically different advice. 
Make a deal that will avert military action, urged the Russians, a
leader in promoting a solution that accommodates Iraqi complaints about the
U.N. weapons monitoring system. 
Work toward a diplomatic solution, but only if it gives no ground on
long-standing demands that U.N. inspectors have full and unfettered access
to Iraq's nuclear, chemical and biological weapons facilities, countered
the Americans. 
Critics say Russia is so keen to prevent military action it would
acquiesce in almost any diplomatic formula, even if it destroys
international credibility while emboldening Saddam and other strongmen who
threaten their region or the world. 
Like China and France, Russia is concerned military strikes on Iraq
could raise tensions in the Middle East and elsewhere. 
But there are other factors. Moscow has long had ties to Iraq and hopes
to exploit them with lucrative commercial ventures once sweeping U.N.
sanctions imposed after the 1990 invasion of Kuwait are lifted, experts say. 
Russia is anxious to have Iraq resume regular oil flows so it can recoup
the $8 billion debt owed to Moscow for Baghdad's purchase of Russian
military equipment before the Gulf War. 
Moscow is also motivated by a desire to limit the supremacy Washington
has enjoyed since its Soviet superpower rival collapsed in 1991 and to
reclaim its place as a major world player, according to U.S. officials and
experts. 
The United States, unwilling to inflame the situation, puts the most
benign view on the dispute. While the relationship is complex, Washington
and Moscow have cooperated on many issues, like Bosnia, State Department
spokesman James Rubin said. 
He insisted differences over Iraq are merely "tactical (and are) not
going to, in our view, overwhelm what is a very constructive relationship
across the board." 
Privately, however, some U.S. officials are more willing to acknowledge
a growing concern about Russia's approach. 
Moscow's rhetoric last week resonated loudly here as President Boris
Yeltsin warned of a possible new world war if Washington bombs Baghdad and
his defense minister said an attack could cause unpredictable damage to
U.S.-Russia ties. 
"Clearly the (Russian) remarks that have been made ... raise a lot of
concerns and make us ask some questions about where the Russians are headed
and are they going to stick with us on this," one State Department official
said. 
U.S. officials and analysts say the avidly pro-Iraqi position espoused
by Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov, an Arabist and long-time
friend of Saddam, is in part designed to appease Russian nationalists and
hardliners. 
But some fear Moscow's anger with the United States over Iraq could
spill over into other areas, further hindering, for example, the
long-delayed ratification of the START 2 nuclear arms reduction treaty by
the Russian parliament. 
The Soviet Union also resisted military action against Iraq in the
run-up to the Gulf War. But Ariel Cohen of the Heritage Foundation said now
there is a "feverish pitch of anti-American hysteria (in Moscow)
unprecedented since the end of the Cold War." 
"Russia is wasting the goodwill capital its politicians managed to
accumulate in the West since the days of (Soviet leader Mikhail) Gorbachev
and this may eventually be translated into a loss of foreign investment and
assistance from the IMF and World Bank," he said in an interview. 
Jack Mendelsohn of the non-profit Arms Control Association said the U.S.
determination to expand NATO has fostered an image of Russia as enemy
outsider and undercut Washington's ability to win Moscow's cooperation on
Iraq and other issues. 
Primakov, accused by then-Secretary of State James Baker of "meddling"
to no good end in the 1991 Iraq crisis, last November engineered a deal
with Baghdad on weapons inspections that almost immediately collapsed. 
This time, he is maintaining more distance but few here doubt he is the
main architect of Russian policy on Iraq. 
"It will be a massive diplomatic defeat for the Russians if we find it
necessary to use military force," one senior U.S. official said. What he
failed to say is that it would also be a defeat for Washington if military
strikes do not solve the problem of Saddam and U.S.-Russian ties
deteriorate too. (Reuters) 

******

#14
Gov't Puts 10 Major Co's on '98 Privatization List 
Interfax
18 February 1998

MOSCOW -- The Russian government approved a register of major companies
slated for privatization in 1998. 
The list was signed by Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin on Wednesday,
according to government spokesman Igor Shabdurasulov. 
The register includes the Svyazinvest telecom holding company; the
LUKoil, Rosneft, TNK and Norsi-Oil oil companies; the VNK and Slavnet oil
and gas companies; the Novosibirsk Electrode Plant; the Elektrosvyaz
communications company and the Sibur petrochemical company. 
The government earlier submitted a register of companies due for
privatization in 1998 to the State Duma. However, the Duma has not yet
approved that list. 
A lengthy preparatory period is required for privatization tenders,
allowing for the accumulation of funds by potential investors, the
spokesman said. The government sees privatization as a source of budget
revenue, he said. 
For this reason, the government approved a separate register of major
companies slated for privatization this year, Shabdurasulov said.

********