#20 - JRL 2008-160 - JRL Home
Date: Wed, 27 Aug 2008
From: Andrei Liakhov <gaffriloff@yahoo.co.uk>
Subject: International Law and SO/Abkhazian
independence.
Much is said and written about whether Russian recognition of the
independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetija is a breach of public international
law. Amidst various references to a plethora of international documents (ranging
from the UN Charter to the 1975 Helsinki Act) of various degree of legal force,
both the players and the commentators seem to ignore how the modern public
international law treats secession of States.
Legally the situation is not so one sided as the US, EU and NATO are trying
to potray it. Leaving aside historic, political and emotional spin put on the
Abkhazian and South Ossetian secession from the international law point of view
is definitely neither unique nor percedent setting. Nor does it differ from the
Kosovo scenario.
States generally have shown themselves "allergic" to the concept of secession
at all times to the extent that until very recently even the word secession was
not used in public international law documents (1978 Vienna Convention On
Succession of States is a good example) and preferred to use expressions like
"separation of a part of a State". This is because cession is charaterised by
the lack of consent of the predecessor State, in this case, Georgia. The lack of
consent of the predecessor state in theory and in practice of international law
is the key element that characterises a strict notion of secession. At the same
time, this factor explains why secession is so controversial in international
law. On the one hand, the absence of agreement is a source of dispute between
the new and the parent State. On the other hand, for want of consent of the
latter, the newly formed entity has to find a legal justification for its
creation elsewhere. Conversely, the parent State will presumably attest that
this justification does not exist in international law and that, on the
contrary, the international legal order protects itself against attempts to
dismatle it, such as those processes constituting secession.
The above provides a short summary of a typical secession situationand the
legal implications of secession in international law. Abkazian, Kosovo, South
Ossetija and Pridnestrovie situations are not particularly different. Again
since the early 1920s there is a clear attempt by the existing States not to
allow cesession to be goverened by international law. (See for example the early
courses of the Hague Academy of International Law, or Lauterpacht's "Recognition
in International Law"). However, the prevailing view re-affirmed in 1991 by the
arbitration commission of the Peace Conference for Yugoslavia (the "Badinter
Commission" insisted unanimously (with both Western and Soviet members voting
for that) that "the existence or disappearance of the State is a question of
fact". As the result of this view very little legal theory on the creation of
States emerged and legal scholarship was concerned with recognition instead.
It follows from here that the only real dispute (on the the significance of
which I will dwell later) is whether Abkhazian and South Ossetian independence
is a classic secession or it was created, like Namibia, Erithrea, East Timor,
Micronesia and Palau on the basis of international law with the latter having
played a role of "midwife", providing legal justification for the creation of
new States. The other cases of new States which emerged after the end of the
Cold War, which represented the larger number of new States, did not benefit
from international legal backing. Apparently these States (firstly and
foremostly the 15 ex Soviet republics) came into being as a matter of fact, a
situation which international law neither sanctions nor prevents.
The traditional view was that secessionist movements, when not under foreign
control (something which both South Ossetian and Abkhazian regimes certainly
were not), were a purely domesttic affair. Thus modern international law neither
encourages nor prohibits secession. It follows from here that if secessionists
were successfull in imposition of the existence of a new State, then the
international legal system was to record the emergence of a new State. The key
in legal consequences of a formation of a new state is the status of the
territory in question. Where a state is created under the international law
(like Eritrea or, as some would argue, Kosovo) its territory had some
international status prior to being proclaimed as a sovereign State. In a
classic secessionist situation, the creation of a new state is made to the
detriment of an existing independent State. Situations of agreed dissolution
(the USSR or the UAR), unification or devolution (Macedonia) do not create major
problems with regard to the very fact of the coming into being of the new
States. What presents a problem is where the secessionist movement does not
reach an agreement with the predecessor State, like South Ossetija and Abkhazia.
Although this technically (following the theory that the creation of a state is
a matter of fact) does not preclude the secessionist movement from exercising
its sovereign rights over the territory it considers to be a new sovereign
state, the lack of such agreement could create a number of problems and/or new
conflicts ranging from the right of the population to choose between old and new
citizenships, to deliniation of borders, property disputes protection of common
heritage, etc.
As with Kosovo, both territories held referendums which produced overwhelming
support for independence. As with Kosovo, local secessionist movements had
effective control over the respective territories sinceat least the end of the
1992 war. Unlike Kosovo, UN involvement in running these territories was minimal
and less than 4,000 Russian peacekeepers (1,600 in South Ossetija and some 2,000
in Abhazija) could hardly be classified as an outside controlling force. Thus
the secessionist movements have had much fuller control over the territories
than the KLA had over Kosovo during approximately the same period.
On the basis of the above it could be argued that the the precious little
international law developed primarily to deal with the secessionist movements in
the Balkans in the eartly 90s does not preclude Abkhazia and South Ossetia from
becoming independent states.
Yours,
AL (an expert of the Badinter Commission 1990-1994).
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