#18 - JRL 2008-17 - JRL Home
From: "Josh Wilson" <jwilson@sras.org>
Subject: The Medvedev Economy
Date: Thu, 24 Jan 2008
The Medvedev Economy
By Josh Wilson
Assistant Director
The School of Russian and Asian Studies
www.sras.org
The Russian economy is due for a major shift. Much of the rapid growth from
the past eight years has come from something called "unused capacity." When
Russia's economy experienced negative growth for most of the 1990s, many metals
and hydrocarbon companies cut production, leaving production facilities idle.
During the stable growth seen in this century's first years, those facilities
have come back on line, boosting GDP and exports. Given that Russia has suffered
from under-investment and production is set to again stagnate, Russia's economic
growth, long powered by resources exports, will slow.
Most likely.
However, Russia still has a great deal of what can be considered "unused
capacity" in other industries which have been quiet parts of its economy for
more than a decade: timber and agriculture. Furthermore, just as much of
Russia's economic growth reflected the personal economic theories of current
president Vladimir Putin, who wrote his thesis on how Russia could harness its
mineral wealth to gain economic prosperity and a renewed stance in world
politics, his chosen successor, Dmitry Medvedev (who also has a 64-point lead in
the presidential polls), has personal experience in timber and has specifically
stated that Russia can become a great agricultural power, turning high food and
energy prices "from challenges into our advantages."
Medvedev spent six years as the general counsel for Russia's largest pulp
company, Ilim pulp. Russia controls about twenty percent of the world's total
forested area and has about three times the amount of harvestable forest as the
current forest-product leader, Canada. Seventy five percent of Russia's
harvestable forest is mature or over-mature - in other words, it consists of
commercially viable breeds that are ready for market. Yet Russia is utilizing
only about twenty-five percent of this potential. The timber industry in Russia
is also currently inefficient. An estimated twenty-five percent of the annual
Russian timber harvest is lost to the black market. Most Russian exports are of
raw timber, rather than the more valuable paper, pulp, and manufactured goods.
Due to underinvestment and poor management, productivity in Russia's timber
industry is only an eighth of that neighboring Finland.
Despite all this, Russian timber exports grew nearly 170% from 2001-2006.
There are also programs in place which will help rectify the state of the
industry. Russia will boost export tariffs on timber to 80% in 2009. Rather than
lose a valuable source of product, the efficient Scandinavians are investing in
Russian operations. Industry giant UPM-Kymmene, which leads the world in
producing magazine paper, recently inked a deal with Alexei Mordashev, the
Russian metals magnate, to invest 1.4 billion USD into timber and timber
processing with production due to start in 2009. The Russian government has
pledged to finance the infrastructure needed for transporting the pulp, boards,
and other products. Given the potential of Russia's forests, the demand for
Russian wood, the coming high export tariffs, and Russia's willingness to
support such ventures, it is very likely that more deals like this one are set
to continue. Rumors are that Scandinavian companies, some of the largest timber
and wood processing companies in the world, will be closing their North American
facilities and opening shop in Russia. That Mr. Medvedev has personal experience
and contacts in this industry are likely to make such investments even more
stable.
Mr. Medvedev has also expressed interest in Russia's agricultural sector.
Speaking at an agricultural conference in Kaliningrad, he expressed confidence
that Russia can become a major agricultural power. Was this simply a populist
election campaign speech or is there more to it?
Agriculture is perhaps the economic sector to have made the least recovery
from the economic turmoil of the 1990s. However, in 2006, Russia was second only
to China in potato production, producing about double the weight produced in the
US. Most surprising about this is that 90% of those potatoes were grown on
"peasant plots," which are less than five acres and where most work is done by
hand.
The majority of Russia's crops and livestock are raised in this manner,
particularly vegetables. The numbers for all types of farm machinery in Russia,
from fertilizer equipment to tractors and grain harvesters have fallen by
sixty-five to nearly ninety percent since 1992, according to the Russian
Ministry of Agriculture. Due in large part to this, sixty-three percent of the
agricultural land in use in 1993 is dormant today. As much as 80 percent of
Russia's potential agricultural land is unused.
This situation is aggravated by the fact that much of this land is owned by
the Ministry of Defense and more is owned by land speculators and ill-managed
firms who are either unwilling or too strapped with debt to buy the machinery
required to operate efficiently - or operate at all.
Although no specific plans have been made for this area, besides a statement
from Medvedev that Ministry of Defense land will be dispersed faster, this would
be precisely an area where Russia's growing state corporations would step in.
Victor Zubkov, Russia's current prime minister, has stated that state
corporations will continue to invest "where private business refuses to invest
and does so for various reasons." He named specifically nanotechnology and
aerospace as immediate targets. However, agriculture is obviously an area that
businesses have also neglected - and perhaps for good reason. Agriculture is
high-risk and it often takes several years to see a return on that investment.
A major state corporation, which could usurp a great deal of the Defense
Ministry land all at once and have the backing of the government's considerable
funds to invest in seed and equipment could quickly find itself with a cash flow
large enough to buy poorly managed farms and invest in processing facilities,
perhaps in partnership with large western firms, who have generally been
receptive to such government-backed investment projects.
Investing in agriculture and timber would also have considerable economic
advantage outside of simply boosting Russia's GDP and export potential. While
Russia's economy has grown considerably over the last eight years, this growth
has disproportionately served Moscow, St. Petersburg, and a few other regional
capitals. Agriculture and timber would push money into rural areas - where it is
needed most. It would also create labor-intensive industries to compete with
construction in Moscow, which for now is the target of nearly every immigrant to
Russia and nearly all migration within Russia. This is creating a massive strain
on Moscow's infrastructure, particularly its roads and public transportation.
This investment would also create increase the presence of legitimate
entities throughout Russia, meaning that illegal lumber operations would be
easier to spot.
Of course, these efforts, in order to be effective, would require Russia to
act logically and efficiently, which is not something that its government (or
any government for that matter) is particularly known for. It would also require
Russia to increase its number of migrant workers and assure that a majority of
the jobs created by investments to these relatively labor-intensive industries
would offer enough pay and prestige that local Russians would work them.
Currently, Russia's government is tightening its visa regimes and restricting
the areas in which immigrant workers can be employed. However, these
restrictions mainly concern the retail sectors. Timber and agriculture could
absorb those workers being displaced by the new legislation.
While an economic slowdown in 2008 is probably unavoidable, Russia could also
see another boom in growth in 2009-2010, as potential investments to agriculture
and timber bring the potential of those industries online. Given that Russia's
current political system will most likely continue for the next four to eight
years and will continue to favor state-led growth, and given that Russia's next
president has specific interest and contacts in these two underperforming
sectors, those investments and that boom are likely just over the horizon.
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