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#14 - JRL 2008 - Special Edition - JRL Home Russia Profile April 19, 2008 Russia Profile Weekly Experts Panel: Does Putin Need to Lead United Russia? Introduced by Vladimir Frolov Contributors: Stephen Blank, Ethan Burger, Andrei Seregin, Sergei Shishkarev This week, less than one month before president Putin steps down from office, the United Russia Party held its off-calendar congress. Its declared agenda was to discuss the strategy for Russia’s development until 2020, and what the party should do to implement it according to Putin’s Plan. But the strategy is still being heatedly debated within the government, and there is little indication that United Russia or any other political party in this country has anything to do with this process. Rather, the hottest issue debated in connection with the congress has been whether Putin would finally accept the party’s invitation and join the ranks as United Russia’s official leader. Many argued that this would be a very logical and a rather necessary thing for Putin to do. Since he is expected to become Russia’s prime minister on May 8, leading the dominant political party in the country with solid majorities in the Duma and in regional legislatures would cement Putin’s hold on power, and would provide additional political and administrative resources for implementing his reform agenda. The move would also provide Putin with an important hedge against Dmitry Medvedev’s hypothetical decision to part ways and remove him from his position as prime minister with a stroke of the presidential pen (as provided for in the Russian constitution). But whether Putin joins United Russia is also important for the party itself. Putin’s leadership would cement the party’s monopoly on power and would for some time allow it to cruise to easy political victories. Medvedev, however, although invited to the congress, has not joined United Russia. Some analysts speculated that Medvedev does not want to see United Russia’s continued dominance, and that he would like to see a more pluralistic party system in Russia, where several strong parties freely compete for power. But Putin and his inner circle seem to be more interested in a Mexican or a Japanese system with one dominant party incorporating different political factions. Indeed, at the congress at least three political clubs turned factions a liberal, a social-conservative, and a statist - have been set up to reflect United Russia’s pluralism and interest in internal debate. Duma speaker and current United Russia leader Boris Gryzlov has recently suggested that parliamentary and presidential elections in Russia should be separated by at least two years, raising the specter of an early presidential vote in 2010, which would require Medvedev to voluntarily cede power two years before his term in office expires. For this scenario to materialize, Putin’s leadership of United Russia is essential. Is Putin likely to use United Russia to perpetuate his hold on power, either as prime minister or through an early presidential election? Are Putin and his entourage really interested in restoring a one-party state in Russia, where real political power will be centered within an unelected party bureaucracy? Where does all of this leave Medvedev? How much of a check would a dominant United Russia, with Putin at the helm, have on him when important state decisions need to be made? Would it make sense for Medvedev to try to work with a liberal political party that would provide the much needed support for his agenda? Is there such a party in Russia that Medvedev might call his own? Or can he really create one as Putin did with Yedinstvo in 1999? Are we going to see a partisan battle on policy between Putin and Medvedev in the future? Sergei Shishkarev, Chairman, Committee on Transport, Russian State Duma (United Russia) It was a welcome and logical move for Vladimir Putin to join United Russia. After all it is his party, he helped set it up. After last year’s Duma campaign, in which Putin agreed to lead United Russia’ slate of candidates, the President’s political preferences have become obvious, and it made no sense for him not to lead the party as he led its Duma list of candidates. Of course, we would have preferred if Vladimir Putin became a United Russia Party member, but the new position of the Party’s Chairman allows him to exercise his leadership independently. This decision will be a big step forward for the evolution of the Russian political system. We will have an essentially political government led by the leader of the largest political party that controls a constitutional majority in the Duma. Not only does this bring greater political accountability of the government before the United Russia faction in the Duma, it also strengthens the role of the Duma in policy making, and makes it a really serious player in shaping government policy. This would have the indirect effect of people showing more interest in the way the Duma operates, and attaching more importance to the process of electing Duma members. Another important consequence of Putin’s decision will be the creation of a powerful balance to the omnipotent office of the President. Many fear the dual centers of power in Russia, suggesting that this will necessarily be destabilizing. I think the opposite will be the case. The creation of two powerful political centers, each with distinct political responsibilities, will be beneficial to the Russian political system, as now it is too centralized. It would also solve the problem that Putin described during his last conversation with the members of the Valdai Club a system where everything depends on one man. Ethan S. Burger, Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University Law Center, & Scholar-in-Residence, School of International Service, American University, Washington, D.C. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s assumption of the position as United Russia’s chairman has strong elements of what has been described as cognitive dissidence. At least he did not take on the title of United Russia's "General Secretary." United Russia seemingly stands for little other than to preserve the present system and the power of those who benefit from it. The degree to which United Russia aims to pursue policy issues appears to be of lower priority than maintaining its own power. To facilitate this, Putin will continue to exercise authority in the country as prime minister (power is addictive) and Medvedev’s role will be that of his subordinate (for the foreseeable future), even though the Russian Constitution clearly makes the president superior to the prime minister. At first glance, from a practical and political standpoint, such an arrangement reflects an inherent logic: Putin has achieved a lot in restoring Russia’s standing in the world pecking order, the economy is performing better than under the late President Boris Yeltsin, and his popularity among the electorate appears high, although there is debate about the reasons behind this. The Japanese and Mexican analogies are valid, but the ruling parties in both countries held onto power through widespread patronage and corruption -- often to the detriment of the people's needs. The Russian economy indeed may not be as healthy as it appears. It remains heavily dependent on the export of natural resources, increasingly controlled directly or indirectly by the state. Its oil sector requires significant investment to reverse its declining production, and put in light of the absence of the rule of law to protect private property rights, it is not clear who will provide such investment. It is unrealistic that Western firms will be willing to fill the gap. Russian legal entities and its billionaires, as the source of their wealth remains murky, seem to be more interested in acquiring assets abroad than in Russia. The Russian political leadership has continued to use its power to reduce (or even eliminate) the independent media, opposition media, or non-governmental organizations advocating policies that run counter with those of the authorities. It has also consistently acted to reduce the power of the regions, both in the Federal Assembly and with respect to the division of power between central and regional authorities. Medvedev seems to appreciate the need to take steps to establish a real rule of law. Sergey Staphashin is troubled by the mysterious appearance of a large number of Russian billionaires. Have their recent remarks been empty rhetoric or evidence of their powerlessness? At present, there is little indication that political and economic change is forthcoming. If indeed Russia has discarded the political system created by the Russian Constitution in 1993, would it not be appropriate to amend it so that it reflects the new realities? The rules governing a country should be clear, so that the scope of permissible political activity is formalized, and the risk of arbitrary rule by the elites is reduced. Otherwise, it appears that people seek political power primarily to protect their economic gains and to obtain political immunity from the laws, and are not responsive to the needs of the Russian people, which may represent a recipe for disaster over time. United Russia leader Boris Gryzlov’s suggestion that two years separate the presidential and parliamentary elections may lead to a greater policy debate. But if such debate is to prove meaningful, the current legislative system, in which the Duma is entirely elected on the basis of being “first through the gate,” as opposed to a system where there are political districts essential in a country as large as Russia, and where there are huge differences in the range of issues the population is concerned about, needs to be changed. Perhaps a compromise, hybrid system could be accepted as the second best option. The late U.S. Speaker of the House Tip O’Neil (Democrat-Massachusetts) has been widely quoted for his observation that “all politics is local.” In contemporary Russia, it seems to be the reverse. Andrei Seregin, Director of Research, Imageland PR Agency, Moscow The nomination sounds more like a bail-out deal for United Russia party. Unlike the top party officials, Putin himself won't benefit much from being the party secretary for several obvious reasons. Leading United Russia in a brand-new position of a party secretary (unlike former CPSU, United Russia party has a very complicated and artificial leadership system not even all party members can easily say what many party governing bodies do. Ironically, the charter of the party provides that non-member can be appointed party secretary) is not likely to add to Putin's popularity. The president has already been associated with the party for a long time - with little (if any) consequences for his popularity. Being United Russia’s official leader may not be sufficient enough to exercise full power. It's highly arguable that a leadership position within the party will give Putin additional political and administrative leverage. Putin's party rule can be effective enough unless there is a major conflict of interests between Putin and Medvedev. Still, there is more than a hypothetical possibility of Medvedev playing his own game. Putin himself created the situation that most power is still vested in the Kremlin, and the one behind its walls has more advantages over any contenders. Medvedev is rapidly gaining popularity, Putin, although still dominant, is loosing it. A leadership position within United Russia is a poor shield. Though formally a guarantee of a strong parliamentary majority, and thus an effective instrument in rewriting the Constitution in favor of the prime minister, United Russia has too much of a vested interest inside to be considered rock-solid. United Russia’s parliamentary majority may well end up following the Ukrainian model, and may soon become useless, with the party itself breaking into factions as the president-elect and the new prime minister start to exercise their powers and to build coalitions within federal and regional authorities. Moreover, the mechanics of positioning United Russia within the country (its relations to the Kremlin, the government, the regional authorities, etc.) were designed with a strong central leadership premise in mind the notorious “power vertical.” Now that there is clear public misunderstanding of the president's and prime minister’s role in Russian politics, the party might not find it easy to adjust to the two decision-making centers, let alone to any kind of competition between them. Thus, becoming Russia’s prime minister may also weaken Putin's popular support. The nightmare scenario for the party and for the prime minister will be sharing responsibility for presiding over anticipated economic turmoil, unpopular reforms and social policies (sharply rising prices, cutting further social benefits and pensions etc.), failed national projects on affordable housing and in agriculture, corruption, a surge in bureaucracy, and the poor state of the healthcare and the education systems. Professor Stephen Blank, the U.S. Army War College, Carlyle Barracks, PA Obviously, we cannot know what will happen once Medvedev takes power in his own name. But it is clear that Putin is determined to maintain an independent and possibly unassailable power position in the new Russia. It may well be the case that he intends to return in 2010, but it is unlikely that he established Medvedev as president to see him fail or that Medvedev, who after all, is quite well versed in Kremlin intrigues, will be content with the role of a mere shadow president for Putin. United Russia might turn into a real political party or factionalize, either option is conceivable, but so is a Mexican option, where it becomes irredeemably corrupt like the PRI as is now the case. Despite claims to the contrary, there is nothing democratic about any of this. This is simply another way for the party of power to hold onto its ill-gotten gains, and rule with unaccountability and a sham democracy masking real autocracy. As many commentators have suggested, Russia has never had dual power centers before that functioned well together, and what is going on in the Kremlin are not auguries of a harmonious resolution of the inevitable clashes that will ensue. While none of us can predict what is going to happen, chances are that stability will prove elusive. That, after all, is in the Russian history of the last century. Therefore, it is unknowable if Medvedev can create his own party. But if he does, it will likely lead to a ferocious conflict with United Russia and with Putin, whose outcome cannot be foretold. Yet such a conflict would not necessarily open the way to liberalism, let alone democracy.
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