#36 - JRL 2008-158 - JRL Home
Date: Mon, 25 Aug 2008
From: Stephen Shenfield <sshenfield@verizon.net>
Subject: How the war began
Extensive war preparations like those Felgengauer describes do not prove that
a definite decision has been taken in favor of war, only that the leadership
wants to have the option of war available. The US has made extensive
preparations for war with Iran ("preparing the battlefield"), but as yet there
is no definite decision to go to war.
To be more precise, extensive preparations usually make available a range of
more or less far-reaching military options. The option finally chosen can then
be made dependent on circumstances as they evolve. Thus, for the Russian
operation in Georgia a minimum option might have been confined to introducing
forces into Abkhazia and South Ossetia to back up recognition of their
"independence." A maximum option might have entailed occupying Tbilisi and
enforcing regime change -- though not, I suspect, advancing south of Tbilisi
because this would have threatened core Western interests (i.e., the oil and gas
pipelines). What happened in the event was an option between these two.
I think that the two key aspects of the evolving situation that may have
influenced the choice of option were:
(1) the Georgian reaction to the creeping annexation of South Ossetia in its
various aspects (making more Ossets Russian citizens, expulsion of inhabitants
of Georgian villages in SO, etc.)
(2) the reaction of the West.
Given a Western reaction restricted to rhetoric, I think that if there had
been no significant Georgian reaction the operation would have been limited to
the minimum option, as defined above. This would not have attracted so much
world attention and would almost certainly have sufficed to block Georgia's
accession to NATO, which is after all the main Russian goal. The political costs
of going further under those circumstances would have exceeded the military
benefits.
However, the Georgian attack on Tskhinval sharply changed this calculus in
Russia's favor. It meant that even if a more ambitious option was selected world
opinion would be confused and divided. Instead of Russia finding itself isolated
internationally for clear-cut aggression, many people throughout the world (most
importantly in Europe) sympathized with the Osset victims and adopted a position
equidistant between the sides.
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