#31 - JRL 2008-69 - JRL Home
Moscow News
http://www.mnweekly.ru/
April 3, 2008
U.S. Presidential Candidate John McCain: The End of
US-Russian Diplomatic Niceties
By Dmitry Gornostayev, Political Analyst
What the president keeps to himself, the nominee reveals. Needless to say, if
John McCain is elected president, he will not say what he said to the Los
Angeles World Affairs Council.
It would not be appropriate for the U.S. president to repeat that the G8
should "expel Russia," or speak about the need of "addressing the dangers posed
by a revanchist Russia."
George W. Bush also criticized Russia before the 2000 elections, and even in
the first months of his presidency. True, when he realized that he would have to
meet the Russian president, he had to alleviate the
embarrassment. Bush looked into Vladimir's eyes and was "able to get a sense
of his soul," which he told the world, and, of course, his own voters, whom he
had been vehemently trying to persuade to the contrary several months before.
Senator McCain will also have to come up with a nice story about his sudden
recovery of insight, if he gets elected. But this is not so important. It does
not even matter whether McCain or a Democratic nominee is elected. His critical
remarks about Russia have tactical and strategic dimensions.
It is not an accident that his tough criticism coincided with Bush's
statement about going to Russia to discuss bilateral relations with outgoing
President Vladimir Putin.
Both McCain and Bush are neo-Conservatives, who are still in control of U.S.
foreign policy. Despite different manners of expression, their philosophy of
relations with Russia is pretty much the same - the main goal is to weaken
Russia or at least to deter it (but Russians should not suffer from megalomania
- American policymakers are much more afraid of China).
Apparently, both statements constitute one tactically logical step - to seal
at the top level the inevitability of the deployment of an ABM third positioning
area in Europe.
Bush said he thinks that many people in Europe would give a sigh of relief if
they reach agreement on missile defense, and expressed the hope that it would be
reached. It is clear on what terms Bush is going to reach agreement. This sounds
rather nice when compared to McCain's: "Rather than tolerate Russia's nuclear
blackmail or cyber attacks, Western nations should make it clear that the
solidarity of NATO, from the Baltic to the Black Sea, is indivisible and that
the organization's doors remain open to all democracies committed to the defense
of freedom."
The gist of this trick is simple. The Kremlin is given a choice - either come
to terms with Bush now, or you will have to deal with McCain later on. Bush
bluntly said that he is going to discuss a certain "strategic agreement" with
Putin in Sochi. The American strategists are pushing their Russian colleagues to
strike an agreement with Bush so that they could avoid a situation where McCain
may refuse to talk about anything.
Incidentally, in the same speech McCain not only promised to rebuff Moscow
but to become friends with Beijing. It is hard to believe in the sincerity of
this friendship. His speech is aimed at making Russia feel threatened. This is a
good-cop-bad-cop situation.
Americans once played this game when they discussed ABM with Russia in the
late 1990s-early 2000s. The outgoing Clinton administration suggested amendments
to the ABM Treaty, and wanted to deploy interceptor missiles in Alaska, and the
Republicans, who were about to occupy the White House, wanted to cancel this
treaty. As a result, the ABM Treaty ceased to exist.
Now the Americans are criticizing the Russians for not making concessions -
if they had agreed to amendments on Alaska, the problem of ABM deploy-ment in
Poland and the Czech Republic would not have existed.
Today the Russians are being asked to think again. Maybe, it is better to
accept this deployment than see a radar in Kyrgyzstan and interceptors in
Georgia in eight years?
This is the gist of Bush's words interpreted with McCain's magic chanting.
Despite its strategic dimensions, this is still a tactical aspect.
McCain's straightforwardness is strategic indeed. This is the quintessence of
Washington's views on relations with Russia. Experts do not conceal this fact.
It is enough to listen to Richard Holbrooke, who advises Hillary Clinton, or
Zbigniew Brzezinski, who is trying to conceal his involvement with Barack
Obama's team. They are Democrats but they think the same as Republican McCain
about Russia (a marginal issue for American voters), although they argue
bitterly on other issues, like healthcare, abortion, troop withdrawal from Iraq
or the right to carry handguns.
Even public statements differ only in the extent of criticism of the Kremlin.
No nominee has said, "We should not be afraid of Russia. It is our partner,
almost an ally." Only presidents talk like that at joint news conferences with
their Russian counterparts. But as a result, these words may be a detail of the
protocol. Missile interceptors will be brought to Poland in any event - but
under the Democrats, this will be done more slowly, with more sophisticated
arguments, and less resolve.
But what is the difference between the Democrat Bill Clinton, who started the
bombing of Yugoslavia in violation of the UN Charter, and George Bush, who did
the same in Iraq? Who is better for us - Madeleine Albright, who said missile
interceptors in Alaska were targeted at North Korea rather than Russia, or
Condoleezza Rice, who supports the same idea but in respect of Poland and Iran?
McCain's victory in the presidential election would escalate tensions between
Moscow and Washington. But for all its disadvantages, there would be no
illusions left. Everything would be clear-cut, and we won't hear charmingly
ambiguous diplomatic niceties.
The question of continuity in U.S. foreign policy towards Russia is resolved
much simpler than in Russia towards the U.S.. Words may differ, but actions are
taken in one and the same direction. Which is the lesser evil - a Republican or
Democratic option? Both are equally bad.
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