I found myself agreeing with Dale Herspring's comments to Felgenhauer's thesis about "Russian provocation". We cannot know yet who provoked who.

However, I do think that in a sense, all sides were ready for the war.

Saakashvili may - we don't really know - have been trapped by the Russians, or perhaps by the South Ossetians going it alone - but he was also trapped by his own words about reintegrating South Ossetia and Abkhazia. I think many of us have underestimated the dangers of ever-escalating rhetoric and ever more serious clashes each summer since 2004. It is dangerous to speak about peace with a soaring military budget in the background, especially when you have powerful neighbours with interests in your region. On this background, of course the Russians were prepared. And of course Saakashvili was easy to provoke, if that is what happened.

While the details are still unknown, I suspect this was a classic case of August 1914 - all parties being bound by their obligations and blinded by their own nationalism (Georgia) and the yearning to once again rule the Caucasus (Russia). Everybody simply played a dangerous game, and war in the end broke out, perhaps even to the surprise of quite a few of the actors.

But what happened afterwards with the Russians going deep into Georgia, destroying infrastructure and military bases, need not have been planned to the same extent as the invasion. Perhaps it was just too good an opportunity to let go, seen from the Kremlin?

So pre-planned from April - well, in a sense, perhaps, but in another sense, the last two years of long escalation between Georgia and Russia at least should have prepared everyone for war, and I think that is far more important.

Ingerid M Opdahl
Research Fellow
The Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies
www.ifs.mil.no