#29 - JRL 2008-154 - JRL Home
Russia Profile
August 20, 2008
A Black and White World
In the West, Russia Is Still Perceived as the Usual Suspect Prone to Aggression
Comment by Georgy Bovt
Nowadays, while watching Russian and Western television channels
simultaneously, even a viewer experienced in information wars can still get a
more or less objective picture of the events taking place in South Ossetia and
in Georgia. But if the viewer is inexperienced (as is the overwhelming majority
of people in all countries on earth), then he will either get lightheaded or
think that two completely different wars are being discussed.
I had the opportunity to observe how the Russian-Georgian war is interpreted
and presented by the Western, first and foremost European, media. I got the
impression that never since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the
Soviet Union has the Western interpretation of events been so diametrically
opposed to how this is all perceived in Russia and not just on federal
television but in public opinion as well. And if today in Russia – and these
sentiments are now even stronger then during the second Chechen war – the
dominant viewpoint is that in relation to Georgia, on the whole, Russia is in
the right and acting accordingly, despite some minor “war flaws,” then in the
West, Russia’s actions appear to be a brazen and unprovoked aggression against
an independent, pro-Western state headed by a democratically-elected president.
Never in the last 20 to 25 years has Russian and Western public opinion
diverged so far, and never, as a whole, has the incandescence of political and
diplomatic passions between Russia and the West been so strong. It appears that
the enormous civilization gap, the incompatibility that optimistically disposed
politicians tried to downplay and diminish over the recent years, has just now
manifested itself. Alas, today the West perceives Russian actions -- exactly as
in the Cold War years -- purely in a negative context, with no inclination to
see any justification or motivation for these actions other than “aggressive
imperialistic intentions.” Nobody wants to examine the details that complicate
the customary view of the world. And the customary world view is that Russians
are nothing more than “barbarians and aggressors,” and one should not expect
anything else from them.
The Western media have nearly “ignored” the attack on South Ossetia by the
Georgian armed forces on August 7 and 8. They “did not notice” hundreds of
civilian casualties that resulted from the massive shelling of Tskhinvali by the
Georgian “Grad” installations. All major events in this distant part of Georgia,
which an average Western person could not locate a map, began in the second half
of August 8, when regular Russian forces entered Georgian territory. At that
moment, the “Russian aggression” began.
After that, the world returned to its “customary” viewpoint.
It is precisely this view that accounts for Mikheil Saakashvili’s having the
greater share of time on Western television channels, which he uses more than
effectively from a propagandistic standpoint. He speaks of Russian tanks that
"stand at Tbilisi’s doorstep" and will enter any minute now. And this is almost
always modestly left alone without clarifying commentary. With apparent sincere
flare he suggests that in reality it was Russian aircraft and artillery that
bombed Tskhinvali, causing mass casualties. And this is also left alone without
commentary – let’s repeat that the ordinary Western person did not understand,
was not given the chance to understand, that the Russian-Georgian war actually
began with the intrusion of Georgian armed forces into the territory of the
unrecognized republic of South Ossetia.
Of course, in terms of international law, the Georgian president seemingly
had authority to “restore the territorial integrity” of his country and to
combat separatists by military means if necessary. But is this right of an
unconditional and unlimited nature? Does it justify numerous preceding civilian
casualties?
If this right bears precisely an unconditional nature, then the same
opportunities must be given by the world community to the "legitimate
government" of Sudan - in the fight against separatists in Darfur, and to the
authorities in Beijing in the fight against supporters of Tibetan independence.
Slobodan Milosevic should be posthumously pardoned, since he also struggled
against "separatists" in the form of leaders of other republics comprising
Yugoslavia.
Today, in fact, due to double standards in propaganda and information warfare
efforts, the whole system of international law, in the shape it took after the
Second World War, is disintegrating. If some can do anything they want just
because they are “friends of the West and America,” then why can’t others do
anything at all? If in some cases, the principles of “inviolability of borders”
and “territorial integrity” of independent, sovereign, recognized nations are
sacrificed for political expediency (as in the case with Kosovo), then why can’t
the same “exception to the rules” be made with respect to other states and other
separatist entities? Who should be the supreme and unquestioned judge in a
situation where universal international standards either do not work or are
discredited?
And finally, a purely "personal" question: how, exactly, in the opinion of
today's most ardent critics of Russia’s actions, should Moscow have behaved in
that specific situation which occurred around South Ossetia, the majority of
whose residents have Russian citizenship, on August 8, 2008? And who would have
the courage to act differently in this situation?
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