Regarding JRL 2008-160, I am grateful for exhaustive accounts of the early hours of the conflict between Georgia and Russia, as elaborated in lead articles by Patrick Worms, Thomas Goltz, and Nikolaus von Twickel.

Essentially, the argument that these contributors separately outline is that Russia's invasion of South Ossetia and Abkhazia was pre-planned and pre-positioned. It may have been deliberately instigated by South Ossetians who fired on Georgian troops on August 6. Hence, the short war was nothing less than a deliberate territorial appropriation by Russia.

My questions for these writers, or for any others who share this view are:

1. Were not minor skirmishes between South Ossetians and Georgian troops occurring in a commonplace manner over many years without leading to broader fighting?

2. In response to an alleged minor skirmish between some South Ossetians and some Georgian troops, why was it necessary for Georgian troops to bombard Tskhinvali civilians for approximately 12 hours on August 7?

3. In response to an alleged minor skirmish between between some South Ossetians and some Georgian troops, why was it necessary for Georgian troops to launch a full-scale invasion of South Ossetia on August 7?

4. Since Georgian troops did bombard Tshkinvali civilians for approximately 12 hours on August 7, and since Georgian troops did launch a full-scale invasion of South Ossetia, wasn't the subsequent Russian invasion morally and legally justifiable? Was it any less justifiable because of the prior position of Russian troops on Russian soil?

5. Leaving morality and legality aside, would most great powers approach these circumstances in a manner substantially different from Russia? (What was America doing in Mexico in 1911, or in Guatemala in 1954, or in Grenada in 1983, or Panama a few years later? What was Britain doing in the Falklands?)

6. Throughout the 1990s when Russians often sought partnership, friendship, guidance, and support from the West, why were nearly all Western leaders incapable or recognizing that Russia inevitably would return to great power status and that it would be far better to have a revived Russia as our ally than as our adversary?

7. Isn't the most interesting thing about this debate the hard, cold fact that we can't do anything about it anyway, and that the reason that we can't do anything about it is that we have spent the past 18 years foolishly squandering our influence in the region? And isn't that exactly what we are doing with a vengeance right now?