The Russo-Georgian War

Moscow draws a line in the sand as the new cold war flares up in earnest

· The armed conflict between Russia and Georgia was triggered by Tbilisi’s attempt to swiftly subdue the separatist regions.

· Western media and governments predictably reacted by condemning Russia, while playing down Georgian culpability.

· Recent events have placed Russia’s relations with the West on a fundamentally new footing and have far reaching and long-standing ramifications.

· Apart from the need to protect the Russian citizens in the separatist regions of Georgia, Moscow has also drawn a red line in its opposition to NATO’s expansion into its backyard.

· Since Washington will not relent in its drive to enlist Georgia and Ukraine into NATO, more crises of this nature are on the cards.

· The notion that deeper all-round integration between Russia and the West will prevent this dire scenario is unrealistic. Indeed, the Russo-Georgian war, an unprecedented event in the post-Soviet period, has taken place despite deepening integration.

The first armed conflict in the new cold war

The military confrontation between Russia and Georgia is a landmark event with far-reaching and lasting repercussions. While conflict is rooted in the region’s complex ethnic make-up, aggravated by the fighting following the Soviet break-up, the Russo-Georgian war is also a thoroughly modern, 21st century’s phenomenon. It would be no exaggeration to characterise it as the first armed (albeit semi-proxy) conflict between Russia and the West in what has thus far merely been a (new) cold war. Unless objective analyses of the Russo-Georgian conflict’s causes are immediately carried out and unless, based on such analyses, the West (but above all the United States) substantially modifies its stance towards Russia, more episodes of this kind are on the cards.

Unfortunately, the outlook in this respect does not look promising. For the most part, Western capitals, defence and foreign policy establishments, think tanks and media continue to view post-Soviet Russia with deep suspicion, as a resurgent neo-imperialist autocracy. Since this interpretation continues to be reinforced by chronic, almost Orwellian mass media misrepresentation and since the Russo-Georgian war has provided untold fresh opportunities to portray Russia as a neo-imperialist aggressor, the disinformation is bound to further unleash the anti-Russian tendency in the West. As positions on both sides harden, the new cold war is bound to become more entrenched.

It is, therefore, reasonable to conclude that the point of no return has been reached, with the West and Russia entering a wholly uncharted and dangerous territory. An influential school of thought maintains that a new cold war is impossible because the economic, commercial, cultural and other ties between Russia and the West have deepened to unprecedented levels. Furthermore, unlike in the first Cold War, the two sides share the capitalist system and ideology. Unfortunately, this is wishful thinking. If the level of integration has failed to prevent the present Russo-Georgian war, why should it prevent other such conflicts?

Besides, it is precisely the economics that is driving the new cold war. With large countries outside the West (especially the BRIC countries, but including others) setting on the path of rapid economic development, competition over the globe’s resources will intensify. The Russo-Georgian conflict should, therefore, be seen in the context of this wider confrontation, with the West seeking to consolidate its position on the Eurasian continent dominated by Russia and China.

Georgia was first to strike, allegedly committing atrocities It is not easy to satisfactorily unravel these complex issues. Nevertheless, first things first. On the night of 7th August (only hours before the opening ceremony of the Olympic Games in Beijing) the Georgian (US and Israeli-trained) military, arguably the best equipped and trained forces in the CIS (outside Russia), attacked the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali. This followed weeks of rising tensions, which some commentators correctly predicted would usher in a full blown shooting war.

However, what was conceived as a lightning operation to gain control of the separatist region’s capital swiftly deteriorated into the indiscriminate use of heavy weapons against local separatist fighters, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of civilians and a dozen or so Russian peacekeepers. (Russian and Georgian peacekeepers have been in the region since 1992 under a CIS-sponsored and West-approved agreement). According to Russian and Ossetian sources, the Georgian forces also deliberately bombarded the fleeing or cowering civilians; on that basis, Russia and South Ossetia have brought allegations of genocide being perpetrated against the Ossetian population. The Russian and Ossetian authorities put the number of dead as high as 2,000.

Although not entirely unprepared (having exercised and put into place the logistics for this eventuality), the Russian leadership and military command, appears to have been caught off guard (President Medvedev commenced his vacations, while Prime Minister Putin was attending the Olympic ceremony in Beijing). Nevertheless, Moscow responded swiftly by sending regular troops to Tskhinvali to repel the Georgian attack. As the fighting escalated, Russian air force bombarded military targets inside Georgia proper ­ with stray munitions killing a number of Georgian civilians ­ while Russian forces temporarily moved to areas outside the zone of their peace-keeping responsibility defined by the 1992 agreement. Given the character of Georgian onslaught, this limited violation of Georgian sovereignty is understandable and most likely justifiable from the military point of view (thus being legally defensible).

On 12th August Russian President Medvedev ordered an end to the military operations, having judged that Moscow’s objectives had been achieved. These objectives included ensuring the security of its peacemakers and Russian citizens (living outside the Russian Federation). A six point peace plan hammered out with the participation of the EU provides for the unconditional withdrawal of Georgian forces from South Ossetia and the start of a peace process under French-led EU mediation, leading to the signing by Georgia of a legally-binding document renouncing a further use of force. The peace plan is to be debated by the EU foreign ministers and will likely serve as the basis for a UN Security Council resolution.

Western response was predictable but inappropriate

Largely ignoring Russian and Ossetian allegations of massacres and ethnic cleansing (which Moscow characterised as genocide), Western governments and media predictably depicted the conflict as Russian aggression against Georgia, using the Cold War era templates, such as the suppression of the Hungarian uprising in 1956 and the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Comparisons with the behaviour of Adolf Hitler have, of course, also been made.

As the initial shock subsided, Western anti-Russian verbal and media campaign truly took off, with President Bush describing Russia’s actions as “disproportionate”. The most strident critics, such as US presidential candidate John McCain, have depicted the Russian military response as an unprovoked aggression against the fledgling Georgian democracy designed to effect a regime change in Tbilisi and re-impose a Soviet-like imperial writ over the region. For his part, US Vice-President Dick Cheney ominously intoned that Russian aggression would not go unanswered. A wave of anti-Russian demonstrations in European capitals, especially in the former Soviet bloc, followed.

The reaction by the bulk of the Western media and their audience is understandable ­ indeed, it is practically impossible to separate fact from fiction in a situation inherently fraught with claims and counter-claims in a region insufficiently understood by the outside world. Under such conditions it is not hard to see why journalists resorted to the tried and tested Cold War template as the most readily available option.

However, when this template is used by leaders of the democratic West, who have at their disposal extensive information processing machinery, or by semi-academic think tanks, the question arises as to their motives. Clearly, inherent in the Western political structures and culture is an in-eradicable anti-Russian sentiment. Whatever Moscow does or does not do ­ be it the protection of Ossetian civilians from sustained military attack or the bombing of targets in Georgia ­ will be interpreted in a negative light, as a menace to the West and democracy at large. Indeed, the concept of the “West” as a geopolitical entity did not even exist before the Western powers’ confrontation with the Soviet Union.

The appropriate template

This, however, should be no excuse for blundering in a fundamental manner. A template that ignores key facts, such as that the Soviet Union and its expansionist ideology no longer exist, that the Russo-Georgian war was provoked by a Georgian attack and massacres committed during its prosecution or that Georgia is no more democratic (and no less “autocratic”) than Russia surely is not a reliable orientation tool. No one should be deceived by slick Western style presentation, the ability to speak fluent English and the dressing of the Georgian army in the US-style uniforms into laying the blame entirely on the Russian side.

Here is a significantly more appropriate approach. The collapse of the Soviet empire has created a vacuum in its various corners, including the strategically important Caucasus. Observing this from the Western vantage point, one might argue that a failure to exploit such opportunities would almost be tantamount to a dereliction of duty. Thus when US-trained lawyer Mikheil Saakashvili became Georgia’s president in a bloodless coup in 2003 (the so called “Rose revolution”), it was only natural that Washington would throw its full weight in support of his “democracy”. This was carried out through the usual financial, diplomatic and military channels, Georgia having already hosted US anti-terror specialists since 2002.

Having secured the allegiance of most of the formerly communist Central and Eastern Europe, Orange Ukraine and the Baltic republics, US influence in Georgia held the promise of establishing a bridgehead further to the East and closer to the leading member of President Bush’s “axis of evil” ­ Iran.

But this is not merely an issue of filling the post-Soviet vacuum. With oil-rich Russia rapidly overcoming its post-Soviet collapse and rebuilding its economic and military might, it has become imperative for the West to ensure that Russia’s regional ambitions are checked. Against this background, Washington has pushed for early Georgian (and Ukrainian) membership of NATO ­ a controversial issue that the countries of Old Europe (mainly Germany and France) managed to kick into the long grass at the alliance’s summit in Bucharest in April. However, both Georgia and Ukraine were promised NATO membership at an unspecified date, when they are ready and the international conditions are right (read: mainly when Russia’s vehement opposition to this move and the Old Europe’s misgivings are somehow neutralised).

Unfortunately for South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Adjara (another autonomous republic within Georgia), a key condition for NATO membership is that the candidate country is not involved in any military conflict and that it has uncontested control over its territory. But for President Saakashvili, who upon assuming power promised to integrate the separatist republics firmly under Georgia’s control as well as bring his country into the Western fold, this represented a happy convergence of objectives. The incentives for getting the project going proved irresistible.

The realm of speculation

Although President Saakashvili is widely believed to be a loose cannon, so obsessively committed to his objectives as to embark on his Ossetian adventure without informing his allies, it is difficult to believe that Georgia’s American advisers and middle- or even high-ranking officials in the US administration were not aware of, or at least did not suspect, what was afoot.

Furthermore, it is possible to speculate that, with the US presidential elections looming, Mr Saakashvili hoped to remove the main obstacles to Georgia’s NATO membership while President Bush (a strong supporter of this course) was still in power. One can even imagine him reasoning that his conflict with Russia would boost the electoral credentials of John McCain, the chief bearer of the anti-Russian torch in the United States. A victorious confrontation with Moscow-supported separatists, followed by the delivery of a NATO-ready, strongly anti-Russian Georgia into McCain’s (imaginary) “League of Democracies” would surely create an atmosphere conducive to a McCain electoral victory. On the other hand, a defeat at the hands of the Russian “aggressor” would doubtless serve as the ultimate justification for continuing to expand the Atlantic alliance and conceding no ground to the “aggressor”.

What the future may hold

While Russia’s response to the Georgian attack is widely perceived as Russia drawing a line in the sand, warning the West of the dire consequences of Georgian (and Ukrainian) membership of NATO, it would be naïve to expect Washington to pay much heed to any such warning (be it under McCain or Barack Obama). On the contrary, the pressure for these countries’ early Alliance membership is bound to intensify. It will be justified by the Russian “aggression” and the ditherers in Old Europe will be dismissed as appeasers. Washington will be supported in its drive by the New European neophytes, especially Poland and the Baltic republics, with NATO and the EU likely to experience serious internal tensions over the issue. (Assuming a McCain presidency, one can even imagine a splitting of the Alliance).

Given this relentless Western push into Eurasia, Georgia (and Ukraine ­ though Ukraine might split over the issue) will likely eventually be granted NATO membership. Even if President Saakashvili is replaced (a very likely scenario, as he stands discredited in the eyes of his electorate) and Georgia is governed by a less stridently anti-Russian regime, it is difficult to see how Russo-Georgian relations could ever become cordial enough to wean Georgia from its pro-NATO course. Equally, it is hard to see how South Ossetia (and Abkhazia) can remain part of Georgia after the atrocities of 7-10th August. It is more realistic to assume that the hostility will deepen and that Tbilisi will define its “democracy” and sovereignty in terms of its opposition to Moscow.

With Russia also needing a more stable modus operandi with the West, Moscow will likely seek an accommodation, rather than continued confrontation. A compromise, therefore, may be possible, for example through a deal in which Georgia’s separatist regions become de facto protectorate of the Russian Federation in return for its acceptance of Georgia’s membership of NATO. The case of the Serbian province of Kosovo, which earlier this year was detached from Serbia in the face of Russian opposition, might serve as a precedent. (The West justified Kosovo’s independence by claims, among other things, that Belgrade lost its moral right to the province because of the ethnic cleansing committed by President Milosevic in 1998-1999. This resonates with Moscow’s utterances that Georgia has lost its moral right to the separatist regions).

This, however, would be the optimistic scenario. It is more likely that the friction, which we have characterised as the new cold war, will continue unabated, as Russia will resist Western expansion into its backyard. Unfortunately, this scenario, which we consider more likely, raises the spectre of a much more serious confrontation, this time in the course of possible partition of Ukraine, should a pro-Western regime in Kiev prevail with its plans to join NATO.

In this respect, it will be critical who is elected US president. While both presidential candidates have adopted a tough stance on Russia, continued confrontation would be significantly less likely under an Obama presidency; equally, without conceding much ground, Obama would likely be more accommodating. Conversely, the victory of John McCain, made more likely by recent events, would spell more trouble ahead.