First, permit me to express my sadness at seeing the way Mr. Felgenhauer, whose work I have used and respected, refers to a colleague with whom he disagrees. I had expected more from him.

I have been following the Soviet and the Russian military for more than 40 years. I make no claim of having the kind of expertise and certainty that Mr. Felgenhauer apparently believes he possesses.

I have obtained my information from a number of sources both East and West. Permit me to outline my position as of 28 August.

First, I disagree with Mr. Felgenhauer that these forces would have had to come from Moscow and it would have taken several months to get them there. As one colleague noted, "it was a good thing that the war happened in Georgia, because anywhere else and the Army would have been unable to respond." Please keep in mind that two elite units (the Airborne unit at Pskov and the Naval Infantry units at Sevastopol were involved as were units from the 58th division. Many members of that unit had combat experience in Chechnya.

Second, the 58th division had just finished Kavkaz 2008 and all of the personnel, equipment and weapons used in that exercise (which was identical to that used in Georgia) were still on alert. Second, the ships in Sevastopol were preloaded (and I do know something about that as a retired Navy officer). That is a very time consuming undertaking and must be done in a very specific manner or one will end up the kind of fiasco that was the Bay of Pigs. (Ships were loaded wrong, and the wrong things came off first, the more important at the bottom). We also know that the Russian planes were flown by test pilots and instructors.

Third, I don't know where Mr. Felgenhauer got the impression that I thought the Russian troops were caught off guard. The question I raised, to which I still do not have an answer is "what exactly happened between the action by the Georgians and the appearance of the Russians." There are some reports that armor from the 58th was sitting in tunnel, just waiting for the word to attack. We also know that the rail line to Abkhazia had just be repaired making it possible to move Russian equipment by rail.

Fourth, most reports suggest that there was a 12 hour delay between the order to march and the time the 58th finally showed up. Knowing a lot about the current state of the Russian military, this does not surprise me even if it was on alert. Breakdown in Russian equipment, poor march discipline, and a hundred other problems (including the roads) delayed the Russians.

Fifth, it is clear that the Russian action did not go over well with the High Command. I am told that the two star in charge was fired, and the Russian military press has been full of articles blasting the military for the inept way it was conducted and for the lack of modern weapons systems.

Sixth, I have no doubt that this conflict was begun by Saakashvili in his effort to reassert authority over South Ossetia. American officials repeatedly warned him not to take such a step, but he went ahead believing that the West would back him up. He should have known that if there is one law of US-Russian relations for the past 60 years it is that we will go out of our way to avoid a direct US-Russian confrontation. The same is true of NATO. That is why the USCG cutter was moved from Poti where there were Russian troops.

Seventh, Just as I think it is clear that Saakashvili started this conflict, I have no doubt that the Russians were waiting for an excuse to move forces into Georgia and Abkhazia. Putin in particular was sick and tired of what he saw as Western refusal to honor Russian national interests.

George Bush assured Gorbachev that there would be no more expansion if the GDR became part of Germany and that country was permitted to join NATO. Then came Madeleine Albright who broke Bush's word by adding Poland, Hungary and her favorite, The Czech Republic to NATO. That was followed by the Baltics, Balkans, and then Georgia and Ukraine were up for membership. This was Putin and Medvedev's red line. That and the bitterness they felt vis-a-vis Kosovo when they were forced to sit and watch while their objections were ignored. Now, they had a chance to turn the tables. Send a message to other former Soviet Republics not to get too close to the West - plus, you made us eat ---- when it came to Kosovo, now it is your turn.

Finally, there is still a lot that we do not know. I will have no problem in modifying my comments above if shown material that makes more sense, but for the present I feel comfortable with the above comments. I also have no intention of insulting Mr. Felgenhauer because he may disagree with me. That is what freedom of the press is all about.