[Russia-Georgia conflict, start of hostilities]
Dale Herspring, a University Distinguished Professor at Kansas State University and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, is a retired US diplomat and Navy captain.

Let me begin by stating the obvious. The jury is still out on who started this conflict. Having said that, I think the following are worthy of attention.

What do we know?

1. Based on conversations with the American trainers, it is clear that the Georgians were not ready for such a conflict. They were being trained, not for a conflict in South Ossetia, but for Iraq. They arrived at work on August 7, only to find that their troops (who they were supposed to train for three weeks), were sitting on their rucksacks singing folk songs. Obviously, something was up from the Georgian side.

2. It is not clear who provoked who. There are a number of sources claiming that the South Ossetians clearly provoked the Georgians, just as there are sources claiming the opposite. The bottom line is that this was a brutal, ethnic free-for-all and if one side didn't prokoke it the other side might have.

3. Based on what I have seen thus far, it appears relatively clear to me that Saakashvilli decided to retake control over South Ossetia, and in response to firing from the South Ossetian side (whether real or created) decided to "normalize" the situation.

4. This brings us to the Russian question -- was the Russian Army just waiting for an opportunity to attack the Georgians and liberate South Ossetia and Abkhazia as Felgenhauer asserts?

-- Again the material is unclear.

a. on the pro side.

-- the Russian Army had just finished Kavkaz 2008 in which it rehearhsed exactly this scenario. It is hard to convince any one with a military background that it was "just getting prepared for a future conflict as one person put it to me." The same troops, the same equipment, the same weapons? Six months later, perhaps, but a week later? Very supicious.

-- The Russian logistics network was already to go. Ships in Sevastapol were loaded (and that is something that cannot be done over night), and the same was reportedly true of the ground logistics capability. The same was true of the Railroad Troops fixing the rails in Abkhazia. Again, the argument can be made that it was just a case of being "prudent," but it is clearly very suspicious.

-- The Russian units involved were probably the only in the Russian Army at this point that could have been used effectively. The Naval Infantry at Sevastapol, the Airborne regiment at Pskov, and the 58th has experience in Chechnya.

-- It took the Russian military 12 hours to respond, although that might be fast given the sorry state the Russian military remains in at present.

b. on the con side.

-- If the Russian military had known this invasion was coming, it would have been saddled up waiting for the go sign. In fact, it wasn't at least insofar as the troops were concerned.

-- 12 hour response time suggests that the troops were relaxed. They may have expected a need to deploy forces, but could have been caught by surprise when it happened. The Georgians may have preempted.

-- based on comments from senior Russian military officials and commentators, the Russian military screwed up the operation, even to the point of getting planes shot down and its general wounded. Clearly, an intelligence failure, which I am told cost the commanding general his stars.

-- was the delay and were the screw-ups due to the incompetence of Russian troops or does it mean they really did not know the Georgian action was forthcoming? It is impossible for me to say.

4. The rest of Felgenhauer's commentary is possible, but who knows? I think we are going to have to wait until we get more data. I would advise against jumping to conclusions at this point. Although someone else may have conclusive data, I don't have it, nor does Felgenhauer -- even though I submit that his claims must be taken seriously, which has not happened in Moscow where they are dismissed with no counter evidence.